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The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is inextricably linked to the condition 
of the environment. The rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“the Covenant”) are increasingly threatened by environmental degradation 
and climate change. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the 
Committee”) has recognised the relationship between the environment and Covenant rights. 
However, the Committee has not yet developed a systematic approach to integrating the 
environment within its supervisory mandate. 
The integration of environmental considerations within the scope of the Covenant through 
interpretation (or “greening” the Covenant) must follow the rules applicable to the 
interpretation of human rights treaties. A teleological interpretation of human rights treaties 
demands that the object and purpose of the treaty be given practical effect in the lives of 
individual rights-holders. The evolutive approach to interpretation emphasises that human 
rights treaties are living instruments that must evolve according to changing circumstances. 
In order to evolve appropriately and be effective in realising Covenant rights, it is critical that 
the interpretation of the Covenant takes the threats posed by climate change and 
environmental degradation into account. 
To guide this greening of the Covenant, the dissertation draws on established principles of 
international environmental law. These principles include: sustainable development; the no-
harm principle; the principle of prevention; the precautionary principle; the polluter pays 
principle; and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The principles 
demonstrate recognised approaches to environmental challenges under international 
environmental law and are a valuable source of insight for greening the Covenant.  
The dissertation focuses on the interpretation of key aspects of State Parties’ obligations 
under article 2(1), namely: maximum available resources; core obligations; progressive 
realisation; and non-retrogression. Given its central role in the Covenant, the interpretation 
of article 2(1) has relevance for all Covenant rights. Focusing on key aspects of article 2(1) 
thus facilitates a substantive and systematic integration of environmental considerations 
within all Covenant rights.  
A number of significant contributions are made by the dissertation with regard to the 
proposed greening of article 2(1). First, the dissertation argues that maximum available 
resources should be understood from a qualitative perspective, particularly in relation to 




Secondly, it proposes the establishment and protection of the baseline environmental 
conditions necessary for the enjoyment of the core of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Thirdly, the dissertation argues that measures towards the progressive realisation of 
Covenant rights must be environmentally sustainable in order to prevent future 
retrogression. Finally, it is argued that the interpretation of the full realisation or ceiling of 
Covenant rights must be defined according to planetary boundaries and environmental 
limits. 
This greening of article 2(1) aids in protecting Covenant rights from the threats of 
environmental degradation, and supports the protection of the environment on which those 
rights depend. Through greening States Parties’ obligations, the dissertation offers an 
interpretation of the Covenant that would ensure its relevance and responsiveness to the 
urgent and existential environmental challenges confronting humanity. 
Opsomming 
Die verwesenliking van ekonomiese, sosiale en kulturele regte hou onlosmaaklik verband 
met die toestand van die omgewing. Die regte in die Internasionale Verdrag oor 
Ekonomiese, Sosiale en Kulturele Regte (“die Verdrag”) word toenemend bedreig deur die 
agteruitgang van die omgewing, veral deur klimaatsverandering. Die Verenigde Nasie 
Komitee vir Ekonomiese, Sosiale en Kulturele Regte (“die Komitee”) erken die verhouding 
tussen omgewing en Verdragsregte. Die Komitee het egter nog nie 'n stelselmatige 
benadering ontwikkel om die omgewing binne sy toesighoudende mandaat te integreer nie. 
Die integrasie van omgewingsoorwegings binne die bestek van die Verdrag deur 
interpretasie (of "vergroening" van die Verdrag) moet noodwendig die reëls volg wat van 
toepassing is op die interpretasie van menseregteverdragte. 'n Teleologiese interpretasie 
vereis dat die doel van die verdrag prakties in die lewens van individuele regtehouers 
toegepas word. Die evolutiewe benadering beklemtoon dat menseregteverdrae lewendige 
instrumente is wat by veranderende omstandighede moet aanpas. Om toepaslik te ontwikkel 
en om effektief Verdragsregte te verwesenlik, is dit van kritieke belang dat die interpretasie 
van die Verdrag die bedreigings wat klimaatsverandering en die agteruitgang van die 
omgewing inhou, in ag neem. 
Om hierdie vergroening van die Verdrag te rig, berus die proefskrif op gevestigde beginsels 
van internasionale omgewingsreg, insluitend: volhoubare ontwikkeling; die geen-skade-
beginsel; die beginsel van voorkoming; die voorsorgbeginsel; die beginsel van die 




verantwoordelikhede. Die beginsels toon erkende benaderings tot omgewingsuitdagings 
ingevolge die internasionale omgewingsreg en is 'n waardevolle bron van insig om die 
Verdrag te vergroen. 
Die proefskrif fokus op die interpretasie van sleutelaspekte van die partye se verpligtinge 
ingevolge artikel 2(1), naamlik: maksimum beskikbare bronne; kernverpligtinge; 
progressiewe besef; en nie-retrogressie. Gegewe die sentrale rol van artikel 2(1) in die 
Verdrag, is die interpretasie daarvan van toepassing op alle Verdragsregte. Die fokus op 
sleutelaspekte van artikel 2(1) vergemaklik dus 'n substantiewe en stelselmatige integrasie 
van omgewingsoorwegings binne alle Verdragsregte. 
'n Aantal belangrike bydraes word gelewer deur die proefskrif met betrekking tot die 
voorgestelde vergroening van artikel 2(1). Eerstens voer die proefskrif aan dat die 
maksimum beskikbare hulpbronne vanuit 'n kwalitatiewe perspektief verstaan moet word, 
veral in verband met natuurlike hulpbronne en hul inherente bydrae tot die genieting van 
Verdragsregte. Tweedens stel dit voor dat die basiese omgewingstoestande, wat nodig is 
om die kern van ekonomiese, sosiale en kulturele regte te geniet, ingestel en beskerm word. 
Dit is. Derdens voer die proefskrif aan dat maatreëls vir die progressiewe verwesenliking 
van Verdragsregte omgewingsvolhoubaar moet wees om toekomstige retrogressie te 
voorkom. Ten slotte word daar aangevoer dat die interpretasie van die volle verwesenliking 
van Verdragsregte gedefinieer moet word volgens planetêre grense en omgewingsperke. 
Die vergroening van artikel 2(1) help om die Verdragsregte te beskerm teen die bedreigings 
wat daargestel word deur die omgewing se agteruitgang, en ondersteun verder die 
beskerming van die omgewing waarvan daardie regte afhanklik is. Deur middel van 
vergroening van die verpligtinge op state, bied die proefskrif 'n interpretasie wat die 
relevansie van die Verdrag sou verseker in die lig van die dringende en eksistensiële 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Background 
The well-being and survival of humankind is inextricably connected to, and dependent 
on, the environment. Despite this reality, the environment and the life-supporting services it 
provides are subject to numerous threats largely driven by human activity. Scientific 
evidence shows that “atmospheric, geological, hydrological, biological and other Earth 
System processes are being altered by human activity”,1 and there is a “rapid decline” in 
ecosystems and biodiversity. 2  In relation to the impact of climate change, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has highlighted significant changes 
to hydrological systems; patterns and behaviours of terrestrial, freshwater and marine 
species; and crop yields.3 
The interdependence of humans and the environment has been underscored by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Experts have recognised that pandemics are often caused by human 
activity and related impacts on the environment.4 The anthropogenic drivers of zoonotic 
diseases include “[u]nsustainable exploitation of the environment due to land-use change, 
agricultural expansion and intensification, wildlife trade and consumption” as well as 
biodiversity loss.5 Addressing the challenges related to the interface of humans and the 
environment is essential for the prevention of future pandemics.6 It is thus undeniable that 
                                            
1 UNEP Global Environment Outlook 5: Environment for the Future We Want (2012) xviii. 
2 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in S Díaz, J Settele, ES Brondízio, HT Ngo, M Guèze, J Agard, A Arneth, 
P Balvanera, KA Brauman, SHM Butchart, KMA Chan, LA Garibaldi, K Ichii, J Liu, SM Subramanian, 
GF Midgley, P Miloslavich, Z Molnár, D Obura, A Pfaff, S Polasky, A Purvis, J Razzaque, B Reyers, R Roy 
Chowdhury, YJ Shin, IJ Visseren-Hamakers, KJ Willis & CN Zayas (eds) Global Assessment Report on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (2019) 11. See also UNEP Global Environment Outlook 6: Summary for Policymakers 
(2019) 8; UNEP Global Environment Outlook 6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People (2019) 153-154. 
3 IPCC Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) 6. See also O Hoegh-Guldberg, 
D Jacob, M Taylor, M Bindi, S Brown, I Camilloni, A Diedhiou, R Djalante, K Ebi, F Engelbrecht, J Guiot, Y 
Hijioka, S Mehrotra, A Payne, S Seneviratne, A Thomas, R Warren & G Zhou “Impacts of 1.5ºC Global 
Warming on Natural and Human Systems” in V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, H Pörtner, D Roberts, J Skea, P 
Shukla, A Pirani, W Moufouma-Okia, C Péan, R Pidcock, S Connors, J Matthews, Y Chen, X Zhou, M Gomis, 
E Lonnoy, T Maycock, M Tignor & T Waterfield (eds) Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on 
the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, 
Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (2018).  
4 IPBES “Executive Summary” in P Daszak, C das Neves, J Amuasi, D Hayman, T Kuiken, B Roche, C 
Zambrana-Torrelio, P Buss, H Dundarova, Y Feferholtz, G Foldvari, E Igbinosa, S Junglen, Q Liu, G Suzan, 
M Uhart, C Wannous, K Woolaston, P Mosig Reidl, K O'Brien, U Pascual, P Stoett, H Li, HT Ngo (eds) 
Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (2020) 5. See also UNEP & International Livestock Research Institute Preventing the 
Next Pandemic: Zoonotic Diseases and How to Break the Chain of Transmission (2020) 7, 9 & 15-19. 
5 IPBES “Executive Summary” in Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the IPBES (2020) 5-9. 
6 IPBES “Executive Summary” in Workshop Report on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the IPBES (2020) 5-9. 




our future (and our ability to realise human rights) will be determined by our relationship to 
the environment. 
The unprecedented human impact on the earth has led to the onset of a new geological 
epoch which scientists have termed the Anthropocene.7 Kim and Bosselmann note that the 
conditions of this epoch “are very likely to be catastrophic for the resilience of human 
societies and economies”. 8  Human-induced changes to the environment include rising 
global temperatures;9 rising sea levels; increased emission of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”); 
and changes in land use for agriculture and urbanisation, including deforestation.10 
Without the essential elements for human survival, we cannot fully realise human rights. 
Weeramantry J of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), in a separate opinion in 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 11  has noted that protection of the 
environment is: 
“[A] vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous 
human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to 
elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human 
rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments”. 12 
A healthy environment is indispensable for human rights. Civil and political rights, as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights depend on a healthy environment for their full realisation. 
In relation to the threat of climate change to human rights, Atapattu argues that to state that 
“climate change has the potential to undermine the enjoyment of many protected rights, if 
not all, is an understatement”.13  
The former Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John Knox, noted that 
the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) has on a number of occasions identified 
                                            
Diseases and How to Break the Chain of Transmission (2020); UN Food and Agriculture Organization The 
COVID-19 Challenge: Zoonotic Diseases and Wildlife: Collaborative Partnership on Sustainable Wildlife 
Management's Four Guiding Principles to Reduce Risk from Zoonotic Diseases and Build More Collaborative 
Approaches in Human Health and Wildlife Management (2020). 
7 UNEP Global Environment Outlook 5: Environment for the Future We Want (2012) xviii. 
8 RE Kim & K Bosselmann “Operationalizing Sustainable Development: Ecological Integrity as a Grundnorm 
of International Law” (2015) 24 RECIEL 194 195. See 207 where Kim and Bosselmann point out rather 
chillingly that “due to the complex nature of Earth’s social–ecological system, the changes will not be 
incremental but will likely be abrupt, involving a societal collapse”. 
9 In 2014 the IPCC noted, for example, that “[e]ach of the last three decades has been successively warmer 
at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850”. IPCC Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report 
(2014) 2. See also UNEP Global Environment Outlook 6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People (2019) 47. 
10 UNEP GEO5: Environment for the Future We Want xviii. See also See UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, 
Healthy People 162. 
11  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1997) 7 (‘Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros’). 
12 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros (Separate Opinion of Vice–President Weeramantry) 4. 




environmental threats to human rights including the threat of hazardous wastes to the rights 
to life and health; the threat of climate change to the rights to life, health, food, water, housing 
and self-determination; and the threats of environmental degradation, desertification and 
climate change to the right to food.14 In his final report in 2019 the former Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston underscored the dangers associated 
with climate change: 
“Climate change threatens truly catastrophic consequences across much of the globe and the 
human rights of vast numbers of people will be among the casualties. By far the greatest 
burden will fall on those in poverty, but they will by no means be the only victims. To date, most 
human rights bodies have barely begun to grapple with what climate change portends for 
human rights. However, as a full-blown crisis bears down on the world, business as usual is a 
response that invites disaster”.15 
There is no doubt that environmental degradation, and climate change in particular, poses 
an immense and critical threat to the realisation of all human rights. Addressing these 
challenges requires an evolution in the interpretation of human rights norms and obligations. 
Environmental threats to the earth as a whole have famously been conceptualised in 
terms of planetary boundaries. In 2009 Johan Rockström and his colleagues proposed a 
framework of planetary boundaries which “define the safe operating space for humanity with 
respect to the Earth system” and they explain that “[i]f these thresholds are crossed, then 
important subsystems […] could shift into a new state, often with deleterious or potentially 
even disastrous consequences for humans”.16 The planetary boundaries are comprised of 
essential “Earth-system processes” namely climate change, rate of biodiversity loss, 
interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean 
acidification, global fresh-water use, change in land use, chemical pollution and atmospheric 
aerosol loading.17 Kate Raworth builds on this conceptualisation of planetary boundaries 
and provides a useful articulation of the relationship between human rights and planetary 
boundaries in her theory of doughnut economics.18 She suggests that the “safe operating 
space” described by Rockström and his colleagues is the intervening space between the 
outer limits of planetary boundaries and the inner limits of an essential social foundation 
                                            
14 UNHRC Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H. Knox: Preliminary Report (24 
December 2012) A/HRC/22/43 para 19. 
15 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Climate Change and 
Poverty (17 July 2019) A/HRC/41/39 para 1. 
16 J Rockström, W Steffen, K Noone, Å Persson, FS Chapin III, EF Lambin, TM Lenton, M Scheffer, C Folke, 
HJ Schnellnhuber, B Nykvist, CA De Wit, T Hughes, S Van der Leeuw, H Rodhe, S Sorlin, PK Snyder, R 
Costanza, U Svedin, M Falkenmark, L Karlberg, RW Corell, VJ Fabry, J Hansen, B Walker, D Liverman, K 
Richardson, P Crutzen, JA Foley, “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity” (2009) 461 Nature 472 472. 
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which includes human rights.19 These inner and outer limits form two concentric circles 
(shaped like a doughnut) that enclose the “safe and just space” within which humanity must 
exist.20 Achieving this safe and just space requires an approach to human rights that, at the 
very least, takes environmental considerations into account and promotes the protection of 
the environment on which human rights depend. 
The interdependent relationship between the environment and human rights was 
recognised in the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (“the Stockholm Declaration”). 21  The Stockholm Declaration affirmed that 
“[b]oth aspects of man's environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his 
well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself”.22 As this 
understanding of the relationship between the environment and human rights grew, 
environmental rights were introduced into two binding human rights instruments: the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981 23  and the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in 1988.24 A number of states have also incorporated environmental rights or duties into their 
national constitutions. 25 However, as Knox points out, the recognition of environmental 
rights “came too late to be codified in the major international human rights agreements” as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 26  and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the Covenant” or “ICESCR”)27 were both adopted in 
1966. 28 In the international law arena, at least for now, the question of environmental 
                                            
19 Raworth Doughnut Economics 49. 
20 Raworth Doughnut Economics 44-45. This implies limits to development and expansion of economic growth 
as well as limits to the infringement of human rights due to environmental degradation. 
21 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, June 1972) UN Doc 
A/CONF48/14/Rev1. 
22 Stockholm Declaration, Proclamation 1. 
23 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
21 ILM 58 (1982) article 24. 
24 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) (entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 
(1988) article 11. See HM Osofsky “Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International 
Environmental Rights” (2005) 24 Stanford ELJ 71 78. 
25 JH Knox “Human Rights, Environmental Protection, and the Sustainable Development Goals” (2015) 24 
Washington International Law Journal 517 519; LH Leib Human Rights and the Environment Philosophical, 
Theoretical, and Legal Perspectives (2011) 1-2. For a comprehensive examination of national environmental 
rights globally see DR Boyd The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights and the Environment (2012). 
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
27 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 




protection has not been addressed through specific environmental rights 29  (with the 
exception of the two regional instruments referred to above). 30 A “Global Pact for the 
Environment” proposed by the UN General Assembly has been drafted, 31 and a “Draft 
International Covenant on the Right of Human Beings to the Environment” has also been 
submitted to the UN Human Rights Council by the International Center for Comparative 
Environmental Law.32 It is clear that pressure for the recognition of the right to a safe, clean, 
healthy and sustainable environment is increasing.33 In the context of indigenous peoples, 
as well as in relation to peasants and other people working in rural areas, specific 
environmental rights have been recognised by the UN General Assembly, including the right 
to “the conservation and protection of the environment”.34 In the absence of a universal and 
distinct environmental right in international law, it is even more important to ensure that 
existing human rights treaties integrate environmental considerations. However, this 
dissertation proposes that, even when distinct environmental rights receive recognition at 
the international level, environmental considerations will continue to be intrinsically relevant 
for the realisation of Covenant rights and should therefore remain integrated within the scope 
of the Covenant.35 
                                            
29 Environmental rights, as used in this dissertation, refers to rights of nature or the environment as well as to 
dedicated human rights to an environment of a certain standard. 
30 See for example JH Knox “The Global Pact for the Environment: At the Crossroads of Human Rights and 
the Environment” RECIEL 28 (2019) 40-47; JH Knox & R Pejan (eds) The Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment (2018); Atapattu HR Approaches to Climate Change 51-62; S Atapattu “The Right to a Healthy 
Life or the Right to Die Polluted? The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under 
International Law” (2002) 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 65-126; LE Rodriguez-Rivera “Is the Human 
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31 UNGA Towards a Global Pact for the Environment (14 May 2018) A/RES/72/277; Knox RECIEL 28 (2019). 
For the text of the draft Global Pact, see International Group of Experts for the Pact “Text of the Draft Global 
Pact for the Environment by the IGEP” (2017) Global Pact for the Environment 
<https://globalpactenvironment.org/en/document/draft-global-pact-for-the-environment-by-the-igep/> 
(accessed 15-10-2020). 
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Non-governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status (15 February 2017) A/HRC/34/NGO/60. 
33 See, for example, “The Time is Now: Global Call for the UN Human Rights Council to Urgently Recognise 
the Right to a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment” (10-09-2020) Geneva Environment Network 
<https://www.genevaenvironmentnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TheTimeIsNow_Global-Call-for-
the-UN-to-Recognize-the-Right-to-a-Healthy-Environment-English.pdf> (accessed 10-11-2020). See also 
UNHRC Rights of the Child: Realizing the Rights of the Child through a Healthy Environment (13 October 
2020) A/HRC/RES/45/30. 
34 UNGA United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (21 
January 2019) A/RES/73/165 article 18; UNGA United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2 October 2007) A/RES/61/295 article 29. 
35 In the event that environmental rights receive international recognition, this position would also be consistent 
with the interdependence of rights which should include environmental rights if they are internationally 
recognised. In relation to interdependence, see UNGA Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within 
the UN System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (16 
December 1977) A/RES/32/130 Article 1(a); UNGA Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, 
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1 2 Motivation 
1 2 1 The need for greater integration of environmental considerations within ESCRs 
Given the significant links between human rights and the state of the environment, it is 
necessary to ensure that environmental considerations are integrated into the interpretation 
of human rights. A number of civil and political rights are threatened by environmental 
degradation, including the rights to life, privacy, home and family life, and freedom of 
association.36 The economic, social and cultural rights (“ESCRs”) in the Covenant are also 
intimately connected to the environment. In particular, the realisation of the rights to 
housing, 37 health, 38 food39 and water 40 are directly dependent on the environment and 
natural resources.41 It is therefore vital that States Parties’ measures to realise ESCRs take 
the environment into account in order to protect the environment on which these ESCRs so 
closely depend. 
The integration of environmental considerations within human rights involves ensuring 
that environmental degradation does not “impair and undermine all the human rights spoken 
of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments”.42 Although awareness 
regarding the “inherently interdependent”43 relationship between environmental protection 
and human rights has increased since the Stockholm Declaration, the potential for 
environmental protection through human rights has not been fully explored.44 In 2015 Knox 
noted, for example, that “the relevance of human rights for environmental protection, the 
third pillar of sustainable development, has only recently begun to receive increased 
attention at the United Nations”. 45  Leib points out that “human rights approaches to 
environmental issues are gaining currency in both international and domestic law”, arguing 
that that “[t]he human rights system offers sophisticated legal and extra-legal mechanisms 
                                            
Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International 
Covenants on Human Rights” (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769-878. 
36 ICCPR article 6, 17, 22 & 23. 
37 ICESCR article 11(1). 
38 ICESCR article 12. 
39 ICESCR article 11. 
40 The right to water is established by the Committee with reference to ICESCR articles 11 & 12 in General 
Comment No 15. See CESCR General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant) 
(20 January 2003) E/C12/2002/11 para 2-6.  
41 UNEP Compendium on Human Rights and the Environment: Selected International Legal Materials and 
Cases (2014) 13. 
42 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros (Separate Opinion of Vice–President Weeramantry) para 21. 
43 UNHRC Preliminary Report (2012) A/HRC/22/43 para 10. 
44 Leib Human Rights and the Environment 1-2. 




necessary to tackle both the severe impact of human activities on the environment and the 
human rights implications of ecological degradation”.46 
In recent years a number of human rights have been interpreted and applied by 
international and regional human rights tribunals in light of relevant environmental 
considerations.47 Existing rights which have found application in environmental matters in 
international and regional cases include the rights to life;48 privacy, home and family life;49 
health;50 property;51 and freedom of association.52 
Human rights tribunals and academic scholarship have not considered the relationship 
between the environment and ESCRs in the Covenant in great detail. Chuffart and Viñuales 
note that in relation to the environment and human rights, the emphasis has been on human 
rights law generally, and how it influences IEL or promotes environmental protection.53 
There has been little attention in the research to ESCRs in particular and what environmental 
law and environmental considerations mean for their scope and application as well as for 
States Parties’ obligations.54 
                                            
46 Leib Human Rights and the Environment 1-2. 
47 For examples of such cases, see DK Anton & DL Shelton Environmental Protection and Human Rights 
(2011) 436; Leib Human Rights and the Environment 72; JH Knox (2015) Wash Intl LJ 522; D McGoldrick 
“Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception” (1996) 45 International and 
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(2020) HRC para 9.4-9.5 & 9.11. See, generally, Leib Human Rights and the Environment 72-76; Anton & 
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49 Leib Human Rights and the Environment 76-78; Anton & Shelton Environmental Protection and Human 
Rights 487-512; Orellana et al Climate Change in the Work of the CESCR 13-14; McGoldrick (1996) ICLQ 
815; Shelton (1991) SJIL 114-115; Shelton (2006) DJILP 153-158. 
50 Leib Human Rights and the Environment 78-80; Anton & Shelton Environmental Protection and Human 
Rights 436-456. Orellana et al Climate Change in the Work of the CESCR 15-16; Shelton (2006) DJILP 147-
148. 
51 Anton & Shelton Environmental Protection and Human Rights 512-519. Shelton (1991) SJIL 114-116; 
Shelton (2006) DJILP 159. 
52 JH Knox (2015) Wash Intl LJ 522; Shelton (2006) DJILP 159. 
53 Chuffart S & JE Viñuales “From the Other Shore: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from an International 
Environmental Law Perspective” in Riedel E, G Giacca & C Golay (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (2014) 286 286. 
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rights; (2) the way in which we think about them; and (3) the range of available enforcement mechanisms. See 
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Integrating the environment within the Covenant can support both the protection of 
ESCRs themselves as well as the protection of the environment. As noted in the UN 
Environment Programme’s 2019 Global Environment Outlook: 
“Mainstreaming environmental considerations into social and economic decisions at all levels 
is of vital importance. […] GEO-6 shows that environmental issues are best addressed in 
conjunction with related economic and social issues, taking into account synergies and trade-
offs between different goals and targets, including consideration of equity and gender 
dimensions”.55 
Measures to realise economic, social and cultural rights should therefore incorporate 
environmental considerations. Consistent with the balancing of economic, social and 
environmental dimensions central to sustainable development, the effective implementation 
and realisation of ESCRs requires the deliberate and comprehensive integration of 
environmental considerations into the decision-making and measures taken for the fulfilment 
of ESCRs.  
1 2 2 The Committee’s treatment of environmental challenges 
Little attention has been paid in academic scholarship to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“the Committee” or “CESCR”) and its work in relation to the 
environmental dimensions of human rights. 56  Francioni has suggested that “the 
development of an environmental dimension in the human rights provisions of the two UN 
Covenants has been rather modest”.57 It should become evident from this dissertation that, 
certainly in recent years, the Committee’s efforts in recognising the environmental 
dimensions of ESCRs are more than “modest”. The Committee has demonstrated a clear 
willingness to engage with the relationship between the environment and ESCRs, although 
there remains significant room for the development and expansion of ESCRs to incorporate 
environmental concerns. 
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States' Human Rights Obligations in the Context of Climate Change: Synthesis Note on the Concluding 
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References to environmental considerations can be found in the Committee’s general 
comments, statements and concluding observations. 58  One of the Committee’s first 
references to the environment appears in General Comment 4 where the influence of 
“ecological conditions” on the right to housing is recognised.59 There was, however, no 
description of these ecological conditions or any explicit consideration of how these 
conditions interact with the right to housing. In relation to the right to food, the Committee 
has referred to ecological conditions as well as sustainability and future generations,60 and 
General Comment 14 recognised a healthy environment as an underlying determinant of 
the right to health.61 In one of its most substantive considerations of environmental factors, 
the Committee’s General Comment 15 in relation to the right to water included obligations 
related to, for example, reducing contamination of water-related ecosystems; monitoring 
water reserves; and assessing the impacts of climate change, desertification, deforestation 
and biodiversity loss.62 
The Committee’s later general comments do not address environmental concerns in any 
detail, but some do make reference to the environment. In General Comment 24 in relation 
to business activities, the Committee recognises the need for due diligence and the 
assessment of impacts on the environment resulting from certain activities.63 In its general 
comment on science, the Committee refers to the precautionary principle and notes that it 
requires “unacceptable harm to the public or the environment” to be diminished or avoided.64 
 While a number of the Committee’s earlier statements have recognised the relationship 
between the Covenant and the environment and sustainable development,65 in recent years 
                                            
58 For helpful summary of some important aspects of the Committee’s work in relation to the environment and 
climate change, see Duyck & McKernan States' Human Rights Obligations in the Context of Climate Change: 
Synthesis Note on the Concluding Observations and Recommendations on Climate Change adopted by UN 
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1991) E/1992/23 para 8. 
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64 CESCR General Comment No 25 on Science and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 15(1)(b), 15(2), 
15(3) and 15(4)) (7 April 2020) E/C12/GC/25 para 56. 
65 See CESCR Statement to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Seattle, 30 
November to 3 December 1999) (26 November 1999) E/C12/1999/9 para 2; CESCR Statement of the 




its statements have addressed environmental concerns more explicitly. 66  In 2018 the 
Committee devoted a statement to climate change where, for example, it affirms that climate 
change is a threat to ESCRs and points out that States Parties have an obligation to prevent 
foreseeable harm resulting from climate change.67 In 2019 the Committee made a statement 
in relation to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development68 which focuses on the 2030 
Agenda’s pledge to leave no one behind. The statement emphasises the needs of those 
most vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation 69  and insists that 
measures to realise ESCRs must be sustainable “so as to ensure that the rights are secured 
both for present and future generations”.70 
In addition to its general comments and statements, the Committee has also regularly 
referred to the environment in its concluding observations on state reports, with increasing 
attention to climate change impacts, mitigation and adaptation. 71  The Committee’s 
concluding observations have also emphasised: the importance of assessing the impacts of 
activities that may cause damage to the environment;72 the environmental harm caused by 
extractive activities, with particular attention to the relationship between private actors and 
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October 2017) E/C12/RUS/CO/6 para 42; CESCR Concluding Observations, Bangladesh (18 April 2018) 
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indigenous peoples; 73  and the obligation of consultation with local and indigenous 
communities with respect to activities that may harm the environment and ESCRs.74 
It is therefore evident that environmental harm has a significant effect on the enjoyment 
of ESCRs. The Committee clearly recognises this relationship between ESCRs and the 
environment. However, with the possible exception of General Comment 15, the 
Committee’s treatment of environmental considerations is often lacking in concrete 
guidance for States Parties in relation to what the environmental dimensions of their 
obligations under the Covenant require in practice. This dissertation will argue that the 
principles of international environmental law (“IEL”) are particularly valuable in developing 
an environmentally responsive interpretation of the States Parties’ obligations under the 
Covenant. 
1 2 3 The potential for principles of international environmental law to guide the integration 
of environmental considerations 
Throughout the development of IEL, certain overarching principles have emerged from a 
range of multi-lateral environmental agreements, treaties and decisions of various 
international bodies and tribunals.75 This dissertation will argue that these principles offer 
crucial guidance regarding appropriate responses and approaches to contemporary 
environmental challenges. 76  Some of these principles also form part of customary 
                                            
73 See, for example, CESCR Concluding Observations, Russian Federation (20 May 1997) E/C12/1/Add.13 
para 14; CESCR Concluding Observations, Nigeria (16 June 1998) E/C12/1/Add23 para 29; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Venezuela (21 May 2001) E/C12/1/Add.56 para 12; CESCR Finland (2014) para 9; 
CESCR Canada (2016) para 53; CESCR Concluding Observations, Philippines (26 October 2016) 
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para 18; CESCR Concluding Observations, Ecuador (7 June 2004) E/C12/1/Add.100 para 12. 
74 This includes free, prior and informed consent where indigenous peoples are concerned. See, for example, 
CESCR Ecuador (2004) para 35; CESCR Concluding Observations, Mexico (9 June 2006) E/C12/MEX/CO/4 
para 10; CESCR Cambodia (2009) para 15; CESCR Russian Federation (2017) para 15; CESCR Australia 
(2017) para 16; CESCR Philippines (2016) para 14; CESCR Canada (2016) para 14. CESCR New Zealand 
(2018) para 9; CESCR Mali (2018) paras 43-44; CESCR Concluding Observations, Cameroon (25 March 
2019) E/C12/CMR/CO/4 paras 16-17. 
75 These principles have been catalogued on a number of occasions. See, for example, Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987) A/42/427; Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, June 1972) A/CONF48/14/REV1; Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 1992) A/CONF151/26; New Delhi 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development (August 2002) 
A/CONF199/8. See also E Scotford Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (2017) 
72-73; L Krämer & E Orlando (eds) Principles of Environmental Law (2018); P Sands, J Peel, AF Aguilar & R 
Mackenzie Principles of International Environmental Law 4 ed (2018) 197-251. 
76 See Chuffart & Viñuales “From the Other Shore” in ESCR in International Law 307 where the authors affirm 
that IEL has much to offer human rights law, noting that viewing human rights from an environmental 
perspective “provides a number of insights which are potentially useful not only for a broader understanding 





international law and are therefore directly applicable to States Parties to the Covenant 
(unless they have persistently objected to the establishment of the relevant customary 
rule).77 However, even where certain principles of IEL have acquired the status of customary 
international law, the application of these principles and the imposition of related 
environmental obligations by the Committee is not within its mandate. The Committee’s 
mandate is determined by the content of the Covenant and can therefore only extend to 
environmental concerns to the extent that they impact on Covenant rights. The principles of 
IEL can be a useful guide in the interpretation of the Covenant and assist the Committee in 
designing appropriate recommendations for States Parties to address environmental 
challenges impacting on ESCRs. 
What is required is consistent integration of environmental considerations within the 
obligations of States Parties as interpreted by the Committee. Integrating environmental 
considerations with reference to established principles of IEL would contribute to a more 
systematic and effective response to environmental threats to ESCRs, as well as to the 
harmonisation of IEL and human rights law. 
In recent years the Committee has demonstrated the possibilities of drawing from 
principles of IEL in the interpretation of the Covenant through, for example, its references to 
the precautionary principle. This principle has been relied on in the context of regulating or 
controlling the use of harmful herbicides and pesticides, 78 as well as in the context of 
potential harm resulting from scientific research.79 This illustrates the potential role of the 
principles of IEL in guiding the interpretation and implementation of the Covenant. It also 
demonstrates the Committee’s is willingness to rely on these principles where they are 
relevant to the realisation of ESCRs. However, the challenge is to develop a more 
systematic approach to the integration of a wider range of IEL principles by the Committee 
in fulfilling its interpretive and supervisory mandate under the Covenant.  
                                            
77 On customary international law in this context, see Sands et al Principles of IEL 119-125. States are not 
bound by customary international law if they have explicitly and persistently objected to the binding nature of 
the customary rule. On the persistent objector principle see Sands et al Principles of IEL 124; R Wallace & O 
Martin-Ortega International Law 6 ed (2009) 12. 
78  CESCR Concluding Observations, Israel (12 November 2019) E/C12/ISR/CO/4 para 45; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Argentina (1 November 2018) E/C12/ARG/CO/4 para 60. 
79 CESCR General Comment No 25 on Science and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 15(1)(b), 15(2), 




1 3 Research problem 
1 3 1 Primary research question and hypothesis 
The primary research question that this dissertation seeks to answer is how the Covenant 
should be interpreted so as to systematically integrate environmental considerations within 
the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1). The principal underlying 
hypothesis is that effective realisation of ESCRs and protection of the environment require 
an integrated interpretation of States Parties’ obligations that takes environmental factors 
into account. 
1 3 2 Supplementary research aims and hypotheses 
1 3 2 1 The value of principles of IEL 
The first supplementary aim of the dissertation is to identify relevant and recognised 
principles of IEL to guide the integration of environmental considerations in the Covenant. 
The underlying hypothesis is that these principles of IEL represent established and well-
grounded means for addressing environmental challenges. A related hypothesis is that 
States Parties to the Covenant are already bound by these principles, or party to soft law 
declarations that recognise one or more of these principles. Appropriately relying on them 
to guide the interpretation of the Covenant would thus assist States Parties in understanding 
the nature and scope of related Covenant obligations. 
1 3 2 2 Interpreting States Parties’ obligations 
The second supplementary aim is to investigate how States Parties’ obligations under 
article 2(1) should be interpreted to take environmental considerations into account, with 
reference to the principles of IEL. The underlying hypothesis is that substantive obligations 
related to the environment can be identified in article 2(1) of the Covenant through a 
teleological interpretation that emphasises effectiveness and the evolutive approach. The 
central elements of the general obligations in article 2(1) that will be examined are the 
following: maximum available resources; core obligations; progressive realisation; and non-
retrogression. 
1 3 2 3 Greening States Parties’ obligations 
The final aim of this dissertation is to propose an interpretation of article 2(1) that 
appropriately incorporates environmental considerations, including through identifying some 
of the primary environment-related obligations that should be imposed on States Parties to 




environment will provide valuable guidelines for the Committee in fulfilling its supervisory 
mandate, and also stimulate States Parties to take environmental considerations more 
seriously in fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant. 
1 4 Scope of dissertation 
This dissertation examines how environmental considerations can be integrated more 
systematically within the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant, 
with the guidance of established principles of IEL. The focus on States Parties’ obligations, 
specifically the general obligations in article 2(1) of the Covenant, means that the findings 
have relevance for all ESCRs in the Covenant. 80  This facilitates a substantive and 
comprehensive integration of environmental considerations within all Covenant rights, which 
is consistent with the embedded and inescapable role of the environment in all ESCRs. 
Through references to existing principles of IEL the research makes use of recognised 
approaches to environmental challenges while supporting greater harmony between the 
fields of human rights law and IEL. 
Given the breadth of these areas of international law, it is necessary to clarify the scope 
of this dissertation and the limitations thereon. There is growing pressure for the recognition 
of distinct environmental rights in international law.81 While this is a potentially fruitful avenue 
for integrating human rights and the environment, it is beyond the scope of this research, 
which is specifically concerned with the interpretation and implementation of existing ESCRs 
under the Covenant. Focusing on existing human rights allows for the integration of 
environmental considerations within the established obligations that States Parties have 
incurred under international human rights treaties. Creating independent environmental 
rights or a dedicated treaty will require negotiation and States Parties’ consent which will 
take time. As noted above, the threats to the environment are urgent and require immediate 
attention to the integration of environmental considerations in all human rights instruments. 
In any event, the recognition of a distinct environmental right would not detract from the 
importance of integrating relevant environmental considerations into the interpretation and 
                                            
80 On the “dynamic relationship” between article 2 and the rest of the Covenant, see CESCR General Comment 
No 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art 2, para 1 of the Covenant) (14 December 1990) E/1991/23 
para 1. See also Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 312. 
81  See, for example, UNHRC Rights of the Child: Realizing the Rights of the Child through a Healthy 
Environment (13 October 2020) A/HRC/RES/45/30; UNGA Towards a Global Pact for the Environment (14 
May 2018) A/RES/72/277. See further Knox “The Global Pact for the Environment” (2019) 28 RECIEL 40-47; 
International Group of Experts for the Pact “Text of the Draft Global Pact for the Environment by the IGEP” 
(2017) Global Pact for the Environment <https://globalpactenvironment.org/en/document/draft-global-pact-for-
the-environment-by-the-igep/> (accessed 15-10-2020). See also Atapattu HR Approaches to Climate Change 




implementation of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant. Even if an internationally 
recognised environmental right is established, the Committee would still need to consider 
the environmental dimensions of Covenant rights in fulfilling its mandate to interpret the 
Covenant in accordance with the relevant principles of human rights treaty interpretation. 
The emphasis on States Parties’ obligations means that the environmental dimensions of 
specific individual rights in the Covenant are not examined in great detail in this research. 
The States Parties’ obligations in article 2(1) of the Covenant do, however, apply to all 
substantive ESCRs.82 The obligations in article 2(1) encompass a number of important 
concepts. Particular attention is given in this dissertation to the notions of maximum 
available resources, core obligations, progressive realisation, and non-retrogression. Other 
elements of article 2(1), such as the obligation of international assistance and cooperation, 
are incorporated where relevant. 
It is also important to emphasise that this dissertation investigates the Covenant and the 
work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee’s general 
comments, statements and concluding observations are therefore primary sources. 
Although it is possible, and perhaps inevitable, that environmental considerations will form 
part of the Committee’s evolving jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,83 
the subject matter of the complaints received thus far has not included factors directly related 
to the environment, natural resources or climate change. The Committee’s jurisprudence 
under the Optional Protocol is therefore not considered in any detail in this dissertation. 
While other human rights treaties and human rights tribunals include economic, social 
and cultural rights (and civil and political rights) that should similarly integrate environmental 
factors, the detailed consideration of the jurisprudence of additional international and 
regional human rights tribunals is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, given the 
influence of the Committee and its interpretations of the Covenant on the approach to 
ESCRs in regional and domestic human rights law, this research is likely to have relevance 
beyond the Committee and the Covenant itself.  
With regard to the principles of IEL, the scope of this research does not allow for the 
analysis of every emerging and existing principle of environmental law that has been 
identified. 84 The selection of principles that are used to guide the interpretation of the 
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83 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 10 
December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013) A/RES/63/117. 
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Covenant is therefore limited to those that have been most widely recognised and accepted 
in international law. In addition, it is necessary to point out that this dissertation does not 
purport to apply international environmental law rules and principles to human rights law in 
the international arena, as applying another autonomous body of international law would go 
beyond the scope of the Committee’s mandate. The emphasis remains on States Parties’ 
obligations under the Covenant, and IEL is referenced to the extent that it is relevant for the 
principles and their value in guiding the interpretation of the Covenant. 
1 5 Methodology 
1 5 1 Human rights approaches to environmental protection 
There are three primary human rights approaches to environmental protection identified 
in the literature. The first concerns the mobilisation of existing human rights for 
environmental protection, primarily through the use of procedural rights, which has been 
referred to as “the environmental democracy theory”. 85 The second approach involves 
broadening the scope of existing human rights to incorporate relevant environmental 
dimensions through interpretation, which can be described as “the expansion theory”.86 
Finally, environmental protection and human rights can be approached by focusing on the 
establishment of new and distinct environmental rights, also known as “the genesis 
theory”.87 
This dissertation follows what Leib calls the expansion theory, which requires the 
reinterpretation and expansion of existing human rights to allow for the incorporation of 
                                            
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, June 1972) 
A/CONF48/14/REV1; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 1992) 
A/CONF151/26) and documents drafted by certain international bodies or organisations (such as the 
International Law Association’s New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International Law Relating to 
Sustainable Development (August 2002) A/CONF199/8 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Environmental Principles and Concepts (1995) OCDE/GD(95)124). See E Scotford 
Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (2017) 72-73. See also L Krämer & E 
Orlando (eds) Principles of Environmental Law (2018); P Sands, J Peel, AF Aguilar & R Mackenzie Principles 
of International Environmental Law 4 ed (2018) 197-251. 
85 Leib HR and the Environment 81. See also MR Anderson “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection: An Overview” in AE Boyle & MR Anderson (eds) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection (1998) 1 4; Chuffart & Viñuales “From the Other Shore” in ESCR in International Law 288. 
86 Leib HR and the Environment 71-72. See also Anderson “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection: An Overview” in HR Approaches to Environmental Protection 4; Chuffart & Viñuales “From the 
Other Shore” in ESCR in International Law 288; AC Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 3 ed 
(2004) 663; Shelton (2006) DJILP 130. 
87  Leib HR and the Environment 88. See also Anderson “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection: An Overview” in HR Approaches to Environmental Protection 4; Chuffart & Viñuales “From the 
Other Shore” in ESCR in International Law 288; AC Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 3 ed 




environmental dimensions. 88  The expansion theory will be used in relation to the 
interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1). The term “greening” is used 
throughout this dissertation to denote the interpretation of human rights treaty provisions so 
as to integrate environmental considerations in accordance with this approach. The 
interpretation of existing human rights in accordance with the expansion theory has many 
potential benefits for environmental protection, and therefore for the continued feasibility and 
promotion of the rights themselves. In contrast to substantive environmental rights, which 
are still being debated in the international arena, the rights and obligations in the Covenant 
are already accepted and established, allowing for a broader possible acceptance of the 
environmental dimensions thereof.89 From a human rights-based perspective, it is essential 
to take environmental considerations into account in the interpretation of the Covenant to 
ensure that (1) the environment is adequately protected in order to preserve its human 
rights-supporting functions; and (2) the enjoyment of human rights is not unduly impeded by 
the threats of environmental degradation and climate change. 
1 5 2 Interpretation of human rights treaties 
In order to interpret the Covenant from an environmental perspective by integrating 
environmental considerations, it is necessary to adhere to the established general rules and 
principles of treaty interpretation in international law. In addition to this, the particular 
interpretive methods applicable to human rights treaties are important for the interpretation 
of the Covenant. 
The starting point for international treaty interpretation is the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”),90 particularly articles 31 and 32 thereof. Article 31(1) of the VCLT 
states that: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose”.91 This dissertation examines the interpretive methodologies that flow from the 
provisions of the VCLT, with attention to how these methodologies have been applied by 
                                            
88  Leib Human Rights and the Environment 71-72. See also Anderson “Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection: An Overview” in HR Approaches to Environmental Protection 4; Kiss & Shelton 
International Environmental Law 663. 
89 In relation to the establishment of substantive environmental rights in international law, see for example, 
Knox (2019) RECIEL 40-47; Knox & Pejan (eds) The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (2018); Atapattu 
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UNTS 331. 
91 See M Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties” in D Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (2013) 739 760-764 for an analysis of article 31(1) of the VCLT in the context 




human rights tribunals. This is done with reference to the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals, and human rights tribunals in particular, as well as academic scholarship in this 
regard. 
In particular, human rights tribunals follow a teleological approach to interpretation 
emphasising that human rights treaties are “live instruments, whose interpretation must go 
hand in hand with evolving times and current living conditions”.92 The teleological approach 
of human rights tribunals is examined in Chapter 2, along with the related principle of 
effectiveness and the evolutive approach to interpretation. The particular methodologies 
employed by the Committee are also investigated. 
This dissertation relies primarily on teleological interpretation for an interpretation of the 
Covenant that integrates environmental considerations. Most notably, the principles of 
effectiveness and evolutive interpretation open the door for a broader interpretation of the 
Covenant that allows for the integration of environmental dimensions into existing 
provisions, thereby “greening” the rights and obligations in the Covenant.93 An interpretation 
of the Covenant that appropriately incorporates environmental considerations can ensure 
that the Covenant does not become obsolete and irrelevant to present-day challenges. 
Although the Committee has already made some important steps towards taking the 
environment into account, a more deliberate, systematic and comprehensive effort is 
required in order to meet the vast and urgent challenges of environmental degradation and 
climate change. 
1 5 3 Primary sources arising from the supervisory mandate of the Committee 
In addition to the abovementioned interpretive methods, it is important to consider the 
role of the Committee and its supervisory mandate in relation to the Covenant. Supervision 
of the Covenant is entrusted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(“ECOSOC”) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been 
established by means of a resolution of the ECOSOC. 94 The Committee exercises its 
supervisory mandate through its concluding observations, general comments, statements, 
                                            
92 Mapiripán Massacre vs Colombia Series C No 122 (2005) IACtHR para 106. See Alston & Goodman 
International Human Rights 117-118 where it is noted that “[t]he long-term treaty must rest upon a certain 
flexibility and room for development if it is to survive changes in circumstances and relations between the 
parties”. 
93 See Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 79-81. 
94 UN Economic and Social Council Decision 1978/10 (3 May 1978); UN Economic and Social Council 
Resolution 1985/17 (28 May 1985). See also E Riedel, G Giacca & C Golay “The Development of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law” in E Riedel, G Giacca & C Golay (eds) Economic, Social and 
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and views under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.95 These are fundamental sources to 
consider when interpreting the rights and obligations under the Covenant and it is therefore 
necessary to note the role of these sources. Concluding observations of the Committee are 
the outcome of the reporting process wherein States Parties participate in a “constructive 
and mutually rewarding dialogue” with the Committee.96 The Committee comments on the 
State Party’s compliance with the obligations in the Covenant through its concluding 
observations.97 While these are not judicial pronouncements, they are valuable in providing 
clarity on the meaning, nature and content of Covenant obligations.98 General comments 
are another mechanism for developing the understanding of norms in the Covenant whereby 
the Committee assists States Parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations through 
developing and clarifying its interpretation of Covenant provisions. 99  Although general 
comments are not binding per se, Craven notes that the Committee’s interpretations do have 
“considerable legal weight”.100 The Committee also contributes to the interpretation of the 
Covenant through its views expressed in jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol. 101 
Through interpreting the Covenant in relation to a specific case, the Committee is able to 
further “crystallize the normative content and scope of each Covenant right”.102 Finally, it is 
necessary to note that the Committee also adopts statements in relation to specific topical 
issues or themes. As Liebenberg notes, these are intended as “responses to the 
contemporary developments affecting Covenant rights”.103 While these statements have 
less authoritative status than general comments or views under the Optional Protocol, they 
remain “indicative of an emerging consensus” regarding the application of Covenant rights 
to contemporary circumstances.104  
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The Committee’s general comments, statements and concluding observations will be 
considered in the interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant in this dissertation. As 
noted above, the Committee’s views under the Optional Protocol have not yet addressed 
environmental concerns in any detail, but they will be referenced where relevant to the 
current interpretation of the Covenant.  
1 6 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between the Covenant and the environment. The 
detrimental impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on human rights, and 
ESCRs in particular, are surveyed. This is followed by a close examination of how the 
Committee’s general comments, statements and concluding observations have dealt with 
environmental factors, such as those related to environmental harm, climate change, 
pollution, natural resource exploitation and sustainable development. 
Chapter 3 examines the interpretive methodology that is applied in the later chapters. It 
begins with an overview of human rights approaches to environmental protection, affirming 
that this dissertation follows the expansion theory, which supports the interpretation of 
existing human rights to incorporate environmental dimensions. This is followed by an 
analysis of the nature of legal interpretation, the rules of treaty interpretation as they appear 
in the VCLT, and the rules and principles applicable to human rights treaty interpretation. 
Finally, the interpretive approaches of the Committee are analysed. 
The principles of IEL are investigated in Chapter 4. The chapter begins with an 
examination of the relationship between rules and principles. This is followed by a general 
analysis of principles of IEL and a description of the principles selected for this study. Each 
principle is then examined and defined in relation to its meaning and status in international 
environmental law. The selected principles include: sustainable development and the 
related principles of integration, sustainable use, intergenerational equity, and 
intragenerational equity; prevention and the related no-harm principle, sovereignty over 
natural resources, preventive principle, and precautionary principle; the polluter pays 
principle; and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. These principles 
will guide the interpretation of key elements of article 2(1) in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The focus of Chapter 5 is on the obligation on States Parties to use the “maximum of 
available resources” for the realisation of Covenant rights. This chapter investigates how the 
concept of maximum available resources should be interpreted to include environmental 




begins with an investigation of the right to self-determination in article 1 of the Covenant, 
which is closely associated with the use of natural resources. The examination and 
interpretation of maximum available resources is carried out with reference to core elements 
of the concept, namely: the meaning of resources; the availability of resources; the meaning 
of “maximum”; and the obligation of equitable and effective use of resources. The 
interpretation of each of these elements in the Committee’s current doctrine is examined. 
This analysis of the current interpretation is followed by an investigation of the environmental 
dimensions of each element, with reference to the principles of IEL examined in Chapter 4. 
It concludes with proposing an interpretation of each element of maximum available 
resources that appropriately integrates the environment.  
Chapter 6 examines the notion of core obligations as well as the obligations of 
progressive realisation and non-retrogression. As with Chapter 5, the current interpretation 
of each of these concepts is analysed, followed by an investigation of the environmental 
dimensions, with reference to the principles of IEL. With respect to the concept of 
progressive realisation, this chapter emphasises the forward-looking dimension of 
progressive realisation and also examines the relevance of future generations under the 
Covenant. 
Finally, Chapter 7 of the dissertation consolidates the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 by 
providing a synthesis of how the selected principles of IEL should guide the interpretation of 
States Parties’ obligations in article 2(1) of the Covenant. Following this, the chapter 
considers the aspects of States Parties’ obligations that have been examined in the 
preceding chapters, highlighting the most important elements of an interpretation of article 
2(1) that integrates environmental considerations. 
1 7 Conclusion 
The enjoyment of the ESCRs under the Covenant cannot be secured without the 
integration of environmental considerations within States Parties’ obligations under the 
Covenant. The immense threats to ESCRs as a result of environmental degradation and 
climate change require urgent action from States Parties to the Covenant. The Committee 
must, therefore, incorporate obligations that relate to the environment within its 
understanding of article 2(1) of the Covenant. This can be achieved through an expansion 
or reinterpretation of the Covenant to include the environmental dimensions of the rights and 
obligations therein. This greening of the Covenant must follow the rules applicable to the 
interpretation of treaties, particularly those applied to the interpretation of human rights 




object and purpose of a treaty, and the principles of effectiveness and evolutive 
interpretation. 
This dissertation therefore proposes an interpretation of States Parties’ general 
obligations in article 2(1) of the Covenant that actively integrates the environment and is 
guided by established principles of IEL, with a particular emphasis on the notions of 
maximum available resources, core obligations, progressive realisation and the duty of non-
retrogression. The ultimate aim of greening of States Parties’ obligations under the 
Covenant is to ensure its relevance and responsiveness to the urgent and existential 




CHAPTER 2:  
THE COVENANT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
2 1 Introduction 
The state of the environment has significant consequences for human life on Earth, and 
therefore for human rights. Climate change and environmental degradation pose serious 
threats to human rights and should be taken into account when interpreting the human rights 
obligations of states. Environment-related human rights obligations have been investigated 
and reported on, in particular, by the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) and various 
special rapporteurs, including Special Rapporteurs on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment. In relation to the Covenant, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“Committee” or “CESCR”) has increasingly incorporated environmental 
considerations and environment-related obligations within its work, particularly in recent 
years. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the impacts of environmental degradation and 
climate change on human life with reference to reports of, among others, the UN 
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”). Environment-related human rights obligations are then considered in relation to 
the work of various special rapporteurs and independent experts. The chapter will then 
examine how the Committee has incorporated environmental considerations in the 
performance of its mandate under the Covenant with reference to its statements, general 
comments and concluding observations. As will be seen below, the Committee has been 
receptive to accommodating the environmental dimensions of the rights and obligations in 
the Covenant. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite these developments, the 
Committee’s approach lacks a systematic methodology for incorporating environmental 
considerations in the interpretation of the Covenant. It is proposed that established principles 
of IEL can inform such a systematic methodology. 
2 2 Human rights and the environment: Impacts and obligations 
2 2 1 Environmental threats to human rights  
There can be no doubt that the global state of the environment has extensive 
consequences for the enjoyment of human rights. It is widely acknowledged, and self-




resources it provides.1 The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (“IPBES”) explains: 
“Nature, through its ecological and evolutionary processes, sustains the quality of the air, fresh 
water and soils on which humanity depends, distributes fresh water, regulates the climate, 
provides pollination and pest control and reduces the impact of natural hazards”.2 
The first major assessment of the health of earth’s ecosystems and their relationship with 
human well-being was carried out between 2001 and 2005.3 Called for by the then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is “a major 
international collaborative effort to map the health of our planet”. 4  The assessment 
describes the benefits and contributions received from the environment in terms of four types 
of ecosystem services:  
“[P]rovisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect 
climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, 
aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, 
photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling”.5 
Each of these ecosystem services form an essential part of human health and well-being. 
UNEP has described ecosystem services as environmental endowments which include 
“clean air to breathe; clean water to drink; food to eat; fuels for energy; protection from 
storms, floods, fires and drought; climate regulation and disease control; and places to 
congregate for aesthetic, recreational and spiritual enjoyment”.6 UNEP affirms that these 
ecosystem services are “essential to core survival and vital to human flourishing”. 7 
Considering the broad range of ecosystem services that the natural environment provides, 
it is clear that full realisation of human rights and the promotion of human well-being cannot 
be achieved without reliance on the environment.8  
                                            
1 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in S Díaz, J Settele, ES Brondízio, HT Ngo, M Guèze, J Agard, A Arneth, 
P Balvanera, KA Brauman, SHM Butchart, KMA Chan, LA Garibaldi, K Ichii, J Liu, SM Subramanian, 
GF Midgley, P Miloslavich, Z Molnár, D Obura, A Pfaff, S Polasky, A Purvis, J Razzaque, B Reyers, R Roy 
Chowdhury, YJ Shin, IJ Visseren-Hamakers, KJ Willis & CN Zayas (eds) Global Assessment Report on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (2019) 10. See also Handl G “Human Rights and Protection of the Environment” in Eide 
A, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 revised ed (2001) 303 303. 
2 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
10. 
3 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis (2005). 
4 Annan K We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (2000) 65. 
5 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Ecosystems and Human Well-Being v (emphasis in original). 
6 UNEP Climate Change and Human Rights (2015) 1. 
7 UNEP Climate Change and HR 1. 
8 Although widely employed, the concept of ‘eco-system services’ is not without criticism. Kate Raworth argues 
that the terminology of ‘natural capital’ and ‘ecosystem services’ can be problematic as it “simply shifts the 
living world from being man’s material means to being an asset on his balance sheet”. See K Raworth 
Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist (2017) 116. For present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that the environment is essential for human flourishing as it supports and provides for life 




Although human beings are dependent on the planet for their continued existence, there 
are numerous threats to the environment and therefore to the life-supporting services it 
provides. The IPBES notes, for example, that “the great majority of indicators of ecosystems 
and biodiversity [are] showing rapid decline”.9 One of the most pressing environmental 
challenges is climate change and the myriad of impacts on human and natural systems that 
are likely to result from global warming.10 The 2019 Global Environment Outlook 6: Healthy 
Planet, Healthy People (“GEO-6 Report”) describes climate change as “a global driver of 
environmental, social, health and economic impact and heightened society-wide risks”.11 In 
its 2019 statement on the climate, the World Meteorological Organization (“WMO”) notes 
the following:  
“Climate-related events already pose risks to society through impacts on health, food and 
water security as well as human security, livelihoods, economies, infrastructure and 
biodiversity. Climate change also has severe implications for ecosystem services. It can affect 
patterns of natural resource use, as well as the distribution of resources across regions and 
within countries”.12 
Where action is not taken to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, the risk of dramatic 
climate change impacts will increase. Extreme weather events, persistent drought, heat 
waves, and changes in disease vectors13 will continue to threaten livelihoods, health, water, 
food and energy security.14 These impacts are likely to lead to an increase in poverty, 
migration, forced displacement and conflict.15 Sudden-onset environmental disasters affect 
an increasing number of people and have the potential to “set back development gains by 
years or even decades, at immense social and economic cost”.16 In 2016, for example, the 
number of people displaced by disasters “outnumbered those who were newly displaced by 
conflict and violence three to one”.17 
Combined with climate change, numerous additional risks are posed by environmental 
challenges related to, for example, air pollution, loss of biodiversity, acidification and 
                                            
9 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
11. 
10 UNEP Global Environment Outlook 6: Summary for Policymakers (2019) 7. 
11 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 7. 
12 WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2019 WMO-No 1248 (2020) 27. 
13 UNEP Global Environment Outlook 6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People (2019) 47. See also WMO State of 
the Global Climate in 2019 23-25 & 27-28; UNDP Human Development Report 2019: Beyond Income, Beyond 
Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st century (2019) 180. 
14 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 14; UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 86. See also 
WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 27. 
15 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 76 & 86; UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 7. 
16 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 79. 
17 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 80. See also WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 30 
which notes that Asia and the Pacific are particularly vulnerable to such disasters. The WMO also notes that 




pollution of oceans, land degradation and deforestation, and scarcity and pollution of 
freshwater resources. In 2015 approximately 9 million deaths were caused by environmental 
pollution, primarily from air pollution and contaminated water.18 Air pollution contributes 
substantially to the burden of disease worldwide and causes up to seven million premature 
deaths annually. 19 Exposure to ambient particulate matter has been described as “the 
highest environmental risk factor for the global burden of disease”.20 Already vulnerable 
populations such as “the elderly, very young, ill and poor” are also more susceptible to the 
impacts of air pollution. 21  Early evidence suggests, for example, that exposure to air 
pollution may be linked to an increased risk of infection in relation to COVID-19.22 Polluted 
water and lack of access to adequate sanitation result in roughly 1.4 million deaths annually 
from preventable diseases. 23 The global water cycle is affected by “population growth, 
agriculture, economic development, urbanization, industrialization, deforestation and 
climate change” with these factors having a detrimental effect on the quality and quantity of 
freshwater supplies.24  
Food security is also threatened by climate change and environmental degradation.25 For 
example, crop production is adversely impacted by changes in rainfall and temperatures as 
well as the spread of invasive species. 26  The GEO-6 Report notes that “[c]urrent 
environmental pressures from the global food system cannot be sustained”.27 However, in 
order to meet the projected demands of the population in 2050 “world agricultural production 
would need to increase by 50 per cent from 2013 levels”.28 In addition to these challenges, 
the increased prevalence and severity of extreme weather events will have a significant 
impact on the stability of food prices and food supply,29 while the decline in biodiversity 
                                            
18 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 14; UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 78. 
19 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 108 & 125. See also WMO State of the Global Climate in 
2019 27. 
20 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 125. 
21 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 126. 
22 Cole M, C Ozgen & E Strobl “Air Pollution Exposure Linked to Higher COVID-19 Cases and Deaths: New 
Study” (20-07-2020) World Economic Forum & The Conversation 
<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/air-pollution-exposure-covid19-cases-deaths-study> (accessed 
25-01-2021). With regard to the relationship between air pollution and COVID-19 mortality rates see, for 
example, Pozzer A, F Dominici, A Haines, C Witt, T Münzel & J Lelieveld “Regional and Global Contributions 
of Air Pollution to Risk of Death from COVID-19” (2020) 116 Cardiovascular Research 2247 2247–2253. 
23 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 12; UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 236 & 246. 
24 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 236. 
25 See, for example, WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 33-34 on food insecurity and displacement in 
the Greater Horn of Africa. 
26 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 128. WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 29. 
27 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 96. 
28 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 96. 
29 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 128. See also WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 29 
which states that “climate variability and extreme weather events are among the key drivers of the recent rise 




further threatens food security.30 Disasters resulting from extreme weather events can have 
a particularly severe impact in states “with pre-existing vulnerabilities such as high levels of 
poverty and undernutrition”,31 thereby compounding the situation.32 
Threats to biodiversity have a significant impact on human health and well-being.33 The 
GEO-6 Report advises that a “major species extinction event, compromising planetary 
integrity and Earth’s capacity to meet human needs, is unfolding”.34 One of the ways this 
event manifests is through the emergence of infectious diseases “driven by activities that 
affect biodiversity”. 35  This is evidenced by, for example, the COVID-19 pandemic. 36 In 
addition, those whose livelihoods depend on natural resources – often indigenous peoples, 
peasants, and those working in rural areas – are disproportionately affected by declining 
biodiversity.37 Not only are these individuals and communities disproportionately affected, 
but approximately 70% of them are already living in poverty.38 Deforestation, for example, 
threatens the livelihoods of up to 73 million people employed in the formal and informal 
sectors.39 
                                            
30 Highlighting the importance of biodiversity, the IPBES notes that “more than 75 per cent of global food crop 
types, including fruits and vegetables and some of the most important cash crops, such as coffee, cocoa and 
almonds, rely on animal pollination”. See IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in Global Assessment Report on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 10. See also UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 8; UNEP GEO-
6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 153-154. 
31 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 128. See also UNDP Human Development Report 2019 180. 
32  See WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 29. See also “Summary for policymakers” in Global 
Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 12. 
33 See, generally, ES Brondizio, J Settele, S Díaz & HT Ngo (eds) Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (2019). 
34 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 8; UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 144. 
35 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 8; UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 144 & 162; 
UNDP Human Development Report 2019 180; WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 27-28; UNEP 
Frontiers 2018/2019: Emerging Issues of Environmental Concern (2019) 10. 
36 See, for example, Vittor AY, Laporta GZ & Sallum MAM “How Deforestation Helps Deadly Viruses Jump 
from Animals to Humans” (25-06-2020) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/how-deforestation-
helps-deadly-viruses-jump-from-animals-to-humans-139645> (accessed 04-02-2021). See, generally, IPBES 
“Executive Summary” in P Daszak, C das Neves, J Amuasi, D Hayman, T Kuiken, B Roche, C Zambrana-
Torrelio, P Buss, H Dundarova, Y Feferholtz, G Foldvari, E Igbinosa, S Junglen, Q Liu, G Suzan, M Uhart, C 
Wannous, K Woolaston, P Mosig Reidl, K O'Brien, U Pascual, P Stoett, H Li, HT Ngo (eds) Workshop Report 
on Biodiversity and Pandemics of the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(2020). 
37 UNEP Frontiers 2018/2019 41; IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in Global Assessment Report on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 14-15 & 18. In relation to the rights of peasants and those working in 
rural areas, see UNGA United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in 
Rural Areas (21 January 2019) A/RES/73/165. 
38 The GEO-6 Report indicates that “[t]he livelihoods of 70 per cent of people living in poverty directly depend 
on natural resources”. See UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 9. 
39 According to the GEO-6 Report “over 13 million people are employed in the formal forest sector, and another 
40‐60 million people may be employed in informal small and medium-sized forest operations”. See UNEP 




Another area of concern is environmental degradation of oceans caused primarily by 
warming and pollution.40 The ongoing environmental health of oceans is crucial for the 58 
to 120 million people whose livelihoods are supported by small-scale fisheries.41 The loss 
of coral reefs due to coral bleaching also impacts on “fisheries, tourism, community health, 
livelihoods and marine habitats”.42 The overexploitation of marine living resources further 
exacerbates these problems, leading to population decline.43 The GEO-6 Report notes that 
in 2015, for example, “over 50 per cent of the stocks in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, the 
Pacific Southwest and the Atlantic Southwest were fished at biologically unsustainable 
levels”.44 In 2018 the IPCC warned that global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius may result 
in a “projected decrease in global annual catch for marine fisheries of about 1.5 million 
tonnes” whereas an increase of 2 degrees Celsius could amount to a loss of over 3 million 
tonnes.45 
What is particularly concerning is that nearly all of these impacts from climate change and 
environmental degradation are significantly worse for already disadvantaged populations, 
including women, children, the elderly, the poor, peasants, indigenous peoples and, more 
broadly, developing states.46 The 2018 IPCC Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C notes, for 
example, that groups at higher risk from the impacts of climate change include 
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41 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 10. 
42 UNEP GEO-6: Summary for Policymakers 10. See also UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 186; 
WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 32. 
43 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 159; WMO State of the Global Climate in 2019 32. 
44 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 159. 
45 O Hoegh-Guldberg, D Jacob, M Taylor, M Bindi, S Brown, I Camilloni, A Diedhiou, R Djalante, K Ebi, F 
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Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of 
Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (2018) 175 238. 
46 See UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 48, 76, 86, 126 & 128; UNEP GEO-6: Summary for 
Policymakers 12 & 9; Hoegh-Guldberg et al “Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human 
Systems” in Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report 234-235 & 244-245; J Roy, P Tschakert, H 
Waisman, S Abdul Halim, P Antwi-Agyei, P Dasgupta, B Hayward, M Kanninen, D Liverman, C Okereke, P 
Pinho, K Riahi & A Suarez Rodriguez “Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing 
Inequalities” in V Masson-Delmotte, P Zhai, H Pörtner, D Roberts, J Skea, P Shukla, A Pirani, W Moufouma-
Okia, C Péan, R Pidcock, S Connors, J Matthews, Y Chen, X Zhou, M Gomis, E Lonnoy, T Maycock, M Tignor 
& T Waterfield (eds) Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report (2018) 445 452-453. See also UNHRC 
Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, John H Knox: Mapping Report (30 December 2013) 
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“disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and local 
communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods”, while the regions at a higher 
risk include small island developing states, and least developed states.47 It is important to 
note that the aforementioned local communities dependant on agricultural or coastal 
livelihoods are also rights-holders under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and 
Other People Working in Rural Areas (“UNDROP”).48 The IPBES similarly notes that the 
areas most affected by climate change and environmental degradation “are also home to 
large concentrations of indigenous peoples and many of the world’s poorest communities”.49 
The GEO-6 Report adds that the potential impacts are most severe for those who depend 
greatly on natural resources and for “those experiencing multiple forms of inequality, 
marginalization and poverty, thereby amplifying existing risks and creat[ing] new ones”.50 
Philip Alston, the former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
suggests that, unless human rights are considered in climate change responses, the 
inequality resulting from climate change could become a form of “climate apartheid”,51 and 
that climate change constitutes “an unconscionable assault on the poor”.52 The UNDP has 
noted that climate change and related disasters are “disequalizing” 53 as they “deepen 
existing social and economic fault lines”. 54  In addition to severe inequalities in the 
distribution of the abovementioned environmental harm, the IPBES has noted that “[n]ature’s 
contributions to people are often distributed unequally across space and time and among 
different segments of society”.55  
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49 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
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50 UNEP GEO-6: Healthy Planet, Healthy People 48. 
51 UNHRC Climate Change and Poverty (2019) A/HRC/41/39 paras 11-15 & 46-50. 
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change, see also UNDP Human Development Report 2019 178-184 and 195-196. 
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Equity: A Better Future for All (2011) 4, 7 & 59-61.  
54 UNDP Human Development Report 2019 179. See also 184 where the report notes that this disproportionate 
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The impact of the abovementioned environmental challenges on human rights is evident, 
and has been well-documented.56 It is widely recognised that the impacts of environmental 
degradation and climate change pose serious threats to civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights, including the rights to life;57 health;58 food;59 water;60 
housing;61 and the rights to respect for privacy, family life and home.62 
Indeed, very few dimensions of human rights remain unaffected by the state of the 
environment and the current climate crisis.63 Without the essential elements for human 
survival, we cannot fully realise human rights. The separate opinion of Weeramantry J in 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)64 bears repeating here. He stresses that 
environmental protection is “a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to 
health and the right to life itself” emphasising that “damage to the environment can impair 
and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human 
rights instruments.” 65  It is crucial that environmental considerations form part of the 
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the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
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approach to human rights in order to ensure that environmental degradation does not “impair 
and undermine” the rights themselves. Appropriate interpretation and application of human 
rights therefore requires an integration of environmental considerations in order to protect 
the environment and ensure the continued realisation of human rights. 
To underscore the importance of integrating environmental considerations, it is useful to 
consider the impact of environmental degradation on the pursuit of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (“SDGs”).66 The goals are described as “integrated and indivisible” and 
balancing the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development.67 The IPBES affirms that “nature is essential for achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals” and warns that the current trajectory in relation to biodiversity and 
ecosystems is likely to undermine 80 percent of the “the assessed targets of Goals related 
to poverty, hunger, health, water, cities, climate, oceans and land”.68 This illustrates the 
futility of addressing social and economic concerns (and rights) without actively integrating 
the environment.69 
Incorporating environmental considerations into human rights norms and obligations is 
thus essential for making human rights law more responsive to the environmental threats 
described above. Effective enjoyment of human rights requires the protection of the 
environmental foundation for human rights and indeed human life. The recognition of 
environmental dimensions of human rights obligations has been increasing in human rights 
tribunals and treaty bodies in recent years. The clearest articulation of such environment-
related human rights obligations can be found in the work of the UNHRC which is discussed 
in more detail further below.70 
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2 2 2 Environment-related human rights obligations 
In the area of human rights there is increasing awareness of the implications of 
environmental threats for the enjoyment of human rights and, consequently, increased 
recognition of human rights obligations relating to the environment. In particular, the UNHRC 
has explored the relationship between human rights and the environment through the work 
of an independent expert and special rapporteur on human rights obligations relating to the 
environment. In 2012 the UNHRC appointed “an independent expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment”.71 Following an initial three year appointment, the mandate of the independent 
expert, John Knox, was extended in 2015 for a further three years and amended to the 
position of special rapporteur.72 In 2018 the mandate for the special rapporteur was once 
again extended, and awarded to David Boyd.73 The contents of the former Independent 
Expert and Special Rapporteurs’ reports are considered below. 
The various reports of the abovementioned Independent Expert and Special Rapporteurs 
underscore the range of impacts environmental degradation can have on the enjoyment of 
human rights, and how essential it is to maintain a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment for the continued enjoyment of all human rights. The former Independent 
Expert has noted that environmental threats to human rights include the threat of hazardous 
wastes to the rights to life and health; the threat of climate change to the rights to life, health, 
food, water, housing and self-determination; the threats of environmental degradation, 
desertification and climate change to the right to food; and the threat of environmental 
degradation on indigenous peoples’ rights to life and property.74 Annual thematic reports of 
the Independent Expert and Special Rapporteurs have highlighted, among other things, the 
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significant impacts that climate change, biodiversity and air quality have on various human 
rights.75 
In addition to reiterating the impact of environmental harm on human rights, the reports 
of the Independent Expert and Special Rapporteurs have examined the range of procedural 
and substantive human rights obligations of states in relation to the environment. The 
procedural obligations which have been identified include duties to assess environmental 
impacts and make environment-related information public;76 to facilitate public participation 
in environmental decision-making; 77  to provide access to effective remedies for 
environmental harm to human rights;78 to protect the rights of expression and association, 
particularly of those seeking to defend their rights in relation to environmental concerns;79 
and, with regard to children’s rights, to provide for environmental education and 
consideration of the views of children.80 The Independent Expert and Special Rapporteur 
have also recognised a number of substantive obligations on states in relation to the 
environment. These substantive obligations include the obligation to “adopt legal and 
institutional frameworks that protect against, and respond to, environmental harm that may 
or does interfere with the enjoyment of human rights”;81 the obligation to protect against 
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activities by private actors which may cause environmental harm which threatens human 
rights;82 and obligations related to transboundary harm and international cooperation.83 
At this point it is necessary to note that in addition to the above obligations, States Parties 
have particular obligations towards indigenous peoples as well as towards peasants and 
other people working in rural areas, which have important implications for the relationship 
between these communities and the environment.84 These are discussed separately below. 
States Parties’ obligations towards indigenous peoples have been underscored by the 
work of the former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya.85 
The most prominent obligation in this regard is the requirement of free, prior and informed 
consent (“FPIC”). 86  The most explicit recognition of FPIC is found in the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”),87 although there are earlier 
references to the concept.88 The UNDRIP affirms that FPIC must be obtained from affected 
indigenous peoples with regard to: relocation from their lands or territories;89 legislative and 
administrative measures that may affect them;90 the storage or disposal of hazardous waste 
in their lands or territories;91 and the approval of any development project affecting their 
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lands, territories or resources, including the exploitation of natural resources.92 As a result 
of the nature of FPIC, environmental impact assessments (“EIAs”) are particularly important 
where indigenous peoples might be affected as informed consent necessitates information 
regarding actual and potential impacts of the relevant activities.93  
The position of indigenous peoples is also underscored in a 2020 report of the Special 
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Karima Bennoune.94 The report discusses the 
relationship between cultural rights and climate change, emphasising that climate-related 
impacts on culture are particularly significant for indigenous peoples.95 In addition to FPIC, 
it is important to note that the UNDRIP includes specific environment-related obligations. 
Article 29 of the UNDRIP establishes a right to “the conservation and protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of [indigenous peoples’] lands or territories and 
resources”.96 States are required to “establish and implement assistance programmes” for 
this conservation and protection.97 
The UN Declaration on Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas 
(“UNDROP”) 98  imposes a number of environment-related obligations on states. These 
include procedural obligations such as the obligation to take measures to ensure that impact 
assessments, consultations and appropriate benefit-sharing agreements precede the 
exploitation of natural resources.99 The substantive environment-related obligations include 
duties to formulate policies to advance and protect “sustainable and equitable food 
systems”;100 to take measures “aimed at the conservation and sustainable use of land and 
other natural resources”;101 to take appropriate measures to ensure the “conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity”;102 to protect and restore water-related ecosystems as well 
as to prioritise water use for human needs above other uses.103 
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Significantly, article 18 of the UNDROP includes a right to the conservation and protection 
of the environment similar to that contained in article 29 of the UNDRIP. This includes an 
obligation on states to “take appropriate measures to ensure that peasants and other people 
working in rural areas enjoy, without discrimination, a safe, clean and healthy 
environment”.104 Article 18 also requires states to comply with international obligations with 
regard to climate change; to cooperate in addressing transboundary environmental harm; 
and to protect peasants and other people working in rural areas from abuse by non-state 
actors through the enforcement of relevant environmental laws.105  
In addition to the various obligations outlined above, in 2018 the former Special 
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John Knox, presented his final report to the 
UNHRC, containing a set of Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment 
(“Framework Principles”). 106 These principles “reflect the application of existing human 
rights obligations in the environmental context”.107 The Framework Principles underscore 
the interdependence of human rights and a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment.108  
The Framework Principles reiterate a number of obligations identified in the Special 
Rapporteur’s earlier reports, including obligations on states in relation to: non-
discrimination, 109  access to information, 110  prior assessment, 111  public participation, 112 
effective remedies, 113  and state cooperation in relation to transboundary and global 
environmental harm. 114 Principle 11 affirms that “States should establish and maintain 
substantive environmental standards that are non-discriminatory, non-retrogressive and 
otherwise respect, protect and fulfil human rights”. This principle emphasises that 
environmental standards cannot infringe on human rights and must meet human rights 
standards. Principle 16 similarly asserts that “States should respect, protect and fulfil human 
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rights in the actions they take to address environmental challenges and pursue sustainable 
development”. 
Finally, the Framework Principles highlight that special attention must be given to 
vulnerable groups as well as indigenous and traditional communities. Principle 14 requires 
states to “take additional measures to protect the rights of those who are most vulnerable 
to, or at particular risk from, environmental harm” and it is noted that those at risk include 
“women, children, persons living in poverty, members of indigenous peoples and traditional 
communities, older persons, persons with disabilities, ethnic, racial or other minorities and 
displaced persons”. 115  In relation to indigenous peoples and members of traditional 
communities, Principle 15 underscores the existing obligations of states towards these 
groups, including the obligation of FPIC and fair and equitable benefit-sharing.116 
There can therefore be no doubt that the environment has a significant impact on human 
rights and that states therefore have environment-related obligations under human rights 
law. As the work of the abovementioned special rapporteurs has highlighted, human rights 
obligations must be understood to include procedural and substantive environment-related 
obligations. This is fundamental to ensuring the protection of the environmental base upon 
which all human rights are founded. The section below considers economic, social and 
cultural rights (“ESCRs”) in particular and the extent to which the Committee has recognised 
environmental impacts and obligations in relation to the Covenant. 
2 3 Economic, social and cultural rights and the environment under the Covenant 
2 3 1 Introduction 
Although it is clear that the condition of the environment impacts most, if not all, human 
rights, a number of Covenant rights rely directly on the environment and natural resources 
for their realisation. These rights include the rights to health, housing, water, food, and safe 
and healthy working conditions, as well as cultural rights. These rights have underlying 
environmental determinants and therefore depend heavily on natural resources and a 
healthy environment for their fulfilment. In relation to the right to an adequate standard of 
living, for example, UNEP has noted the following: 
“[The] components of the right to an adequate standard of living are linked to environmental 
protection. Realization of the right to food is closely tied to environmental factors such as water, 
climate, soil quality, air quality, and biological diversity. Pollution and land degradation can 
impact the right to housing through rendering existing or potential residential areas 
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uninhabitable. At the same time, inadequate housing can leave individuals more vulnerable to 
environmental threats such as pollution, natural disasters, and low temperatures”.117 
While the obligations of states in relation to the environment and ESCRs are encompassed 
in the duties identified by the special rapporteurs above, many of these obligations have 
also been considered independently, in particular by the Committee itself. 
Before turning to the environment-related obligations identified in the context of the 
Covenant, it is useful to note that States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant differ from 
those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)118 in certain key 
respects. The obligations in the ICCPR are not subject to the qualifying concepts of 
maximum available resources and progressive realisation that are found in the Covenant. 
Article 2 of the Covenant refers to, among other things, the State Party’s obligation to take 
steps “to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in [the Covenant]”.119 These concepts have important 
implications for how the environment-related obligations in the Covenant are interpreted. 
For example, the condition and extent of a State Party’s national water resources (as well 
as the state of the environment as it affects the quality of those resources) will form part of 
the “available resources” to be used for the realisation of the right to water. 
Although numerous threats to the environment have been outlined above, it is important 
to note that the rights in the Covenant remain fundamental and binding in the face of 
environmental challenges. States Parties may not use the climate crisis or environmental 
degradation as a justification for failing to comply with their human rights obligations in the 
name of environmental protection. In a 2009 UNHRC report on the relationship between 
climate change and human rights, it was noted that the impacts of climate change should 
not be used to flout ESCRs: 
“[I]rrespective of the additional strain climate change-related events may place on available 
resources, States remain under an obligation to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights under any given circumstances. Importantly, States must, 
as a matter of priority, seek to satisfy core obligations and protect groups in society who are in 
a particularly vulnerable situation”.120 
Any measures taken to address the climate crisis must therefore safeguard ESCRs, and 
protect ESCRs from the impacts of climate change wherever possible.121 In his report on 
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climate change and poverty, the former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights underscored the importance of ESCRs, noting that “[a]s people’s access to food, 
land, water, health care, housing, and education are threatened or destroyed, there will be 
an ever-greater need for principled policies that ensure respect for economic and social 
rights”.122 
As is evidenced by the latter quote, cultural rights are often overlooked in relation to the 
impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. The Special Rapporteur in the 
Field of Cultural Rights, Karima Bennoune draws attention to the impacts of climate change 
on cultural rights more broadly, noting that “cultural rights are particularly drastically affected, 
in that they risk being simply wiped out in many cases”123 and that entire nations face “the 
threat of cultural extinction”. 124  Despite this, these rights have received insufficient 
attention.125 As with other climate change impacts, the consequences for cultural rights have 
a disproportionate effect on those “with pronounced cultural connections to land, sea, natural 
resources and ecosystems, including indigenous, rural and fisher peoples”.126 The Special 
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights thus concludes that States have an obligation to 
“[t]ake cultural rights and cultural impacts into consideration in responding to all aspects of 
climate change and in climate action”.127 
ESCRs are the subject of a report of the UN Secretary-General in relation to the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (“the 2030 Agenda”).128 
The procedural obligations identified by the special rapporteurs above are echoed in this 
report. 129  In addition to appropriate legal and institutional frameworks, the substantive 
obligations identified include obligations with regard to equality and non-discrimination, 
particularly in the case of vulnerable populations.130 It is noted, for example, that natural 
hazards do not necessarily constitute disasters, but can become disasters due to “the 
multiple and complex interplay between the exposure, vulnerability and resilience of 
individuals and communities”.131 Significantly, the realisation of ESCRs is recognised as an 
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important contributor to the resilience and sustainability of societies.132 The report notes that 
states are required to ensure that the level of enjoyment of ESCRs does not deteriorate, 
obliging States Parties to take preventative action against the effects of natural disasters 
and climate change.133  
Turning to the CESCR, it is important to note that the Committee is well-positioned to 
address the threat of environmental harm and urge States Parties to ensure that such harm 
is prevented. Voigt and Grant note that human rights tribunals typically respond to 
environment-related human rights violations when affected groups and individuals seek 
remedies after the fact, explaining that “human rights systems tend to take a reactive 
approach to environmental harm”. 134  While the Committee is in a position to react to 
environmental harm after the fact, particularly through its views under the Optional Protocol 
and concluding observations, it is also in a position to recommend action related to 
environmental protection before harm occurs. Through issuing general comments and 
statements the Committee is able to recognise environment-related obligations prior to the 
occurrence of the harm. It is also able to do so with respect to its concluding observations 
on States Parties’ reports as the Committee’s recommendations in this regard are not 
dependent on responding to, or establishing, an existing violation. The Committee is 
therefore well-placed to promote environmental protection and related preventative 
measures where they are relevant for Covenant obligations. 
The CESCR has addressed the relationship between the Covenant and the environment 
on a number of occasions. 135  As will be seen below, the Committee’s references to 
environmental considerations (including climate change) have increased in recent years and 
the Committee has demonstrated a growing awareness of the critical relationship between 
the environment and the rights and obligations in the Covenant. The Committee is 
increasingly willing to require States Parties to consider the impact of the environment on 
ESCRs and to include environment-related obligations within the scope of the Covenant. 
The Committee’s references to the environment and environment-related considerations are 
discussed below with reference to its official statements, general comments and concluding 
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observations. As noted above, it is possible, and perhaps inevitable, that environmental 
considerations will form part of the Committee’s evolving jurisprudence under the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.136 However, the subject matter of the complaints received thus far 
has not included factors directly related to the environment, natural resources or climate 
change. The Committee’s views under the Optional Protocol are therefore not discussed 
separately. 
2 3 2 The Committee’s statements 
One of the Committee’s earliest references to environmental considerations is in a 
statement adopted in 1999 to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”).137 The Committee urged the WTO to review international trade and 
investment policies and rules, and to ensure these are consistent with human rights and that 
they “address as a matter of highest priority the impact of WTO policies on the most 
vulnerable sectors of society as well as on the environment”.138 In 2002 the Committee 
issued a statement highlighting the importance of including human rights in discussions 
concerning sustainable development at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held 
at Johannesburg in the same year.139 A 2008 statement on the world food crisis recognised 
the influence of climate change and urged States Parties to promote sustainable agriculture 
and ensure that strategies to combat climate change are not detrimental to the right to 
adequate food and freedom from hunger. 140  In 2012, in anticipation of the Rio+20 
Conference, the Committee adopted a statement on “the green economy in the context of 
sustainable development and poverty eradication”. 141  This statement affirmed the 
interlinkages of ESCRs and “the sustainability of environmental protection” and highlighted, 
among other things, certain obligations relating to the environment that flow from the rights 
in the Covenant.142 The obligations identified include the obligations to ensure a healthy 
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working environment;143 to avoid adverse environmental impacts on the right to food;144 and 
to ensure conservation and sustainable use of natural resources which serve as elements 
of the right to health.145 The statement also recognises the relationship between biodiversity 
and the promotion of health (through advancing pharmacology and medicine) as well as the 
relationship between biodiversity and cultural rights (through the rights of indigenous 
peoples and the protection of traditional knowledge).146 
The Committee’s later statements include a 2018 statement on climate change and a 
2019 statement on the 2030 Agenda. 147  The statement on climate change and the 
Covenant was adopted shortly after the publication of the IPCC report on the impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.148 The statement serves as a reminder 
to states that, apart from commitments made under the climate change regime, they have 
human rights obligations “which should guide them in the design and implementation of 
measures to address climate change”.149 The Committee emphasised that failing to prevent 
foreseeable harm from climate change or “to mobilize the maximum available resources in 
an effort to do so” could amount to a violation of the obligation to “respect, protect and fulfil 
all human rights for all”.150 It observed, for example, that many of the nationally determined 
contributions under the Paris Agreement were insufficient to be considered consistent with 
States Parties’ human rights obligations under the Covenant.151 The Committee has also 
issued a joint statement with other human rights treaty bodies in relation to human rights 
and climate change. The latter statement recognises the “damage suffered by ecosystems, 
which in turn affect the enjoyment of human rights”.152 The joint statement also emphasises 
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the disproportionate impact of climate change on those individuals and groups who are 
already disadvantaged or marginalised.153 
The Committee’s 2019 statement in relation to the 2030 Agenda focuses on the pledge 
to leave no one behind, which the Committee describes as “a commitment by States to 
prioritize the needs of the most disadvantaged and marginalized in realizing the Sustainable 
Development Goals”. 154 The statement recognises the discrimination and disadvantage 
experienced by, among others, “nations and communities vulnerable to climate change and 
environmental pollution and degradation”.155 The Committee also notes that methods used 
to fulfil the rights in the Covenant should be sustainable “so as to ensure that the rights are 
secured both for present and future generations”. 156  The statement demonstrates that 
compliance with the obligations of the Covenant will strengthen States in their pursuit of the 
SDGs and the pledge to leave no one behind.157 
2 3 3 General comments 
The Committee’s general comments also contain references to the environment and 
environmental considerations.158 The general comments refer to the following: the climatic 
and ecological conditions that influence the notion of adequacy in the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights;159 sustainability and the needs of future generations;160 the concept of a 
healthy environment;161 biodiversity as a cultural resource;162 respect for the relationship 
between indigenous peoples and nature; 163 the assessment of potential environmental 
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impacts;164 the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm;165 and the avoidance of 
unacceptable harm to the environment. 166 On the whole these references are in brief, 
general terms and require greater elaboration if the environmental dimensions of the 
relevant rights are to be appropriately integrated in the Covenant. 
General Comment 15 on the right to water is an exception in that it provides a more 
detailed and practical indication of what is expected of States Parties.167 According to the 
Committee, the right to water includes the following obligations: 
“States parties should adopt comprehensive and integrated strategies and programmes to 
ensure that there is sufficient and safe water for present and future generations. Such 
strategies and programmes may include: (a) reducing depletion of water resources through 
unsustainable extraction, diversion and damming; (b) reducing and eliminating contamination 
of watersheds and water-related ecosystems by substances such as radiation, harmful 
chemicals and human excreta; (c) monitoring water reserves; (d) ensuring that proposed 
developments do not interfere with access to adequate water; (e) assessing the impacts of 
actions that may impinge upon water availability and natural ecosystems watersheds, such as 
climate changes, desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation and loss of 
biodiversity; (f) increasing the efficient use of water by end-users; (g) reducing water wastage 
in its distribution; (h) response mechanisms for emergency situations; (i) and establishing 
competent institutions and appropriate institutional arrangements to carry out the strategies 
and programmes”.168 
These obligations go beyond the mere provision of water by giving due consideration to the 
underlying environmental factors that influence a State Party’s ability to fulfil the right to 
water. The Committee therefore recognises, for example, that water resources are 
connected to natural ecosystems and biodiversity; and that preventing contamination and 
ensuring the sustainable use of water resources is essential in order to fulfil the right to 
water. While the above description of the obligations under the right to water in General 
Comment 15 is more detailed, the environmental dimensions of States Parties’ obligations 
under the rest of the Covenant are not identified as explicitly. 
While the reference to environmental considerations in general comments is often cursory 
and with little substantive elaboration, it is noteworthy that two of the Committee’s recent 
general comments make explicit reference to principles of environmental law. The principles 
referred to are the prohibition of transboundary harm169 and the precautionary principle.170 
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As this dissertation argues, the incorporation of existing principles of IEL can assist in 
providing meaningful guidance for States Parties with respect to environment-related 
obligations. 
2 3 4 Concluding observations 
The Committee’s concluding observations on States Parties’ reports, under the periodic 
reporting procedure in terms of articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, similarly take note of 
environmental factors in some cases.171 It is apparent that references to environmental 
issues in the Committee’s concluding observations are rapidly increasing in both frequency 
and scope. The Committee has demonstrated an understanding of the interrelatedness of 
human rights and the environment and a readiness to acknowledge the need for an 
interpretation of the Covenant that incorporates environmental factors. This is evident, for 
example, in the Committee’s recognition of the adverse impacts of climate change on the 
enjoyment of ESCRs172 and its express concern where domestic environmental protections 
have diminished.173 
 Many of the Committee’s environment-related concerns in its concluding observations 
are associated with climate change. Early references to climate change in the Committee’s 
concluding observations began with, for example, welcoming the adoption by a State Party 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)174 and the 
pursuit of projects under the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism and Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD”) Programme.175 By 2009 
the Committee’s concluding observations had only referred to climate change on three 
occasions.176 Recent treatment of climate change is more frequent and includes greater 
specificity and scope. In relation to States Parties’ contributions to climate change, the 
Committee’s recommendations have covered the reduction of GHG emissions;177 pursuit of 
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renewable energy;178 cessation of support for new coal operations;179 and revised climate 
change policies.180 The Committee has also recommended action in relation to the impacts 
of climate change, particularly regarding the rights of indigenous peoples.181 This range of 
recommendations includes “addressing” climate change impacts;182 mitigating impacts;183 
monitoring climate change and its impacts;184 and providing information on climate change 
and its impacts on ESCRs to those affected.185 It is worth noting that the Committee’s 
concerns regarding climate change have focused primarily on developed states and their 
contributions to climate change. 186  In its concluding observations on Mauritius the 
Committee has also encouraged the State Party to “strengthen the preparedness” of 
communities prone to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change, and has urged 
the State Party to seek international support in order to respond to climate change and its 
effects.187 The Committee is placing an increasing emphasis on climate change evidenced, 
for example, by the fact that 42 percent of its 2018 concluding observations contained 
references to climate change.188 
The Committee has also welcomed efforts by States Parties to protect the environment 
through legislative and other means. 189 In relation to the right to food, the Committee 
recommended that the State Party of Guinea “[b]uild the resilience of agriculture to 
environmental shocks”.190 The Committee has also expressed concern over the activities of 
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private actors which have a detrimental impact on land and natural resources, particularly 
extractive industries and logging operations, with an emphasis on the impacts on indigenous 
peoples. 191  In relation to Ecuador, for example, the Committee has noted its concern 
regarding detrimental health and environmental impacts of extractive activities “at the 
expense of the exercise of land and culture rights of the affected indigenous communities 
and the equilibrium of the ecosystem”.192 The Committee has recommended consultation 
and engagement with affected communities; the guarantee of FPIC by indigenous 
communities; as well as compensation for loss and a share of the profits for affected 
communities from the exploitation of natural resources.193 Regarding the financial benefit of 
exploiting natural resources, it has also been recommended that fees charged to foreign 
investors for such activities should be increased in order to effectively mobilise domestic 
resources for the progressive realisation of ESCRs. 194  Similarly, in its concluding 
observations regarding Mali, the Committee has recommended the review of tax exemptions 
granted for the exploitation of natural resources “with a view to raising the level of public 
spending for the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights”.195  
The Committee has also recommended that EIAs be required before potentially harmful 
activities are undertaken; 196  that they take into account the need for sustainable 
development;197 that they are subject to independent review;198 and, in the case of hydraulic 
fracturing, that an appropriate regulatory framework is developed including documentation 
of the range of impacts and threats associated with the activity. 199 Most recently, the 
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Committee has recommended that human rights and environmental impact assessments 
also be conducted prior to investment and trade agreements.200 The Committee has also 
noted its concern regarding pollution and contamination on a number of occasions, most 
commonly in relation to water resources. 201 Some of the Committee’s later concluding 
observations have expressed its concern with growing instances of threats, harassment and 
violence against human rights defenders in the environmental sector, encouraging the 
investigation of such cases.202 
In addition to the above references made by the Committee in relation to individual state 
reports, since 2016 the Committee’s concluding observations have included a standard 
paragraph referring to the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. The Committee encourages States 
Parties to take the obligations under the Covenant into account when implementing the 
goals.203 This emphasises the role of the binding obligations in Covenant in achieving the 
SDGs which are “integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable 
development: the economic, social and environmental”. 204  Although this does not 
necessarily require an integration of environmental dimensions into the Covenant itself, it 
does encourage States Parties to consider their commitments under the SDGs, which 
include environmental components.205  
2 3 5 The need for a more systematic approach 
It is clear that the Committee has “firmly established that the enjoyment of several 
economic, social and cultural rights depends upon the existence of a healthy 
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environment”. 206  The Committee should be applauded for its willingness to address 
environmental concerns as they relate to the rights in the Covenant. Duyck and McKernan 
note that, compared to other human rights treaty bodies, the Committee has been more 
vocal about the important relationship between indigenous rights and climate change, as 
well as about the need for climate change mitigation.207 Similarly, in relation to climate 
change, the former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip 
Alston, noted that the Committee “has produced the most extensive and focused response 
to date” through its 2018 statement on climate change and the Covenant.208 However, the 
Special Rapporteur has also shown that of the three most engaged treaty bodies, “just 9 
percent of references to climate change since 2008 have dealt with mitigation, the issue of 
greatest importance for reversing the current trajectory”.209 The Special Rapporteur’s report 
on climate change and poverty suggests that greater clarity and specificity is required in 
interpreting and articulating the obligations of States Parties in relation to climate change, 
emphasising the need for “detailed, actionable recommendations” 210  and “meaningful 
guidance as to the measures needed, or at least as to the procedures that might be 
adopted”.211 The Special Rapporteur also warns that treaty bodies must be careful of terms 
that are “so open-ended and non-specific” that States Parties are required to do “little more 
than ticking the climate change box”.212 The report notes that each human rights body 
should consider how it can “highlight the urgency of the obligation to combat climate change” 
through its existing processes.213 
It is evident that the Committee has likely surpassed most other human rights treaty 
bodies in its progressive inclusion of environmental considerations. While this is certainly 
commendable, a more detailed and systematic approach to the environmental dimensions 
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of ESCRs is required. Such an approach should include more “detailed, actionable 
recommendations” and “meaningful guidance” regarding measures and procedures 
required. This dissertation investigates how the principles of IEL might assist the Committee 
in designing a more appropriate response and guiding its future recommendations in relation 
to the environment.214 
An approach that incorporates existing environmental law principles could assist the 
Committee in providing greater clarity to States Parties on the nature and scope of their 
obligations and ensure that environmental dimensions of the relevant rights are dealt with 
appropriately. By way of example, in response to the report of the Philippines in 2016, the 
Committee expressed concern regarding declining fish stocks in the State Party and the 
impact that this, in conjunction with encroaching commercial fishing, was having on small-
scale fishers.215 The Committee’s recommendation included delineation of municipal waters 
and coastal zoning as well as a broad reference to “all measures necessary” to improve 
fishers’ income. 216  From an environmental perspective, it is surprising that the 
recommendation made no mention of sustainable use, a well-known principle of IEL.217 
Sustainable use refers to the exploitation of renewable natural resources at a rate which 
allows for their continued renewal. The principle forms one of three fundamental objectives 
of the widely ratified Convention on Biological Diversity218 and has been described as a 
customary rule or norm of international law.219 In relation to peasants and other people 
working in rural areas (including small-scale fishers) the UN General Assembly has also 
recognised obligations of sustainable use on States Parties.220 Measures in relation to the 
livelihood of small-scale fishers that do not address sustainable use could be rendered 
meaningless if the stocks are entirely depleted. 221  Any effective long-term approach 
concerning marine living resources that are essential for livelihoods should therefore 
incorporate this principle. If the Committee is able to integrate environmental principles in its 
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environment-related obligations, it would ensure that recommendations in this regard are 
more informed and effective in protecting the environment and natural resources for the 
sake of the human rights dependent on them. 
It is significant to note that the Committee has already demonstrated a willingness to refer 
to relevant environmental principles in its recommendations on a few occasions. In its 
concluding observations in relation to Argentina in 2018 the Committee made explicit 
reference to the precautionary principle.222 The Committee recommended that:  
“[T]he State party adopt a regulatory framework that includes the application of the 
precautionary principle with regard to the use of harmful pesticides and herbicides […] in order 
to avoid the negative health impacts and environmental degradation that can result from their 
use”.223 
The Committee also refers to the precautionary principle in its general comment on science 
and ESCRs in the context of participation in scientific processes.224 Similarly, the Committee 
refers to the prohibition of transboundary harm in its general comment on state obligations 
in the context of business activities.225 
The use of an existing principle in IEL introduces a concept with a degree of recognised 
meaning and content which can assist the Committee in formulating its concluding 
observations while also guiding the State Party in developing an appropriate response in 
light of the Committee’s recommendations. This facilitates harmonisation between IEL and 
human rights law. The quality and effectiveness of the Committee’s recommendations in the 
context of the intersection between ESCRs and the environment would be significantly 
strengthened by building synergies between the Committee’s existing doctrine and the 
principles of IEL. 
The Committee should be commended for its readiness to embrace the environmental 
dimensions of the rights and obligations in the ICESCR. It has demonstrated an awareness 
of the complex relationship between the environment and human rights, and a willingness 
to adapt to evolving conditions by increasingly concerning itself with matters related to the 
environment and climate change. However, it is important to ensure that this inclusion of 
environmental factors is considered and appropriate, and guided by relevant principles such 
as those recognised in IEL. It will become ever more important for the Committee to adopt 
a comprehensive and systematic approach which ensures the consistent integration of 
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environmental considerations within the obligations of States Parties as interpreted by the 
Committee through its jurisprudence, general comments and concluding observations. 
2 4 Conclusion 
The rights in the ICESCR are at risk due to expanding environmental degradation and 
rapidly growing threats from climate change. It is no longer possible to ensure the rights to 
health, food, water and housing without taking the environmental dimensions of these rights 
into account. In order to ensure the protection and realisation of the rights in the Covenant, 
it is vital that environmental considerations are incorporated into the interpretation of States 
Parties’ obligations by the Committee through its statements, general comments, concluding 
observations and views under the Optional Protocol. Some guidance can be obtained from 
the work of the special procedures of the UNHRC, particularly in relation to the issue of 
human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment. 
The Committee has shown a laudable readiness to incorporate environmental 
considerations within the scope of rights and obligations in the Covenant. However, any 
attempt to integrate the environment into the work of the Committee is only useful to the 
degree that it is consistent and effective. The environment-related obligations identified and 
discussed above do not always provide States Parties to the Covenant with the necessary 
detailed and actionable recommendations and guidance required to effectively implement 
these obligations. The Committee will be more effective in addressing environmental threats 
to human rights if it is able to provide more meaningful and substantive guidance to States 
Parties in relation to such obligations. It is therefore proposed that a more systematic and 
principled approach to the inclusion of environmental considerations could ensure the 
consistent integration of environment-related obligations in the Committee’s work and allow 
the Committee to provide more appropriate recommendations in respect of the environment.  
This chapter concluded by arguing that the principles of IEL constitute a vital tool for the 
Committee in advancing the latter objective. The principles of IEL are considered in more 
detail in Chapter 4. The following chapter lays the foundation for the interpretation of 
Covenant obligations by examining the rules of interpretation applicable to international 
treaties, and human rights treaties in particular. The purpose of the next chapter is to 
investigate how the relevant rules of human rights treaty interpretation can facilitate the 






 GREENING THE COVENANT:  
LAYING THE INTERPRETIVE FOUNDATIONS 
3 1 Introduction 
Considering the risks posed by environmental degradation and climate change as 
examined in Chapter 2 above, it is necessary to explore how environmental considerations 
should be incorporated into the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under the 
Covenant. This greening of Covenant provisions would ensure that ESCRs are not 
compromised or violated as a result of environmental harm and would also safeguard the 
continued realisation of ESCRs by protecting the environment on which these rights depend. 
Human rights approaches to the environment include an interpretation of rights that 
incorporates the environment.1 As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation seeks to expand the 
interpretation of the Covenant in order to include environmental considerations within the 
scope of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant. In order to do so, the accepted 
methodologies applicable to treaty interpretation must be applied. These are examined in 
detail in this chapter. 
Any interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant must be approached in accordance 
with the relevant rules of interpretation applicable to international treaties. This includes the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) 2 as well as the more specialised 
interpretive methods developed in relation to human rights treaties, including teleological 
interpretation, the principle of effectiveness, and the evolutive approach. 
This chapter begins by describing traditional human rights approaches to environmental 
protection. The objectives of environmental protection and realisation of human rights will 
also be distinguished from one another. The accepted rules and methods of interpretation 
applicable to international treaties under the VCLT are then investigated. Following this, the 
methods used in the interpretation of human rights treaties are examined. Finally, the 
interpretive methodology of the Committee is analysed along with the possibilities for 
integrating environmental considerations within the Covenant through this methodology. 
                                            
1 See Chapter 1, 1 5 1 and 3 2 below. 





3 2 Human rights approaches to environmental protection 
Literature on the intersection between human rights and the environment has, for the 
most part, emphasised the potential for human rights to enhance environmental protection. 
Framed in this manner, the underlying objective could be understood by some as being the 
protection of the environment. It is necessary to distinguish the latter approach from this 
dissertation which investigates how environmental considerations can be integrated into 
ESCRs in order to ensure that those rights are more effectively protected both now and into 
the future. Although this necessarily involves environmental protection, the main objective 
is to protect the environmental base which is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of these human 
rights. This is not to say that there is no merit in expanding environmental protection through 
human rights mechanisms, but the motivation for this research is the realisation of ESCRs 
and not the protection of the environment per se.3 
Chuffart and Viñuales note the emphasis on human rights approaches to environmental 
protection in international law and point out that it can also be useful to consider human 
rights from an environmental perspective: 
“Human rights have, of course, much to offer to international environmental law, but the 
opposite is also true. […] [L]ooking at human rights from the environmental shore provides a 
number of insights which are potentially useful not only for a broader understanding of human 
rights and their normative context but also, and more importantly, for the continuing quest for 
their implementation”.4 
This dissertation views ESCRs from “the environmental shore” in order to examine how the 
integration of environmental considerations can protect and enhance the realisation of the 
rights in the Covenant. It is nevertheless useful to briefly outline existing human rights 
approaches to environmental protection. Although the underlying objective of these 
approaches may differ, they provide deeper insights into how the relationship between 
human rights and the environment can be understood. 
As noted in Chapter 1, a number of human rights approaches to environmental protection 
are identified in the literature.5 Boyle and Anderson identify three approaches, namely: the 
mobilisation of existing human rights for environmental ends; the reinterpretation of existing 
rights to incorporate environmental concerns; and the establishment of new rights with an 
                                            
3 Of course, in many instances the goals of environmental protection and the realisation of ESCRs will be 
mutually supporting. 
4 S Chuffart & JE Viñuales “From the Other Shore: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from an International 
Environmental Law Perspective” in Riedel E, G Giacca & C Golay (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (2014) 286 307. 




explicit environmental character. 6  Leib identifies similar approaches referred to as: the 
expansion theory (bestowing an environmental interpretation on established human rights);7 
the environmental democracy theory (empowering the public through the use of 
environmental procedural rights);8 and the genesis theory (the creation of a new human right 
based on the claim that a right to the environment is indispensable for the fulfilment of other 
human rights).9 Kiss and Shelton identify the following four approaches: (1) the utilisation of 
relevant human rights in the drafting of international environmental instruments; (2) the 
application or recasting of existing human rights to include an environmental dimension 
where they are threatened by environmental harm; (3) the incorporation of the environmental 
agenda into human rights by formulating a new substantive environmental right;10 and (4) 
the reframing of the question by addressing ethical and legal duties instead of rights.11 
The reinterpretation of existing human rights has many potential benefits for 
environmental protection, and therefore for the continued feasibility and promotion of the 
rights themselves. In contrast to substantive environmental rights, which are still being 
debated in the international arena, the rights in the Covenant are already accepted and 
established, allowing for a broader possible acceptance of the environmental dimensions 
thereof. From an anthropocentric, human rights-based perspective, it is essential to take 
environmental considerations into account to ensure (1) that the environment is adequately 
protected in order to preserve its human rights-supporting functions; and (2) that the 
enjoyment of human rights is not unduly impeded by environmental threats and degradation.  
This dissertation will use the expansion theory or the reinterpretation of existing human 
rights obligations to extend the interpretation and application of the Covenant in order to 
incorporate environmental dimensions. The underlying aim is to further the objectives of the 
Covenant and safeguard the rights therein. As the effective integration of environmental 
                                            
6 MR Anderson “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview” in AE Boyle & MR 
Anderson (eds) Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (1998) 1 4. 
7 LH Leib Human Rights and the Environment (2011) 71-72. 
8 Leib HR and the Environment 81. 
9 Leib HR and the Environment 88. Chuffart and Viñuales similarly identify three approaches: broadening 
existing rights; asserting substantive environmental rights; and asserting procedural environmental rights. See 
Chuffart & Viñuales “From the Other Shore” in ESCR in International Law 288. 
10  See, for example, UNHRC Rights of the Child: Realizing the Rights of the Child through a Healthy 
Environment (13 October 2020) A/HRC/RES/45/30; UNGA Towards a Global Pact for the Environment (14 
May 2018) A/RES/72/277. See further Knox “The Global Pact for the Environment” (2019) 28 RECIEL 40-47; 
International Group of Experts for the Pact “Text of the Draft Global Pact for the Environment by the IGEP” 
(2017) Global Pact for the Environment <https://globalpactenvironment.org/en/document/draft-global-pact-for-
the-environment-by-the-igep/> (accessed 15-10-2020). See also Atapattu HR Approaches to Climate Change 
51-62. See also Chapter 1, 1 1. 
11 AC Kiss & D Shelton International Environmental Law 3 ed (2004) 663. See also D Shelton, “Human Rights 




considerations within the Covenant requires legitimacy and support from States Parties to 
the Covenant, any interpretation must be grounded in the existing rules regarding treaty 
interpretation, and specifically the interpretation of human rights treaties. These rules of 
interpretation are therefore set out in more detail in the sections that follow. 
3 3 Interpretation of the Covenant 
3 3 1 Introduction 
This section outlines the rules applicable to the interpretation of the Covenant. It begins 
with a discussion of the nature legal interpretation in international treaty law, with an 
emphasis on the rules set out in the VCLT. As particular interpretive methods have 
developed regarding human rights treaties, these are addressed separately before 
analysing the particular interpretive methods applied and endorsed by the Committee itself 
in interpreting the Covenant. 
3 3 2 Treaty interpretation in international law 
3 3 2 1 The nature of legal interpretation 
Legal interpretation, like any textual interpretation, involves ascribing meaning to the 
language of the text. This is not always a straightforward process as meaning is rarely (if 
ever) clear and fixed.12 There is a range of possible meanings that could be attributed to a 
text through interpretation, and it is not always possible to determine which interpretation is 
‘correct’.13 It is therefore important to differentiate between the extraction of meaning and 
the construction of meaning. The latter is the act of retrieving the ‘true’ meaning hidden 
within the text. 14 This requires the interpreter to buy into the “myth of the mechanical 
extraction of pre-ordained meaning”.15 In reality, the text should be seen as holding within it 
                                            
12 This indeterminacy of meaning is a central element of the interpretive turn in legal interpretation. On the 
interpretive turn generally, see S Fish Is There a Text in This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities 
(1980); O Fiss “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739 739-763; RL West “The 
Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn” (1990) 66 Chicago-Kent Law Review 451 451-480; SM Feldman 
“The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence” (1991) 76 Iowa Law Review 661 661-699; RL 
West “Are There Nothing but Texts in This Class? Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal Thought” (2000) 
76 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1125 1125-1165.  
13 P Allott “Interpretation: An Exact Art” in A Bianchi, D Peat & M Windsor Interpretation in International Law 
(2015) 373 374; J d’Aspremont “The Multi-Dimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-Determination and 
Law-Ascertainment Distinguished” in A Bianchi, D Peat & M Windsor Interpretation in International Law (2015) 
111 115-116. 
14 D Peat & M Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation: On Meaning and Metaphor in International Law” 
in A Bianchi, D Peat & M Windsor (eds) Interpretation in International Law (2015) 3 9; d’Aspremont “The Multi-
Dimensional Process” in Interpretation in International Law 114. 




“countless possible meanings”.16 Interpretation is not an empirical process of “unearthing 
what is already out there”,17 but rather “an act of the imagination”18 which involves creatively 
constructing meaning.19 There is no single correct or true meaning to be extracted and the 
act of interpretation could therefore be described as an art rather than an exact science.20 
The absence of a single correct meaning of the text, it is necessary to consider the context 
within which interpretation takes place. Allott notes that interpretation is carried out at various 
moments in the life of the text, by various interpreters, and in various circumstances, all 
forming part of the “unique ‘becoming’” of the text. 21  He identifies three ‘moments’ of 
interpretation in the life of a legal text: (1) the programmatic moment of interpretation “in 
making the text”; (2) the prevenient moment of “interpreting an existing text in order to 
exercise influence over its future interpretation”; and (3) the pragmatic moment of 
interpreting the text “in order to apply it authoritatively”.22 This study is concerned with the 
prevenient moment which is characterised by efforts aimed at influencing the eventual 
interpretation of those who have legal power to make authoritative interpretations and 
decisions when the text is interpreted and applied in the pragmatic moment.23 
This idea of ‘moments’ in interpretation serves as a reminder that interpretation is not 
static, but rather “a moment in the colourful life of a text, an event in its ongoing biography”.24 
Meaning is not permanently fixed, but rather shifts and evolves with each interpretation (and 
interpreter), and must adapt to new contexts. Allott suggests that interpretation can be 
understood as the resolution of the tension between the text and its context.25 It is interesting 
to note that Allot’s conceptualisation of the text as a “living process” echoes the 
characterisation of human rights instruments by international tribunals and the application 
of the evolutive approach discussed below.26 
Despite the multiplicity of potential meaning and the recognition that the interpretation of 
a text involves a creative construction of meaning, legal interpretation is constrained by 
                                            
16 Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 374. 
17 d’Aspremont “The Multi-Dimensional Process” in Interpretation in International Law 115. 
18 Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 373. 
19 Peat & Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 9. 
20 Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 382; DB Hollis “The Existential Function of 
Interpretation in International Law” in A Bianchi, D Peat & M Windsor (eds) Interpretation in International Law 
(2015) 78 84-85. 
21 Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 380. 









specific rules. Formal rules for the interpretation of treaties are set out in articles 31 to 33 of 
the VCLT. Commentators have recognised the problematic nature of prescribing methods 
of treaty interpretation within a treaty which is itself open to interpretation. Allott notes, for 
example, that the use of the term “context” in the VCLT has the effect of “opening the 
interpretative process as wide as the imagination of the interpreters” illustrating the “fatuity” 
of a treaty outlining universal rules for interpretation when that text is itself open to 
interpretation.27 Peat and Windsor note that the VCLT lends “an aura of formalism” to the 
interpretation of international treaties.28 Although these rules are themselves incapable of a 
single fixed or true meaning, Allott aptly points out that it may be important to make use of 
these rules if the resulting interpretation is to have persuasive effect: 
“Interpretation in all fields, including in the legal field, has no inherent limits to its reliance on 
external contexts and references and associations. But its effectiveness in changing minds 
and causing social change depends on pragmatic respect for conventionally determined 
expectations limiting its inherent freedom, expectations that are indeterminate but numerous 
and powerful”.29 
In other words, an interpreter is entitled to take any number of factors into account and this 
could produce a vast range of possible interpretations, but these interpretations may not 
have the desired impact or influence if they fail to comply with the established rules of the 
game, i.e. the provisions of the VCLT. The formal rules of interpretation in the VCLT are 
widely recognised and, in order to propose a convincing and defensible interpretation of a 
treaty within the international legal arena, one must “play by the rules”. 30  The art of 
interpretation therefore involves prudent use of the creative imagination to propose “a better 
kind of law for a better kind of international society” within the conventional constraints 
imposed by the VCLT. 31  As will be argued below, this does not mean that treaty 
interpretation should be static and formalistic. In fact, the interpretation of human rights 
treaties, and indeed the Covenant itself, illustrates the scope for the imaginative art of 
interpretation within the bounds of the VCLT. 
                                            
27  Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 383. See also Allott “Interpretation” in 
Interpretation in International Law 375 where the following is noted: “It is a source of special intellectual 
pleasure to note that, from the moment they were put on paper, the Vienna Convention provisions on the 
interpretation of treaties have themselves been subjected to interpretation of an exceptionally intense and 
contentious kind. The Vienna Convention text on ‘meaning’ certainly has no ‘meaning’”. 
28 Peat & Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 5. See also 
d’Aspremont “The Multi-Dimensional Process” in Interpretation in International Law 122. 
29 Allott “Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 392. 
30 Peat & Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 5. 




3 3 2 2 Treaty interpretation prior to the VCLT 
Prior to the adoption of the VCLT in 1969, there were three principal approaches to treaty 
interpretation. The first was the subjective approach which aims to establish the intention of 
the parties; the second was the objective or textual approach which focuses on the meaning 
of the text; and the third was the teleological approach which emphasises the object and 
purpose of the treaty.32 As Fitzmaurice notes, “[t]hese schools of interpretation are not 
mutually exclusive” and can be applied in conjunction with one another.33 In relation to 
human rights treaty interpretation, the teleological approach was recognised as particularly 
important, while the textual approach was generally understood to be less rigid in the case 
of human rights treaties.34 
The VCLT, in formalising the rules or principles of treaty interpretation, draws on all three 
of the abovementioned approaches.35 It accommodates these methods of interpretation, 
and proponents of each of these approaches are able find support for their position within 
its provisions.36 It therefore cannot be said that the VCLT validates one particular approach. 
Despite the formalisation of the approaches to interpretation within the VCLT, Gardiner 
argues that the provisions have been flexibly interpreted and applied, and suggests that they 
are “more in the nature of principles and indications of admissible material”.37 He suggests 
that the provisions should be imagined as “scaffolding” for interpretation as opposed to a 
“formulaic set of requirements”. 38 The components of this scaffolding in the VCLT are 
discussed in more detail below. 
3 3 2 3 The provisions of the VCLT  
Article 31 of the VCLT sets out the “general rule of interpretation”. Article 31(1) states: 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”. 
Article 31(2) elaborates on the meaning of context; article 31(3) provides for additional 
factors that should be considered; and article 31(4) makes reference to the intention of the 
                                            
32 E Bjorge “The Vienna Rules, Evolutionary Interpretation and the Intentions of the Parties” in A Bianchi, D 
Peat & M Windsor (eds) Interpretation in International Law (2015) 189 196; M Fitzmaurice “Interpretation of 
Human Rights Treaties” in D Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013) 
739 745; M Fitzmaurice “The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties” in MD Evans (ed) International Law 2 
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33 Fitzmaurice “Law of Treaties” in International Law 199. 
34 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation” in Oxford Handbook of International HR Law 745-746. 
35 Fitzmaurice “Law of Treaties” in International Law 199. 
36 Hollis “Existential Function of Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 81; Fitzmaurice “Law of 
Treaties” in International Law 199. 
37 R Gardiner “The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation” in DB Hollis (ed) The Oxford Guide to 
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parties. Article 31 therefore provides for interpretation which considers ordinary meaning, 
context, and object and purpose. Many commentators have noted that the use of the 
singular “rule” in the title of article 31 suggests that treaty interpretation should involve all 
these elements, rather than proposing a piecemeal or hierarchical approach. 39  The 
elements of article 31 have also been described as representing a “logical progression”.40 
Ҫalı supports a holistic approach to article 31, recognising the importance of examining how 
“the wording, context, and object and purpose interact with each other”.41 Interpretation 
which combines these elements of article 31 has also been referred to as the “crucible 
approach”.42 The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) endorsed this approach in 
Golder v United Kingdom43 where the Court confirmed that “the process of interpretation of 
a treaty is a unity, a single combined operation” which places the various elements of article 
31 “on the same footing”.44 
Turning to the specific components of article 31, the provision begins by stating that 
interpretation of a treaty must be done “in good faith”, requiring the parties “to act honestly, 
fairly and reasonably” in interpreting treaties.45 The good faith requirement means that 
parties are bound by what they have agreed to. 46  The parties cannot deliberately 
misconstrue a provision to exclude its ordinary meaning in order to avoid the associated 
obligations.  
The requirement to consider “ordinary meaning” supports an objective textual approach 
(or literal approach) to treaty interpretation. As noted above, an “ordinary” or universal 
meaning to language is frequently elusive. The absence of a fixed objective and true 
meaning necessitates the consideration of context and object and purpose. 47 Gardiner 
notes that context and object and purpose are often “pointers to the appropriate ordinary 
meaning”.48 Establishing ordinary meaning can be particularly problematic in relation to 
                                            
39 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation” in Oxford Handbook of International HR Law 746; Fitzmaurice “Law of Treaties” 
in International Law 199; Gardiner “Vienna Convention Rules” in Oxford Guide to Treaties 480; B Ҫalı 
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40 Fitzmaurice “Law of Treaties” in International Law 199. 
41 Ҫalı “Specialized Rules” in Oxford Guide to Treaties 528 & 532-533.  
42 Ҫalı “Specialized Rules” in Oxford Guide to Treaties 528 & 532-533. 
43 Golder v United Kingdom Application No 4451/70 (1975) ECtHR (“Golder”). 
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Rules” in Oxford Guide to Treaties 528; Fitzmaurice “Interpretation” in Oxford Handbook of International HR 
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human rights treaties that very often include “abstract concepts or general terminology that 
may apply to many different situations or include many particular elements or principles”.49  
The context referred to in article 31(1) is further defined in article 31(2) which states that 
context includes: the text itself; its preamble and annexes; agreements between the parties 
connected to the treaty’s conclusion; and instruments related to the treaty which have been 
accepted by the parties.50 Contextual interpretation can also be described as systematic 
interpretation, referring to a systematic consideration of a treaty as a whole.51 
The object and purpose of a treaty are important elements of its interpretation and central 
to the teleological approach. Article 31(1) requires that the meaning attributed to the treaty 
must be consistent with its object and purpose, which can be determined through reference 
to the “aims, nature and end” of the treaty as a whole.52 Object and purpose can, however, 
be difficult to establish. Some argue that a treaty may have multiple objects and purposes, 
and individual provisions may even have diverging objects and purposes.53  
Gardiner notes that the reference to object and purpose in article 31 “is not a teleological 
imperative subordinating the terms of the treaty to its purpose”, but rather an enabling 
provision which allows for the object and purpose to form part of the interpretation.54 The 
language of treaty provisions therefore does not lose significance where object and purpose 
are emphasised. Of course, there may be disagreement regarding the reach of object and 
purpose where there is a conflict with the ordinary meaning of the terms. A teleological 
approach promotes the object and purpose to the extent that the language of the treaty 
allows it. As is discussed below, this approach is particularly important for the interpretation 
of human rights treaties. 
Article 31(3) of the VCLT states that any subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, 
and any relevant rules of international law must be taken into account. It is not always clear 
when or how subsequent practice should influence interpretation. Importantly for human 
rights treaties, the outcomes of human rights treaty monitoring procedures could be 
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considered subsequent practice as states generally give tacit approval to such outcomes.55 
Yeshanew echoes this position, arguing that: 
“[T]he views on individual complaints, concluding observations and general comments of 
human rights monitoring organs in the UN human rights system […] may also be regarded as 
subsequent practice or authoritative institutionalized practice in the application and 
interpretation of those treaties”.56  
He also argues that consensus regarding subsequent practice is more important than the 
status of such practice as binding or non-binding.57 Arato suggests that reliance on the 
practice of states is influenced by the nature of the norm in question. Where human rights 
are concerned, it is unlikely that subsequent state practice would be relied on in support of 
a restrictive interpretation of the relevant right.58 Subsequent practice must therefore be 
understood in combination with other interpretive approaches. 
As for the “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”59, this accords with the principle of systematic integration in international law and 
ensures that the treaty is not interpreted in a “legal vacuum” without due regard for the 
broader context of international law.60 Chuffart and Viñuales note, for example, how the 
ECtHR has relied on the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (“the Aarhus 
Convention”) 61 as relevant international material for the interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).62 
Article 31 concludes with reference to the intention of the parties to the treaty. Article 
31(4) states that “[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended”. The intention of the parties is a traditional concept in treaty 
interpretation, based on the premise that the parties have agreed to a particular 
understanding of the treaty, and their intentions in concluding the treaty are paramount. 
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Bjorge argues that the search for the parties’ intention is “the very aim of the process set out 
in Article 31 of the VCLT”. 63 In line with the idea of a singular rule in article 31, he suggests 
that the process set out in the article will give effect to article 31(4).64 In Bjorge’s view, the 
intention of the parties is determined through an application of the means of interpretation 
in article 31(1)-(3) and does not constitute “a separately identifiable factor”.65  
In addition to the general rule of interpretation in article 31, article 32 of the VCLT sets 
out supplementary means of interpretation. 66  These supplementary means include 
preparatory work in relation to the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. In contrast 
to the elements of article 31, the supplementary means are only put to use where the 
application of the general rule in article 31 “does not provide a satisfactory result or leads to 
absurd meanings”.67 Yeshanew notes that the travaux preparatoires of human rights treaties 
can be useful in providing insight into the meaning of the treaty or specific provisions thereof, 
or for “identifying sources of inspiration for the instrument which in turn are relevant in the 
treaty’s interpretation”.68 While this is true, the preparatory work and the related intention of 
the drafters holds less weight in the case of human rights treaties which emphasise the 
position at the time of interpretation.69 
Finally, article 33 governs the interpretation of treaties where the treaty is authenticated 
in two or more languages. The article sets out the circumstances where another version of 
the text will be considered authentic, and states that the terms of the treaty “are presumed 
to have the same meaning in each authentic text” unless the parties or the treaty appoint 
one to prevail.70 
In conclusion, it is clear that the VCLT accommodates different modes of interpretation, 
indicating that these should be employed concurrently as part of the single “rule” of 
interpretation. Such an approach will not, of course, result in a single “correct” interpretation, 
as the choices interpreters make and the different methods emphasised can result in a range 
of legitimate interpretations. As Hollis points out, the proponents of the different methods of 
interpretation have all found support for their particular method in the provisions of the 
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VCLT.71 Given the potential for various approaches (and consequently various meanings) it 
is therefore necessary that interpreters are transparent about the approaches which have 
been favoured. The following section analyses the particular approaches emphasised in the 
interpretation of human rights treaties. 
3 3 3 Interpretation of human rights treaties 
3 3 3 1 A specialised regime for human rights treaties? 
The VCLT provisions provide important rules for interpretation which apply to all treaties, 
including human rights treaties.72 However, due to their distinctive nature, there is some 
debate around whether human rights treaties require a specialised or self-contained regime 
in relation to interpretation.73 Alston and Goodman suggest that an obstacle to “reliable 
generalization about treaty interpretation”, and therefore a reason for varied approaches, is 
the fact that treaties serve a variety of purposes.74 However, Fitzmaurice argues that the 
idea of a self-contained regime may “giv[e] too much credence to the ‘separateness’ of a 
particular field of law” as there is never a complete separation from general law.75 The 
ECtHR has, however, confirmed the distinctive nature of human rights treaties in relation to 
the ECHR, noting that “regard must be had to its special character as a treaty for the 
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.76 
In order to understand the distinct approaches to human rights treaties, it is useful to 
consider the characteristics of such treaties that have a bearing on their interpretation. 
Fitzmaurice identifies two important shared characteristics.77 The first relates to the “so-
called ‘constitutional’ nature” of the treaties and is linked to the non-reciprocal nature of the 
obligations.78 The second relates to the subject matter of these treaties, requiring what is 
known as the ‘pro homine’ approach which seeks to interpret a treaty so as to give practical 
effect to the rights and needs of the individual.79 Fitzmaurice notes that the latter approach 
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confirms the ‘constitutional’ nature of human rights treaties by recognising that human rights 
arise from the nature of the human person and not from their explicit inclusion within a 
treaty.80  
Ҫalı points out that the scope of application is also vastly different for human rights 
treaties: 
“Human rights treaties apply to a much larger universe of situations than many other 
international treaties. By their very nature, human rights provisions need to be interpreted in 
the light of changing political, social, and economic justifications of State policies”.81 
She explains that the act of interpreting and applying human rights treaties necessarily 
involves “subsuming particulars under generals in the domain of the relationship between 
the State and the individual”.82 For this reason the wording of human rights treaties tends to 
be more generalised and abstract than is the case with other treaties.83 
Arato recognises that specialised treatment has been recommended for human rights 
treaties on the basis of their subject matter, their object and purpose, and the presence of 
third-party rights.84 However, Arato makes a compelling argument for differential treatment 
on the basis of the nature of the obligations themselves. He distinguishes between absolute, 
reciprocal and interdependent obligations, and suggests that varying interpretive 
approaches of international tribunals can be explained according to the type of obligation 
being interpreted. 85 In other words, Arato argues that it is the nature of human rights 
obligations, which he identifies as absolute obligations, that should dictate the approach 
used. Fitzmaurice similarly notes that “the non-reciprocal character of human rights 
obligations” is a crucial distinguishing feature of human rights treaties.86 The “mastery” that 
states enjoy over reciprocal obligations, allowing them to modify or replace obligations 
through agreement, cannot be applied to the same degree in relation to absolute 
obligations.87 Arato explains that absolute obligations are: 
“[M]ore insulated from the changing will of the parties (reducing the weight assigned to 
subsequent practice that deviates from the treaty’s object and purpose), and are potentially 
more amenable to autonomous evolution (again in light of its object and purpose)”.88  
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This approach also allows for specialised treatment of different obligations within the same 
treaty, although most human rights treaties will largely be made up of such absolute 
obligations.89 
It is necessary to consider how human rights tribunals deal with treaty interpretation in 
practice. Although each tribunal develops its own approaches, Fitzmaurice has identified 
three common approaches of human rights tribunals to treaty interpretation.90 The first is a 
recognition of the subject matter of human rights, which links to the pro homine approach 
referred to above. The second is the recognition of the non-reciprocal rights and obligations 
and the constitutional nature of the treaties that justifies “a more teleological approach” to 
interpretation.91 Finally, the interpretive practice of human rights tribunals indicates that 
there is a great deal of conscious cross-fertilisation among these tribunals through reference 
to each other’s jurisprudence and to common sources.92 In relation to the latter approach, 
Ҫalı notes that this may assist in “reaching a coherent or overlapping interpretation of human 
rights treaty provisions by cumulatively confirming a particular interpretation”.93 She links 
this approach to article 31(3) of the VCLT and points out that the practice of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) and the ECtHR demonstrates that this cross-
fertilisation “enables interpreters to solidify and harmonize the meanings of human rights 
treaty provisions”.94 
Fitzmaurice notes that, among international scholars, there seems to be consensus that 
the interpretive approaches of human rights tribunals accord with the provisions of the VCLT, 
and that the varying approaches of these tribunals are moving towards a largely unified 
methodology.95 Specific aspects of this methodology are discussed in more detail below, 
particularly in relation to the role of object and purpose, the closely related principle of 
effectiveness, and the evolutive approach to interpretation. 
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3 3 3 2 The interpretive methodology of human rights tribunals 
3 3 3 2 1  Object and purpose 
Object and purpose are identified in article 31 of the VCLT as relevant factors to take into 
account when interpreting a treaty. 96 As noted above, it is widely recognised that the 
teleological approach is particularly important for human rights treaties. 97  The 
characteristics of human rights treaties, including their abstract wording, broadly formulated 
provisions, non-reciprocal obligations, and multilateral nature necessitates an approach that 
places less emphasis on the subjective and objective approaches to interpretation. Rather, 
the question is whether or not a particular interpretation is in line with the object and purpose 
of the treaty.98 
As Yeshanew explains, a treaty’s ‘object and purpose’ refers to “its aims, nature and end 
and applying to a treaty as a whole rather than to its parts or articles”.99 This can be identified 
through examining preambular provisions, treaty titles and “similar instruments concluded 
among a similar group of parties”.100 Fitzmaurice notes that many human rights fora have 
followed a teleological approach to interpretation by giving weight to “preambles of the 
conventions and even to extraneous documents, such as human rights declarations, to 
which the preambles generally refer”.101 
Commentators agree that there is an important link between the teleological approach 
and what is termed the ‘principle of effectiveness’. Fitzmaurice suggests that the principle of 
effectiveness forms part of the requirement in article 31 to consider object and purpose.102 
Gardiner similarly argues that the VCLT requirements of ‘good faith’ and ‘object and 
purpose’, when read together, encapsulate the principle of effectiveness.103 Ҫalı, on the 
other hand, describes effectiveness as the “overarching umbrella” encapsulating the 
“special rules” of human rights treaty interpretation.104 She suggests that the effectiveness 
approach has its origins in article 31(1), arguing that human rights interpreters “view the 
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interaction between wording, context, and object and purpose as requiring ‘effective, real, 
and concrete’ protection of human rights provisions”.105 
Although there are different ways to conceptualise the place of the principle of 
effectiveness in human rights treaty interpretation, its meaning is relatively clear. 
Effectiveness is generally defined in terms of two aspects.106 First, effectiveness means that 
each provision in a treaty has meaning and effect.107 This has been linked to the idea of 
good faith interpretation in the VCLT.108 This aspect of effectiveness also relates to the Latin 
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, that a provision should be interpreted to have an 
effect rather than no effect.109 A good faith interpretation should therefore assume that every 
provision of a treaty has significance and should be ascribed some effect.110 The second 
aspect of effectiveness relates to teleological interpretation111 and the idea that a treaty 
should be interpreted in such a way as to actually achieve its object and purpose.112 In other 
words, a treaty must be afforded an interpretation that renders it practically effective in 
achieving its aims.113 
Although the principle of effectiveness applies generally to treaty interpretation, Ҫalı 
illustrates how the abovementioned aspects of effectiveness have been developed in the 
context of human rights treaties.114 The first aspect of effectiveness, requiring a good faith 
interpretation which has meaning and effect, emphasises the need for human rights treaties 
to have “real effect in terms of the concrete and actual lives” of individual rights-holders.115 
Ҫalı argues that this element of effectiveness also “requires the interpreter to take into 
account the ability of existing frameworks to protect individual rights over time”.116 This 
approach has been followed by the ECtHR in the case of Airey v Ireland117 where the Court 
held that the ECHR “is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but 
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rights that are practical and effective”.118 In the context of the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights this principle has, for example, been expressed as requiring a 
“responsiveness to African circumstances”.119 
The second aspect of effectiveness, relating to teleological interpretation, has been linked 
to the burden of proof in the human rights context. Ҫalı argues that this aspect of 
effectiveness requires the burden of proof to shift from the individual to the state in order to 
justify a failure or infringement on the state’s part.120 This is due to the objects and purposes 
of human rights treaties which relate to the protection of the human person.121 This facet of 
effectiveness and teleological interpretation is associated with the idea of pro homine 
interpretation, i.e. interpretation which favours the rights-holder.122 Pro homine interpretation 
seeks to give the broadest possible protection to the rights-holder. The IACtHR has 
developed the pro homine approach to the extent that an interpretation which favours the 
individual is followed “even if this comes at the expense of the wording or context”.123 An 
effective interpretation which seeks to favour the individual in their concrete circumstances 
should be pragmatic and take into account present day conditions.124 Ҫalı notes that “[a]n 
important consequence of the employment of effectiveness has been to disregard original 
intent and formal protection of rights in favour of dynamic interpretation and practical 
protection of rights.”125 
3 3 3 2 2  The evolutive approach 
The second important approach to human rights treaty interpretation rooted in object and 
purpose is the evolutive approach (or evolutionary interpretation).126 This refers to the need 
for a treaty to be interpreted in light of changing circumstances and evolving meaning. As 
human rights treaties are long-term treaties which need to be applied to a variety of 
circumstances over time, their interpretation must be flexible and sensitive to change.127 As 
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Alston and Goodman note, “[t]he long-term treaty must rest upon a certain flexibility and 
room for development if it is to survive changes in circumstances and relations between the 
parties”.128 
 Bjorge describes evolutionary interpretation as interpretation which is flexible and takes 
account of the “meaning acquired by the treaty terms when the treaty is applied”.129 He links 
this approach to the intention of the parties, arguing that evolutive interpretation aims to 
establish the “objectivized intention of the parties” at the time the treaty is interpreted through 
the application of articles 31-33 of the VCLT.130 Peat and Windsor argue that, in the case of 
Goodwin v United Kingdom,131 the ECtHR attempted to establish the intent of “a hypothetical 
speaker”132 (the international community), as opposed to the intent of the original drafters of 
the ECHR.133 In this way the court allowed for the interpretation of the ECHR to evolve with 
changing circumstances.134 
Fitzmaurice describes evolutive interpretation as a mechanism which links article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT to article 31(1). 135  In other words, it acknowledges developments in 
international law applicable between the parties, thereby allowing for the constant evolution 
of the treaty’s meaning. The International Court of Justice applied this approach in Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 136  where the ICJ 
emphasised the necessity of considering important developments which occurred between 
the conclusion of a treaty and its interpretation.137 
The IACtHR has affirmed the evolutive approach and held it to be consistent with the 
provisions of the VCLT.138 In Mapiripán Massacre vs Colombia the IACtHR followed this 
                                            
128 Alston & Goodman International HR 117-118. 
129 Bjorge “Vienna Rules” in Interpretation in International Law 191. 
130 Bjorge “Vienna Rules” in Interpretation in International Law 190-191. 
131 Goodwin v United Kingdom Application No 28957/95 (2002) ECtHR. 
132 Peat & Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation” in Interpretation in International Law 11. 
133  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, as amended by additional protocols) 213 UNTS 222 
(“ECHR”). 
134 Peat and Windsor explain that the ECtHR relied on increased “international consensus regarding the 
recognition of post-operative transsexuals” to interpret the ECHR so as to include an obligation on the state to 
recognise the post-operative gender of transsexual persons. The intent relied on was that of the international 
community as “hypothetical speaker”. See Peat & Windsor “Playing the Game of Interpretation” in 
Interpretation in International Law 11. 
135 Fitzmaurice “Interpretation” in Oxford Handbook of International HR Law 751. 
136 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 16. 
137 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971) 16 para 53. See also Fitzmaurice “Interpretation” in Oxford Handbook 
of International HR Law 750. 




evolutive approach and noted that “human rights treaties are live instruments, whose 
interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and current living conditions”.139 
The idea of human rights treaties as “living instruments” is evident in the practice of a number 
of human rights tribunals, and is linked to an evolutive approach to interpretation.140 This 
‘living instrument’ approach is also referred to by some as “the concept of dynamic 
interpretation of treaties”.141 The IACtHR has also held that human rights treaties are “living 
instruments whose interpretations must consider the changes over time and present-day 
conditions”.142 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR also refers to ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ from as early 
as 1978.143 In Tyrer v United Kingdom the court held that “the [ECHR] is a living instrument 
which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.144 As Fitzmaurice 
points out, the living instrument concept has been “fundamental to the development of the 
ECtHR’s concept of evolutive interpretation”.145  
In addition to the ECtHR and the IACtHR, the dynamic interpretation of treaties as living 
instruments is an approach followed by UN human rights bodies. 146 In relation to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 147  the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”) has held that the ICCPR must be interpreted as a “living instrument” 
and that the rights therein should be applied “in the context and in the light of present-day 
conditions”. 148 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has similarly 
referred to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination149 as a “living instrument” that “must be interpreted and applied taking into 
[account] the circumstances of contemporary society”.150 
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It is clear that human rights tribunals have advanced an approach to treaty interpretation 
which allows for meaning to evolve over time and according to circumstances, thereby 
ensuring that human rights treaties do not become obsolete.151 Medina argues that this 
process of updating human rights to apply to new circumstances is a duty forming part of 
the judicial (and treaty body) mandate.152 This “pragmatic and evolutive” approach allows 
these treaties to be applied to new problems which did not exist at the time of their drafting, 
thereby continuing to ensure the realisation of human rights in accordance with the object 
and purpose of protecting the human person (or persons) as rights bearer.153 
3 3 3 3 The role of treaty bodies in interpretation 
Treaty monitoring bodies have a particularly important role to play in the interpretation of 
human rights instruments. This is largely due to the fact that human rights treaties have 
individual (and collective) beneficiaries. The states which are parties to these instruments 
have an interest in interpreting human rights restrictively in order to limit their own 
obligations, which is one of the reasons why treaty bodies are necessary for appropriate 
interpretation of human rights treaties.154 Treaty bodies fulfil the primary interpretive role in 
relation to human rights instruments and they are bound to do so in accordance with the 
VCLT.155 In accordance with a teleological approach to interpretation, treaty monitoring 
bodies tend to rely primarily on the reference to “object and purpose” in the VCLT in support 
of their approach.156 
As noted above, 157  human rights treaties are characterised by the generalised and 
abstract wording required in order to allow their provisions to find application in a diverse 
range of circumstances. 158 This requires greater interpretive efforts to determine how to 
apply these treaties to the specific political, social and economic circumstances at hand. 
Human rights treaty bodies therefore have a particularly important role in the interpretation 
of these treaties. 159 
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 Regarding the outputs of treaty bodies, Mechlem notes that these are included in the 
“subsequent practice” in article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.160 In this way the practice of treaty 
bodies plays an important role in interpretation. State practice remains significant as states’ 
responses to the work of a treaty body can also constitute subsequent practice under article 
31(3)(b).161 Mechlem notes that states tend to rely on “interpretations offered by the treaty 
bodies in General Comments, the reporting guidelines, and the questions provided to 
them”.162 
Adherence to the VCLT rules in relation to treaty interpretation is important for the 
legitimacy of human rights treaty bodies.163 Mechlem examines the interpretive work of 
treaty bodies and comes to three conclusions. Firstly, she notes that “methodological 
weaknesses compromise the comprehensibility, consistency, rationality, and legitimacy of a 
committee’s output”.164 In other words, it is important for a treaty body to follow accepted 
methods of interpretation. Secondly, “a coherent body of interpretation” can be established 
by following the VCLT rules which require consideration of the text, context, and object and 
purpose of the treaty.165 Finally, following clearly defined rules of interpretation ensures that 
the line between interpretation of existing provisions and development of new law is not 
crossed.166 Applying consistent interpretive methodology in line with the VCLT therefore 
ensures that a treaty body remains within the boundaries of its mandate, and provides for 
more consistent and predictable interpretations that in turn allow States Parties to better 
predict the treaty body’s approach to future problems. These benefits of methodological 
certainty therefore enhance the legitimacy of the treaty body’s output.167 The particular role 
of the CESCR and its interpretive methodology is examined below. 
3 3 4 The interpretive methodology of the Committee  
3 3 4 1 The role of the Committee in interpreting the Covenant 
Before turning to the interpretation of the Covenant itself, it is necessary to discuss the 
role of the Committee and its supervisory mandate in relation to the Covenant. As noted in 
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Chapter 1, the supervision of the Covenant was entrusted to the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations (“ECOSOC”), and the Committee was subsequently 
established by means of a resolution of the ECOSOC.168 The Committee is unique in this 
respect as it has not been established in terms of the Covenant itself, and thus functions as 
a subsidiary of the ECOSOC.169 Despite this formal distinction between the Committee and 
other treaty bodies, Sepúlveda notes that “it has performed its tasks on an equal footing with 
the treaty bodies and has achieved recognition and respect”.170 The Committee exercises 
its supervisory mandate primarily through its concluding observations, general comments, 
and views under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (“Optional Protocol”).171 These are 
briefly discussed below. 
Concluding observations of the Committee are the outcome of the reporting process 
wherein States Parties participate in a “constructive and mutually rewarding dialogue” with 
the Committee.172 Since 1992 the Committee has commented on State Parties’ compliance 
with the obligations in the Covenant through concluding observations. 173 These are an 
important tool for identifying violations as well as structural issues hindering implementation 
of the Covenant.174 Concluding observations also include detailed recommendations for the 
protection of Covenant rights. This practice provides insight into how the Committee 
envisages the protection of ESCRs under the Covenant in the context of a specific 
country.175 Odello and Seatzu therefore note that this practice has contributed to “a wide 
interpretation of fundamental rights which can be applied to all ESCR”.176 While concluding 
observations are not judicial pronouncements, they are valuable in providing clarity on the 
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meaning and content of Covenant obligations.177 Mechlem notes that although concluding 
observations are not legally binding, “only a handful of states” have noted this, indicating 
widespread acceptance of the Committee’s authority and recognition of the Committee’s 
interpretation through this mechanism. 178  In addition to assisting States Parties in the 
interpretation and application of the Covenant, concluding observations may also be a 
helpful source of information and interpretation for other UN human rights organs.179 
General comments are another mechanism for developing the understanding of norms in 
the Covenant whereby the Committee assists States Parties in fulfilling their obligations 
through developing and clarifying its interpretation of Covenant provisions. 180  The 
Committee’s general comments have been described as “an essential tool for the 
understanding, interpretation and application of economic, social and cultural rights”. 181 
While they do not address the application of the Covenant within a specific country or 
situation, the Committee’s general comments contain a range of “conditions and practices 
that represent good examples for the application of ESCR in and by States Parties”.182 
General comments are not legally binding, but the Committee’s interpretations in this regard 
do have “considerable legal weight”.183 Many view a treaty body as “the most authoritative 
interpreter of the treaty it monitors”, making general comments a reflection an authoritative 
interpretation of the Covenant.184  
The Committee contributes to the interpretation of the Covenant through its views 
expressed in jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol.185 Communications can be brought 
by individuals or groups alleging a violation of rights under the Covenant. The Committee 
can then consider the communication and provide its reasoned view on whether or not there 
has been a violation of the Covenant. Mechlem notes that this consideration of individual 
communications by treaty bodies “has a clearer legal character than the adoption of 
concluding observations”.186 Through interpreting the Covenant in relation to a specific case, 
the Committee is able to further “crystallize the normative content and scope of each 
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Covenant right”.187 The Optional Protocol remains a relatively recent development, although 
the Committee is well on its way to developing a body of jurisprudence in this regard.188  
Finally, the Committee also delivers statements in relation to certain topics and issues of 
concern. These statements are the Committee’s “responses to the contemporary 
developments affecting Covenant rights”,189 and they “clarify and confirm” the Committee’s 
position in this regard.190 While the Committee’s statements do not have the same degree 
of persuasive legal weight afforded to the Committee’s other outputs, they do provide an 
indication of how the Committee’s envisages the application of the Covenant to 
contemporary challenges.191 These statements therefore provide an important indication of 
“an emerging consensus” from the Committee on how the Covenant should be interpreted 
and applied.192 
3 3 4 2 The Committee’s methods of interpretation 
In line with the approaches of other human rights treaty bodies and tribunals, the 
Committee’s approach to the interpretation of the Covenant is guided by the provisions of 
the VCLT, with a particular emphasis on the object and purpose of the Covenant.193 The 
Committee’s application of the interpretive method(s) in the VCLT will be briefly illustrated 
below with reference to its general comments. 
While much has been made of human rights treaty interpretation following a teleological 
approach, it must be noted that objective, textual (and contextual) interpretation still has an 
important role to play. The Committee has often referred to the ordinary meaning of 
individual terms in the Covenant as a starting point for interpretation.194 With regard to 
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contextual or systematic interpretation, there are a number of instances where the 
Committee has referred to the broader context of the Covenant and has interpreted 
provisions of the Covenant in light of other provisions and the Covenant as a whole.195 The 
context within which the Committee interprets the Covenant also extends to the field of 
human rights as a whole. The Committee regularly refers to the interdependence and 
indivisibility of rights, and will interpret individual Covenant rights in light of other international 
human rights norms.196 In accordance with VCLT article 31(3)(c) the context considered by 
the Committee also includes the broader field of international law. The Committee will, for 
example, refer to definitions of certain terms from other international organisations.197 This 
is an example of the conscious cross-fertilisation in human rights treaty interpretation 
referred to above.198 The Committee has also referred to the history of the drafting of the 
Covenant as provided for in supplementary materials in article 32 of the VCLT.199 
As would be expected, the Committee emphasises the object and purpose of the 
Covenant in its general comments, although the terminology of object and purpose is not 
always used.200 In General Comment 3, for example, the Committee notes that it is an 
objective of the Covenant “to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realization of the rights in question”.201 General Comment 19 refers to the preamble of 
the Covenant and notes the importance of the principle of human dignity contained 
therein.202 The Committee’s frequent reliance on human dignity confirms that it is a central 
object and purpose of the Covenant.203 The reliance on object and purpose, including 
human dignity, in the Committee’s interpretive methodology underscores the pro homine 
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approach, requiring an “extensive or inclusive interpretation” for the benefit of the rights-
bearer.204  
As noted above, the principle of effectiveness and the evolutive approach are derived 
from the object and purpose of human rights treaties. 205 The Committee’s interpretive 
methodology also demonstrates this. For example, the principle of effectiveness is evident 
in the Committee’s statement that an interpretation of a right in the Covenant should not 
“depriv[e] its correlative obligation of all meaningful content”.206 In other words, to interpret 
a right so restrictively that there is no substantive obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant would render the right meaningless. This would offend the principle of 
effectiveness which demands that every provision of a treaty is meaningful and effective. 
Similarly, the Committee has stated that the right to culture cannot be interpreted so as to 
undermine or destroy other rights in the Covenant, thereby rendering them meaningless and 
ineffective.207 The Committee also emphasises the need for the Covenant to have practical 
effect for the benefit of the individual (or collective) rights-bearer.208 
The evolutive approach is also evident in the Committee’s work. Sepúlveda notes that 
the Committee has provided a contemporary interpretation of the Covenant in line with 
developments in ESCRs.209 The Committee plays an important role in promoting changes 
in perception and “in creatively interpreting the Covenant by incorporating such changes in 
perception into the protection afforded by the Covenant”.210 The Committee recognises that 
certain notions evolve with developments in society and that the interpretation of Covenant 
must reflect this.211 In its general comments the Committee has recognised the evolution of 
the notions of “family”, “health” and “work” and has given these terms contemporary 
interpretations.212 The Committee is thus sensitive to the evolution of “assumptions […] 
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commonly accepted in 1966 when the Covenant was adopted”,213 as well as the evolution 
of human rights standards, treaties and jurisprudence.214  
Ultimately, the rights in the Covenant must be interpreted in order to “[give] them full effect 
in light of present-day conditions”.215 The Committee’s teleological approach has led to a 
broadening of its interpretation of Covenant rights and, therefore, an expansion of States 
Parties’ obligations. Sepúlveda argues that this is “absolutely in line with the rules for the 
interpretation of treaties in general international law as well as with the work of other human 
rights supervisory bodies”.216 
The Committee’s interpretation of the Covenant in its general comments is in line with the 
provisions of the VCLT. However, the application of the VCLT is not explicit, and the 
Committee rarely identifies its interpretive methodology. Some authors have suggested that 
more transparency and recognition of its methodology could increase the legitimacy (and 
predictability) of the Committee’s interpretations of the Covenant.217 The legitimacy of the 
Committee’s interpretations is ultimately essential for the effectiveness of the Covenant 
itself. As Sepúlveda notes “[t]he extent to which States Parties view the Committee’s 
interpretation as having ‘legitimacy’ will determine both how inclined they are to comply and 
the cost of non-compliance (in terms of ‘mobilisation of shame’)”.218 For the purposes of this 
dissertation it is therefore important to apply the accepted methods of interpretation 
discussed above in order to give full effect to provisions of the Covenant. 
3 3 5 Integrating environmental considerations into the Covenant through interpretation 
The interpretation of international treaties involves narrowing down the numerous 
possible meanings through an application of the accepted rules of interpretation. The VCLT 
sets out these rules, requiring a good faith interpretation which considers ordinary meaning, 
context, and object and purpose. 219 Given the nature of human rights treaties, certain 
methods of interpretation are particularly important for human rights tribunals and treaty 
bodies. Human rights treaty interpretation has emphasised interpretation “in the light of [the 
treaty’s] object and purpose”.220 This has led to a preference for teleological interpretation 
as well as the related pro homine approach; principle of effectiveness; and evolutive 
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approach. As demonstrated above, 221  the interpretive methodology applied by the 
Committee is consistent with the provisions of the VCLT. Adherence to these accepted rules 
of interpretation is necessary for the legitimacy of an interpretation and for subsequent 
compliance with the obligations of the Covenant.  
Any integration of environmental considerations through interpretation of the Covenant 
must therefore comply with the interpretive methods set out in this chapter. While the 
overarching teleological approach to interpretation forms the basis for the proposed 
interpretations in this dissertation, the principle of effectiveness and the evolutive approach 
to human rights treaty interpretation are of particular importance. These elements of 
teleological interpretation affirm that “new, clear, potential, or actual threats that the changes 
occurring in the world pose, necessitate a response, if the object and purpose of human 
rights law is not to be undermined”. 222  Given the rapidly changing condition of the 
environment and the vast extent of the threats to ESCRs posed by widespread 
environmental degradation and climate change,223 these interpretive methods provide clear 
support for the integration of environmental considerations within the Covenant. In fact, the 
application of the teleological approach demands that relevant environmental considerations 
are taken into account, particularly in light of principle of effectiveness and the evolutive 
approach. 
In conclusion, the integration of environmental considerations within the Covenant must 
adhere to the rules of the VCLT and the accepted methods of interpretation applied by 
human rights tribunals. 224 A failure to do so would threaten the legitimacy of the Committee 
as well as the cooperation and support of States Parties to the Covenant. In other words, 
the Covenant cannot be (mis)interpreted to impose environmental obligations which are 
outside the scope of the Covenant as understood according to the relevant rules and 
methodology. However, this dissertation aims to apply the methods of interpretation set out 
above to show that, in order for the Covenant to evolve with changes in society and to be 
effective in light of present-day circumstances, environmental considerations must be 
regarded as an essential part of the rights and obligations in the Covenant.225 
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3 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined an interpretive methodology for greening States Parties’ 
obligations under the Covenant. The human rights approaches to environmental protection 
illustrate how various scholars have understood the relationship between the environment 
and human rights. Given the burgeoning threat that environmental degradation poses to 
ESCRs, the continued protection and realisation of these rights compels a consideration of 
the environment in the interpretation of the Covenant. This dissertation aims to interpret 
States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant in light of environmental considerations in 
order to ensure the continued effective realisation the rights in the Covenant. This 
interpretation or “greening” of the Covenant must comply with accepted methods of 
interpretation. The applicable interpretive methods of interpretation for treaty interpretation 
are set out in the VCLT. In particular, human rights treaties emphasise teleological 
interpretation as well as the principle of effectiveness and the evolutive approach. These 
methods of interpretation support, and indeed require, an interpretation of States Parties’ 
obligations under the Covenant that appropriately incorporates the environment. 
This dissertation refers to a selection of principles of IEL to guide the systematic greening 
of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant. These principles of IEL are investigated 
in detail in the following chapter. The principles are later applied to key elements of States 
Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) so as to determine how these obligations should be 
interpreted in accordance with the interpretive methods examined in this chapter.226
                                            





 PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
4 1 Introduction 
It has been argued above that the Committee can achieve a deeper and more systematic 
integration of environmental considerations in its interpretive mandate under the Covenant 
by drawing on existing principles of international environmental law (“IEL”). This chapter 
investigates how principles of IEL can provide guidance on how environmental problems 
can be appropriately understood and regulated. These principles of IEL will later be used to 
guide the greening of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) in order to ensure the 
effective protection and realisation of Covenant rights.1 The purpose of referring to these 
principles of IEL is not to impose rules of environmental law onto the Covenant, but rather 
to use the principles of IEL as a guide to illustrate the ways in which the Covenant should 
be interpreted to integrate environmental considerations. Any such interpretation of the 
Covenant must be consistent with the interpretive methodology set out in Chapter 3 above. 
In the field of international environmental law and policy, developments in the 1970s 
resulted in “an increasingly prominent profile” for environmental principles as policy 
concepts.2 Various international declarations and agreements began to list environmental 
principles.3 Scotford argues that these international instruments are “attractive sources of 
principles in environmental law [due to] the international consensus or authority they 
represent”.4 For scholars, environmental principles create some commonality and potential 
for coherence, and “provide a collective identity” 5  within a field of “novel and speedy 
regulatory developments”. 6 The principles of IEL therefore provide an indication of the 
underlying values and guiding concepts that have shaped approaches to the environment 
in international law. Understanding these principles is important for understanding how to 
integrate environmental considerations within the Covenant in order to promote the object 
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and purpose of the Covenant in the face of increasing environmental threats.7 Drawing on 
these principles also contributes to the harmonisation of IEL and human rights law. In the 
context of the interpretation of the Covenant it is important to note that relying on principles 
of IEL, as opposed to rules, contributes to their usefulness as they are amendable to 
application in a variety of contexts and are not overly prescriptive in their content. 
This chapter begins by analysing the nature of environmental principles in the 
international law context. It will then examine the meaning and status of certain principles of 
IEL. As there is no authoritative list of principles, and an assessment of each identified 
principle of IEL is beyond the scope of this research, those environmental principles most 
widely recognised have been selected. The individual principles considered in this chapter 
include: sustainable development and its related elements (the principle of integration, 
sustainable use, and inter- and intra-generational equity); the concept of prevention and the 
related principles of no-harm, sovereignty over natural resources, prevention and 
precaution; the polluter pays principle; and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (“CBDR”). 
4 2 The nature of environmental principles in international law 
Before discussing individual environmental principles, it is necessary to establish what is 
meant by principles. Dupuy and Viñuales make the important distinction between a principle 
as a “type of statement or formulation of a norm” and a legal principle as “the legal foundation 
of a norm”.8 The former, a principle in the ordinary sense of the word, could be found in a 
soft-law instrument but have no legal character. The nomenclature of environmental 
principles can lead to an assumption regarding their legal status as legal principles without 
any interrogation.9 As the principles do not in fact form an established group, each principle 
must be examined individually in order to determine its legal nature or status.10 
It can also be useful to refer to certain environmental norms as “concepts”. Dupuy and 
Viñuales describe rules, principles and concepts according to their degree of generality or 
particularity.11 They explain that concepts can be thought of as “guiding norms that are 
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implemented by principles, which, in turn, are realised by rules”.12 Maintaining a distinction 
between environmental principles generally and legal principles, Beyerlin and Marauhn 
describe three layers of environmental law concepts: “a thin layer consisting of highly 
abstract ideals, a thicker one with less abstract concepts, and a huge one with concrete 
norms”.13 They describe the concepts of international solidarity and justice as examples of 
the abstract ideals which form the “ethical roots” of the less abstract concepts usually termed 
‘principles’.14 
Scholars have noted the difficulty in differentiating between principles and rules. Martin 
demonstrates that environmental principles and rules can be distinguished by source, by 
form, and by function.15 The clearest distinction between rules and principles can be seen 
when one examines their function.16 Beyerlin and Marauhn point out that both rules and 
principles have a normative “steering effect” on states.17 Rules primarily relate to specific 
action which must be taken or avoided,18 and they may also distribute rights and organise 
information.19 Principles, on the other hand, are more general in nature and are designed to 
find application in various contexts.20 They are not directed at specific behaviour, but have 
a “symbolic, orienting and thus political function”.21 Principles interact with rules by guiding 
the creation of new rules; the influencing the interpretation of existing rules, and guiding 
decision-making in the absence of specifically applicable rules.22 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and 
Mackenzie distinguish between rules and principles with reference to the Gentini case which 
describes rules as practical and binding; and principles as an expression of a general truth 
and theoretical basis for action. 23  In this view, rules are considered as the practical 
formulation of principles, and the application of principles to “the varying circumstances of 
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practical life”.24 In relation to environmental law, principles are also seen to function as a 
“connective glue” or as general norms providing coherence and stability to a complex and 
rapidly evolving system.25  
This particular nature of principles described above is what makes them useful for the 
greening of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant. They do not prescribe precisely 
what action must be taken, allowing context-specific flexibility. It is therefore possible to 
apply them within the specific scope of Covenant, to the extent that they are consistent with 
the interpretive methodology in Chapter 3. The principles can thus have a “steering effect”26 
and influence the interpretation of Covenant obligations and related decision-making.27 The 
flexibility of these principles also allows for the appropriate application of each principle, 
where appropriate, to the country-specific context of individual States Parties.28 
Before turning to the meaning and status of specific principles of IEL, it is important to 
note that determining the precise legal status of environmental principles is by no means 
straightforward. Scotford attributes the legal ambiguity of some environmental principles in 
IEL to four factors: 
“(1) they are contained in instruments of soft law and so have uncertain normative status; (2) 
they represent between them very different kinds of ideas about environmental protection; (3) 
their meanings are unclear or contested; and (4) they constitute a shifting but usually select 
group of principles out of all ‘principles’ so-called in these [international soft law] instruments”.29 
While it is not possible to go into these factors in detail here,30 it is sufficient to note that 
there is no clarity on the legal status of many of the principles of IEL founded in international 
soft law instruments.31 This lack of clarity is also a result of the nebulous and contested 
nature of international ‘soft law’ and its imprecise distinction from ‘hard law’.32 Soft law 
declarations and principles may provide the “underpinnings for international treaty 
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instruments” and contribute to the development of customary international law.33 Although 
non-binding, these soft law sources may therefore have a significant impact on international 
law, including its interpretation.34 For rapidly developing areas such as IEL, soft law is also 
important for the articulation of guidelines, rules and standards where consensus has not 
yet been reached or treaty negotiation is not yet finalised. 35 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and 
Mackenzie point out the difficulty of determining the meaning and status of each principle or 
rule of IEL and attribute this to “the absence of clear judicial authority” and the presence of 
“conflicting interpretations under state practice”. 36  In determining the legal status of 
principles of IEL it is essential to consider each principle on its own terms: 
“Any effort to identify general principles and rules of international environmental law must 
necessarily be based on a considered assessment of state practice […] as well as the growing 
number of decisions of international courts and tribunals”.37 
Beyerlin and Marauhn, for example, avoid the language of principles and choose to examine 
each environmental concept individually in order to determine its legal status as a rule, 
principle, or soft law concept or policy.38 Environmental principles have no “pre-programmed 
legal identities” and the status of each ‘principle’ set out below will therefore be examined 
separately.39 It is important to note that although the legal status of these principles of IEL 
is relevant in relation to their persuasive force, it is by no means determinative of the 
usefulness of these principles in guiding the interpretation of the Covenant, which is the 
focus of this dissertation.40 The discussion below considers the meaning and status of the 
principles specifically in the context of IEL. Their relevance for the Covenant (and potentially 
human rights law in general) is reviewed in Chapter 7.41 
                                            
33 Mensah (2008) Environmental Policy and Law 52; Wallace & Martin-Ortega International Law 32; Sands et 
al Principles of IEL 116; Boyle “Soft Law in International Law-making” in International Law 120-121; Aust 
Handbook of International Law 11. 
34 Mensah notes that “soft law principles provide incentives and tools to courts and tribunals in interpreting and 
applying international treaties, as well as national laws and constitutional instruments”. See Mensah (2008) 
Environmental Policy and Law 54. 
35 See, for example, Mensah (2008) Environmental Policy and Law 53 where the author explains that some 
soft law sources are given binding effect through incorporation by reference in later treaties. 
36 Sands et al Principles of IEL 198. 
37 Sands et al Principles of IEL 200-201. 
38 Beyerlin & Marauhn International Environmental Law 38. 
39 Scotford Environmental Principles 6. 
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4 3 The principles of international environmental law 
Although they are often referred to collectively, there is no single authoritative list or group 
of environmental principles in IEL. 42 Krämer and Orlando suggest that an authoritative 
indication of such a definitive list “can be found in non-binding texts […] as well as in the 
various attempts by expert groups and legal scholars to adopt compendia of environmental 
law principles”.43 While international soft law does provide a number of such lists, it fails to 
address the issue of inconsistent and diverging lists.44 It is unclear whether each principle 
mentioned in such lists should be considered part of the corpus of environmental principles, 
or whether only those appearing in multiple lists should be included.45 
The aforementioned lists are, of course, not the only sources for environmental principles 
in international law. As will be seen below, a number of individual environmental principles 
have developed through the decisions of international courts and tribunals,46 and through 
various multi-lateral environmental agreements.47 Combined with the various soft law lists 
of principles, these have led to a proliferation of principles beyond the scope of this study. 
Those most widely recognised, and with the most prominent status in international law, will 
therefore be focused on in this chapter. 
The environmental principles chosen for this study, and elaborated on in more detail 
below, are: (1) sustainable development and the related principles of integration, sustainable 
use, intergenerational equity, and intragenerational equity; (2) prevention and the related 
principles of no-harm and sovereignty over natural resources; the preventive principle; and 
the precautionary principle; (3) the polluter pays principle; and (4) the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities (“CBDR”). 
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4 3 1 Sustainable development 
4 3 1 1 Introduction 
The origins of sustainable development are evident in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”) which recognises the interrelationship 
of development and the environment. Despite the absence of the term itself in the Stockholm 
Declaration, the elements of sustainable development are encapsulated in the following 
objective: 
“To defend and improve the human environment for present and future generations has 
become an imperative goal for mankind – a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony 
with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social 
development”.48 
This signals some of the early articulations of the elements of integration and of inter- and 
intra-generational equity which later became central to the concept of sustainable 
development.49 The term ‘sustainable development’ first appeared in a 1975 decision of the 
UN Environment Programme (“UNEP”) which stated the following: 
“Environmental management implies sustainable development of all countries, aimed at 
meeting basic human needs without transgressing the outer limits set to man’s endeavours by 
the biosphere”.50 
Sustainable development subsequently appeared in the 1980 World Conservation Strategy 
of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (“IUCN”).51 
However, widespread recognition of sustainable development and definition of the concept 
began with the creation of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(“Brundtland Commission”) in 1983.52  
In 1987 the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(“Brundtland Report”) provided the first definition of sustainable development as 
                                            
48 Stockholm Declaration proclamation 6. 
49 These elements of sustainable development are discussed in detail at sections 4 3 1 2 to 4 3 1 5 below. 
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50 UNEP Governing Council (2 May 1975) Decision 20(III) para II.9(b). See NJ Schrijver The Evolution of 
Sustainable Development in International Law: Inception, Meaning and Status (2008) 47. 
51 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources World Conservation Strategy: Living 
Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (1980). See also Schrijver Evolution of Sustainable 
Development 46-47; Tladi D Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-
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development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”.53 The Report goes on to say that  
“[S]ustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the 
opportunity to fulfil their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will 
always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes”.54 
The UN General Assembly affirmed the centrality of sustainable development in a 1987 
resolution wherein it welcomed the Brundtland Report and held that sustainable 
development “should become a central guiding principle of the United Nations, Governments 
and private institutions, organizations and enterprises”.55 
Following the Brundtland Report, the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(“Rio Conference”) was convened in 1992. 56  Barral argues that the Rio Conference 
constitutes “[t]he most fundamental landmark in sustainable development’s history”.57 The 
conference resulted the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (“Rio 
Declaration”) which made a substantial contribution to the articulation and conceptualisation 
of sustainable development and environmental law through its 27 principles.58 Echoing the 
definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration states 
that “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations”.59 The Rio Conference resulted in 
widespread endorsement of sustainable development as the “unavoidable paradigm of 
environment/development relations”.60  
Following the Rio Conference, many significant multi-lateral environmental agreements 
were adopted, and the integration of environmental considerations in non-environmental 
treaties became more common. 61 References to sustainable development, or elements 
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54 Brundtland Report para 27. 
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56 Kiss & Shelton International Environmental Law 52 & 55. 
57 Barral (2012) EJIL 379. 
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thereof, became more widespread in international instruments and the concept of 
sustainable development gained substantial currency in this period. 62 
The understanding of the concept of sustainable development later progressed from a 
mechanism to address an environment-development dichotomy to the idea of balancing 
social development, economic development and environmental protection.63 These three 
dimensions were included in the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development 
which held that “economic development, social development and environmental protection 
are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable development, which 
is the framework for our efforts to achieve a higher quality of life for all people”.64 The 
concept of sustainable development was once again affirmed in the 2000 UN Millennium 
Declaration which declares that natural resources should be managed prudently in 
accordance with sustainable development; that the “immeasurable riches” of nature should 
be passed on to our descendants; and that unsustainable production and consumption 
threatens present and future generations.65 In Part IV of the Declaration support for the 
“principles of sustainable development” is affirmed. 
In 2002 the World Summit on Sustainable Development (“WSSD”) was held in 
Johannesburg with an emphasis on reviewing compliance with existing norms and 
obligations and on integrating environmental, social and economic objectives.66 It has been 
suggested that the resultant plan of implementation shifted the focus from concerns related 
to environmental protection, to “an integrated environmental, social and development 
agenda”.67 At the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development this conception of 
sustainable development was reiterated as states acknowledged “the need to further 
mainstream sustainable development at all levels, integrating economic, social and 
environmental aspects and recognizing their interlinkages, so as to achieve sustainable 
development in all its dimensions”. 68  More recently, the UN adopted the Sustainable 
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63 Barral (2012) EJIL 379; Marong (2003) GIELR 28; S Atapattu “The Paris Agreement and Human Rights: Is 
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64 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development (Copenhagen, March 1995) A/CONF166/9 article 6. See 
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Marauhn International Environmental Law 21. 
66  See Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, September 2002) 
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Development Goals (“SDGs”) and affirmed that the goals are “integrated and indivisible and 
balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and 
environmental”.69 
Despite the widespread awareness of the concept today, sustainable development has 
no authoritative definition and its content “is still subject to significant controversies and 
uncertainty”.70 Barral points out that the general nature of the concept, which facilitates its 
application in a variety of circumstances, “carries with it the inconvenience that sustainable 
development may mean very different things to different people, to the point of emptying it 
of any coherent meaning and function”. 71  This is perhaps why it is suggested that 
sustainable development has been “used and abused” more than any other concept in IEL.72 
The extensive debate and discussion surrounding the precise content and meaning of 
sustainable development has resulted in various attempts to determine its components. 
Barral suggests the “intrinsically evolutive” nature of sustainable development makes its 
content very difficult to determine with certainty (or finality).73 These core components or 
elements of sustainable development as proposed by various authors include: the 
integration of the environment and development (the principle of integration);74 inter- and 
intra-generational equity; 75 sustainable use of natural resources; 76 CBDR; 77 sovereignty 
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70  V Barral “The Principle of Sustainable Development” in L Krämer & E Orlando (eds) Principles of 
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over natural resources;78 and the right to development.79 International organisations have 
also proposed lists of “principles of sustainable development” that should form part of the 
term.80 Although there is no final consensus on the elements of the concept, it is widely 
accepted that, at a minimum, sustainable development entails integration of environmental 
considerations into social and economic development.81 The principle of integration has 
been referred to as “the very backbone or cornerstone of the concept of sustainable 
development”.82 In addition to the principle of integration, there is little dispute that a core 
principle of sustainable development is equity in relation to present and future generations. 
Barral suggests that inter- and intra-generational equity are “axiomatic to understanding 
sustainable development”.83 
For the purposes of this study, reference is made to the following elements of sustainable 
development identified by Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie: the principle of integration; 
the principle of sustainable use; the principle of intergenerational equity; and the principle 
intragenerational equity or equitable use.84 This cluster of principles is consistent with the 
widespread acceptance of equity and integration as the core of sustainable development 
with equitable use being integrally linked to intragenerational equity, and sustainable use as 
similarly crucial for intergenerational equity. This concurs with Barral’s understanding of the 
core components of sustainable development which she argues are intergenerational equity 
(the sustainability dimension); intragenerational equity (the developmental dimension); and 
integration (the blending of both dimensions). 85 The identified elements of sustainable 
development will be discussed separately below. 
Despite a widespread recognition that sustainable development is recognised as an 
essential concept in international law, its precise nature and status is less certain. Academic 
opinion on the nature and status of sustainable development covers a range of potential 
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positions. Possible views include sustainable development as: (1) a principle of international 
law (or an emerging one); 86 (2) an objective or goal of international law;87 (3) a meta-
principle or interstitial norm;88 (4) a mechanism for conflict resolution;89 and, most recently, 
(5) a right.90 
Many authors suggest that sustainable development is an established principle of 
international law, or at least an emerging principle. Weeramantry J noted in his separate 
opinion in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros that “[t]he principle of sustainable development is […] part 
of modern international law by reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also 
by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global community”.91 Although the 
status of sustainable development in international law is far from settled, it is evident that, at 
a minimum, sustainable development is widely recognised as an indispensable objective or 
goal of international law. The status of the individual elements or principles of sustainable 
development will be addressed separately as they also operate independently and each 
have varying degrees of recognition and acceptance. 
4 3 1 2 Integration 
4 3 1 2 1  Meaning 
As is evident from the discussion above, the principle of integration is fundamental to the 
concept of sustainable development. Many define sustainable development with reference 
to integration, arguing that it constitutes the core of sustainable development itself rather 
than an element thereof.92 Others describe integration as the tool for attaining sustainable 
development.93 While the other elements of sustainable development are often treated as 
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environmental principles in their own right, the principle of integration is rarely independent 
from sustainable development.94 
The principle of integration is rooted in a recognition of the interdependence between the 
environment and social and economic development. The principle of integration recognises 
that the interrelationship of these interests means they should not be pursued independently. 
Montini describes integration as “the soft law obligation that States should endeavour to 
determine and promote their development patterns in an integrated and co-ordinated way 
with the necessity to establish an adequate legislation for the protection of the 
environment”. 95  The principle of integration aims to ensure that the environment is 
considered in “the planning and implementation of development activities”.96 The Stockholm 
Declaration requires “rational management of resources” through “an integrated and co-
ordinated approach to [States’] development planning”. 97  Integration also requires the 
promotion of economic systems that “better address the problems of environmental 
degradation”.98 This integration requires states to consider carefully how they manage the 
environmental, social and economic dimensions of their respective jurisdictions. Integration 
necessitates cooperation between the officials from each of these areas tasked with 
planning, policy making, regulation, law-making and implementation.  
It is inevitable that conflicts will arise in attempting to achieve the integration demanded 
by sustainable development. How these conflicts should be resolved is unclear, although 
the Stockholm Declaration refers to “rational planning” as an essential tool for conflict 
resolution,99 and the New Delhi Declaration notes that such resolution may involve the use 
of new or existing institutions.100 Both these examples envisage a balanced reconciliation of 
conflicting interests, and unfortunately do not address the circumstances of an irreconcilable 
clash between competing interests. In such a case it is not clear which aspect of sustainable 
development should be preferred. What is certain, however, is that integration requires, at 
the very least, that social and economic policy, planning and laws take environmental 
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considerations into account and endeavour not to cause unnecessary harm to the 
environment. 
While it is widely recognised that integration is about the integration of environmental 
considerations into other areas, descriptions of these other areas have evolved alongside 
the concept of sustainable development. The initial conceptualisations of sustainable 
development centred on the integration of the environment and development (often 
specifically economic development).101 A clear expression of integration is found in principle 
4 of the Rio Declaration which states that “[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and 
cannot be considered in isolation from it”.102  
Following the 1992 Rio Conference, the understanding of the concept of sustainable 
development progressed from a mechanism to address an environment-development 
dichotomy to the idea of balancing social development, economic development and 
environmental protection.103 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration asserts that there is a 
“collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - economic development, social development 
and environmental protection - at the local, national, regional and global levels”. 104 
Cordonier Segger and Khalfan suggest that this conscious separation of economic and 
social development is evidence of a growing awareness that “economic development is not 
synonymous with social development, and one does not automatically lead to the other”.105 
It is interesting to note, however, that some authors still describe integration in terms of the 
environment and development, either grouping economic and social development together 
or sometimes ignoring social development altogether.106 Nevertheless, the three pillars of 
sustainable development continue to receive support and have appeared in Agenda 2030 
for Sustainable Development and the SDGs. The principle of integration forms the basis for 
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the SDGs which cover a range of social, economic and environmental issues.107 They 
promote integration by ensuring that social, economic and environmental goals are pursued 
concurrently in an integrated manner. 
The principle of integration continues to evolve, and it has been suggested that a new 
dimension of the principle of integration is emerging – that of integration between 
sustainable development and climate change. 108  Alternative conceptualisations also 
propose that the integration of human rights is an additional component of integration and 
sustainable development.109 There are those who describe sustainable development as the 
integration of three fields of international law as opposed to the integration of environmental 
considerations more broadly – these authors describe the principle of integration as the 
integration of IEL, international economic law, and international human rights law. 110 
Regardless of the different areas to which integration is applied, it remains centred around 
the inclusion of environmental protection or environmental considerations in areas where it 
was previously overlooked or ignored. The most widely recognised conceptualisation of the 
principle of integration remains the integration of social, economic and environmental 
dimensions. 
4 3 1 2 2  Status 
The principle of integration has enjoyed wide recognition and adoption. In Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros the ICJ affirms the need to “reconcile economic development with protection of 
the environment” expressed in “the concept of sustainable development”.111 In his separate 
opinion, Weeramantry J referred to the need to balance environmental and developmental 
considerations and held that sustainable development is “more than a mere concept” 
arguing that it is “a principle with normative value”.112 Weeramantry J describes sustainable 
development as “the principle of reconciliation” and “harmonization of developmental and 
environmental concepts”,113 and argues that the principle of sustainable development “is an 
integral part of modern international law”.114  
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The 2005 decision in the Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration (Belgium/Netherlands) (“Iron 
Rhine”) similarly recognises principle 4 of the Rio Declaration and the integration of 
“environmental protection into the development process”. 115  The Tribunal states that 
“[e]nvironmental law and the law on development stand not as alternatives but as mutually 
reinforcing, integral concepts”.116 The Tribunal held that the reactivation of the Iron Rhine 
railway line on Dutch territory “represents an economic development […] with which the 
prevention and minimalization of environmental harm is to be integrated” and the costs of 
environmental protection measures could not be severed from other costs associated with 
the reactivation of the route. 117 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie suggest that this 
decision confirms that the principle of integration “is a requirement of international law”.118 
Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie also note that the principle of integrating 
environment and development is evident in a number of regional treaties.119 This integrated 
approach is also found in international economic law and policy.120 The preamble of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) recognises the “objective of 
sustainable development”,121 while the WTO Appellate Body has also described sustainable 
development with reference to the principle of integration.122 
It is not possible to entirely separate the legal status of the principle of integration from 
the concept of sustainable development. Beyerlin and Marauhn explain sustainable 
development in terms of integration and argue that it is best described as “a holistic policy 
goal”.123 It is therefore concluded that although some may view integration as legal principle, 
it is most widely considered to be a policy goal or objective in international law.124  
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4 3 1 3 Sustainable use 
4 3 1 3 1  Meaning 
In addition to its place as an element of sustainable development, the sustainable use of 
natural resources has been linked to the concepts of intergenerational equity, 125 
conservation,126 precaution,127 and sovereignty over natural resources.128 While there is no 
universal conceptualisation of sustainable use as a principle of IEL, in essence it relates to 
the conservation of natural resources for the sake of their long-term sustainability. Redgwell 
argues that the need for a principle of sustainable use of natural resources is “inextricably 
linked with human beings’ increased capacity (technological, economic and social) to 
deplete or exhaust such resources”.129 
Early indications of an awareness of the dangers of over-exploitation of natural resources 
are evident in the 1893 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration (United States v United 
Kingdom). 130  The arbitration concerned a dispute over the exploitation of a common 
resource between the two states, in this case fur seals. The arbitration resulted in the 
adoption of regulations for the protection and preservation of fur seals,131 although the 
underlying motivation was based on ideas of property and rights to hunt seals rather than 
modern conceptions of sustainability. In the decades that have followed, sustainable use 
has become a central concern in the management of marine living resources. Treaties 
concerned with the exploitation of marine living resources require levels of species’ 
populations or stocks to be ‘sustainable’, ‘optimal’ or limited to the ‘optimum sustainable 
yield’, ‘maximum sustainable yield’, or ‘maximum sustained levels’.132 
The concept of sustainable use developed alongside the idea of conservation of the 
environment. Redgwell argues that the conservation of living resources in international law 
“includes both their protection and sustainable use, subject to the need to protect and 
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preserve endangered species, ecosystems and areas of natural beauty and cultural 
importance”.133 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie similarly note that sustainable use is 
evident in international legal instruments which refer to ‘rational’, ‘wise’, ‘sound’ or 
‘appropriate’ conservation measures and programmes.134 Whether the goal is described as 
conservation or as sustainable use, it is clear that there is an imperative to prevent unfettered 
exploitation of natural resources to ensure that these resources are preserved and not 
unduly depleted. 
The principle of sustainable use appears in a number of international treaties. 135 A 
noteworthy example is the widely ratified Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) that 
was signed at the 1992 Rio Conference.136 The objectives of the CBD are listed in article 1 
of the Convention as “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources”. Article 2 then defines sustainable use as “the use of components of 
biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of 
biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of 
present and future generations”. Another interesting example of sustainable use in 
international treaty law is that of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO137 
which refers in its preamble to “the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development”.138 This underscores the relationship between the 
principle of sustainable use and the broader concept of sustainable development. 
In addition to the presence of the principle in international treaties, sustainable use 
appears in a number of soft-law instruments. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration recognises 
that natural resources must be safeguarded “through careful planning and management”139 
and that the earth’s capacity to produce renewable resources “must be maintained and, 
wherever practicable, restored or improved”.140 The Brundtland Report similarly affirms the 
need to preserve natural resources and to “observe the principle of optimum sustainable 
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yield” in relation to living natural resources and ecosystems. 141  Sustainable use was 
included in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specifically SDG 14 and SDG 
15.142 
There is no universal or fixed meaning of sustainable use.143 It is evident that different 
language is used in various instruments and the meaning attached to such language will be 
context-dependent.144 It is also true that the specific measures required to give effect to 
sustainable use of the natural resource in question will depend on the shifting conservation 
status of the relevant species or the resource in question. 145 Permissible utilisation or 
consumption of natural resources is inherent in the concept, although the extent to which a 
particular use will be considered sustainable will depend on “the status of the resource and 
the demands upon it at any particular time”. 146 What is common across these various 
iterations of sustainable use is the idea of sustainability over time and that of necessary 
limits to the exploitation of natural resources, often with reference to the principle of 
intergenerational equity.147  
4 3 1 3 2  Status 
As noted above, the principle of sustainable use of natural resources forms part of the 
concept of sustainable development. Beyerlin and Marauhn describe sustainable use as a 
“subordinate norm” or “special emanation” of sustainable development.148 It has, however, 
developed independently of sustainable development and its status must therefore be 
considered separately. 
Given the wide acceptance of sustainable use and its incorporation into a number of 
significant multilateral environmental treaties, it is possible to argue that the sustainable use 
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of natural resources “has gained the status of a universal customary rule”.149 Redgwell 
suggests that the crystallisation of sustainable use as an independent customary norm of 
international law can be attributed to substantial evidence of the principle in soft law, treaty 
commitments, supporting state practice and judicial decisions.150 Although the contours of 
the principle are perhaps vague, it is clear that there is a customary rule or norm which 
states that natural resources should be conserved and utilised in a manner that does not 
result in their depletion over time. 
4 3 1 4 Intergenerational equity 
4 3 1 4 1  Meaning 
As noted above, intergenerational equity is a vital component of sustainable 
development. It is the temporal dimension of sustainable development that requires the 
needs and interests of future generations to be considered in environmental and 
developmental planning and decision-making. 151  The principle is often described with 
reference to the responsibility of each generation to hold the environment in trust on behalf 
of future generations. 152  This forward-looking approach is particularly significant for 
environmental concerns as environmental damage “continues to produce effects over time, 
well beyond the time span of the current generation”.153  
A number of early environmental treaties refer to intergenerational equity and the interests 
of future generations. The earliest of these is the 1946 International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling which recognises in its preamble “the interest of the nations of the 
world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the 
whale stocks”.154 The 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources referred to “the present and future welfare of mankind”,155 while the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention also makes reference to future generations.156 
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Following these early treaties, intergenerational equity was increasingly recognised in 
international soft law declarations. The Stockholm Declaration notes that there is a 
responsibility “to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”. 
The Brundtland Report similarly recognises the principle of intergenerational equity, stating 
that “States shall conserve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of 
present and future generations”.157 The Rio Declaration affirms the need to “equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”.158 The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development also refers in its preamble to the protection of the 
planet “so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations”.159 
The principle was also included in later environmental treaties. The UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which was signed at the 1992 Rio Conference, 
not only refers to future generations in its preamble, but places intergenerational equity at 
the centre of the climate change regime by including it as one of the Convention’s guiding 
principles.160 In addition to the recognition of this principle in the UNFCCC, references to 
future generations have been included in numerous environmental treaties.161 However, 
these references tend to be broad and often fall within non-binding portions of these 
agreements (often appearing in the preamble).162 
Evidence of intergenerational equity can also be found in international jurisprudence. The 
ICJ made brief reference to intergenerational equity in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons where it held that “the environment is not an 
abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human 
beings, including generations unborn”.163 The Court also mentioned future generations in 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros where it recognised “a growing awareness of the risks for mankind 
– for present and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions [in nature] at an 
unconsidered and unabated pace”.164 More recently in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v 
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Japan), 165  the ICJ noted the significance of a preambular reference to safeguarding 
resources for future generations in the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling, linking it to sustainable exploitation of resources.166 
Domestic jurisprudence suggests that the needs and interests of future generations can 
play an important role in affording standing to organisations or individuals in matters 
concerning the environment.167 A significant domestic example of a case that considered 
the meaning of intergenerational equity in international law is that of Urgenda Foundation v 
State of the Netherlands.168 In this case the court held that the principle of equity, in the 
context of UNFCCC article 3, 
“[M]eans that the [international climate] policy should not only start from what is most beneficial 
to the current generation at this moment, but also what this means for future generations, so 
that future generations are not exclusively and disproportionately burdened with the 
consequences of climate change”.169 
Perhaps the most notable scholarly work on intergenerational equity in international law 
is that of Edith Brown Weiss. She understands intergenerational equity as a “partnership 
among all generations” where each generation serves as trustee of the earth for future 
generations, and “a beneficiary of previous generations’ stewardship”.170 With regard to the 
environmental burdens that current generations place on future generations, Brown Weiss 
identifies three categories: (1) depletion of resources; (2) degradation of environmental 
quality; and (3) discriminatory access to the environmental resources and benefits enjoyed 
by previous generations. 171  She proposes three corresponding principles of 
intergenerational equity to address these burdens.172 Firstly, “the conservation of options” 
involves protecting the diversity of resources so as not to unduly restrict the options available 
to future generations.173 Secondly, the “conservation of quality” refers to the maintenance 
of the earth’s quality so as to leave it in no worse condition than it was received (i.e. providing 
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a planet of equal quality to each generation).174 And finally, “the conservation of access” 
refers to “equitable rights of access to the planetary legacy of past generations”.175 It is also 
important to note that for Brown Weiss the interests of future generations are also closely 
linked to the needs of the poor.176 Intergenerational equity therefore cannot be achieved 
without a corresponding intragenerational equity.177  
This influential work on intergenerational equity by Brown Weiss began before climate 
change became the urgent crisis it is today. The nature of long-term impacts associated with 
climate change and the content of article 3 of the UNFCCC plainly underscore the 
importance of intergenerational equity. Michallet points out that the “pending catastrophe of 
climate change has paved the way for the acknowledgement of the need for true equity for 
future generations”.178 The principle of intergenerational equity is more important than ever. 
Atapattu notes, however, that despite the progress made in the recognition of 
intergenerational equity, “the modalities of actually giving effect to the principle in the legal 
system have not been worked out”.179 
4 3 1 4 2  Status 
There is broad recognition of the relevance of the principle of intergenerational equity in 
international law. It is referenced in numerous multilateral environmental treaties and 
international declarations.180 However, outside of its inclusion in the UNFCCC, Michallet 
notes that the recognition of intergenerational equity “remains largely symbolic” and 
generally limited to “texts that are not legally binding or in the preambles to treaties”.181 
Dupuy and Viñuales similarly note that “the foundation of the principle in positive law is still 
debated”.182 Due to this lack of legal recognition in international law, Michallet suggests that 
future generations exist “primarily in a world of legal potentialities”.183 While the interests of 
future generations are often referred to in international instruments, there is currently no 
conclusive evidence of an accepted legal principle of intergenerational equity in international 
law. 
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4 3 1 5 Intragenerational equity 
4 3 1 5 1  Meaning 
Intragenerational equity is recognised as a fundamental component of sustainable 
development.184 However, its precise contours are difficult to determine. Equity between 
present and future generations is regularly considered in tandem. Brown Weiss recognises 
the important link between the needs of present and future generations. She suggests that 
intragenerational equity is a dimension of intergenerational equity, arguing that the members 
of each generation have “an equal right to use and benefit from the planet”.185 Brown Weiss 
points out that the position of the poor must be considered, as “people living in extreme 
poverty cannot be expected to conserve resources for future generations when they cannot 
even care for the living”.186 She therefore argues that wealthier states must assist the poor 
with the protection of resources; access to economic benefits; and the prevention of 
environmental degradation.187 
Equity among the present generation is often viewed in terms of North-South divisions.188 
States in the south have emphasised the urgency of present inequalities and poverty, 
arguing that these concerns must be addressed before intergenerational equity is tackled.189 
As Atapattu points out, “[i]n a world that has achieved unparalleled advancement in terms 
of wealth generation and technology, it is unthinkable that the vast majority of people live in 
appalling conditions and lack access to basic necessities of life”.190 It is the insistence of 
southern states that led to the inclusion of poverty eradication in a number international 
declarations related to the environment and sustainable development. 191 These North-
South divisions have also brought about the concept of CBDR that has its roots in equity 
and fairness and recognises the varying capabilities of different states to combat poverty 
and environmental degradation.192 
The concept of intragenerational equity can also be referred to as the principle of 
“equitable use”, although this term aligns more closely with a circumscribed version of 
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intragenerational equity that is particularly concerned with the allocation of natural 
resources.193 Equitable use could be seen as a component within the broader notion of 
intragenerational equity. In this sense, intragenerational equity is concerned with the 
equitable sharing of resources, for example shared fisheries stocks or freshwater 
resources.194 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie note that this is particularly important in 
relation to the allocation of shared natural resources. 195 This is evidenced by the ICJ 
judgments in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v 
Uruguay)196 both of which dealt with the use and control of a river as a shared natural 
resource. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros illustrates that unilateral control of a shared resource 
deprives the other state(s) of a reasonable and equitable share of the resource,197 while 
Pulp Mills confirms that a failure to consider the environmental protection of the resource 
means that the use thereof is not equitable or reasonable.198 The use of transboundary 
natural resources in “a reasonable and equitable manner” is a principle in the Brundtland 
Report,199 while fair and equitable benefit-sharing in relation to genetic resources is also a 
central objective of the CBD.200 The principle of equitable use aims to ensure that the use 
and allocation of natural resources is equitable and reasonable, although precisely what this 
means in practice would depend on the relevant international instrument and the resource 
in question. 
The notion of intragenerational equity also intersects with the idea of environmental 
justice. Both equity and environmental justice are concerned with fairness in relation to the 
equal distribution of environmental resources as well as the burden of environmental harm. 
Kiss and Shelton recognise this link and suggest the following: 
“[S]tates and the international community must fairly allocate and regulate scarce resources to 
ensure that the benefits of environmental resources, the costs associated with protecting them, 
and any degradation that occurs (i.e., all the benefits and burdens) are equitably shared by all 
members of society”.201 
This problem of the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens is evident in the case 
of climate change. Those who are most impacted by the negative impacts of climate change 
are often vulnerable communities in developing states, while those who have contributed 
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most have enjoyed the benefits associated with carbon-producing technologies.202 Atapattu 
therefore argues that “the intragenerational aspect of climate change is quite clear”.203 As 
already noted above, article 3(1) of the UNFCCC recognises the importance of 
intragenerational equity and states that the climate system should be protected “for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. 
Although there is no universal conceptualisation of intragenerational equity, it is evident 
that the notion implicates the allocation of shared natural resources, the distribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens, as well as the eradication of poverty, and that it 
requires fairness and due consideration of the responsibilities and capabilities of different 
states. The precise nature of the concept may depend on the context within which it is 
applied. 
4 3 1 5 2  Status 
Little work has been done on the status of intragenerational equity. It is clear that it is 
broadly considered to be a component of sustainable development which, as noted above, 
is a widely recognised policy goal seen by some as a principle of international law. However, 
as a legal principle in its own right, intragenerational equity has received little recognition, 
despite its presence in international declarations and jurisprudence. Intragenerational equity 
as a principle of IEL therefore remains a soft-law concept with no independent legal force 
outside of its context-specific inclusion in binding instruments such as the CBD and 
UNFCCC. 
4 3 2 Prevention 
4 3 2 1 Introduction 
Dupuy and Viñuales identify an  overarching concept encompassing “principles 
expressing the idea of prevention”.204 They note that these principles related to prevention 
originate in “a body of international law concerning the friendly relations between 
neighbouring States”.205 Initially focused on the relationship between neighbouring States, 
these older principles developed to include emerging concerns related to transboundary 
harm as well as global environmental threats. 206 Although many treat these principles 
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individually, this section follows the aforementioned conceptualisation to underscore the 
relationship between these principles.207 
The emphasis on prevention in environmental law is rooted in an understanding that 
environmental harm is complex and frequently irreversible. Kiss and Shelton describe 
prevention as the “Golden Rule for the environment” explaining that from an environmental 
perspective remediation is often not possible and, from an economic perspective, where 
environmental rehabilitation is indeed possible, the costs thereof are can be prohibitive.208 
It is therefore economically and environmentally desirable to favour prevention when it 
comes to environmental harm. Duvic-Paoli echoes the centrality of prevention and describes 
it as “the cornerstone of environmental law”. 209 The fundamental role of prevention is 
evidenced by its feature as an objective of almost all IEL mechanisms.210 
Dupuy and Viñuales distinguish between prevention as an overarching concept or 
category of principles, and prevention as a distinct principle in its own right (the preventive 
principle).211 Other principles under the umbrella of prevention include the no-harm principle 
(or the responsibility not to cause transboundary harm), the precautionary principle, and 
cooperation. Duvic-Paoli also describes prevention as incorporating three core norms, which 
she identifies as: (1) the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources; (2) the 
no-harm principle; and (3) the extension of prevention beyond national jurisdictions (which 
could be identified as the preventive principle).212 
In addition to the substantive preventive principle, the discussion that follows will address 
the abovementioned principles of sovereignty over natural resources; no-harm and 
precaution. Given the well-recognised and intrinsic relationship between the principle of 
sovereignty and the no-harm principle, these will be discussed concurrently.213 
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4 3 2 2 Sovereignty over natural resources and the no harm-principle 
The principle of no-harm (or the prohibition of transboundary harm) can be traced back 
to the now classic Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) where the arbitral 
tribunal held as follows: 
“[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury 
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is 
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”.214  
As Gestri points out, no-harm was originally framed with reference to private law terms such 
as the principle of good neighbourliness. 215 This principle later appeared in the Corfu 
Channel case where the ICJ confirmed that it was a general and well-recognised principle 
that every state must not knowingly allow its territory to be used “for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states”.216 
The principle of state sovereignty over natural resources developed independently of the 
no-harm principle.217 Gestri notes that the classical international law concept of sovereignty 
included the right to exploit, regulate or dispose of natural resources within the state’s 
jurisdiction and this right was largely considered to be absolute. 218 Recognition of the 
principle (or right) can also be found in the 1962 UN General Assembly resolution which 
referred to “the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources”.219 The resolution further qualifies the right, stating that it must be 
exercised in the interests of the “national development of the well-being of the people of the 
state concerned”. 220  Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie note that some international 
tribunals have accepted this right as part of customary international law.221 
In 1972 the Stockholm Declaration explicitly recognised the principles of state sovereignty 
and no-harm, and made the important link between the two. Both principles form Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration which states that: 
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
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control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction”.222 
Dupuy and Viñuales point out that the no-harm principle thus became considered as “a 
corollary of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources”.223 The content 
of Principle 21 was repeated almost verbatim in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration,224 
confirming continued support for this consolidated principle which some consider to be “the 
cornerstone of modern international environmental law”.225 Although the principles of no-
harm and sovereignty are intrinsically linked, it is useful to consider the content and meaning 
of each concept independently. 
4 3 2 2 1  Sovereignty over natural resources 
As noted above, an absolute right to exploit natural resources without consideration for 
resultant environmental damage has been rejected in international law. This absolute 
version of sovereignty is sometimes referred to as the Harmon Doctrine, named after a 
conflict between the United States and Mexico regarding water pollution. 226  Kiss and 
Shelton note that this understanding of sovereignty has received “virtually unanimous” 
condemnation.227 Gestri notes that sovereignty has become a qualified right that is restricted 
by various aspects of international law.228 These limitations have been imposed by, inter 
alia, the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm;229 the emergence of a general 
interest in the management of certain natural resources; 230  and the duty to ensure 
sustainable use of natural resources.231 The strength of these limiting principles or factors 
is of course dependent on the authoritative status of the relevant aspect of IEL. 
The recognition of state sovereignty in the Stockholm Declaration coincided with an 
increased recognition of the need for international cooperation for environmental 
protection.232 The juxtaposition of state sovereignty and the prohibition of transboundary 
harm led to a new approach to sovereignty which allows for limitations to the use and 
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exploitation of natural resources in the interests of environmental protection. Nevertheless, 
state sovereignty over natural resources has remained central to IEL and is evident in 
various international environmental instruments.233 Elements of state sovereignty can be 
found as early as 1933 when the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and 
Flora in the Natural State held that animal trophies were “the property of the Government of 
the territory concerned”.234 The principle of state sovereignty also appears in, for example, 
the 1971 Ramsar Convention 235 and the preamble the 1989 Basel Convention. 236 The 
preamble of the UNFCCC confirms “the principle of sovereignty of states in international 
cooperation to address climate change”.237 
It is important to note that shared natural resources require particular attention and 
regulation in relation to state sovereignty. Shared natural resources are those resources that 
exist over the territory of two or more states and therefore require a particular legal regime 
for their management. This includes transboundary watercourses, oil and gas deposits, and 
ecosystems as well as migratory species and regional air masses.238 Gestri notes that this 
legal regime is based on a general duty of cooperation and the equitable use of shared 
resources.239 In this sense each individual state cannot exercise an absolute and unfettered 
sovereignty over the resources in question. 
In addition to the use and exploitation of natural resources, the right to sovereignty 
includes “the right to be free from external interference” in the exploitation of such 
resources. 240  This raises questions about the extraterritorial application of national 
environmental law in cases concerning shared natural resources. In other words, can a state 
protect its share of a common resource by imposing its nationally determined environmental 
standards on that resource within the territory of another state? An example of such a case 
is the Shrimp/Turtle dispute before the WTO Appellate Body where it was recognised that 
the United States could claim an interest in the conservation of endangered and migratory 
sea turtles in Asian waters.241 The need for an extraterritorial application of national laws 
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arises where there are insufficient internationally accepted standards for environmental 
protection and conservation.242 As Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie note: 
“For ‘shared resources’ such as the high seas and atmosphere, it will often be difficult, if not 
impossible to draw a clear line between natural resources over which a state does and does 
not have sovereignty or exercise sovereign rights”.243 
The extraterritorial application of national environmental laws remains an unresolved 
question, and there is little clarity regarding the circumstances that would allow a state to 
adopt and apply unilateral environmental measures extraterritorially. 244  Beyerlin and 
Marauhn note that the equitable use of such shared resources should not dilute the 
obligation to prevent transboundary harm.245 This obligation is discussed in more detail 
below.246 
It is evident that the principle of state sovereignty over natural resources is qualified in a 
variety of ways unforeseen at the time of Harmon, although the circumstances and extent 
of such qualifications are often unclear. In any event, the right to sovereignty over natural 
resources remains relevant for IEL and should only be restricted to the extent deemed 
necessary to prevent environmental harm. 
4 3 2 2 2  No-harm principle 
As noted above, the principle that states should not use their territory in such a manner 
as to cause harm to another state (the no-harm principle) dates back to the decision in the 
Trail Smelter arbitration.247 The most widely accepted formulation of the principle appears 
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and is repeated in Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration, 248 both of which assert that states have “the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. 
Many authors have noted the significance of the phrase “or of other areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction”, arguing that this is indicative of an extension of the no-harm 
principle beyond the scope of transboundary concerns. Whereas an earlier conception of 
the principle focused on harm caused by neighbouring states, the Stockholm Declaration 
extended the scope of environmental protection to common areas (such as the high seas, 
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the atmosphere, or Antarctica). 249  Despite the wording of the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations, the no-harm principle continued to be treated as a limited question of 
transboundary harm.250 In 1996, however, the ICJ confirmed the broader version of the 
principle in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
where it held that: 
“[T]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.251 
Dupuy and Viñuales suggest that the less restrictive form of the no-harm principle, extending 
beyond transboundary concerns, later developed into “a more comprehensive principle of 
prevention”.252 A distinct substantive principle of prevention is discussed below.253 
Following its inclusion in the Stockholm Declaration, the no-harm principle was affirmed 
by a number of international organisations.254 The UN General Assembly, for example, held 
that Principles 21 and 22 of the Declaration laid down “the basic rules” governing the 
“international responsibility of States in regard to the environment”.255 The principle also 
appears in various international treaties,256 particularly in relation to the regulation of natural 
resources and pollution. 257  The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) 
expresses the principle as a positive duty on states to: 
“[T]ake all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are 
so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment, and 
that pollution […] does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights”.258 
Following its inclusion as principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, the no-harm principle was 
incorporated into article 3 of the CBD as well as the preamble of the UNFCCC. 
Although there is widespread recognition of the no-harm principle as a rule of customary 
international law,259 the scope of its application is not always clear. It is useful to consider 
two central questions which relate to the threshold of harm and the nature of the 
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responsibility on states. Firstly, the threshold of damage to which the principle applies will 
be dependent on the circumstances of each case.260 It is at least clear that the no-harm 
principle is not concerned with de minimis harm and it is widely accepted that the 
environmental damage should be considered “significant” for the principle to apply.261 The 
second question regarding the content of the principle concerns the nature of the 
responsibility. A violation of the responsibility not to cause transboundary harm does not 
require injurious intent on the part of the state of origin, but rather a failure to exercise due 
diligence.262 The principle of no-harm therefore imposes an obligation of due diligence on a 
state to take reasonable measures to “control and restrain likely harmful activities”, where 
the harm is foreseeable.263 Various factors will impact the particular degree of diligence 
required of a state, including the interests involved and the technical and economic ability of 
the state in question.264 As Lefeber points out, it is interesting to note that the degree of 
diligence required has certainly increased since the Stockholm Declaration, and will likely 
require continuous revision according to the demands of the particular circumstances and 
state of the environment.265 
Read with the right of states to exercise sovereignty over natural resources, the no-harm 
principle can be characterised as “a compromise between the territorial sovereignty of the 
state of origin of the environmental harm, on the one side, and the territorial integrity of the 
state likely to be affected by this harm, on the other”.266 Beyerlin and Marauhn suggest that 
this is a compromise which favours territorial integrity over sovereignty.267 Whether or not 
this is the case, it is true that neither territorial integrity nor territorial sovereignty are 
absolute. As Lefeber explains: 
“[T]he carrying on of activities within a state’s jurisdiction or control is not in all instances lawful 
(no absolute territorial sovereignty), and the causation of harm outside areas within a state’s 
jurisdiction and control is not in all instances unlawful (no absolute territorial integrity)”.268 
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4 3 2 2 3  Status of sovereignty over natural resources and the no-harm principle 
The responsibility not to cause transboundary environmental harm has a wealth of 
support in international law269 and has become part of customary international law.270 It has 
been suggested that the no-harm principle is in fact a rule of customary international law,271 
although many refer to it as ‘principle’ of customary international law.272 The principle is 
increasingly considered in terms of its formulation in Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. 273  In other words, no-harm and 
sovereignty are considered two elements of a single principle which aims to prevent 
environmental harm without unnecessarily infringing on state sovereignty. Sands, Peel, 
Aguilar and Mackenzie suggest that this consolidated rule “may provide a legal basis for 
bringing claims under customary international law asserting liability for environmental 
damage”.274  
It is therefore clear that the legal principle of sovereignty over natural resources and the 
responsibility not to cause environmental harm forms part of customary international law. 
The principle was applied in the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration where it was held 
that: 
“There is no doubt that states are required under contemporary customary international law to 
take environmental protection into consideration when planning and developing projects that 
may cause injury to a bordering State”.275 
As this example shows, the principle still finds application primarily in the context of 
transboundary harm and not “areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”,276 which has 
resulted in the development of a more comprehensive and substantive preventive principle 
to address broader environmental concerns. 277 This substantive preventive principle is 
discussed below. 
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4 3 2 3 Preventive principle 
4 3 2 3 1  Meaning 
As noted above, the no-harm principle has evolved to include prevention of environmental 
harm beyond the transboundary context. The preventive principle (also known as the 
principle of prevention or preventive action) applies to the prevention of environmental 
damage irrespective of whether there are transboundary impacts.278 There is naturally a 
great deal of overlap between the no-harm principle and the more comprehensive preventive 
principle. It is therefore necessary to point out that the boundaries between no-harm and the 
preventive principle are not always clear or consistently applied. Some authors prefer to 
simply extend the scope of no-harm;279 while others refute the applicability of prevention to 
areas beyond national jurisdictions. 280  Then there are those that treat the preventive 
principle as independent, suggesting that the particular regime surrounding transboundary 
harm necessitates another distinct, more comprehensive principle applicable to the broader 
environment.281 This section will treat the principle of prevention as an independent principle 
which may overlap with the features of the no-harm principle. 
The principle of prevention emerged from the no-harm principle, and was initially a 
response to environmental damage in the form of pollution prevention.282 However, the 
principle has evolved according to new understandings of the complexity of environmental 
degradation to include other types of harm as well as areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.283 The preventive principle is essentially concerned with pro-active, anticipatory 
prevention to protect the environment in response to the often irreversible nature of 
environmental damage.284 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros the ICJ noted that it was:  
“[M]indful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required 
on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage”.285 
In Pulp Mills the ICJ also recognised the importance of “vigilance and prevention” in 
protecting ecological balance, noting that “the negative impact of human activities on the 
                                            
278 Kiss & Shelton International Environmental Law 204. 
279 See, for example, Beyerlin & Marauhn International Environmental Law 39-46. 
280 See Duvic-Paoli “Prevention” in Principles of Environmental Law 170. 
281 Dupuy & Viñuales International Environmental Law 62; Kiss & Shelton International Environmental Law 
204; Sands et al Principles of IEL 211. 
282 Kiss & Shelton International Environmental Law 204; Dupuy & Viñuales International Environmental Law 
62 & 66; Duvic-Paoli “Prevention” in Principles of Environmental Law 166. 
283 Duvic-Paoli “Prevention” in Principles of Environmental Law 166. 
284  Dupuy & Viñuales International Environmental Law 66-67; Duvic-Paoli “Prevention” in Principles of 
Environmental Law 166. 





waters of the river may affect other components of the ecosystem of the watercourse such 
as its flora, fauna, and soil”.286 
The preventive principle requires the exercise of due diligence in ensuring that proactive 
measures are taken to prevent environmental damage.287 It therefore requires “objective 
risk anticipation” as opposed to compensation for harm after the fact.288 Duvic-Paoli argues 
that the principle of prevention (and associated duties) is triggered in circumstances where 
there is both a risk that environmental damage will materialise, as well as a sufficient 
magnitude or scope of harm.289 In other words, a state will not be required to act according 
to the principle where there is a low probability of harm and the extent of the potential harm 
is negligible.290 
The nature and extent of the due diligence obligation on states remains ill-defined. Duvic-
Paoli indicates that states enjoy “considerable autonomy and flexibility” in this regard.291 
Despite this vague standard of care, the actions taken by a state would need to be 
reasonable, appropriate and proportional in light of the level of risk and harm in question.292 
States should also take into account relevant international minimum standards related to 
environmental management and protection as well as the latest applicable scientific 
understanding and technology.293 In Pulp Mills the ICJ elaborated on the obligation of due 
diligence and described it as “an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate 
rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the 
exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the 
monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators”.294  
Three duties can be identified in relation to the principle of prevention. The first (or 
overarching) duty is the duty to refrain from causing environmental harm and to take pro-
active measures to prevent such harm.295 The secondary (and procedural) duties flowing 
from this are the duty of cooperation and the duty to conduct environmental impact 
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assessments (“EIAs”).296 The duty of cooperation includes duties of notification, exchange 
of information and consultation with other (potentially) affected states. 297  The duty to 
undertake EIAs is required in circumstances where a proposed activity is “likely to have a 
significant adverse impact” on the environment.298 
As already noted, prevention is premised on the idea that it is better to prevent 
environmental harm before its occurrence than to provide for rehabilitation or compensation 
after the fact. This remains the ideal sequence of events.299 The preventive principle does, 
however, have relevance for circumstances where harm has already occurred.300 In the 
climate change regime, for example, the phrase “climate change mitigation” is preferred to 
prevention since climate change is already occurring.301 The preventive principle remains 
relevant for the purposes of mitigating the scope of the harm despite the fact that it can no 
longer be entirely prevented.302 
Despite the recognition in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the applicability of 
prevention to areas beyond national jurisdiction, there is still uncertainty as to whether the 
principle of prevention can apply to instances of environmental harm regardless of where 
they occur. It is accepted that the principle applies to transboundary harm and to 
environmental harm in common areas such as the atmosphere and the high seas. What is 
not clear is whether it can be applied in a domestic context. This uncertainty relates to the 
principle of sovereignty. As discussed above, a state’s sovereignty to use and exploit its 
natural resources can be restricted where the exercise of such sovereignty causes harm to 
the environment in other states (or to shared resources and common areas). Sands, Peel, 
Aguilar and Mackenzie argue that the extension of the duty to include environmental 
damage within a state’s own jurisdiction is what distinguishes the broader principle of 
prevention from Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.303 
Duvic-Paoli outlines two possible approaches to the application of the preventive principle 
to environmental harm within a state’s own territory.304 The first is a human rights approach 
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consistent with the recognition in human rights courts that states have an obligation “to take 
preventive measures to ensure that industrial or technological activities, as well as natural 
disasters, do not adversely affect the enjoyment of specific human rights”. 305 Such an 
approach does not apply to any environmental harm as it requires an impact on recognised 
human rights. The second approach is simply to establish inter-state preventive obligations 
that apply regardless of where the harm occurs. In the case of the UNCLOS, obligations 
related to the protection of the marine environment are not limited spatially and have been 
held to apply “regardless of where the harm is located”.306 These two approaches are 
increasingly used to apply the principle of prevention in a domestic context, but this domestic 
dimension is not yet recognised as part of the customary international law on prevention of 
environmental harm.307 
4 3 2 3 2  Status 
The preventive principle is set out in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. It explicitly extends the prevention of environmental harm 
beyond the jurisdiction of individual states. Although prevention was widely accepted in 
international law prior to 1996, this recognition was generally limited to transboundary 
harm.308  
However, there is now widespread incorporation of prevention into numerous 
international environmental treaties. 309  The ICJ has also confirmed the expanded 
formulation of the preventive principle and held it to be part of general international law.310 
Similarly, in 2005 the arbitral tribunal in Iron Rhine noted the “growing emphasis” on 
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prevention in IEL311 and recognised the “duty of prevention” as a legal principle of general 
international law.312 
4 3 2 4 Precautionary principle 
4 3 2 4 1  Meaning 
The precautionary principle can be seen as an extension of the preventive principle. 
Dupuy and Viñuales suggest that precaution is an expression of prevention designed to 
“cover situations where there is scientific uncertainty regarding the impact of an activity on 
the environment”.313 The precautionary principle or precautionary approach has its origins 
in a traditional approach to environmental agreements which relied on scientific findings, 
methods or current knowledge as the basis for action or decisions related to the 
environment.314 Measures to protect the environment would, for example, only be permitted 
where there was scientific evidence of significant damage. 315  However, in the 1980s 
awareness new environmental threats such as ozone depletion led to a more cautious 
approach in the face of scientific uncertainty.  
The first treaty referring to precaution was the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer316 and later its 1987 Montreal Protocol.317 Precaution appeared early on in the 
African context, in the 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and 
the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within 
Africa. 318  The Bamako Convention requires a “preventive, precautionary approach to 
pollution which entails, inter alia, preventing the release into the environment of substances 
which may cause harm to humans or the environment without waiting for scientific proof 
regarding such harm”.319 
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The formulation of the precautionary principle in the Rio Declaration has been extensively 
cited and forms the basis for the incorporation of the principle in a number of subsequent 
environmental agreements.320 Principle 15 sets out the principle as follows: 
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. 
This principle is indirectly referenced in the preamble of the CBD321 and the UNFCCC makes 
explicit reference to ‘precautionary measures’ in article 3, requiring such measures to be 
taken to prevent climate change (and mitigate adverse effects) even where there is a “lack 
of full scientific certainty”. 
Following the Rio Declaration, the precautionary principle was widely incorporated into a 
range of international environmental agreements. There are now over 50 environmental 
treaties containing the precautionary principle.322 In fact, Kiss and Shelton suggest that 
since 1990 the precautionary principle “has appeared in almost all international instruments 
related to environmental protection”. 323  The principle is also found in some non-
environmental treaties, most notably the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) which states that EU policy on the environment “shall be based on the 
precautionary principle”.324 
Precaution also features in a range of regional and international jurisprudence.325 It has 
appeared in the decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”);326 
the WTO;327 the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”);328 as well as the decisions of regional 
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human rights bodies.329 Although the precautionary principle consistently appears in various 
decisions, there is no uniform understanding of its meaning and scope of application. 
Beyerlin and Marauhn note that “international courts have showed reluctance to apply 
[precautionary action] as a legal yardstick for solving interstate disputes, because of the still 
ambiguous contents and normativity of this concept”.330 
It is clear that despite its widespread recognition, there is no single definition of the 
precautionary principle or approach. 331 Wiener submits that there are “several different 
Precautionary Principles” across the variety of treaties and jurisprudence.332 These versions 
of the precautionary principle tend to contain a combination of certain elements which 
include scientific uncertainty; the reversal of the burden of proof; the license to act; and 
provisionality.333 These elements are discussed in more detail below. 
Beyerlin and Marauhn explain that scientific uncertainty is a prerequisite for the 
precautionary principle, distinguishing it from the more general preventive principle.334 In 
other words, precaution does not relate to just any prevention of environmental harm, but is 
specifically applicable in cases where there is uncertainty regarding the environmental 
damage or the causal link between a certain activity and environmental harm.335 In such 
cases the lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a justification for inaction.336 In 
this sense the precautionary principle can be seen as a license to act by taking preventative 
measures in spite of uncertainty. 337 In some contexts the principle has been extended 
beyond this permissive position to include a duty to act where there is a threat of serious 
environmental damage.338 Although it is not settled that precaution entails this duty to act, it 
is clear that it at least prohibits inaction on the sole basis of scientific uncertainty. 
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Some formulations of the precautionary principle also include a reversal of the burden of 
proof. In such cases the proponent of an activity which is potentially harmful to the 
environment bears the onus of proving that the activity will not be harmful.339 This is a 
departure from the standard approach which would require anyone challenging a potentially 
harmful activity to prove the alleged environmental harm. In Pulp Mills the ICJ rejected the 
assertion that the precautionary approach requires shifting the burden of proof.340 Sands, 
Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie argue, however, that state practice supports this interpretation 
of precaution as including a reversal of the burden of proof.341 
The precautionary principle has also been described as a risk management tool requiring 
that precautionary action be taken only once an appropriate risk assessment has been 
completed.342 Wiener notes that, as a risk management tool, the precautionary principle 
does not clarify how various risks should be prioritised, or indeed how the risks of the 
precautionary measures themselves should be weighed against the risk of the potentially 
harmful activity.343 It is important to note that the precautionary approach cannot mean that 
all risks must be eliminated.344 There will always be a degree of risk, and inherent in risk is 
a degree of uncertainty. 345  For this reason, many formulations of precaution include 
qualifications requiring a threat of “serious or irreversible” damage to the environment.346 
Wiener also describes the element of provisionality as integral to the precautionary 
principle.347 The element of provisionality emphasises the dynamic nature of activities and 
their impacts on the environment and requires precautionary measures to be provisional in 
the sense that they are continuously revised and updated according to new developments 
and knowledge.348 In other words, while scientific uncertainty can indicate the need for 
provisional precautionary measures, these measures must be updated when the uncertainty 
inevitably decreases with new scientific knowledge and developments.349 
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As shown above, the international treaties and jurisprudence on the precautionary 
principle evidence a range of formulations of the concept. However, as Beyerlin and 
Marauhn indicate, the collection of multilateral environmental agreements incorporating the 
principle concur that: (1) precaution applies in circumstances of scientific uncertainty; and 
(2) this uncertainty does not justify inaction in the face of potential environmental harm.350 
Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie argue that, at the very least, the precautionary principle 
requires greater protection of the environment in cases where an activity’s impact on the 
environment is scientifically uncertain.351  
The formulation of the precautionary approach in the Rio Declaration incorporates these 
common elements and remains the most widely recognised understanding of the 
principle.352 Due to its extensive use and acceptance, Dupuy and Viñuales refer to Principle 
15 as “precaution’s canonical formulation”.353 It has also been described as reflecting “a 
widely accepted minimum understanding” of the precautionary principle.354 
4 3 2 4 2  Status 
There is no consensus on whether or not the precautionary principle is a legal principle 
of customary international law, although there are indications that it could be considered an 
emerging principle of customary international law.355 Beyerlin and Marauhn note that the 
reluctance of international bodies to rely on the principle raises doubts as to whether it is a 
“universally accepted rule of customary international law”.356 The WTO Appellate Body has 
held that its status “still awaits authoritative formulation”,357 while the ITLOS has noted the 
incorporation of the principle “into a growing number of international treaties and other 
instruments”,358 and a clear “trend towards making this [precautionary] approach part of 
customary international law”.359 Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie suggest that this has 
already happened, arguing that there is sufficient evidence of support for the principle “to 
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allow a strong argument to be made that it reflects a principle of customary law”.360 Whether 
or not it currently constitutes customary international law, at the very least the precautionary 
principle is an emerging principle of customary international law of “eminent importance”.361 
4 3 3 Polluter pays 
4 3 3 1 Meaning 
Pollution and environmental harm can be incredibly costly for the environment and for 
society. The polluter pays principle essentially aims to ensure that the person responsible 
for environmental harm bears the costs of such harm, including the costs of any 
rehabilitation or remediation required to make sure that the environment is in an “acceptable 
state”.362  
Much of the early development of the polluter pays principle occurred within the particular 
context of the OECD in the 1970s. 363 The OECD identified polluter pays as a guiding 
principle in 1972 explaining that “the cost of [pollution prevention and control measures] 
should be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in production 
and/or consumption”.364 This can be described as an internalisation of costs as the costs of 
relevant measures are borne by the producers and/or consumers of the product rather than 
broader society. This idea of internalisation of environmental costs was later carried over 
into the Rio Declaration.  
Prior to the Rio Declaration, one of the only references to the polluter pays principle in an 
international instrument was in the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation which explicitly takes account in its preamble of 
“the ‘polluter pays’ principle as a general principle of international environmental law”.365 In 
1992 the Rio Declaration affirmed the broadened applicability of the polluter pays principle 
beyond the OECD. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration states that: 
“National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs 
and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, 
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in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment”.366 
What Beyerlin and Marauhn refer to as the “softened” language of Principle 16 – that 
authorities should “endeavour to promote” – is evidence of a compromised formulation of 
polluter pays necessitated by objections to the principle from certain countries. 367 The 
formulation in the Rio Declaration was confirmed in the preamble of the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.368 The polluter pays principle has since been 
incorporated into various other international environmental treaties and continues to play a 
particularly prominent role in the OECD and European contexts.369 It does not, however, 
enjoy the same level of recognition afforded to the principles of prevention and precaution.370 
As noted above, the polluter pays principle aims to internalise environmental costs by 
ensuring that these costs are borne by the producer and/or consumer and not by the greater 
public either in the form of degraded natural resources or through expenditure of public funds 
for measures taken by the state to address the harm.371 The principle is intended to promote 
rational and responsible use of environmental resources372 and can have a steering effect 
on private actors through “a significant negative economic incentive” to avoid future 
environmental harm.373 The internalisation of costs should, however, only apply to certain 
circumstances. Dupuy and Viñuales note that the preconditions for polluter pays are: (1) that 
the activity in question is socially desirable; and (2) that the resulting environment damage 
is tolerable or not considered to be significant.374 In circumstances where the activity has no 
social utility and desirability, or the damage is significant or severe, the principle of 
prevention dictates that the activity should not proceed.375 In other words, the polluter pays 
principle does not imply that any cost can be internalised and it does not constitute a “right 
to pollute”.376 
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The precise contours of the polluter pays principle are undefined and its meaning and 
practical application are open to interpretation. 377  The concept of “polluter” has many 
possible interpretations and there are questions regarding the allocation of costs where 
several entities contribute to the chain of pollution.378 There is also little consistency in state 
practice regarding the methods used to implement the principle.379 This lack of clear content 
may contribute to lack of universal recognition of the polluter pays principle, when compared 
to the more widely accepted principles of prevention and precaution.380 
It is important to note that the polluter pays principle has largely been applied within 
specific geographic regions and has limited application internationally among states. 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration places an obligation on “national authorities”, and 
implementation of polluter pays largely takes place domestically.381 This is perhaps due to 
the principle’s lack of definition, rendering it most effective within the context of an 
established system of legal rules. One notable exception to the domestic application is the 
regional application of the principle in the EU context.382 
4 3 3 2 Status 
The polluter pays principle has been incorporated into various binding and non-binding 
international instruments, but it has not yet become part of customary international law.383 
In 2004 the arbitral tribunal in the Rhine Chlorides Arbitration noted that: 
“[T]his principle features in several international instruments, bilateral as well as multilateral, 
and […] it operates at various levels of effectiveness. Without denying its importance in treaty 
law, the Tribunal does not view this principle as being a part of general international law”.384 
The tribunal also concluded that the polluter pays principle was of no relevance to the 
interpretation of relevant international instruments.385 It is, however, an accepted principle 
in OECD and EU contexts.386 
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Beyerlin and Marauhn note that the polluter pays principle has the normative quality of a 
legally binding rule, but that the “softened” wording of Principle 16 is evidence of a lack of 
state support. 387 Schwartz similarly recognises that the polluter pays principle has the 
potential “to become a legitimate global legal principle”.388 There is therefore the possibility 
that the principle will evolve and gain recognition. Sands, Peel, Aguilar and Mackenzie note 
that polluter pays has received increased attention partly as a result of “the greater 
consideration given to the relationship between environmental protection and economic 
development”, 389  as this requires an awareness of economic factors such as the 
environmental costs of pollution. The polluter pays principle may therefore enjoy increased 
support in future, but it currently does not have customary international law status. 
4 3 4 Common but differentiated responsibilities 
4 3 4 1 Meaning 
The principle of CBDR is rooted in considerations of equity and fairness.390 Atapattu 
suggests that CBDR is an expression of the underlying basis for polluter pays – the idea 
that those responsible for causing environmental harm should bear responsibility for fixing 
it.391 Beyerlin and Marauhn similarly suggest that polluter pays is the domestic application 
of the idea, while CBDR applies it to the realm of interstate relations.392 CBDR ultimately 
aims to balance the needs and interests of developed and developing states. Through 
recognising common responsibilities for global environmental problems, developed 
countries are able to ensure the participation of developing countries in addressing such 
problems, also allowing for development which is limited by virtue of environmental 
considerations. 393  Equally, through recognising differentiated responsibilities for 
environmental harm, developing countries receive recognition for their developmental needs 
and their reduced capacities to address environmental problems.394 
One of the earliest references to CBDR in treaty law can be found in the Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1985 which recognised the need to take account of 
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states’ means and capabilities.395 The 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Convention allowed 
developing countries to delay compliance with certain measures.396 CBDR later became 
more common in multilateral environmental agreements following its inclusion as a principle 
in the Rio Declaration in 1992. 
Leading up to the Rio conference developing countries, in the form of the G-77 group, 
proposed a version of the principle of CBDR which explicitly recognised the consumption 
and production patterns of developed countries as being significant contributors to the 
deteriorating environment.397 This proposal was controversial and the final text of Principle 
7 of the Rio Declaration has been described as a “watered-down” version of this proposal:398 
“States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the 
health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit 
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global 
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command”.399 
This description of CBDR has become the most common, and it reflects the two central 
elements of the principle. The first is the common dimension which recognises the common 
responsibility of states to protect the environment.400 The second element is the differential 
dimension which acknowledges the differing circumstances of states in relation to both the 
contribution of each state to environmental problems (responsibility) as well as each states’ 
level of development and its resultant ability to act in the interests of environmental 
protection (capability).401 
The application of CBDR allows for broader participation of states in environmental 
matters of common concern.402 In relation to the obligations and environmental standards 
applied, CBDR results in either different substantive obligations for developing states or, 
alternatively, the same obligations for all states with a delayed grace period within which 
developing states should comply. 403  The application of CBDR often also includes an 
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obligation on developed states to provide financial and technological assistance to 
developing states in order to enable them to meet their obligations under a specific treaty.404 
When it comes to the presence of CBDR in multilateral environmental treaties, it is 
undoubtedly clearest in the climate change regime. Rajamani describes CBDR as “a 
fundamental part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate change regime” and an 
“overarching principle guiding future development of the regime”. 405 CBDR is found in 
operational provisions of the UNFCCC and in the preamble to the Kyoto Protocol. The 
principle also features prominently in the later Paris Agreement.406 CBDR also features in 
the CBD which not only requires financial and technical assistance to be provided to 
developing states, but also makes the extent of implementation contingent on receipt of such 
assistance.407 The CBD also asserts that the extent to which developing states implement 
their commitments under the Convention “will take fully into account the fact that economic 
and social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of 
the developing country Parties”.408 Although the precise form of CBDR is specific to the 
treaty in question, Rajamani notes that the principle is “the bedrock of burden-sharing 
arrangements crafted in the new generation of multilateral environmental treaties”.409 
The principle of CBDR serves two important functions. Firstly, it can guide the 
interpretation of current provisions of environmental agreements, such as the UNFCCC. 
Secondly, the principle has a “structuring” function in that it influences the content of future 
environmental agreements.410 As noted below, the legal status of the principle is unclear. 
However, Dupuy and Viñuales point out that performance of these functions is not 
dependent on the status of the principle in international law.411 
4 3 4 2 Status 
CBDR is a prominent feature of a number of widely ratified treaties.412 The principle’s 
presence in these treaties is, however, not enough to give CBDR customary status in 
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international law. Outside the context of specific treaties, the status of CBDR “remains 
controversial”.413 Rajamani suggests that the differences in content across various contexts 
indicates that the principle may not have the necessary norm-creating character to be 
deemed a legal principle of customary international law.414 Beyerlin and Marauhn disagree 
and argue that CBDR “possesses a normative quality which makes it eligible for gaining the 
status of a principle of customary international law”.415 Whether or not the CBDR is capable 
of becoming a legal principle of customary international law, it is clear that there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that it currently enjoys such status.  
4 4 Conclusion 
The principles of IEL address multiple dimensions of legal problems related to 
environmental protection, environmental threats and environmental justice. Although the 
principles examined above have different levels of acceptance and legal status, all are 
recognised as playing an important role in contemporary IEL. Reliance on these principles 
of IEL in the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant also facilitates 
the harmonisation of IEL and human rights law. As abstract principles that can find 
application in various scenarios, these principles are potentially useful for understanding 
how human rights and the environment could interact in international law. As a result of their 
legal nature as principles, the principles of IEL are inherently flexible and therefore able to 
be applied to context-specific problems in a range of circumstances. This makes them 
particularly useful in guiding the interpretation of the Covenant and allows for the integration 
of principles that can apply to the diverse circumstances of States Parties. 
For the purpose of this study, these environmental principles serve to illustrate how 
environmental challenges can be addressed and how the Covenant can be interpreted so 
as to incorporate these ideas which may otherwise be overlooked. While these principles 
may offer guidance on how to approach environmental challenges, they should not direct 
the interpretation of the Covenant outside of what the rules of interpretation permit.416 In 
light of this role, it is important to note that any lack of definitive legal status identified in 
relation to the principles in this chapter is not a bar to their usefulness. The principles remain 
useful as indicators of how environmental problems have been approached in international 
law and how they could possibly be addressed where they pose a threat to ESCRs.  
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The chapters that follow explore the extent to which the principles of IEL examined in this 
chapter should contribute to an interpretation of the Covenant that incorporates 
environmental considerations.417 As noted, this interpretation must be consistent with the 
applicable rules of human rights treaty interpretation. It is proposed that this interpretive 
exercise may lead to more appropriate and effective mechanisms to address environmental 
threats to the continued realisation of ESCRs. The chapters below thus consider the 
contribution of the principles of IEL to greening the interpretation of key elements of article 
2(1), beginning with the concept of “maximum available resources”.
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MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES 
5 1 Introduction 
Resources are an inevitable and essential part of fulfilling the rights in the Covenant. 
Article 2(1) requires that States Parties to the Covenant use “the maximum of available 
resources” towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs. 1 The goal of this chapter is 
greening the concept of maximum available resources through an interpretation based on 
the methodology explored in Chapter 3, and guided by the principles of IEL examined in 
Chapter 4. 
The principle of sovereignty over natural resources and the right of self-determination in 
article 1 of the Covenant establish the freedom of states to use and dispose of their 
resources. This chapter therefore begins with an investigation of these concepts with 
particular emphasis on their relationship to natural resources, as well as the constraints 
imposed on the freedom to use and dispose of resources. 
The chapter then investigates the interpretation of maximum available resources. 
Breaking the concept into its central elements, this chapter examines the meaning of 
“resources”, “availability” and “maximum”.2 The notions of equitable and effective use are 
also investigated.3 Each of these elements of maximum available resources is examined in 
turn with an analysis of its current interpretation. Following this, the relevance of 
environmental considerations is considered in relation to each of these elements. This 
analysis is primarily based on the environmental principles identified in Chapter 4 as these 
principles provide an indication of how environmental challenges can be approached and 
managed. The principles of IEL are considered in relation to each element of maximum 
available resources in order to explore what alternative or supplementary interpretations of 
the concept might be appropriate given the interrelationship between ESCRs and the 
environment. 
In light of the significant role of natural resources within the functioning of the 
environment, as well as the extent of potential impacts on ESCRs resulting from natural 
resource exploitation, this category of resources requires particular attention. The definition 
                                            
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 article 2(1). 
2 See sections 5 2, 5 3 and 5 4 below. 
3 See “The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 




of natural resources as well as their relationship with the Covenant and treatment by the 
Committee are therefore examined separately as a type of resource under “maximum 
available resources”.4 Given the particular impacts, risks and challenges of natural resource 
exploitation, these are investigated in the context of the “availability” of resources.5 
5 2 Sovereignty, self-determination and the use of resources 
5 2 1 The relevance of sovereignty and self-determination to “maximum available 
resources” 
Before turning to the meaning and application of specific elements of the concept of 
“maximum available resources” under the Covenant,6 it is helpful to discuss the significance 
of state sovereignty and the right of self-determination in the context of resource use.7 Both 
self-determination and state sovereignty are integral to the question of how a state mobilises 
and uses resources, and is therefore an important point of departure in considering the 
concept of “maximum available resources” under article 2(1) of the Covenant.  
The right of self-determination in article 1 of the Covenant has a degree of overlap with 
the international law principle of state sovereignty, particularly in relation to natural 
resources. Both sovereignty and self-determination relate to the freedom to determine how 
natural wealth and resources are utilised and disposed of by States Parties or by peoples.8 
The concept of state sovereignty has particular relevance in the context of the obligation to 
use the “maximum of available resources” for the realisation of ESCRs. Francioni notes that 
“an attribute of sovereignty is the right of every State to adopt its preferred type of socio-
economic regime”, thereby choosing how resource use and economic activity will be 
regulated and managed. 9  This aspect of sovereignty is echoed in the right to self-
determination in article 1 which allows all peoples to “freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.10 This freedom implies 
freedom from interference by, for example, other states, international organisations, or 
                                            
4 See 5 3 2 below. 
5 See 5 4 2 below. 
6 See sections 5 3 to 5 6 below. 
7 The terms “sovereignty” or “state sovereignty” are used here to denote the principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources which is discussed at Chapter 4, 4 3 2 2 1. 
8 See A Rosas “The Right to Self-determination” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 111 116. Rosas describes the aspect of self-determination related to 
natural resource use as a version of the principle of sovereignty, noting that an earlier draft of the Covenant 
included direct reference to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
9 F Francioni “Natural Resources and Human Rights” in E Morgera & K Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook 
on International Law and Natural Resources (2016) 66 70. 




foreign investors.11 In the context of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the Committee 
has confirmed that it will “respect the margin of appreciation of the State party to determine 
the optimum use of its resources and to adopt national policies and prioritize certain 
resource demands over others”.12 General Comment 3 similarly notes that “the Covenant is 
neutral” with respect to political and economic systems”.13 
However, in order for States Parties to be held accountable for their obligations under the 
Covenant, certain restrictions must be placed on this freedom of States Parties to regulate 
the use of resources. A State Party’s freedom to decide how it mobilises and uses available 
resources is constrained by its obligations to respect, protect and fulfil ESCRs. Uprimny, 
Hernández and Araújo describe some of these “specific obligations” which serve to 
circumscribe state sovereignty: 
“[I]n several concluding observations, the CESCR has recognized that States must take steps 
to use their limited resources on major priorities, to increase allocation of resources to 
particular non-attended economic and social rights, to play a major role in maximizing the 
resources available to address ESCR needs when they are largely devoted to other purposes 
(i.e., debt servicing), and ‘to ensure that limited resources, public as well as private, are used 
in the most effective manner to promote the realization of rights’”.14 
State sovereignty and self-determination can be seen as the point of departure for 
inquiries into States Parties’ resource use and allocation. Although a state is entitled to 
choose its own economic regime and political system, States Parties to the ICESCR have 
agreed to certain constraints on this freedom according to their obligations in relation to the 
fulfilment of ESCRs. Precisely how a State Party’s resource use can be circumscribed or 
redirected for the purposes of the Covenant is largely determined by the Committee’s 
interpretation and application of the obligation to use the “maximum of available resources” 
for the realisation of Covenant rights.  
The meaning and content of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources has been 
discussed in detail in chapter 4.15 The following section therefore focuses on the content of 
                                            
11 See 5 4 2 2 and 5 4 2 3 below for a discussion of the relationship between States Parties, private actors and 
the exploitation of natural resources. 
12 CESCR An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant” (10 May 2007) E/C12/2007/1 para 12. See also para 11. 
13 CESCR General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art 2, Para 1, of the Covenant) 
(14 December 1990) E/1991/23 para 8. 
14 R Uprimny, SC Hernández & AC Araújo “Bridging the Gap: The Evolving Doctrine on ESCR and ‘Maximum 
Available Resources’” in K Young (ed) The Future of Economic and Social Rights (2019) 624 632-633 with 
reference to UN Economic and Social Council Report of the UNHCHR, Agenda Item 14(g) of the Provisional 
Agenda, Geneva (25 June 2007) E/2007/82 para 35. 




the right of self-determination and its implications for resource use, with a particular 
emphasis on natural resources. 
5 2 2 The right of self-determination 
The right of self-determination is set out in article 1 of the Covenant and also appears in 
article 1 of the ICCPR. The provision is therefore often referred to as ‘common article 1’. 
Article 1(1) states that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination” which entitles them 
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”.16 Article 1(2) expressly refers to natural resources, noting that all peoples 
may “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources” and that “[i]n no case may a 
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence”.17 Article 25 echoes this assertion of 
freedom to dispose of natural resources, stating that “[n]othing in the present Covenant shall 
be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely 
their natural wealth and resources”.18 The right of self-determination is particularly important 
for indigenous peoples and the use of their territories and resources.19 The participation of 
the people of a State Party in resource use and allocation is also an important element of 
self-determination.20  
The essence of self-determination has been described as “recognizing the inherent 
equality and dignity of all peoples to maintain their distinct socio-cultural-political 
organization, free from unwanted, external interference”.21 This freedom from interference 
extends to the use and disposal of natural resources. Rosas points out that the freedom to 
dispose of natural wealth and resources in the final version of article 1(2) is “a watered-down 
version” of an earlier draft which referenced the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.22 Francioni explains that the right of self-determination is “at the top of 
the catalogue of human rights” and that it is “inextricably connected with the international 
                                            
16 ICESCR article 1(1). The text of article 1 is repeated in article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 and therefore 
often referred to as ‘common article 1’. 
17 ICESCR article 1(2). See also article 25. 
18 ICESCR article 25. 
19 See, for example, F Mackay “The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International Law” in L Zarsky (ed) Human 
Rights and the Environment: Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing World (2001) 9 9-54; AF Vrodljak “Self-
Determination and Cultural Rights” in F Francioni & M Scheinin (eds) Cultural Human Rights (2008) 41 41-78; 
E Desmet Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (2011) 204-208. 
20 See O De Schutter “Public Budget Analysis for the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Conceptual Framework and Practical Implementation” in K Young (ed) The Future of Economic and Social 
Rights (2019) 527 540 & 622-623. 
21 Mackay “Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in HR and the Environment: Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing 
World 11. 
22 A Rosas “The Right to Self-determination” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and 




regime of natural resources” in relation to the principle of sovereignty over natural resources 
in article 1(2). 23  This “foundational collective human right” 24  forms part of customary 
international law25 and has also been described as a norm of jus cogens26 with erga omnes 
character.27 De Schutter has referred to self-determination as “one of the most under-rated 
and under-utilized norms in the international human rights system of protection”.28 The right 
is also recalled and reiterated in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development which 
states that the right to development implies “the full realization” of the right of self-
determination.29 
In the context of decolonisation, where self-determination has its “most enduring 
impact”,30 this right has been understood as the right of newly independent states to reclaim 
their sovereignty from imperial powers.31 Genest and Paquerot describe self-determination 
as “a normative foundation for decolonization”.32 Self-determination involves the political 
freedom of independent states through self-governance and the ability to manage and 
exploit their natural resources for economic independence and freedom from foreign 
interference.33 The text of common article 1 does not, however, restrict its application to 
colonisation but applies to “all peoples”.34 Self-determination has been recognised as “a 
                                            
23 Francioni “Natural Resources and HR” in International Law & Natural Resources 69-70. See also LH Leib 
Human Rights and the Environment (2011) 141. 
24 A Maguire & J McGee “A Universal Human Right to Shape Responses to a Global Problem? The Role of 
Self-Determination in Guiding the International Legal Response to Climate Change” (2017) 26 RECIEL 54 60. 
25 M Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change and Human Rights under International Law 
(2018) 99. 
26 Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 99. 
27 East Timor (Portugal v Australia) Judgment (Jurisdiction), ICJ Reports (1995) 90 para 29. See C Moore 
“Waterworld: Climate Change, Statehood and the Right to Self-Determination” in O Quirico & M Boumghar 
(eds) Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (2017) 104 107. 
See also article 1(3) of the ICESCR which requires States Parties to the Covenant to promote and respect the 
right of self-determination. 
28  UNHRC Working Group on the Right to Development The International Dimensions of the Right to 
Development: A Fresh Start towards Improving Accountability, Olivier de Schutter (22 January 2018) 
A/HRC/WG2/19/CRP1 para 115. 
29 UNGA Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986) A/RES/41/128 preamble & article 1(2). 
30 AF Vrodljak “Self-Determination and Cultural Rights” in F Francioni & M Scheinin (eds) Cultural Human 
Rights (2008) 41 52. 
31 See Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) 12 para 54-70. See also O De Schutter 
International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary 3 ed (2019) 767; Wewerinke-Singh State 
Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 100; Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 112; Maguire & 
McGee (2017) RECIEL 60. Some have argued that the right does not have application outside of a colonial 
context, however, as Vrdoljak notes, with its inclusion in the Human Rights Covenants of 1966 the right “moved 
away from the narrow colonial context” and became of universal application to all peoples. See Vrodljak “Self-
Determination & Cultural Rights” in Cultural HR 53 & 63. See also S Atapattu Human Rights Approaches to 
Climate Change (2016) 84; Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 114; Mackay “Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” in HR and the Environment: Conflicts and Norms in a Globalizing World 22. 
32 G Genest & S Paquerot “Environmental Human Rights as a Battlefield: A Grammar of Political Confrontation” 
(2016) 7 JHRE 132 151. 
33 Francioni “Natural Resources and HR” in International Law & Natural Resources 70. 




process, and not a right extinguished upon independence”. 35  The right therefore has 
application beyond decolonisation and has played an important role in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ rights, although it is not limited to such groups.36 
Some authors distinguish between an internal and external dimension of the right of self-
determination.37 The external dimension relates to the right to be free from interference or 
intervention, or the right to resist domination and occupation, with the support of the 
international community. 38  The internal dimension relates to a population’s right to “a 
government representative of all the groups within the population”.39 This internal dimension 
underscores the role of self-determination as “a norm about participatory democracy”40 that 
“establishes the democratic principle [of] transferring the sovereignty from the State to the 
people”.41 The right of peoples to determine their political status free from domination or 
exploitation, whether internally or externally, has also been described as the “political 
dimension” of self-determination.42 
Of particular relevance for “maximum available resources”, and natural resources in 
particular, is the “resource dimension” of the right of self-determination.43 This aspect of the 
right relates to the freedom to “pursue socio-economic and cultural development free from 
national or external interference”. 44  This would include freedom to determine socio-
economic policies and freedom from, for example, the exploitation of natural resources by 
foreign investors, particularly where such exploitation does not benefit the local population 
                                            
35 Vrodljak “Self-Determination & Cultural Rights” in Cultural HR 78. 
36  UNHRC Working Group on the Right to Development The International Dimensions of the Right to 
Development (2018) A/HRC/WG2/19/CRP1 para 118; Maguire & McGee (2017) RECIEL 60-61. Where gross 
violations of the right occur, it has been suggested that secession serves as “the ultimate mechanism for 
protecting group identity and the cultural rights of its members. See Vrodljak “Self-Determination & Cultural 
Rights” in Cultural HR 78. 
37 De Schutter International HR Law 773; Genest & Paquerot (2016) JHRE 151; Rosas “Self-determination” in 
ESCR: A Textbook 111; A Bloch “Minorities and Indigenous Peoples” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 373 374-375. 
38 De Schutter International HR Law 773; Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 111-112. 
39 De Schutter International HR Law 773. See also Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 112. 
40  UNHRC Working Group on the Right to Development The International Dimensions of the Right to 
Development (2018) A/HRC/WG2/19/CRP1 para 115. 
41 Genest & Paquerot (2016) JHRE 150. 
42 Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 100. See also UNGA Declaration on the Right 
to Development (4 December 1986) A/RES/41/128 article 1(1) which states that “every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to [political] development”. 
43 Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 100 & 102. There are numerous impacts on 
the right of self-determination in relation to climate change and environmental degradation. Many of these are 
unfortunately outside the scope of this chapter which is focused on an environmental reading of maximum 
available resources in the Covenant. For further discussion of the environment-related threats to self-
determination see Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 98-104; Atapattu HR 
Approaches to Climate Change 221-241; Maguire & McGee (2017) RECIEL; Moore “Waterworld” in Climate 
Change & HR 104-117. 
44 Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 102. See also Vrodljak “Self-Determination & 




or threatens their means of subsistence. 45 The former Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona noted that, given the finite and 
non-renewable nature of many natural resources, the right to self-determination “needs to 
be protected with special care, taking into account the rights of future generations”.46 Genest 
and Paquerot note that the right of self-determination is also “conceptualized as a right of 
the people to say no” and has been used as such in developing and developed countries.47 
The right of the people to participate in and determine their own development and use of 
natural resources therefore means that the population of a state and any separate peoples 
therein are entitled to refuse external control over how their natural resources are used and 
disposed of. Langford notes, for example, that gross exploitation of natural resources by 
other states or non-state actors could be deemed an interference with the right of self-
determination.48 Combining the political and resource dimensions of the right, De Schutter 
argues that: 
“[S]elf-determination means that the peoples, not governments alone, should be making the 
fundamental choices as to how the resources available should be used: in essence, it is a 
norm about participatory democracy, particularly in the context of the use, exploitation and 
allocation of natural resources”.49 
It has also been argued that the freedom to dispose of natural resources places a duty on 
States Parties to ensure that resource use is in the interests of the people, emphasising this 
relationship between natural resource use and participation.50 This is affirmed by the right 
to development which includes a duty on states to formulate national development policies 
                                            
45 Wewerinke-Singh State Responsibility, Climate Change & HR 103; Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A 
Textbook 116. See also The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the Centre for Social 
and Economic Rights v Nigeria Communication No 155/96 (2001) ACHPR. Although the SERAC judgment 
does not refer to the right of self-determination directly, the facts illustrate how the state, in cooperation with a 
foreign entity, can exploit natural resources for its own benefit, to the detriment of the local population. See 
para 65-66 of the judgment in relation to the impact on food sources as a result of exploitation of oil reserves.  
46 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda 
Carmona (22 May 2014) A/HRC/26/28 para 18. 
47 Genest & Paquerot (2016) JHRE 152. 
48 M Langford “Substantive Obligations” in M Langford, B Porter, R Brown & J Rossi The Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Commentary (2016) 203 213. The 
exploitation of natural resources is discussed in further detail at 5 4 2 below. 
49  UNHRC Working Group on the Right to Development The International Dimensions of the Right to 
Development (2018) A/HRC/WG2/19/CRP1 para 115. See also De Schutter “Public Budget Analysis” in The 
Future of ESR 540 where De Schutter argues that “a right to participation flows from the right to self-
determination”. 
50 R Burchill “Democracy and the Promotion and Protection of Socio-Economic Rights” in MA Baderin & R 
McCorquodale Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2007) 361 376; De Schutter “Public Budget 
Analysis” in The Future of ESR 540 & 564. See also UNGA Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(14 December 1962) Res 1803 (XVIII) and Schrijver Sovereignty over Natural Resources 308 where it is 
asserted that permanent sovereignty includes a duty to exercise sovereignty over natural resources for national 




on the basis of the entire population’s “active, free and meaningful participation in 
development” as well as the “fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”.51 
As noted above, article 1(2) of the Covenant specifically prohibits deprivation of a people’s 
means of subsistence. In other words, the natural wealth and resources of a people may not 
be disposed of or threatened to such a degree that they are unable to meet their basic 
needs. 52  Rosas notes that this provision “builds a bridge” between the right of self-
determination and basic individual rights such as the right to an adequate standard of living 
in article 11.53 The Committee has recognised the importance of access to natural resources 
in relation to the right to work and the people’s livelihoods in its concluding observations in 
relation to Israel, although self-determination is not explicitly mentioned. 54  There the 
Committee noted obstacles to the right to work of Palestinian fishermen and called on the 
State Party to “recognize and respect the right of the Palestinian people to the marine 
resources, including the right to fish in the territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of 
the Gaza Strip”. 55 Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani argue that deprivation of a peoples’ 
means of subsistence as a result of severe environmental degradation “would constitute a 
serious abridgement of the right to self-determination”.56 It has also been argued that the 
illicit movement and dumping of toxic waste is a threat to self-determination and the freedom 
to dispose of natural resources.57 In this regard the principle of prior informed consent under 
IEL (distinguishable from the concept of FPIC applicable to indigenous peoples) can be 
understood as a mechanism to promote self-determination and prevent damage to the 
natural wealth and resources of a state.58 In light of the above, the obligation to use the 
                                            
51 UNGA Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986, A/RES/41/128) article 2(3). See also 
the description of “development” in the preamble. 
52 The right of self-determination in the African Charter refers to a peoples’ right of existence. See African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 
UNTS 217 article 20. See also MA Baderin “The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa” in MA Baderin & R McCorquodale Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2007) 139 160-161. 
53 Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 118. 
54 CESCR Concluding Observations, Israel (16 December 2011) E/C12/ISR/CO/3 para 12. 
55 CESCR Israel (2011) para 12. 
56 S McInerney-Lankford, M Darrow & L Rajamani Human Rights and Climate Change: A Review of the 
International Legal Dimensions (2011) 35-36. 
57 See UN Economic and Social Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on Toxic Waste, Fatma-Zohra 
Ouhachi-Vesely: Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products and 
Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights (2001) E/CN4/2001/55 para 58; UNHRC Preliminary Report (2012) 
A/HRC/22/43 para 21. 
58 Prior informed consent under IEL relates to the consent required from a state prior to a potentially harmful 
activity such as the transboundary movement of chemicals, waste or genetic resources. This is governed by 
treaties such as the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal (adopted 22 March 1989, entered into force 5 May 1992) 1673 UNTS 126. Although some 
authors discuss prior informed consent in conjunction with the principle of FPIC, it is submitted that the two 




maximum of available resources for the progressive realisation of ESCRs must include an 
obligation on the State Party to protect the natural resources of its own people and people 
of other states, particularly where their means of subsistence are implicated. This would 
include not only natural resources necessary for health, food and water, but also those 
necessary for livelihoods and development. 
Article 1(2) of the Covenant qualifies the right to dispose of natural wealth and resources 
by stating that it is “without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law”. As Rosas 
explains, this provision relates to, among other things, “the restraints international law may 
place on the right of states and peoples to nationalize and confiscate foreign property”.59 
This qualification in article 1(2) must be read in conjunction with article 25 which states that 
“[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all 
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources”.60 In other 
words, although there may be exceptions in certain areas governed by international law, 
such as multilateral environmental agreements to which a state is a party, the emphasis 
remains on the full and free enjoyment and utilisation of natural resources, not only by States 
Parties, but by all peoples. In light of the context of decolonisation, article 25 ensures that 
previously occupied or dominated states are given the freedom to choose how their natural 
wealth and resources are used, without undue interference and control by external actors 
such as international corporations.61 As Barral notes, “control over resources thus ensured 
that independence was not just an empty shell, but a concrete attribute which would pave 
the way to economic development”. 62  It is unclear from article 25 itself or from the 
Committee’s doctrine precisely what relevance this provision has outside of this context of 
decolonisation. It would, however, be wholly inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
                                            
particular rights of indigenous peoples. See, for example, G Roller “Prior Informed Consent” in L Krämer & E 
Orlando (eds) Principles of Environmental Law (2018) 338 338-350. In relation to FPIC, see Chapter 2, 2 2 2. 
59 Rosas “Self-determination” in ESCR: A Textbook 116. 
60 ICESCR article 25. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 article 47. 
61 In relation to national sovereignty over natural resources, Barral notes that after decolonisation “newly 
independent States affirmed their permanent sovereignty over natural resources […] as a means to claim back 
what they ‘owned’ (i.e. natural resources located within their territory) from the foreign corporations that were 
exploiting them”. See V Barral “National Sovereignty” in E Morgera & K Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook 
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Covenant to interpret article 25 as permitting unfettered exploitation of natural resources, 
regardless of the resultant detrimental impacts on the environment and ESCRs.63 
It is important to emphasise that, in contrast to the principle of sovereignty over natural 
resources, the right of self-determination is a collective right of peoples and not a right 
attributable to the state itself.64 Van der Vyver suggests that common article 1 constitutes 
the inclusion of the principle of state sovereignty in the ICESCR and ICCPR and “marks a 
shift away from designating the right over natural resources as an integral part of state 
sovereignty, and toward proclaiming it more specifically as a component of the human right 
of peoples to self-determination”.65 As opposed to sovereignty’s emphasis on the notion of 
the state, self-determination underscores the well-being of the people and their participation 
in their own social, economic and cultural development. Genest and Paquerot argue that 
the participatory dimension of self-determination places limitations on state sovereignty. In 
their view, sovereignty “is only justified to the extent that it translates the self-determination 
of the people – who themselves are in a situation of legitimate political contestation when 
their rights are not respected”.66 This interpretation of sovereignty is consistent with the 
Covenant and the contents of the right of self-determination in article 1. 
Self-determination therefore does not provide for the exploitation of natural resources by 
the state where the people do not participate or benefit from such exploitation. 67 The 
freedom to dispose of natural resources is not a licence for States Parties to do whatever 
they want with their natural resources without consequence. Instead it seeks to give effect 
to the will of the people and to prevent undue interference and intervention from external 
forces in the management, use and allocation of its natural wealth and resources. The use 
and disposal of these resources should be for the benefit of the people and should be 
understood in the context of their participation and self-determination.68 A State Party is 
obligated to use its natural resources for the progressive realisation of ESCRs or more 
broadly for the benefit and well-being of the people. A State Party is not using the maximum 
of its available resources for the realisation of Covenant rights if its natural resources are 
                                            
63 See Chapter 3, 3 3 2 3 and 3 3 3 for a discussion of teleological interpretation. 
64 J van der Vyver “Sovereignty” in D Shelton (ed) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law 
(2013) 379 386-387.  
65 Van der Vyver “Sovereignty” in Oxford Handbook of International HR Law 386-387. 
66 Genest & Paquerot (2016) JHRE 152. 
67 See, for example, Leib HR and the Environment 142; De Schutter “Public Budget Analysis” in The Future of 
ESR 564. 
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exercise of this sovereignty for national development and the well-being of the people. See Schrijver 
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exploited for the financial gain of national or foreign entities with no benefit accruing to the 
people themselves. 
Given the obligation on all States Parties to the Covenant to promote the realisation of 
the right of self-determination, it is necessary to point out that a people’s exercise of the 
freedom to dispose of natural resources may be limited to the extent that its activities 
threaten the same right of another state or people. 69 A state or people cannot justify 
unfettered depletion of its own natural resources where this has the effect of damaging the 
environment and natural resources of a neighbouring people or state to the extent that their 
means of subsistence is threatened. Over-exploitation of marine living resources could, for 
example, threaten the subsistence of neighbouring indigenous peoples or states who rely 
on those resources for food and livelihoods. Similarly, the unrestrained exploitation of fossil 
fuels should not be justified on the basis of self-determination and the freedom to exploit 
natural wealth and resources where the result is the annihilation of small island developing 
states and their own right of self-determination and means of subsistence.70 
The right of self-determination is therefore integral to the use and disposal of natural 
resources and, by extension, a State Party’s use of maximum available resources for the 
realisation of ESCRs. Self-determination highlights the importance of the participation of 
peoples in resource decisions, the necessity of protecting peoples’ means of subsistence, 
and the essential role (and rights) of indigenous peoples in the use and disposal of natural 
resources. Self-determination also has significant implications for interference in natural 
resource use by foreign corporations through the exploitation of natural resources.71 
5 2 3 Environmental considerations and constraints on sovereignty and self-determination 
While both state sovereignty and self-determination underscore the freedom of states and 
peoples to use and dispose of natural resources, this freedom may be subject to certain 
necessary environmental constraints. The principles of IEL discussed in chapter 4 suggest 
that limitations on the use of natural resources are necessary for the protection of the 
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a result of climate change. 




environment, in relation to both the exercise of state sovereignty as well as the right of self-
determination in article 1. However, unlike sovereignty, self-determination is a Covenant 
right. Where the right of self-determination is interpreted as having a more limited scope this 
must therefore be consistent with a teleological interpretation of the Covenant. Alternatively, 
any constraints on article 1 must be justified according to the criteria under article 4.72 
The no-harm principle serves as a limit to state sovereignty requiring states to ensure that 
activities on their territory do not harm the territory of another state.73 Sovereignty over 
natural resources also includes a duty of cooperation of states in respect of shared 
resources.74 This is particularly important in the context of shared watercourses and the 
exploitation of marine living resources. 75  Given the significant overlap between self-
determination and state sovereignty in relation to natural resources, it would be appropriate 
for similar constraints to apply to article 1 to ensure that the exercise of self-determination 
does not unduly restrict the freedoms of neighbouring states and peoples in relation to their 
own use and disposal of natural resources. In the same way that states are required to 
cooperate in relation to shared resources and the prevention of transboundary 
environmental harm, neighbouring peoples or traditional and indigenous peoples within the 
broader population of a state should ensure that their use and disposal of natural resources 
does not harm the human rights or environment of others. 76 An interpretation of self-
determination that ensures the effectiveness of Covenant rights for all, must take such 
constraints into account.77 The scope of the right to self-determination should therefore be 
understood as excluding any exercise of the right that would cause harm to ESCRs or the 
environment on which they depend. 
Barral suggests that the understanding of sovereignty over natural resources in 
international law has evolved in accordance with the development paradigm of sustainable 
development. Barral thus argues:  
                                            
72 On limitations under article 4 see, for example, CESCR General Comment No 13 para 42; CESCR General 
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73 See Chapter 4, 4 3 2 2. 
74 See Chapter 4, 4 3 2 2 1 in relation to sovereignty over natural resources. 
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See Chapter 4, 4 3 1 4 and 4 3 1 5. 
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“[T]he evolution of the conception of development from economic growth to sustainable 
development may well mean that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources today includes a duty of environmental protection, as only then can permanent 
sovereignty be exercised in the interest of development and of the well-being of the people of 
the State”.78  
Barral’s proposal recognises humanity’s dependence on the environment and would be 
consistent with the purposes of the Covenant and, in the context of article 1, with the 
participatory dimension of self-determination. If the principle of integration (the core principle 
of sustainable development) requires environmental factors to be incorporated within 
development decisions, then sovereignty and self-determination exercised in the interests 
of the people should take the environment into account. 79  A failure to consider the 
environment would allow an exercise of sovereignty that depletes the natural resources 
humanity depends on for survival and would fail to ensure the sustainable use and disposal 
of natural resources for the sake of future generations. Such an interpretation of self-
determination and sovereignty would therefore be inconsistent with the object and purpose 
of the Covenant. 
Turning to the principle of sustainable use, Redgwell describes it as a constraint on 
sovereignty and on natural resource development decisions.80 The freedom to use and 
dispose of natural resources for peoples exercising the right to self-determination should 
similarly be constrained. The use and exploitation of natural resources should be 
implemented with the longevity of the resources in mind.81 States Parties (and peoples 
exercising the right of self-determination) should use and dispose of natural resources 
sustainably in order to ensure that these resources are available to continue to support the 
progressive realisation of ESCRs over the long term.82 An interpretation of the Covenant 
that is systematic and teleological indicates that the right of self-determination cannot be 
understood as unlimited if this renders other ESCRs in the Covenant meaningless.83 It is 
therefore essential that, in exercising this right, States Parties limit their use and disposal of 
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Sovereignty” in International Law & Natural Resources 6-7. 
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natural resources to the extent required to protect the environmental base that is vital to the 
realisation of ESCRs. 
In addition to the principle of sustainable use, limits should also be imposed on natural 
resource use in accordance with the principles of precaution and prevention. 84 Where 
projects and activities related to the exploitation of natural resources are concerned, 
precautionary measures should be taken to prevent potentially significant impacts on the 
environment and human rights, even where such impacts are uncertain. Sovereignty and 
self-determination may therefore be limited for the protection of the environment and 
ESCRs. The precautionary principle and the principle of prevention support the limitation of 
resource use in relation to, for example, CFCs (which cause depletion of the ozone layer) 
and GHG emissions (which cause climate change and a host of related impacts) as these 
ultimately result in widespread and long-term harm to ESCRs. 
The use of natural resources will require an exercise of due diligence in order to ensure 
that impacts on human rights, the environment and neighbouring territories are limited. While 
these obligations of due diligence are often imposed on states, indigenous and traditional 
peoples exercising the right of self-determination should also be obliged to undertake human 
rights and environmental impact assessments with respect to natural resource exploitation. 
In order to ensure the realisation of ESCRs in accordance with the object and purpose of 
the Covenant, self-determination must be interpreted as including this obligation of due 
diligence.85 
5 2 4 Conclusion 
The right of self-determination and the principle of state sovereignty over natural 
resources are foundational for questions of related to resources under article 2(1). A State 
Party’s obligation to take steps to the maximum of its available resources towards the 
realisation of Covenant rights must be interpreted in the context of both the State Party’s 
freedom to determine its own path and use of resources as well as the constraints of such 
freedom imposed by IEL, the obligations of States Parties under the Covenant, and the limits 
of natural resources and the environment. As has been emphasised above, the freedom to 
use and dispose of natural resources must always be exercised in the interests of the people 
and the realisation of their ESCRs. With this context in mind, we now turn to the meaning of 
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specific aspects of “maximum available resources” in article 2(1), beginning with the 
meaning of resources. 
5 3 The meaning of “resources” 
5 3 1 Current interpretation 
There is no definition of “resources” within the Covenant and it remains unclear precisely 
which resources (or categories of resources) should be considered for the realisation of 
ESCRs.86 Robertson points out that there is a distinction between the obligation to “take 
steps” and the resources that may be required to do so, noting that “[g]overnment action is 
not synonymous with providing a resource” and that “taking a step may be meaningless 
without an accompanying resource being provided”.87 In other words, resources are often 
indispensable, but they may require additional steps in order to be put to appropriate use. 
Skogly notes that discussions in the drafting phase of the Covenant demonstrate that 
“resources” was understood to include “both financial and other resources available to the 
State, broadly interpreted”.88 However, there has been little definition or elaboration on the 
nature of these “other resources”. From early on in the Committee’s work it has affirmed that 
available resources should include both domestic and international resources 89  in 
accordance with the reference to international assistance and cooperation in article 2(1).90 
The Committee’s general comments indicate that a range of resources may be appropriate 
for realising ESCRs, including legislative, administrative, financial, educational and social 
resources.91 However, it is not always clear “what kind of non-financial public resources 
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A Question of Quality as Well as Quantity” (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 393 396 & 398; Uprimny, 
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must be considered”.92 Robertson suggests that a permanent and definitive list of resource 
types may not be possible as “[t]he ongoing process of economic and social evolution is 
constantly creating different resource needs”. 93  Robertson provides the example of 
information as a resource which was not always recognised as such.94 More contemporary 
examples could be found in the form of various technological resources which would not 
have been considered at the time the Covenant was drafted.95 It is therefore necessary to 
allow for adaptation of the Covenant’s terminology to new and changing resources and 
needs, and in accordance with the evolutive approach to interpretation.96 
Bearing in mind the constant evolution and development of resource needs, there are 
certain categories of resources which commentators have identified as relevant for the 
realisation of ESCRs. For example, Robertson recognises the categories of human 
resources, technological resources, information resources, natural resources, and financial 
resources.97 Skogly similarly refers to natural resources, human resources, cultural and 
scientific resources, and financial resources, as well as related educational, administrative 
and legislative measures.98 With regard to international resources, Skogly identifies two 
types, namely bilateral development assistance or cooperation, and multilateral cooperation 
through international institutions.99 Elson, Balakrishnan and Heintz propose that resources 
include “human, technological, organisational, natural, informational and financial 
resources, both public and private”.100 Aside from these resource types, it is useful to note 
that the resources available to the state for the realisation of ESCRs can be also be classified 
according to their sources, for example, as domestic or international and public or private. 
In addition to the ubiquitous financial resources, a number of the categories proposed by 
the commentators above have been referred to by the Committee, although not always in 
the context of maximum available resources. In its general comments, for example, the 
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Committee makes reference to a number of non-financial resources including human,101 
natural,102 medical,103 technological,104 cultural,105 genetic106 and water107 resources. Many 
of these references to non-financial resources do not appear in the context of discussing 
what resources are “available” to the state under article 2(1), but they do provide a broad 
indication of what the Committee considers as “resources”. 108  General Comment 14 
provides an example of an obligation which relates to non-financial resources. 109  The 
Committee requires States Parties to “cooperate in providing disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance in times of emergency”.110 Although this obligation only applies in 
a circumscribed context, it is clear that the resources required for such relief and assistance 
will often include non-financial resources such as food, water, and medical supplies and 
services.111 Similarly, the Committee’s statement in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic 
refers to non-financial resources from international assistance and cooperation in the form 
of “the sharing of research, medical equipment and supplies, and best practices in 
combating the virus”.112 
Despite the potential relevance of a range of resources, however, the Committee’s work 
has “focused almost exclusively on financial resources”.113 There is of course no doubt that 
financial or economic resources are of fundamental importance for the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs, and commentators have similarly centred the discussion of maximum 
available resources on financial and economic resources.114 As Skogly notes, “rather than 
                                            
101 CESCR General Comment No 19: The Right to Social Security (Art 9 of the Covenant) (4 February 2008) 
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discussing creatively what kind of resources may be available and how they should be used, 
the discussion has focused on prioritising when financial resources are – or have been made 
– available”.115  
With regard to financial resources, much focus has been placed on budgetary allocations 
or state expenditure in relation to ESCRs.116 Uprimny, Hernández and Araújo note that the 
Committee’s emphasis has been on budgets, international development assistance, debt 
and tax issues.117 Arguing for a broader view of financial resources, Dowell-Jones notes that 
state expenditure alone is unable to “capture the diversity of possible institutional 
arrangements” 118 or appropriately provide for the range of rights and economic actors 
involved in fulfilling Covenant obligations.119 Dowell-Jones argues that maximum available 
resources for the purposes of article 2(1) concerns “broad economic capacity rather than a 
narrow notion of State budgetary appropriations”. 120  Uprimny, Hernández and Araújo 
identify five interrelated dimensions of these resources, namely “government expenditure, 
government revenue, development assistance, debt and deficit financing and monetary 
policy and financial regulation”.121 Skogly notes that while some authors have extended the 
concept of resources beyond the realm of national budgeting, the resources considered are 
still confined to financial ones.122 
The distinction between financial and non-financial resources has been described in 
terms of a quantitative and qualitative approach to resources. 123 Skogly describes the 
emphasis on financial resources as a quantitative approach, as it centres on the amount of 
resources set aside for ESCRs, often in relation to budgetary allocations.124 As Skogly 
points out, this is an understandable result of the use of the term “maximum” in article 2(1) 
which encourages an assessment of the amount of resources used.125 However, a purely 
quantitative approach obscures other resources that may have relevance for ESCRs.126 
Natural resources, for example, have relevance as resources which directly assist in the 
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fulfilment of certain ESCRs, while certain types of natural resources also serve as 
commodities that could contribute to a State Party’s available financial resources. A 
qualitative approach considers a broader variety of resource types while also relating these 
to the “‘means’ of implementation such as administrative, financial, educational and social 
measures, and legislation”.127 In other words, a qualitative approach not only recognises the 
relevance of non-financial resources, but includes a consideration of the quality of these 
resources and the effectiveness of how these resources are put to use. Skogly argues that 
“more effective and targeted use of the existing available financial and non-financial 
resources may on the one hand make up for lack of economic resources, and on the other 
be more sustainable in the long term”.128 Given the relationship between natural resources 
and the quality of the environment on which many ESCRs depend, a qualitative approach 
to natural resources is essential for an interpretation of the Covenant that integrates 
environmental considerations. 
The Committee has confirmed on numerous occasions that the “maximum of available 
resources” at the disposal of a state includes those resources which can be obtained through 
international assistance and cooperation.129 A State Party relying on a lack of available 
resources to justify a failure to meet its obligations must show that it sought such 
international support.130 In General Comment 22, for example, the Committee states the 
following: 
“In compliance with article 2(1), States that are not able to comply with their obligations and 
that cannot realize the right to sexual and reproductive health due to a lack of resources must 
seek international cooperation and assistance. States that are in a position to do so must 
respond to such requests in good faith and in accordance with the international commitment 
of contributing at a minimum 0.7 per cent of their gross national income for international 
cooperation and assistance”.131 
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It is worth noting that the Committee’s concluding observations have also consistently noted 
its disapproval where developed states have devoted less than 0.7 percent of their Gross 
National Product to international cooperation and assistance.132 With regard to the form of 
international support, De Schutter notes that international resources include resources from 
foreign direct investment as well as those obtained through development cooperation or the 
provision of loans.133 In its 2019 concluding observations in relation to Switzerland, the 
Committee observed that such international support could include international cooperation 
for the prevention of tax evasion.134 The Committee noted its concern that “illicit financial 
flows from third countries continue to be placed in financial institutions in the State party, 
thereby curtailing the availability of financial resources vital for the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights in those countries”.135 It recommended that the State Party “take 
strict measures to combat tax evasion […] and intensify its efforts to address global tax 
abuse”.136  
Of course, it is also possible for international resources to include non-financial resources. 
Given the wording of article 2(1) it is clear that international assistance and cooperation will, 
at the very least, include technical assistance and cooperation, implying that the resources 
required will not be purely financial. For example, in 2019 the Committee urged Mauritius 
“to seek international support and assistance in order to mobilize the financial and 
technological support to which it is entitled in mitigating and responding to the effects of 
climate change”. 137 Non-financial international resources may have particular relevance 
where medical, scientific and technological advancements are concerned. 138  This is 
confirmed in the Committee’s statement in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic where, in the 
context of international assistance and cooperation, it refers to the sharing of medical 
supplies as well as research.139 Scientific research which impacts on (in this case) the right 
to health, should therefore be understood as a resource available to States Parties which 
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must be used towards realisation of ESCRs, and must be requested from other States 
Parties where necessary.140 This approach is also important with respect to climate change, 
as scientific research and information regarding impacts as well as mitigation and adaptation 
measures are crucial for preventing unnecessary harm to ESCRs. 
In summary, the meaning of resources in article 2(1) refers to those resources which the 
state should use to progressively realise ESCRs. It is accepted that these resources include 
those available from domestic and international sources, as well as public and private 
sources. Financial resources have (understandably) received the most attention from the 
Committee and commentators on the Covenant. The importance and relevance of financial 
resources is not discounted. However, a broader perspective which incorporates both 
financial and non-financial resources would assist States Parties in making use of their 
available resources to the maximum, particularly where financial resources are scarce. A 
broader (and evolving) range of resource types at the disposal of States Parties includes 
human, natural, technological, informational, cultural and scientific resources. This also 
includes those financial and non-financial resources available to the State Party through 
international assistance and cooperation. Given their fundamental relevance for 
environmental considerations, the role of natural resources is analysed in more detail below, 
with particular emphasis on the exploitation of natural resources. 
5 3 2 The role of natural resources 
5 3 2 1 Defining natural resources 
Before discussing the relationship between natural resources and ESCRs in the 
Covenant, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of “natural resources”. The term refers to 
a wide range of resources with varying properties, applications, impacts, and value. Natural 
resources therefore cover “an extremely heterogeneous area”141 and cannot be seen as “a 
single monolithic topic”. 142 Perhaps the most common distinction within the concept of 
natural resources is that between renewable and non-renewable resources. Renewable or 
flow resources are those which are able to regenerate or renew over a short period of 
                                            
140 In this regard, see CESCR Statement on the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic and ESCRs para 
21 where the Committee notes that “States parties should also promote flexibilities or other adjustments in 
applicable intellectual property regimes to allow universal access to the benefits of scientific advancements 
relating to COVID-19 such as diagnostics, medicines and vaccines”. 
141 E Morgera & K Kulovesi “Preface” in E Morgera & K Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook on International 
Law and Natural Resources (2016) xi. 
142 See Morgera & Kulovesi “Preface” in International Law and Natural Resources xi with reference to R Higgins 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994) 129. Higgins also notes that “[a]lmost 




time.143 Some resources that are in principle renewable may not be deemed practically 
renewable given the significant period required for this to occur. 144  Non-renewable 
resources or stock resources have a finite quantity and cannot be regenerated.145 In addition 
to the aforementioned categories, the term “exhaustible resources” can be used to refer to 
are those natural resources which can be depleted and, while this certainly includes finite 
non-renewable resources, it also includes those renewable resources that could be 
exhausted through over-exploitation.146 
 From an economic perspective, natural resources are understood in terms of their utility 
in relation to economic production and consumption.147 While useful, this approach is not 
appropriate in the context of the Covenant. A definition such as the one used by Morgera 
and Kulovesi is more appropriate in this regard. They define natural resources as “materials 
and processes that exist in nature and that are considered of actual or potential use or value 
to humans”. 148  For example, while clean air may not be considered a commodity for 
economic production or consumption, it is certainly a resource that State Parties should be 
required to protect and “mobilise” through pollution prevention and regulation in order to 
realise the right to health. 
There is no clear definition of natural resources in international law.149 In the context of 
the Covenant it is necessary to distinguish between natural resources as a broad category 
of resources which form part of the “maximum available resources” clause,150 and natural 
                                            
143 See N Schrijver Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (1997) 13; World Trade 
Organisation World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (2010) 47. Schrijver notes that this period 
of renewal should be within one generation, whereas the WTO definition describes renewal within an 
“economically relevant” period. 
144 Schrijver Sovereignty over Natural Resources 14; WTO World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural 
Resources (2010) 47. For example, oil may technically be described as renewable, but the process of its 
formation occurs over millions of years and it is therefore not considered renewable in any practical sense. 
145 Schrijver Sovereignty over Natural Resources 13; WTO World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural 
Resources (2010) 47. 
146 WTO World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (2010) 47. Exhaustible renewable resources 
include, for example, species of fish whose populations are unable to recover from overexploitation and 
therefore become extinct. 
147 See WTO World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources (2010) 46 where natural resources are 
defined as “stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and economically 
useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of processing”. See 
also Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development “Natural Resources” Glossary of Statistical 
Terms (02-12-2005) <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740> (accessed 22-04-2020), where 
natural resources are defined as “natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for 
economic production or consumption”. The OECD subdivides natural resources into categories of mineral and 
energy resources; soil resources; water resources; and biological resources. 
148 Morgera & Kulovesi “Preface” in International Law & Natural Resources x. 
149 Morgera & Kulovesi “Preface” in International Law & Natural Resources x; Schrijver Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources 14-15. Schrijver notes that some treaties have their own definitions. See Schrijver 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources 15. 
150 In this context a definition such as that used by Morgera and Kulovesi would be appropriate. See Morgera 




resources as a specific term appearing in articles 1 and 25 of the Covenant which may 
require a more precise definition.151 As far as the Committee’s approach is concerned, its 
concluding observations often make reference to natural resources in broad terms, usually 
in the context of article 1 or the rights of indigenous peoples (or both).152 However, in some 
cases the Committee has referred to natural resources in the context of discussing specific 
resources, indicating that, at the very least, these resources would form part of what is meant 
by “natural resources”. A review of the Committee’s concluding observations reveals that it 
understands natural resources to include minerals;153 oil;154 gas; hydrocarbons;155 forests 
and forest resources;156 as well as fauna and biological and aquatic resources.157 In General 
Comment 15 the Committee also refers to water as “a limited natural resource”.158 A broader 
approach to natural resources, such as the one used by Morgera and Kulovesi,159 could 
include extractible natural resources such as flora and fauna; marine living resources; water; 
minerals; soil; and more complex natural materials and processes such as the atmosphere; 
biodiversity; ecosystems; and the climate system.160 These resources should be regulated, 
managed and mobilised so as to progressively realise ESCRs, and should therefore be 
included in the scope of maximum available resources.  
As noted above, the characteristics of natural resources are varied and, given the wide 
range of natural resources potentially relevant for ESCRs and maximum available 
resources, it is important to note that the treatment and assessment of natural resources will 
differ according to the particular natural resource or category of natural resources at issue. 
                                            
151 Articles 1 and 25 are discussed at 5 2 2 above. See also articles 1 and 47 of the ICCPR. Natural resources 
in the context of these provisions could be understood, at a minimum, to include those extractible natural 
resources which are of economic value. 
152 CESCR Concluding Observations, Cambodia (12 June 2009) E/C12/KHM/CO/1 para 15-16; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Russian Federation (1 June 2011) E/C12/RUS/CO/5 para 7; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Gabon (27 December 2013) E/C12/GAB/CO/1 para 6; CESCR Concluding Observations, El 
Salvador (19 June 2014) E/C12/SLV/CO/3-5 para 27; CESCR Concluding Observations, Ecuador (7 June 
2004) E/C12/1/Add100 para 12; CESCR Concluding Observations, Morocco (22 October 2015) 
E/C12/MAR/CO/4 para 5-6; CESCR Concluding Observations, Paraguay (20 March 2015) E/C12/PRY/CO/4 
para 6; CESCR Concluding Observations, Honduras (11 July 2016) E/C12/HND/CO/2 para 11-12. 
153  CESCR Concluding Observations, Israel (12 November 2019) E/C12/ISR/CO/4 para 14-15; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Venezuela (7 July 2015) E/C12/VEN/CO/3 para 9; CESCR El Salvador (2014) para 
27; CESCR Concluding Observations, Guatemala (9 December 2014) E/C12/GTM/CO/3 para 6-7; CESCR 
Cambodia (2009) para 16; CESCR Concluding Observations, Chad (16 December 2009) E/C12/TCD/CO/3 
para 13. 
154  CESCR Israel (2019) para 14-15; CESCR Concluding Observations, Congo (2 January 2013) 
E/C12/COG/CO/1 para 12; CESCR Cambodia (2009) para 16; CESCR Chad (2009) para 13. 
155 CESCR Venezuela (2015) para 9; CESCR El Salvador (2014) para 27. 
156 CESCR Cambodia (2009) para 15. 
157 CESCR Russian Federation (2011) para 7. 
158 CESCR General Comment No 15 para 1. 
159 Morgera & Kulovesi “Preface” in International Law & Natural Resources x. 
160 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that all of these resources would be relevant or appropriate for 




This is evidenced by the separate international legal regimes dealing with, for example, 
marine living resources, 161  freshwater resources, 162  and biodiversity. 163  Understanding 
natural resources and their relationship to the broader environment is the function of 
scientists of various specific disciplines such as ecologists, hydrologists, botanists and 
meteorologists. As natural resources implicate complex ecological processes and their use 
and exploitation is coupled with a host of potential impacts and consequences, it is essential 
to note that decision-making regarding natural resources will require appropriate 
expertise.164 It is also essential to understand that although international law and human 
rights operate within a framework of statehood and territorial boundaries, natural resources 
do not respect such boundaries. 165  Any effective approach to natural resources must 
therefore reconceptualise our understanding of state sovereignty accordingly.166 
5 3 2 2 The Covenant and natural resources 
Turning to the relationship between natural resources and Covenant rights, it is 
undeniable that natural resources are essential for the enjoyment of ESCRs.167 As Francioni 
notes, “[n]atural resources sustain livelihoods, unite peoples, provide the source for the 
satisfaction of their basic needs and are the material foundation of their enjoyment of human 
rights”.168 Leib also emphasises this relationship between natural resources and ESCRs, 
noting that “the management or mismanagement of natural resources, whether renewable 
or not, has tremendous effect on people’s livelihoods”.169 Significantly, impacts on natural 
resources disproportionately affect the poor as “[t]he livelihoods of 70 per cent of people 
                                            
161 See Sands P, J Peel, AF Aguilar & R Mackenzie Principles of International Environmental Law 4 ed (2018) 
506-547; P Dupuy & JE Viñuales International Environmental Law (2018) 206-212; C Salpin “Marine Genetic 
Resources of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Soul Searching and the Art of Balance” in E Morgera & K 
Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (2016) 411 411-431; UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 
UNTS 3. 
162 See O McIntyre “Water” in E Morgera & K Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and 
Natural Resources (2016) 305 305-326; Sands et al Principles of IEL 360-366; Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 August 
2014) UN Doc A/51/869. 
163 See Sands et al Principles of IEL 384-451; Dupuy & Viñuales International Environmental Law 234-247; 
Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 
79. 
164 A sustainable development paradigm would require an integrated consideration of social, economic and 
environmental factors, therefore requiring expertise from each of the three areas. 
165  V Barral “National Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Environmental Challenges and Sustainable 
Development” in E Morgera & K Kulovesi (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and Natural 
Resources (2016) 3 4 & 10. 
166 See Barral “National Sovereignty” in International Law & Natural Resources 3-25. See 5 2 above in relation 
to sovereignty and self-determination. 
167 See Chapter 2, 2 2. 
168 Francioni “Natural Resources and HR” in International Law & Natural Resources 66. 




living in poverty directly depend on natural resources”. 170 Those dependent on natural 
resources for their livelihoods are often indigenous peoples or peasants and other people 
working in rural areas.171 Natural resources contribute to ESCRs through revenue generated 
from their exploitation, as well as directly through the provision of elements of the 
environment necessary for ESCRs such as clean water to drink, clean air to breathe, and 
fertile soil to produce food.172  
The direct relevance of the state of natural resources for the realisation of ESCRs 
indicates that the qualitative condition of natural resources is an important consideration for 
the realisation of Covenant rights.173 Access to air, soil and water is of little use for the 
realisation of the rights to health or an adequate standard of living if these resources are 
severely polluted or degraded. A qualitative approach to natural resources and ecosystem 
functions is supported by the work of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (“IPBES”). In its 2019 report the IPBES notes, for 
example, that “[i]ncorporating the consideration of the multiple values of ecosystem 
functions and of nature’s contributions to people into economic incentives has, in the 
economy, been shown to permit better ecological, economic and social outcomes”.174 
The manner in which natural resources should be used for ESCRs is not always clear. 
Natural resource exploitation often results in violations of human rights either as a result of 
degraded natural resources threatening ESCRs, or as a result of the profits of such activities 
being prioritised over the needs and rights of local communities.175 However, the exploitation 
of natural resources may have significant advantages for ESCRs, as “it can support the 
realization of economic and social rights by providing employment, social welfare, public 
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171 In relation to the rights of indigenous peoples and peasants see, respectively, UNGA United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2 October 2007) A/RES/61/295; UNGA United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (21 January 2019) 
A/RES/73/165. 
172 See Chapter 2, 2 2 1 in relation to ecosystem services. 
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174 IPBES “Summary for policymakers” in S Díaz, J Settele, ES Brondízio, HT Ngo, M Guèze, J Agard, A 
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Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (2019) 14. 
175 It is necessary to note that local communities will often, but not always, include indigenous peoples as well 
as peasants and other people working in rural areas. The latter groups or communities have additional rights 
under relevant UN Declarations. See UNGA United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other 
People Working in Rural Areas (21 January 2019) A/RES/73/165 and UNGA United Nations Declaration on 




revenues and a general improvement of the conditions of life of the society”.176 The role and 
impact of natural resource exploitation is discussed below in the context of the availability of 
resources. 177 For many States Parties, the revenue generated from the exploitation of 
natural resources is integral to their capacity to fulfil ESCRs. The former Special Rapporteur 
on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona noted the following 
in relation to the benefits of natural resources: 
“At the very least, a State’s population has a right to enjoy a fair share of the financial and 
social benefits that natural resources can bring. This requires ensuring participation, access to 
information and high standards of transparency and accountability in decision-making about 
the use of natural resources. Where indigenous peoples are involved, States have additional 
and specific obligations, including ensuring free, prior and informed consent in any decisions 
regarding the use of their lands”.178 
Whatever choices States Parties make with regard to the management, regulation, 
exploitation or protection of their natural resources, it is evident that there will be significant 
implications for ESCRs, whether for good or for bad. To ensure that the use of natural 
resources has a positive impact and promotes ESCRs, it is essential to consider the role 
that natural resources play in the realisation of these rights.  
In its concluding observations, the Committee’s references to natural resources appear 
in relation to the recognition and protection of indigenous rights to natural resources;179 
access to natural resources; 180  the consultation and consent of local communities or 
indigenous peoples in the context of the exploitation of natural resources;181 the detrimental 
impacts of natural resource exploitation on ESCRs;182 the need to assess the environmental 
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178 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda 
Carmona (22 May 2014) A/HRC/26/28 para 18. 
179  CESCR El Salvador (2014) para 27; CESCR Ecuador (2019) para 15-16; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Costa Rica (21 October 2016) E/C12/CRI/CO/5 para 8-9; CESCR Concluding Observations, 
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March 2015) E/C12/PRY/CO/4 para 6; CESCR Cameroon (2019) para 12-13; CESCR Guatemala (2014) para 
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180 CESCR Concluding Observations, United Republic of Tanzania (13 December 2012) E/C12/TZA/CO/1-3 
para 23; CESCR Honduras (2016) para 11-12; CESCR Israel (2019) para 14-15; CESCR Russian Federation 
(2011) para 7; CESCR Cameroon (2019) para 16-17. 
181  CESCR El Salvador (2014) para 27; CESCR Honduras (2016) para 11-12; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Uganda (8 July 2015) E/C12/UGA/CO/1 para 13; CESCR Concluding Observations, Nicaragua 
(28 November 2008) para 11; CESCR Argentina (2011) para 9; CESCR Concluding Observations, Thailand 
(19 June 2015) E/C12/THA/CO/1-2 para 10; CESCR Russian Federation (2011) para 7; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Peru (30 May 2012) E/C12/PER/CO/2-4 para 23; CESCR Guatemala (2014) para 7; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Mexico (17 April 2018) E/C12/MEX/CO/5-6 para 12-13. 
182 CESCR Burkina Faso (2016) para 13-14; CESCR Concluding Observations, Madagascar (16 December 
2009) E/C12/MDG/CO/2 para 33; CESCR Honduras (2016) para 41-42; CESCR Argentina (2011) para 9; 




and human rights impacts of such exploitation;183 and the role of the exploitation of natural 
resources in maximising revenue available for ESCRs.184 The Committee recognises that 
degradation of natural resources may have a negative impact on ESCRs, but its concluding 
observations do not explicitly recognise the relevance that the natural resources themselves 
have to the obligation of using the maximum of available resources outside of the financial 
revenue they may generate. In others words, the qualitative dimension of natural resources, 
including their inherent capacity to support ESCRs, is overlooked. 
In its general comments the Committee’s references to natural resources focus on access 
to natural resources. General Comment 4 on the right to adequate housing includes 
sustainable access to natural resources in a list of “services, materials, facilities and 
infrastructure” that should be available to beneficiaries of the right. 185  Although the 
Committee does not elaborate on the scope of these natural resources, the context suggests 
that it would likely include access to water (for drinking, cooking and sanitation) and access 
to natural sources of fuel.186 In its general comment on the right to food the Committee notes 
that the availability of food includes “the possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from 
productive land or other natural resources”,187 and states that “[c]are should be taken to 
ensure the most sustainable management and use of natural and other resources for 
food”.188 The general comment also refers to natural resources in the context of “guarantees 
of full and equal access to economic resources, particularly for women”. 189 In General 
Comment 24 the Committee refers to natural resources in the context of the impacts of the 
exploitation of natural resources190 and the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples 
to their lands and natural resources.191 
                                            
2004) E/C12/1/Add100 para 12; CESCR Concluding Observations, Colombia (19 October 2017) 
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183 CESCR Honduras (2016) para 41-42; CESCR Argentina (2018) para 18-19; CESCR Chile (2015) para 11; 
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23. 
185 CESCR General Comment No 4 para 8(b). 
186 CESCR General Comment No 4 para 8(b) states as follows “All beneficiaries of the right to adequate 
housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for 
cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site 
drainage and emergency services”. 
187 CESCR General Comment No 12 para 12. 
188 Para 25. 
189 Para 26. 
190 CESCR General Comment No 24 para 8 & 18. 




The relationship between indigenous peoples and natural resources also forms part of 
General Comment 21 on the right to take part in cultural life. The Committee notes that: 
“Indigenous peoples’ cultural values and rights associated with their ancestral lands and their 
relationship with nature should be regarded with respect and protected, in order to prevent the 
degradation of their particular way of life, including their means of subsistence, the loss of their 
natural resources and, ultimately, their cultural identity”.192 
The general comment requires States Parties to respect the rights of indigenous peoples to 
“maintain and strengthen their spiritual relationship with their ancestral lands and other 
natural resources traditionally owned, occupied or used by them, and indispensable to their 
cultural life”.193  
The Committee’s references to natural resources in its general comments therefore 
largely relate to access to natural resources for the exercise of Covenant rights, and the 
impact on ESCRs of natural resource exploitation. With the exception of General Comment 
15, examined below, there is little guidance from the Committee on how States Parties 
should manage, protect or sustainably use the natural resources that are fundamental to the 
enjoyment of many rights in the Covenant. 
General Comment 15 refers to water as a “limited natural resource” 194 and requires 
States Parties to “ensure that natural water resources are protected from contamination by 
harmful substances and pathogenic microbes”. 195  The general comment also requires 
States Parties to prioritise water needs related to core obligations including those related to 
starvation and disease, 196 and it includes a clear recognition of the vital role of water 
resources for the realisation of other ESCRs including the rights to food, health, livelihoods 
and culture.197 What makes this general comment significant is that it not only recognises 
the importance of access to this natural resource for the realisation of ESCRs, but also 
demonstrates that the protection of the resource is essential for the continued realisation of 
the right to water. Of course, the more detailed discussion of water as a natural resource in 
this case can be attributed to the treatment of access to water as a right in and of itself.198 
As noted above, the Committee’s general comments and concluding observations 
provide little guidance on appropriate regulation and protection of natural resources. It is 
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clear, however, that the Committee recognises the significant role of natural resources in 
the realisation of certain ESCRs. A single, specific circumscribed approach to all natural 
resources would be ill-advised given the vast distinctions between different types of natural 
resources and the range of approaches that may be needed to ensure they are managed 
and used effectively and sustainably. However, the broad principles of IEL could assist in 
steering decision-making related to natural resources and the environment in so far as the 
latter are required for the realisation of ESCRs.199 These flexible principles do not prescribe 
specific action to be taken and are therefore well-suited to the spectrum of Covenant rights 
and natural resources. The relevance of these principles for the interpretation of “resources” 
in article 2(1) is examined below. 
5 3 3 Resources and principles of IEL 
This section discusses the environmental dimensions of resources under article 2(1) with 
reference to the principles of IEL outlined in Chapter 4. Integrating environmental 
considerations within the definition of resources under article 2(1) is required by the principle 
of integration. In accordance with the rules of interpretation described in Chapter 3, 
environmental considerations must only be integrated into article 2(1) to the extent that such 
integration is consistent with the object and purpose of the Covenant. In order to ensure the 
appropriate use of natural resources towards the realisation of ESCRs and the protection of 
the environment on which ESCRs depend, States Parties will need to dedicate resources 
for such environmental protection. This is illustrated in the examples below. 
Appropriate environmental management is necessary for ensuring the environmental 
conditions required for the promotion and protection of ESCRs. Such environmental 
management requires financial, administrative and organisational resources. These 
resources are also necessary for the development and implementation of policies and plans 
for environmental protection. In relation to the right water General Comment 15 requires 
States Parties to ensure that the relevant agencies responsible for implementation of the 
right have the necessary resources to maintain and extend water services and facilities.200 
This obligation should be extended to include those agencies responsible for the protection 
and management of water resources and related environmental protection. Well-resourced 
agencies for water supply would be meaningless without also providing the necessary 
organisational and administrative resources to those responsible for managing and 
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protecting the lakes, rivers and wetlands that serve as the vital source of the water itself. In 
its concluding observations on Kazakhstan the Committee has expressed concern regarding 
regional environmental hazards and pollution and called on the State Party to “strengthen 
its efforts to address environmental issues” and to “allocate more resources in this 
regard”.201 It is also significant that in General Comment 24 the Committee noted that States 
Parties should make use of environmental protection agencies in the context of corporate 
accountability for harm to ESCRs.202 
The necessary regulation and enforcement of environmental laws and prosecution of 
environmental crimes also requires organisational and administrative resources. These are 
vital to ensure that the state or its population does not bear the cost of environmental 
degradation caused by private parties. States Parties must, for example, have mechanisms 
for holding private parties accountable according to the polluter pays principle, to ensure 
that harm to ESCRs as a result of environmental degradation does not result in undue costs 
for the state.203 Compensation for damage to ESCRs as well as related remediation of the 
environment should be provided for through private resources by imposing costs on those 
who are responsible and have benefitted from the environmental harm.204 
Human resources are an important element in ensuring proper environmental 
management and protection. The state must employ or consult people with the necessary 
expertise in order to ensure that decisions made in relation to, for example, the allocation of 
quotas for large and small-scale fishers, appropriately consider the relevant economic, 
social and environmental factors. In this regard, scientific resources in the form of experts, 
research and appropriate facilities are important in ensuring that States Parties’ policies and 
plans are appropriately informed by the applicable scientific knowledge. It is important, for 
example, to follow scientifically sound approaches to food production and water quality, and 
to accurately assess environmental impacts and risks as well as provide appropriate 
remediation or mitigation where needed. Physical resources such as equipment and 
technological devices are also vital in certain contexts, for example where the monitoring of 
air quality and atmospheric emissions is concerned. Scientific research may also have 
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particular relevance for developing innovative solutions to the evolving challenges that 
climate change and environmental degradation will pose to ESCRs.205  
In relation to international resources, it has already been noted that international technical 
assistance and cooperation form part of a State Party’s available resources.206 In addition 
to this, legal mechanisms in the IEL regime could be seen as resources available to States 
Parties and relevant to the environmental dimensions of their obligations under the 
Covenant. The Committee’s concluding observations have already called upon State Parties 
to comply with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).207 The 
climate change regime should be understood as a resource available to States Parties 
seeking to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Mechanisms such as the UNFCCC’s Clean 
Development Mechanism or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (“REDD”) Programme are international resources that will, in certain 
circumstances, have relevance for the realisation of ESCRs. 208  Financial international 
resources related to climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund,209 are also integral 
in the context of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 210  Of course, any such 
mechanisms must always be implemented in accordance with the Covenant and with 
respect for the human rights of local populations. These international mechanisms can be 
leveraged for the protection of ESCRs from environmental degradation and are therefore 
important resources available to States Parties, particularly in light of the obligation of 
international assistance and cooperation. 
Where international assistance or cooperation is provided, the nature of these 
international resources should protect the environment for the realisation of ESCRs. In other 
words, where a developing state is offered international assistance or cooperation with 
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conditions that pose a threat to the environment or depend on unsustainable use of natural 
resources required for the realisation of ESCRs, the receiving state should refuse such 
international resources. A right of refusal in this context would be consistent with the 
principle of sovereignty and the right of self-determination. 211  Similarly, States Parties 
should not offer international assistance or cooperation that is linked to conditions that will 
result in significant harm to the environment on which ESCRs depend. 
In relation to transboundary and global environmental concerns, international resources 
have a significant role to play. In this context it is helpful to consider the role of the principle 
of CBDR. 212  Levels of resources required in terms of international assistance and 
cooperation should be understood in accordance with the principle of CBDR, particularly in 
relation to climate change. Where climate change impacts result in harm to ESCRs in a 
developing state, that state should be able to rely on the international assistance and 
cooperation of developed states. In particular, a greater degree of assistance and 
cooperation should be expected of States Parties with more responsibility for GHG 
emissions, for example, those already identified as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC.213 
Similarly, where a State Party is responsible for, or has contributed to, transboundary 
environmental harm which impacts on ESCRs, the State Party seeking to remedy the harm 
and protect ESCRs in its territory should seek assistance from the responsible state.214 This 
obligation under the Covenant should apply in addition to the  remedies under IEL that are 
available to states in such circumstances. It is proposed that in addition to these remedies, 
the level of international assistance and cooperation expected by the Committee from States 
Parties that bear some responsibility should be greater than the standard expected of other 
                                            
211 See 5 2 above. See also footnote 56 at 5 2 2 above in relation to prior informed consent under IEL and the 
example of a state’s right to refuse transboundary hazardous waste from another state. See also CESCR 
Public debt, austerity measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22 
July 2016) E/C12/2016/1 para 4 where, in relation loans, the Committee notes that the borrowing State is 
responsible for ensuring that conditions attached to the loan “do not unreasonably reduce its ability to respect, 
protect and fulfil the Covenant rights”. 
212 See Chapter 4, 4 3 4. CBDR is sometimes also referred to as common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities. 
213 See Chapter 4, 4 3 4 as well as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107. The category of Annex I parties was, however, not 
carried over to the Paris Agreement. See also De Schutter “Public Budget Analysis” in The Future of ESR 585 
where it is noted that the rise of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities “confirms that 
international law is moving towards the recognition of differentiated duties, depending on the capacity and 
resources of each State”.  
214 On the obligation on States Parties to seek international assistance see, for example, CESCR General 
Comment No 4 para 10; CESCR General Comment No 5: Persons with Disabilities (9 December 
1994) E/1995/22 para 13; CESCR General Comment No 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older 
Persons (8 December 1995) E/1996/22 para 18. See also Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 




States Parties to the Covenant.215 Precisely how such responsibility could be allocated and 
prioritised is an important area for future research.  
In addition to reactionary assistance and cooperation where harm has occurred, it is 
particularly important in relation to climate change and its impacts that resources of 
international assistance and cooperation are provided for the prevention and mitigation of 
impacts as well as for climate change adaptation measures. This is especially relevant for 
small island developing states in dire need of assistance and cooperation from developed 
states in mitigating climate change impacts and in ensuring they are able to adapt optimally 
in order to limit impacts on ESCRs and other human rights.216  
Turning to other principles of IEL and the guidance they provide, limits to the use of natural 
resources are supported by the principle of sustainable use, the precautionary principle, the 
principle of prevention and the no-harm principle. Natural resource use requires limitations 
according to sustainable use in order to ensure the long-term preservation and use of natural 
resources. Sustainable use is recognised as a legitimate constraint on state sovereignty for 
the purposes of long-term sustainability of the relevant resource. 217 The depletion of a 
resource for the purpose of fulfilling ESCRs in the short term is likely to have more severe 
consequences for those same rights in the long term, and is likely to impact a greater number 
of people. A limited, although detrimental, impact on the rights and freedoms of fishers 
catching marine living resources, for example, should be understood as preferable to a 
complete depletion of those resources which would impair the ability of all fishers, including 
future generations, to access resources necessary for their livelihoods as well as for access 
to food for the broader population. An interpretation of the Covenant that includes natural 
resources in the scope of article 2(1) must require States Parties to use such resources in 
accordance with the principle of sustainable use if the Covenant is to be effective in 
protecting ESCRs.218 
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The precautionary and preventive principles similarly suggest that limitations on the use 
of natural resources are necessary in certain circumstances.219 For example, in the course 
of exploiting mineral resources a degree of environmental harm is inevitable. In many cases 
this environmental harm has a severe impact on local communities and indigenous peoples 
and affects a broad range of rights.220 Such exploitation should therefore be limited in 
accordance with the precautionary principle where there is evidence of severe potential 
impacts on the environment (which would in turn impact on ESCRs). In order for these 
potential impacts to be identified, the principle of prevention requires undertaking due 
diligence in relation to human rights and the environmental in the form of environmental 
impact assessments (“EIAs”) and human rights impact assessments (“HRIAs”).221 Such due 
diligence and impact assessments are also required according to the principle of no-harm 
in cases where the territory of other states may be impacted by transboundary activities or 
where activities in one state may cause harm to neighbouring states in the form of, for 
example, air pollution and water pollution.222 The Covenant therefore requires States Parties 
to appropriately exercise the principles of precaution and prevention where activities related 
to natural resources may cause environmental harm impacting on ESCRs. 
In addition to the abovementioned caution that should be exercised prior to the 
commencement of harmful activities, the precautionary principle also requires precautionary 
action in some cases.223 Where there is a risk of severe environmental harm that threatens 
ESCRs, uncertainty regarding the possible impacts must not be used to justify inaction.224 
In the case of climate change, for example, States Parties must not be permitted to rely on 
scientific uncertainty to justify a failure to devote the necessary resources to prevention, 
mitigation and adaptation.225 
The principle of intergenerational equity promotes a forward-looking and long-term 
approach to the realisation of ESCRs and to the protection of the environment on which 
these rights depend. In relation to financial or economic resources, Dowell-Jones proposes 
that article 2(1) implies that objectives set by States Parties must be affordable, and that 
they “must not detrimentally impact the future ability of the state to implement the 
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Covenant”.226 Article 2(1) could also be interpreted to include an understanding of resource 
use and environmental impact that ensures the future ability of States Parties to realise 
ESCRs. In order to ensure that the future realisation of ESCRs is not threatened by climate 
change and environmental degradation, it is therefore important for States Parties to spend 
resources on environmental protection, the prevention of harm and the mitigation of climate 
change. The long-term dimension of progressive realisation and the position of future 
generations is examined in detail in Chapter 6.227 
In conclusion, the integration of environmental considerations within the concept of 
“resources” under article 2(1) of the Covenant requires both the responsible and sustainable 
use of natural resources as well as the dedication of non-natural resources to environmental 
protection through appropriate environmental regulation, management and protection. Such 
an approach may initially be counter-intuitive for human rights practitioners seeking to direct 
funding and resources towards ESCRs. However, these resources are not expended purely 
for the sake of protecting the environment, they are employed in order to ensure that ESCRs 
are able to continue being progressively realised over the long term without being 
unnecessarily impacted by preventable environmental degradation and climate change. In 
accordance with a teleological interpretation of article 2(1), resources devoted to 
environmental protection can form part of the “maximum of available resources” used by 
States Parties, to the extent that such environmental protection is linked to, and supports, 
the enjoyment of ESCRs. The following section examines the notion of availability in the 
concept of maximum available resources. 
5 4 Availability of resources 
5 4 1 Current interpretation 
The use of the term “available” in article 2(1) constitutes an implicit recognition that not 
all state resources can be devoted to the realisation of ESCRs. States Parties are not obliged 
to use all of their resources in meeting their obligations under the Covenant, but rather to 
use the maximum of those resources which are available for use. However, precisely which 
resources should be considered as “available” is not always clear. In relation to the 
realisation of minimum core obligations, General Comment 3 notes that a State Party is 
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required to “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition”.228  
Shahid notes that resource availability includes the expansion of available resources 
beyond a “static representation solely of public finance resources or the budget” to 
encompass “concerted and targeted efforts of all institutions of the State to increase public 
sector resources for ESC rights and other social development programmes”.229 While a 
state could use the resources under its control to provide directly for the rights of those within 
its jurisdiction, the Covenant does not limit a state’s responsibility to the resources that are 
under its exclusive control.230 Dowell-Jones argues that the interpretation of article 2(1) 
“must be based upon the premise that there is no presumption that the State itself is 
obligated to provide these rights directly, but that a wide variety of modalities of protecting 
socio-economic rights is feasible”.231 This means that, for example, international and private 
resources can be considered as available resources for the realisation of ESCRs. 
As noted above,232 the Committee has made it clear that international resources should 
be considered as potential “available resources” for the purposes of article 2(1). 233 In 
addition to resources available through international assistance and cooperation, private 
resources must be considered for the realisation of ESCRs. The state is obliged to effectively 
mobilise resources, including those from private and international sources, in order to 
provide for ESCRs.234 De Schutter suggests that resource mobilisation and generation of 
revenue can occur through a variety of means including trade tariffs, taxation, royalty fees 
from domestic and foreign companies, exploitation of natural resources, fees for users of 
public services, international assistance and cooperation, development aid, or international 
loans.235 Elson, Balakrishnan and Heintz similarly refer to the creation of fiscal space as the 
expansion of public expenditure on programmes supporting human well-being or economic 
development. They list the following means identified by economists to create fiscal space:  
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“[R]eallocating public spending towards the desired goals and improving its efficiency and 
effectiveness; increasing tax revenue, through changes to the tax code and improvements in 
the effectiveness of tax collection; obtaining more official development assistance; and 
appropriate borrowing from private domestic or international sources”.236 
The Covenant does not prescribe a specific economic or political approach for States 
Parties, but merely requires a democratic society with respect for human rights.237 It is 
therefore necessary to remember that States Parties to the Covenant may have very 
different approaches to economic policy.238 However, the Committee recognises that one of 
the most important mechanisms to mobilise resources for the purposes of the Covenant is 
through the imposition of taxes.239 
With regard to taxation, the Committee has shown particular concern for effectively 
combatting inequality 240  and has regularly promoted progressive tax policies with 
redistributive capacity. 241  Tax policies should be consistent with the principles of non-
discrimination and equality.242 For example, the Committee expressed concern where an 
increase in value added tax in South Africa was not assessed for its impact on low-income 
households and its potential to exacerbate existing inequality.243 In relation to business 
activities, General Comment 24 notes that the obligation to fulfil may require “enforcing 
progressive taxation schemes”.244 De Schutter argues that taxation creates a particular 
relationship between the state and the taxpayer or citizen as it creates “a strong incentive 
both for the State to use public revenue for the good of the population, and for the population 
to control the use of public finance”.245 In his capacity as Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human Rights, De Schutter affirms the need for progressive taxation schemes 
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to recover from the current economic crisis and to “eradicat[e] poverty within planetary 
boundaries”.246 Taxation is a means of mobilising private resources for the advancement of 
Covenant rights,247 particularly where tax on wealthier individuals can be redistributed by 
the state through programmes which promote ESCRs.248 Uprimny, Hernández and Araújo 
point out that the Committee’s recent treatment of maximum available resources indicates 
that where States Parties have high levels of economic inequality, redistributive policies for 
the realisation of ESCRs may be warranted.249 
It is also important to note that States Parties must ensure that their policies do not inhibit 
the freedom of individuals to use private resources to meet their own needs. In a 1992 report 
the then Special Rapporteur on the Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Danilo Türk, noted the limitations in the capacity of governments to fulfil ESCRs at every 
level, and emphasised the importance of allowing individuals to flourish by creating space 
which can “lead to improvements in the livelihood of citizens by simply allowing people to 
create their own solutions to their own problems”.250 In this regard a state’s responsibilities 
would include negative obligations not to intervene where individuals are fulfilling their own 
needs through, for example, work in the informal sector or community initiatives.251 This 
approach echoes the requirement in article 1(2) in relation to the right of self-determination 
which asserts that “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence”.252 
Finally, in relation to natural resources, two preliminary points must be made. Firstly, the 
emphasis in relation to natural resource availability and mobilisation to date has been on the 
ability of natural resource exploitation to provide revenue for the realisation of ESCRs, and 
not on the ability of those resources to directly contribute to the enjoyment of the rights in 
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the Covenant.253 In the case of Cameroon, for example, the Committee has recommended 
that the State Party increase revenue by raising fees for foreign exploitation of natural 
resources.254 Secondly, commentators have begun to recognise that the sustainability of 
natural resource use (particularly where non-renewable resources are concerned) may 
impose limits on our understanding of the ‘availability’ of natural resources for the realisation 
of ESCRs.255 The exploitation of natural resources is a significant source of revenue for 
many States Parties, but it is also often the source of significant harm to the environment 
and to ESCRs. The exploitation of natural resources is therefore discussed in more detail 
below. The section that follows will examine the human rights impacts of natural resource 
exploitation; the exploitation of natural resources for financial revenue by States Parties and 
by non-state actors; and the role of EIAs and HRIAs in such activities. 
5 4 2 Exploitation of natural resources 
5 4 2 1 The human rights impacts of natural resource exploitation 
The scope and severity of the human rights impacts of natural resource exploitation is 
evident. For example, the former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona has said the following regarding the sustainable 
use of natural resources and respect for human rights: 
“Natural resources can be a vital source of revenue that the State can use to comply with its 
human rights obligations. The financial and social benefits of natural resource exploitation are, 
however, increasingly bypassing people in producing countries. In most countries, extractive 
industries generate few jobs directly and have only weak links to local markets. Far from 
bringing benefits, the exploitation of natural resources has been frequently linked to human 
rights abuse and encroachment on lands and livelihoods of communities, mass evictions, 
pollution and environmental degradation, which may result in violations of rights to health, food, 
housing and water. The right of people to participate in decisions regarding natural resources 
is often violated, especially where the land, territory and resources of indigenous peoples is 
concerned”.256 
On various occasions the Committee has recognised the risk of activities related to natural 
resource exploitation and their impacts on ESCRs and the environment.257 In its concluding 
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observations the Committee has expressed concern regarding the pollution and damage to 
homes resulting from gas extraction and oil refinery activities;258 as well as damage to the 
environment and indigenous people’s livelihoods as a result of extractive activities.259 In its 
2020 concluding observations in respect of Norway, the Committee expressed concern 
regarding licences issued by the State Party for “the exploration and exploitation of 
petroleum and natural gas reserves […] and their impact on global warming”. 260  The 
Committee recommended that the State Party reconsider its position and that it “take its 
human rights obligations as a primary consideration into its natural resource exploitation and 
export policies”. 261  The Committee’s concluding observations also express concern 
regarding a “lack of information on measures to ensure the right to water” in relation to 
mining activities;262 and the negative impact of extractive industries on the right to health,263 
the right to water,264 as well as on “global warming and on the enjoyment of economic and 
social rights by the world’s population and future generations”.265 The impacts of natural 
resource exploitation extend beyond the immediate impacts felt by local communities, and 
include impacts of environmental harm over the long term. The immediate impact on local 
communities must therefore be considered along with the long-term impacts of, for example, 
water and air pollution or soil degradation as these may lead to irreversible environmental 
damage and more far-reaching consequences for ESCRs. 
The Committee has also highlighted the relationship between the rights of indigenous 
peoples and activities related to the exploitation of natural resources. 266  Importantly, 
General Comment 14 on the right to health the Committee affirms that: 
“[D]evelopment-related activities that lead to the displacement of indigenous peoples against 
their will from their traditional territories and environment, denying them their sources of 
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nutrition and breaking their symbiotic relationship with their lands, has a deleterious effect on 
their health”.267 
This of course applies to other forms of development and not only the exploitation of natural 
resources, although the latter tends to have a greater environmental impact. The 
Committee’s concern for indigenous peoples is echoed in its concluding observations. In the 
case of Cameroon, for example, the Committee noted its concern regarding the removal of 
indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands which were offered to third parties for logging 
activities.268 The Committee recommended “that the State party take effective measures to 
protect the right of each group of indigenous people to its ancestral lands and the natural 
resources found there”.269 Seven years later, the Committee’s concluding observations in 
relation to Cameroon reiterated this concern, noting that some activities related to the 
exploitation of natural resources have negative impacts on “the traditional lifestyles of the 
relevant population groups, including indigenous peoples, and on their access to land, an 
adequate food supply and an adequate standard of living”.270 The Committee has expressed 
similar concerns about the impact of extractive activities on the ancestral lands and 
traditional ways of living of the Sami people in its concluding observations in respect of 
Finland and Sweden.271 These impacts on indigenous peoples are not restricted to the 
boundaries of the State Party’s territory, as is evident in the Committee’s concluding 
observations regarding the Netherlands where it expressed concern about “reports of 
serious damage to the environment and to indigenous peoples livelihoods” in Peru, as a 
result of the conduct of a company domiciled in the Netherlands.272 
The relationship between extractive industries and indigenous peoples is dealt with in 
more detail in the work of the former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, James Anaya.273 The Special Rapporteur’s 2013 report on extractive industries 
and indigenous peoples notes the following: 
“The worldwide drive to extract and develop minerals and fossil fuels […] coupled with the fact 
that much of what remains of these natural resources is situated on the lands of indigenous 
peoples, results in increasing and ever more widespread effects on indigenous peoples’ 
lives”.274 
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The work of the Special Rapporteur thus echoes the concerns expressed by the Committee 
regarding threats to the rights of indigenous peoples as a result of the exploitation of natural 
resources.275  
Of course, natural resource exploitation is not necessarily problematic. These activities 
form an integral part of development and can generate significant revenue for ESCRs while 
also providing for the livelihoods of many individuals and communities. In the case of 
indigenous peoples, it has been demonstrated that the extraction of natural resources can, 
for example, enhance the enjoyment of the right of self-determination for such peoples.276 
What causes harm is unsustainable over-exploitation of resources without consideration for 
the impacts thereof, a lack of consultation with local communities or consideration of 
indigenous practices, as well as poor management and regulation of these activities. Given 
the significant potential for severe environmental and human rights impacts associated with 
such activities, it is important that the risks are carefully assessed and that activities are 
regulated, managed, and monitored so as to avoid harmful consequences and to ensure the 
greatest possible protection of ESCRs. 
5 4 2 2 The exploitation of natural resources for financial revenue 
As noted above, the exploitation of natural resources is an important means of mobilising 
resources for the realisation of ESCRs.277 The Committee has required that the exploitation 
of natural resources result in benefits for the population, criticising States Parties that have 
generated significant revenue from the exploitation of natural resources but have failed to 
translate these gains into ESCRs for their people.278 In its concluding observations with 
respect to Solomon Islands, the Committee noted, for example, that “the major share of the 
country’s natural resources is exploited by foreign companies which pay low taxes, if any, 
to the Government and, by taking most of the profits abroad, leave only few benefits to 
Solomon Islands”.279 This echoes the aspects of state sovereignty and self-determination 
discussed above that require benefits to accrue to the people themselves and not to the 
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state. It is important to note that, in the case of indigenous peoples, FPIC must be obtained 
for such activities.280 De Schutter notes that “[t]he revenues gained from the agreements 
concluded between host States and investors for the exploitation of natural resources should 
[…] serve to fulfil the rights of the population”.281 Effective redistribution of revenue from the 
exploitation of natural resources can be achieved through, for example, setting up funds for 
the purposes of health, education and development projects as well as compensation funds 
for local communities, and putting appropriate monitoring mechanisms and procedural 
safeguards in place to ensure that the local population receives such benefits. 282 The 
Committee’s concluding observations have also recommended benefits and compensation 
for local communities directly impacted by natural resource exploitation.283  
Benefits from natural resource exploitation should also be equitably distributed and 
should be undertaken with respect for the human rights of those directly affected. Perelman 
points out that while many Latin American states have financed land reforms and social 
welfare in part “by revenue flows generated by the adherence of these governments to 
natural resources-led development models”, this has been done at expense of certain 
groups.284 De Schutter similarly notes the dangers of unequal enjoyment of wealth from 
mineral resource exploitation, explaining that the wealth is often controlled by a small 
number of individuals and “[t]he capture of benefits can therefore be highly unequal, unless 
affirmative measures are taken to ensure that they will be fairly distributed across a large 
number of people”.285 
Although the exploitation of natural resources can provide much needed revenue for the 
promotion and realisation of ESCRs, it is sometimes at the expense of human rights and the 
environment itself. This is often the case in relation to local communities directly impacted 
by the activities, 286 particularly where extractive industries and indigenous peoples are 
concerned. As the former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James 
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Anaya observes, “indigenous peoples around the world have suffered negative, even 
devastating, consequences from extractive industries”.287 In addition to the direct impact of 
the exploitation of natural resources on surrounding communities, the impacts on the 
environment and natural resources must also be considered where these are necessary for 
the realisation of human rights. For example, a mining development project should be 
assessed for its cumulative impact on water resources as pollution from acid mine drainage 
could have significant indirect and long-term impacts on the rights to water, health, and food, 
due to the integral role of water resources in fulfilling these rights. 
Any effective mobilisation of financial resources by means of natural resource exploitation 
must therefore include a duty to prevent harm to human rights and the environment of the 
population.288 A State Party’s responsibility to use the maximum of available resources 
should include the protection of available natural resources from degradation in the name of 
economic revenue, where those natural resources are essential for the realisation of 
ESCRs. This is essential for the effectiveness of the interpretation of maximum available 
resources under article 2(1) of the Covenant.289 Covenant rights cannot be realised without 
the preservation of the natural resources on which they depend. An important mechanism 
to ensure the protection of the environment and human rights in this context is the use of 
environmental and human rights impact assessments.290 Before turning to these impact 
assessments, the section below addresses the exploitation of natural resources by private 
actors. 
5 4 2 3 Exploitation of natural resources by private actors 
A State Party is often involved in the exploitation of natural resources through the relevant 
licensing and authorisation processes, and occasionally through direct exploitation of natural 
resources by the state itself. However, most instances of natural resource exploitation are 
pursued by private parties, often foreign or transnational corporations. It has also been 
observed that a significant portion of human rights violations by corporations relate to the 
impacts of environmental harm.291 The role of these private actors is therefore essential to 
consider in the management and protection of natural resources as well as the protection of 
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human rights from the impacts of such activities.292 It is therefore not surprising that the 
Committee’s references to natural resource exploitation have largely centred on the 
activities of such private actors. 
The Committee’s position on the obligations of States Parties in relation to business 
activities is set out in General Comment 24. The Committee states that States Parties may 
be held responsible for the conduct of business entities in the following circumstances:  
“(a) if the entity concerned is in fact acting on that State party’s instructions or is under its 
control or direction in carrying out the particular conduct at issue, as may be the case in the 
context of public contracts; (b) when a business entity is empowered under the State party’s 
legislation to exercise elements of governmental authority or if the circumstances call for such 
exercise of governmental functions in the absence or default of the official authorities; or (c) if 
and to the extent that the State party acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own”.293 
In addition to this, States Parties have an extraterritorial obligation to protect, requiring them 
to “take steps to prevent and redress infringements of Covenant rights that occur outside 
their territories due to the activities of business entities over which they can exercise 
control”.294  
General Comment 24 makes specific reference to the exploitation of natural resources 
by businesses. The Committee notes that the granting of exploration or exploitation permits 
without consideration of the potential adverse impacts on ESCRs would constitute a violation 
of the duty to protect Covenant rights. 295  In respect of extraterritorial obligations, the 
Committee notes that a State Party could be held responsible where a violation of Covenant 
rights is reasonably foreseeable, noting that “considering the well-documented risks 
associated with the extractive industry, particular due diligence is required with respect to 
mining-related and oil development projects”.296 The Committee thus recognises that the 
exploitation of natural resources by business entities, and the resultant impacts thereof, is 
potentially harmful to the enjoyment of ESCRs and due diligence must be exercised with 
respect to potential impacts on human rights. The general comment also highlights the 
vulnerable position of indigenous peoples, requiring States Parties to ensure that private 
actors “consult and cooperate in good faith with indigenous peoples” in order to obtain their 
FPIC, and that impacts on indigenous peoples are included in HRIAs.297 In this context the 
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Committee also notes that companies must “establish mechanisms that ensure that 
indigenous peoples share in the benefits generated by the activities developed on their 
traditional territories”.298 
It is clear from General Comment 24 that the Committee views environmental harm as a 
threat to ESCRs and includes environmental protection as a dimension of the responsibilities 
associated with business activities. The Committee includes domestic environmental law as 
an area of the law applicable to business entities and “designed to protect specific economic, 
social and cultural rights”, 299  and urges States Parties to make use of environmental 
protection agencies in providing remedies for ESCR violations. 300 The Committee also 
recommends that public contracts should not be awarded to companies “that have not 
provided information on the social or environmental impacts of their activities”.301 States 
Parties must therefore ensure that activities related to natural resource exploitation protect 
ESCRs through regulation of environmental law, the effective use of environmental 
protection agencies, and the provision of information on social and environmental impacts.  
The Committee has also addressed the responsibilities of private actors in its concluding 
observations. Since 2017 the Committee has referred to General Comment 24 in a number 
of concluding observations, reminding States Parties of the duty to ensure that companies 
perform human rights due diligence in respect of their activities domestically and abroad.302 
This includes ensuring that there is an effective regulatory framework; that impacts on 
ESCRs are assessed; that where violations occur there is access to remedies for victims; 
and that liability is imposed on entities responsible for such violations.303 The Committee 
has also recommended that States Parties include monitoring mechanisms in their 
regulation of corporations 304  and that they strengthen legislation and measures to 
investigate and hold corporations liable for their actions (particularly in relation to activities 
abroad).305 
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Regarding the obligations of private actors in the context of natural resource exploitation, 
the Committee’s concluding observations are critical of ineffective protection of human rights 
by States Parties when granting permits for exploitative activities;306 the relaxation of rules 
for extractive industries resulting in impacts on ESCRs; 307  and disproportionate and 
unsustainable use of natural resources by private actors.308 It is clear that the Committee 
expects States Parties to regulate the exploitation of natural resources by ensuring the 
protection of ESCRs;309 drawing up clear rules and guidelines for assessing the impacts of 
these activities on ESCRs and the environment,310 using independent experts for such 
assessments;311 and ensuring effective enforcement of these rules and regulations.312 In 
some cases this will require drawing up new rules and regulations to respond to new or 
developing technologies for natural resource extraction. For example, in the case of 
Argentina the Committee recommended that the State Party establish a regulatory 
framework to govern hydraulic fracturing, including provision for impact assessments and 
documentation of potential effects. 313  The Committee has also recommended the 
consultation of local communities,314 including indigenous peoples, as well as compensation 
for damage caused and a share of the profits for these communities from natural resource 
exploitation.315 In its concluding observations in relation to Mauritania the Committee has 
recommended that the State Party ensure that extractive and mining activities, as well as 
the resources they generate, “bring about tangible benefits to the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights by the population”.316 
In response to the impact of mining operations in Mali, the Committee expressed concern 
regarding the resultant “irreversible damage to the environment and [the infringement of] the 
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right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living of affected communities”.317 
The Committee recommended regulations related to human rights and environmental 
impact assessments as well as compensation and a share in benefits for affected 
communities.318 It is noteworthy that in this case the Committee also recommended that the 
State Party “[d]emand that mining companies take effective steps to prevent the water and 
air pollution and soil degradation resulting from their activities” as well as the reclamation of 
areas damaged by mining activities.319 This requires not only an assessment of impacts 
prior to granting authorisations for such activities, but an ongoing duty of care imposed on 
these industries in relation to environmental protection. This ongoing duty of care should 
extend to the closure and decommissioning of facilities and any related environmental 
remediation and rehabilitation. What is clear is that States Parties are responsible for holding 
private entities to account for the damage they cause as a result of natural resource 
exploitation, as well as for ongoing regulation of these activities in order to prevent harm to 
human rights and the environment. 
As noted above, a State Party can be held responsible for the conduct of a company 
domiciled in its jurisdiction and exploiting natural resources elsewhere, in accordance with 
extraterritorial obligations.320 In addition to this, the Committee recognises that, particularly 
due to the nature of environmental harm, the impacts and consequences of extractive 
activities are not necessarily felt where the activity itself is undertaken. In its concluding 
observations in relation to Ecuador in 2019 the Committee noted that increased extractive 
activities would “have a negative impact on global warming and on the enjoyment of 
economic and social rights by the world’s population and future generations” counter to the 
State Party’s commitments in relation to climate change.321 
The responsibilities of corporate entities in relation to climate change are set out in the 
Committee’s 2018 statement on climate change and the Covenant where the Committee 
affirms the duties of “State and non-State actors”, requiring the protection of human rights 
“by effectively regulating private actors to ensure that their actions do not worsen climate 
change”.322 In this context the Committee emphasises that “[c]orporate entities are expected 
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to respect Covenant rights regardless of whether national laws exist or are fully enforced in 
practice” and that “[c]ourts and other human rights mechanisms should ensure that business 
activities are appropriately regulated”.323 These duties therefore apply to the exploitation of 
natural resources where such activities impact on climate change. 
Given the vital role of impact assessments in regulating and monitoring the activities of 
both state and non-state actors in relation to the exploitation of natural resources, it is 
necessary to explore these in more detail. The nature and content of such assessments as 
well as the Committee’s references to them are discussed below. 
5 4 2 4 Environmental and human rights impact assessments 
The assessment of the impacts of activities for the exploitation of natural resources 
primarily takes the form of an EIA, HRIA, or both such assessments. These impact 
assessments are central to the exercise of due diligence in the environmental and human 
rights contexts. They serve to ensure that the possible range of consequences flowing from 
a particular decision are carefully considered, thereby allowing detrimental impacts to be 
avoided or mitigated. As there is a broad range of activities that may require an EIA or HRIA, 
the scope and extent of the impact assessment would need to be determined according to 
the nature of the proposed activity. It is possible, however, for States Parties to identify 
certain categories of activities, such as extractive activities, that will always require an EIA 
and HRIA, or an integrated environmental and human rights impact assessment. 
As noted in Chapter 4, international environmental law views EIAs as a procedural duty 
flowing from the due diligence required by the preventive principle.324 EIAs require the 
proponents of a particular project or activity “to identify, assess and evaluate the potential 
adverse environmental consequences of a proposed activity in a manner that is scientifically 
rigorous, transparent and participatory”.325 This is most commonly required in the context of 
specific projects that trigger the need for an EIA, although in some jurisdictions strategic 
environmental assessments (“SEAs”) are undertaken in relation to broader policies, plans 
and programmes.326 In the international arena, the duty to conduct EIAs has been largely 
confined to instances of potential transboundary environmental harm.327 The specifics of a 
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particular EIA process are not always prescribed in detail as “the content of an EIA will 
depend on the circumstances of the case and the demands of due diligence”.328 However, 
EIAs will often include a description of the particular project and the environmental 
conditions; a description of possible alternatives to the project; and an assessment of the 
impacts of the project as well as the alternatives, including any cumulative impacts.329 
Where an EIA process has been undertaken the proponent may also be obliged to continue 
monitoring impacts after completion of the project or while activities are ongoing.330 In the 
human rights context, EIAs play a crucial role in ensuring procedural rights in relation to the 
environment, particularly access to information, consultation and participation. 331 While 
there is no human right to an EIA itself, Craik argues that it may be “crystallizing” as such in 
the context of indigenous peoples and the right to FPIC as “it is difficult to give full effect to 
informed consent in the absence of an environmental assessment”.332 An obligation to 
conduct social and environmental impact assessments also exists under the UNDROP in 
the context of the exploitation of natural resources held or used by peasants and other 
people working in rural areas.333 These impact assessments are required in addition to good 
faith consultations as well as fair and equitable benefit-sharing.334 
Human rights impact assessments may take a number of forms and are undertaken with 
various motivations and purposes.335 As Walker notes, HRIAs may be motivated by concern 
over the enjoyment of particular rights; the impact of particular projects or policies; or the 
impact of the work of human rights organisations.336 For the purposes of this dissertation, 
the primary focus will be on HRIAs as a preventative tool to determine potential impacts. 
This should be distinguished, for example, from HRIAs undertaken after the fact for the 
purpose of assessing the effectiveness of measures taken for the realisation of the Covenant 
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or a particular right.337 In the context of the exploitation of natural resources, an HRIA is a 
preventative tool to assess the impacts on human rights of particular activities, projects or 
policies prior to initiation of such action.338 Although some HRIAs are undertaken after the 
fact, this usually occurs where the assessment relates to the effectiveness of policies or 
projects intended to advance human rights. In the context of natural resources exploitation, 
HRIAs will most often be undertaken prior to the commencement of the relevant activity in 
order to identify unintended human rights impacts before they occur.  
HRIAs are increasingly required in the context of trade and investment agreements, which 
often have important implications for projects related to natural resource exploitation.339 As 
Walker points out, the categories of human rights cannot be neatly compartmentalised in 
such processes, so in practice HRIAs would assess all potential human rights impacts 
resulting from the relevant conduct, including impacts on civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights.340 Given the wide variety of contexts and uses for HRIAs it is not possible to 
define any scope or content for HRIAs that will be applicable in all circumstances. A project-
specific HRIA might only assess impacts on a particular local community, which would likely 
require a very different approach to a broader HRIA related to policy decisions affecting an 
entire population.341 In all cases, however, HRIAs can be distinguished from generic social 
impact assessments as they set out possible impacts in terms of human rights norms and 
standards with reference to relevant human rights instruments.342 The HRIA process should 
also ensure respect for procedural rights and principles “such as non-discrimination, 
participation, inclusion and accountability”.343  
The 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding Principles”) 
include certain principles related to human rights due diligence, of which HRIAs form part.344 
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Human rights due diligence is the process by which entities “identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their adverse human rights impacts”, and this includes an 
assessment of human rights impacts.345 The Guiding Principles recognise that such due 
diligence will vary according to the nature and content of the relevant operations and the 
associated risks.346 They also require this due diligence to be ongoing as risks may change 
“as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve”.347 With respect to 
exploitation of natural resources and the often incremental and cumulative environmental 
impacts they may cause, the requirement for ongoing human rights due diligence is 
significant.348 In relation to HRIAs, the Guiding Principles require a process which includes 
reliance on human rights expertise; 349  meaningful consultation with those affected; 350 
integration of findings into the functions and processes of the business;351 tracking the 
effectiveness of responses to human rights impacts;352 and communicating and reporting 
on how human rights impacts have been addressed.353 
While the Guiding Principles have made a significant contribution to corporate 
accountability in international law, Morgera notes that there has been considerable criticism 
from human rights scholars. It has been argued, for example, that the language of human 
rights ‘impacts’ rather than the more legal ‘violations’ indicates a shift to a managerial 
approach to corporate human rights accountability. 354  Some of these challenges and 
criticisms are illustrated by Perelman’s study of HRIAs conducted by corporations in the 
context of large-scale natural resource exploitation.355 Perelman cautions that the use of 
ESCR standards and HRIAs by large foreign corporations in extractive industries may lead 
to a privatisation of human rights and links this to “a broader co-option of human rights 
discourse”.356 Perelman notes, for example: 
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“In the context of extractive industries, where the location of investment is bound to resource-
rich countries, many [corporate human rights practitioners] see their role as having to deal with 
‘failed’ or corrupt states that have ‘less concerns about human rights or environmental issues 
than developed countries may have’, evidently not acknowledging the broader postcolonial 
dynamics in the political economy of natural resources and the regulatory race to the 
bottom”.357 
The corporation may then become the “‘vehicle’ for human rights realization, including ESCR 
fulfilment”.358 In such instances, States Parties must impose the necessary obligations on 
private actors to protect ESCRs. 359 While HRIAs can encourage private companies to 
consider and respect human rights, there are also concerns that companies can 
“reappropriate” human rights in this context.360 Perelman notes that the use of the term 
“impact assessment” associates human rights with risk management, ultimately leading to 
“the absorption and prioritization of human rights in a risk assessment framework and a 
remedial blueprint – decided on the terms of corporate risk matrices”.361 In light of the above, 
it is therefore important that, where States Parties to the Covenant regulate EIA and HRIA 
processes in their jurisdictions, they ensure that these impact assessments do not render 
ESCR impacts as mere calculated risks. States Parties must ensure that both the content 
and conduct of impact assessments for natural resource exploitation respect and protect 
ESCRs, bearing in mind the need for a safe, healthy, and clean environment for the 
continued realisation of these rights. 
The Committee recognises the potential negative impacts on ESCRs that may result from 
the exploitation of natural resources and has noted on numerous occasions that State 
Parties should make provision for an assessment of such impacts. 362  However, the 
Committee has been inconsistent in its recommendations related to HRIAs and EIAs where 
natural resource exploitation is concerned. The Committee has, at various times, 
recommended the assessment of specific impacts;363 the assessment of human rights and 
environmental impacts;364 the assessment of environmental impacts;365 or the assessment 
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of “impacts” without specification. 366 While there may be circumstantial and contextual 
reasons for these differences in the terminology of its recommendations, greater clarity is 
needed on the scope of the obligation on States Parties when it comes to the assessment 
of natural resource-related activities.  
However, it is clear from the Committee’s work that it is in support of impact assessments. 
In General Comment 15 on the right to water the Committee affirmed that ensuring sufficient 
and safe water for present and future generations may require “assessing the impacts of 
actions that may impinge upon water availability and natural ecosystem watersheds, such 
as climate changes, desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation and loss of 
biodiversity”.367 The use of both EIAs and HRIAs was also promoted by the Committee in 
its statement in the context of the Rio+20 Conference, where participants were encouraged 
to “adopt recommendations for making not only environmental impact assessments, but also 
human rights assessments when policies are adopted and implemented that affect the 
human environment and may lead, for example, to forced displacement for ecological 
reasons”.368 
In relation to the regulation of EIAs and HRIAs by States Parties, the Committee’s 
concluding observations have recommended, for example, that States Parties “adopt a 
regulatory framework for hydraulic fracturing, including impact assessments”;369 develop 
clear guidelines and rules for assessing the impact of natural resource exploitation on 
ESCRs and the environment;370 strengthen legislation in relation to extractive activities;371 
and enact legislation requiring HRIAs “for activities such as waste management, mining and 
quarrying activities, land use and development activities” prior to granting environmental 
authorisation for such activities.372  
In the case of Peru, the Committee emphasised the need for impact assessments to be 
undertaken prior to the granting of licences as well as the need for such assessments to be 
independent.373 Independence in the conduct of assessments is a key concern for EIAs and 
HRIAs. Perelman notes, for example, the “bias perception” inherent in both corporate-led 
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and community-led HRIAs.374 Stricter regulatory and legislative approaches to independent 
assessments could minimise this. In its 2019 concluding observations in respect of Israel, 
the Committee recommended “scientific assessment of the impact on Palestinians of 
herbicide spraying, on their livelihoods, health, food security and environment”.375 In addition 
to being an interesting example of the Committee recommending a specific impact 
assessment, this recommendation illustrates the important role of expertise in EIAs and 
HRIAs. Particularly where natural resources and the environment are concerned, impact 
assessments will depend on the expertise of a wide range of specialists such as ecologists, 
doctors, hydrologists, geologists and climatologists. Where properly regulated, independent 
assessments from such experts can assist regulators in making informed decisions on 
permits or licences for natural resource exploitation, and it can also assist the Committee in 
establishing the objective impacts of certain activities on ESCRs.376 
While not exclusively related to the exploitation of natural resources, General Comment 
24 requires HRIAs in relation to the conclusion of trade and investment treaties,377 and 
requires that such HRIAs incorporate impacts on indigenous peoples where appropriate.378 
The Committee’s concluding observations confirm this obligation to undertake HRIAs in 
relation to trade, investment and development cooperation,379 often pointing States Parties 
to the Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment 
Agreements that were recommended by the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, Olivier De Schutter. 380  In 2019, in the case of Kazakhstan, the Committee 
recommended that trade and investment agreements as well as licencing investments 
                                            
374 See Perelman “HR, Investment & Rights-ification of Development” in The Future of ESR 457-458. Perelman 
also notes that there are attempts to address the problem of bias through collaborative HRIAs. See Perelman 
“HR, Investment & Rights-ification of Development” in The Future of ESR 463-464. 
375 CESCR Israel (2019) para 44-45. 
376 See CESCR General Comment No 25 on Science and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 15(1)(b), 
15(2), 15(3) and 15(4)) (7 April 2020) E/C12/GC/25 para 53-54 where the Committee recognises the benefit 
of using scientific knowledge in decision-making and policies, and emphasises the importance of transparency 
and participation. Although this is a broad reference to scientific study, these principles are also applicable to 
project-specific impact assessments. 
377 CESCR General Comment No 24 para 13. 
378 CESCR General Comment No 24 para 17. See also para 38 which asserts that States Parties should 
ensure that the information in HRIAs is accessible to indigenous peoples. 
379 CESCR Switzerland (2010) para 24; CESCR Concluding Observations, Norway (13 December 2013) 
E/C12/NOR/CO/5 para 6; CESCR Austria (2013) para 11; CESCR Concluding Observations, Germany (27 
November 2018) E/C12/DEU/CO/6 para 12-13 & 17; CESCR Canada (2016) para 16; CESCR United Kingdom 
(2016) para 14-15. It is interesting to note that the Committee predominantly notes this responsibility in relation 
to developed states. However, see also CESCR Kenya (2016) para 13-14, where the Committee expresses 
regret that negotiations for an agreement with the European Union were not preceded by a HRIA given 
potential impacts on small-scale farmers and fishers. 





should be preceded by both HRIAs and EIAs.381 This may be an indication that in future the 
Committee could require States Parties to undertake EIAs more frequently in relation to 
trade and investment decisions. This is particularly important in light of issues of global 
concern such as climate change, which is driven in large part by investment in the fossil fuel 
industry.382 
Impact assessments should also be undertaken in the context of extraterritorial activities. 
The Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights require states to conduct an assessment “of the risks and 
potential extraterritorial impacts of their laws, policies and practices on the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights”.383 The principles also assert that the results of such 
assessment should be made public and should inform the measures that States Parties 
adopt.384  
Given the inextricable relationship between natural resource exploitation, the 
environment, and human rights, it is important that impact assessments for natural resource 
exploitation include both EIAs and HRIAs or, where necessary, an integrated process for 
environmental and human rights impact assessment. The dependence of human rights on 
the natural environment means that environmental impacts are a fundamental consideration 
in HRIAs. It is therefore unacceptable to undertake HRIAs related to the environment without 
also considering environmental impacts. For example, an accurate understanding of 
impacts on the right to health of a coal-fired power station cannot be properly understood 
without detailed information regarding emissions and the impacts on air quality (not to 
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mention the broader climate change impacts) and their implications for human health.385 
Similarly, the duties of States Parties and non-state actors in relation to human rights mean 
that conducting EIAs without consideration of the impact on human rights should be 
considered inappropriate and irresponsible where there is any risk that human rights are 
potentially affected, even where such effects are indirect or only established in the long term. 
In conclusion, the exploitation of natural resources can generate significant revenue 
which can be directed towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs, and some States 
Parties are more dependent on such exploitation of natural resources than others. However, 
it is clear that the impacts of these activities can be far reaching and require regulation, 
participation of local communities, and extensive assessment of potential impacts. In many 
cases the risks associated with natural resource exploitation and the potential impacts on 
ESCRs may outweigh the ultimate benefits for ESCRs in terms of revenue generated. 
Regardless, where a State Party seeks to use the maximum of its available natural 
resources, it will need to carefully consider the long-term impacts of natural resource 
extraction and consumption on ESCRs and the environment as well as the necessity of 
natural resources for the realisation of many ESCRs. 
5 4 3 Availability and principles of IEL 
Having investigated the current understanding of the availability of resources under article 
2(1), and the particular relevance of the exploitation of natural resources in this context, this 
section considers the integration of environmental considerations within the meaning of the 
concept of “availability”, including its relationship to natural resource exploitation. 
Environmental considerations and the principles of IEL may imply limits for those resources 
which are available to States Parties, and they might also provide guidance on how natural 
resources can be responsibly made available for the realisation of ESCRs. 
As noted above, some authors propose that environmental considerations or 
sustainability may function as a factor excluding certain resources from the pool of resources 
“available” for the realisation of ESCRs.386 The principle of sustainable use qualifies the 
availability of natural resources by suggesting that only those resources which can be used 
sustainably over the long term should be considered available for the purposes of article 
2(1). Although natural resources are accessible and present within a State Party’s 
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jurisdiction, they may be seen as unavailable where it is not possible to use them without 
depleting the resource and causing long-term harm to ESCRs and the environment. In other 
words, where a resource cannot be sustainably used, it should be deemed unavailable. 
In respect of private resources, natural resources that are vital for the realisation of 
ESCRs for the whole population, but have been allocated to private parties, should be seen 
as available to the State Party. For example, where water resources have been allocated to 
private individuals or companies in the form of water rights, licences or allocations, these 
should be included in a State Party’s assessment of the resources available for the right to 
water, particularly where these may be required to meet basic needs in a time of drought. In 
extreme cases where access to water is limited due to drought and the basic water needs 
of the population cannot be met, a State Party could revoke licences for industrial water use, 
particularly where such use is excessive.387 Other private resources that can be considered 
available to State Parties are the financial and other resources of polluters who should, in 
accordance with the polluter pays principle, be required to provide resources for the 
purposes of remediation and compensation for environmental harm. Where polluters have 
provided compensation to the state for harm to the environment and human rights in the 
form of administrative fines or payment of damages the state should ensure that those 
resources are not redirected elsewhere, but are spent on the rehabilitation of the relevant 
area as well as on the promotion of ESCRs in the affected community. 
In light of the duty of cooperation associated with state sovereignty and the principle of 
intragenerational equity, it is important to note that not all natural resources within a State 
Party’s territory should be considered completely available for use or consumption by that 
State Party. Where shared resources are concerned it is essential that States Parties 
consider the needs of other states or peoples dependent on the relevant resource. Once 
again, the right to water is a good example of this. Where a shared river flows from one state 
to another, it would be entirely inconsistent with the Covenant and the principle of 
intragenerational equity for a State Party to use all the water in that river for non-essential 
industrial uses, particularly where individuals downstream in the neighbouring state are 
dependent on that water for their basic needs.388 International cooperation and assistance 
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under article 2(1) are particularly important in such cases and should take into account what 
is necessary for the realisation of ESCRs, prioritising core obligations. 
As noted above, ‘available resources’ include those resources available to the State Party 
through international assistance and cooperation.389 The principle of CBDR is a useful guide 
for interpretation in this regard as it underscores the increased responsibility on certain 
states to provide international assistance and cooperation. While the provision of 
international resources for the purposes of article 2(1) is an obligation on all States Parties, 
this principle of IEL can serve as a guide indicating which States Parties should be 
approached for assistance first or which have stronger obligations, for example due to their 
increased capacities or responsibility for environmental harm. This is, of course, of particular 
relevance where climate change is concerned as the principle of CBDR is most prominent 
within the climate change regime.390 States Parties that have contributed to environmental 
harm which threatens ESCRs in another jurisdiction should be held responsible for providing 
the necessary assistance and cooperation, and therefore resources, to remedy the situation 
and ensure that ESCRs are provided for. This should be seen as an obligation over and 
above the general obligation to provide assistance and cooperation to other States Parties 
where they have insufficient resources for this purpose. 
In accordance with the principle of prevention and the no-harm principle natural resources 
should not be considered available for the purposes of article 2(1) where extraction of the 
relevant resources would necessarily result in significant environmental harm or would 
cause significant transboundary harm. Where natural resources could potentially cause 
harm then they should still be considered available, but their exploitation will be subject to 
the exercise of due diligence and related EIAs and HRIAs as well as appropriate application 
of the precautionary principle. 391  The extraction processes associated with hydraulic 
fracturing (or fracking) could, for example, be understood in these terms. The likely 
significant and far-reaching harm to the environment and to ESCRs as a result of hydraulic 
fracturing should be prevented in accordance with the precautionary principle and the 
associated natural gas resources are therefore not available to the State Party for the 
purposes of the Covenant.392 A similar argument could be made that certain fossil fuels (or 
thresholds thereof) must not be considered available resources for the purposes of article 
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2(1) given the significant damage to the climate and to human rights as a result of fossil fuel-
related emissions. It would be illogical, and inconsistent with a teleological interpretation of 
the Covenant, to permit the use of resources for the realisation of ESCRs by way of an 
activity that itself causes harm to ESCRs. 
Finally, it must be noted that where natural resources are concerned, their availability 
does not necessarily mean that their use is appropriate or consistent with Covenant 
objectives. There may not be a risk of depleting a particular natural resource, and it could 
be considered available in a theoretical sense, but the process of extracting the resource 
may result in significant harm, particularly for indigenous and local communities. Where the 
benefits of extracting or exploiting available natural resources do not outweigh the resultant 
environmental harm and threats to ESCRs, the principle of prevention should be applied, 
bearing in mind that much environmental harm is irreversible. Impact assessments are an 
important tool for determining the nature and extent of the potential impacts and they can 
assist in ensuring that the full range of risks and impacts form part of the decision-making 
process. Where the impacts of such activities are as yet uncertain, but potentially significant, 
the precautionary principle should be applied. 393  The long-term harm to ESCRs from 
environmental degradation should therefore be prevented and should not be permitted for 
the sake of temporary and unsustainable benefits to Covenant rights. 
The interpretation of available resources in the context of article 2(1) must therefore take 
potential environmental harm into account. Natural resources should not be considered 
available where their exploitation or extraction will cause harm to ESCRs or will cause 
irreversible environmental harm. Impact assessments must be undertaken to determine 
whether or not natural resources can be exploited without causing harm to ESCRs or the 
environment on which they depend. Such an approach to the availability of resources 
prevents harm to ESCRs as a result of environmental degradation or the depletion of natural 
resources, and is therefore appropriate in light of the interpretive principle of 
effectiveness.394 The section below considers the interpretation of “maximum” in article 2(1) 
of the Covenant. 
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5 5 The meaning of “maximum” 
5 5 1 Current interpretation 
Article 2(1) requires States Parties to use the “maximum” of their available resources. 
Given the relationship between ESCRs and the “inherent dignity of the human person”395 as 
well as the objective of “establish[ing] clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realization of [ESCRs]”,396 it is appropriate for States Parties to be obligated to use the 
greatest possible amount of resources necessary for the fulfilment of the rights in the 
Covenant. Shahid suggests that “maximum” available resources “must represent the 
broadest possible definition of resources in mobilisation and the most inclusive methods of 
allocation”.397 
Given the priority of human rights over other interests, Robertson notes that the use of 
the maximum available resources should only be limited to the extent that other human 
rights may be infringed upon: 
“Because human rights necessarily claim priority over all other considerations, governments 
must, at least in theory, marshall all the resources needed for their satisfaction, up to the point 
where this would infringe upon the satisfaction of other human rights”.398 
As a result of the requirement to use ‘maximum’ available resources, a strong justification is 
required where States Parties withhold resources that could potentially assist in the 
realisation of ESCRs. This is particularly important in respect of minimum core obligations. 
In General Comment 3, the Committee notes that a State Party relying on a lack of resources 
where it has failed to meet minimum core obligations, “must demonstrate that every effort 
has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations”.399 
The term “maximum” relates to the quantity of resources, essentially indicating that all 
possible resources should be used for the fulfilment of ESCRs. When this is read with the 
concept of progressive realisation in article 2(1) it implies an open-ended growth and a 
correlative perpetual use of resources. However, it is clear that the planet’s resources have 
limits, and a model of unimpeded economic growth is not sustainable. It may therefore be 
necessary to impose limits on the extent of resource use in order to ensure the realisation 
of ESCRs over the long term. However, as noted above, 400 this dissertation proposes 
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addressing the problem of limited resources and sustainability through a broader 
understanding of ‘availability’, so as to exclude those resources which cannot be sustainably 
used. This would then reduce the pool of resources to which ‘maximum resources’ refers. 
5 5 2 “Maximum” and principles of IEL 
As noted above, the obligation to use the maximum of available resources emphasises 
the importance of human rights and the need to prioritise human rights, and ESCRs in 
particular, over other resource needs. In other words, the maximum amount of resources 
must be dedicated to the enjoyment of ESCRs (and core obligations in particular) before 
allocating resources to other areas. This should only be limited at “the point where this would 
infringe upon the satisfaction of other human rights”.401 
In order to ensure that ESCRs are not unduly infringed by environmental degradation in 
the course of States Parties using the maximum of their available resources, decision-
making around resource use, mobilisation and allocation should, at a minimum, take 
environmental factors into account. In accordance with sustainable development and the 
principle of integration, plans, policies and programmes relating to resource use, 
mobilisation and allocation should seek to balance economic, social and environmental 
factors.402  
Similarly, in using the maximum of available resources States Parties should consider the 
realisation of ESCRs over the long term and the ESCRs of future generations. The long-
term dimension of progressive realisation and the position of future generations is examined 
in detail in Chapter 6. For present purposes it is useful to note that although the principle of 
intergenerational equity does not mean prioritising future generations over current needs, it 
does require that future needs at least be taken into consideration. Some commentators 
have recognised the intergenerational inequity resulting from austerity measures and 
financial crises, and it is proposed that environmental impacts on future generations should 
similarly be taken into account. 403 In making resource-related decisions States Parties 
should therefore ensure that their actions take future generations into account and do not 
cause inequitable harm to such future generations.404  
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States Parties need to plan for the future of the current population as well as for future 
generations by considering the long-term impact and sustainability of present resource 
decisions. 405  Resource decisions which would result in long-term environmental harm 
impacting on ESCRs would need to apply the principle of prevention. In doing so, States 
Parties must bear in mind that even where ESCRs can be advanced in the short term, if this 
results in significant or permanent loss of ecosystem services in the long term, it may 
ultimately be more detrimental to Covenant rights.406 Applying the principle of prevention 
may also require States Parties to devote resources to environmental protection where there 
is a threat to ESCRs as a result of potential environmental harm. This would include devoting 
resources to any necessary EIAs and HRIAs where there is potential environmental 
damage. 
In relation to natural resources, maximising resource use will not always mean that these 
resources should be exploited for financial revenue. Exploiting natural resources will often 
involve significant long-term financial costs and risks which should be factored into such 
decisions. For example, activities which result in significant GHG emissions might seem to 
have substantial financial benefits, but States Parties must consider these benefits 
alongside the considerable risks of climate change and the costs related to mitigation, 
adaption, and recovery from climate change impacts. Maximising natural resources and the 
fundamental features of the environment necessary for ESCRs may therefore require 
financial resources to be directed towards environmental protection. For example, ensuring 
that available water resources are utilised to their maximum for the realisation of Covenant 
rights could require spending substantial resources on pollution prevention and the 
protection of natural water sources as well as on efficient water systems to reduce 
wastage.407 Such measures would assist in ensuring that the water resources themselves 
are “maximised” in accordance with their inherent value and that they provide the greatest 
possible benefit for the realisation of ESCRs. Similarly, maximising natural resources for the 
realisation of the right to housing could include for example, the protection and conservation 
of wetlands that have an inherent capacity to protect homes from flooding and thereby 
promote resilience against certain extreme weather events.408 Such an approach is akin to 
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Skogly’s description of a qualitative approach to resources, as it pays attention to the nature 
of the resource in question and not merely its potential economic use. Maximising resource 
use qualitatively thus ensures that resources are managed and used to provide the 
maximum benefit to the enjoyment of ESCRs, as opposed to an approach which seeks to 
provide the maximum quantitative amount of resources for the realisation of ESCRs.409 
While the principle of sustainable use is applied to many natural resources which can be 
exploited and commodified, it is also necessary to consider the sustainable use of those 
aspects of the environment which are vital determinants of ESCRs.410 For example, clean 
air is fundamental to the rights to health and an adequate standard of living. Maximising 
resource use should include maximising benefits of resources such as clean air by directing 
necessary financial, organisational and human resources towards the regulation and 
monitoring of air quality as well as atmospheric emissions. Spending resources on protecting 
the environmental base, in this case clean air, ultimately enhances public health and 
reduces the burden of pollution-related illnesses on the public healthcare system.411 In the 
long run this ensures that funds are not spent on preventable illnesses, leaving more 
resources available for progressively realising ESCRs. The exploitation of natural resources 
and impacts on the environment should therefore be considered in light of the benefits of 
these environmental elements and, particularly in the case of indigenous peoples, the role 
of the environment in supporting and promoting other ESCRs. 
Incorporating environmental considerations into an understanding of maximum available 
resources also requires a more integrated understanding of budgeting and resource 
allocation that includes environmental factors which contribute to the enjoyment of Covenant 
rights. Where resources are devoted to environmental protection for the sake of preserving 
the fundamental determinants of ESCRs for present or future generations, such resources 
may need to be viewed as expenses related to the fulfilment of Covenant rights. Of course, 
it is important that such an approach does not create a loophole for States Parties to allocate 
significant resources to environmental conservation where it is not warranted for the 
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realisation of ESCRs, thereby prioritising non-essential environmental endeavours over their 
binding obligations under the Covenant. The importance of prioritising minimum core 
obligations and the needs of the most marginalised and disadvantaged remains. The 
allocation of resources for such spending on environmental protection could therefore be 
seen as part of the maximum available resources devoted to ESCRs.  
5 6 Equitable and effective use of resources 
5 6 1 Current interpretation 
Compiled by a group of international law experts, the Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“Limburg Principles”) comment on the meaning and interpretation of maximum available 
resources.412 The Limburg Principles note that adequate measures taken for the realisation 
of ESCRs should include “equitable and effective use of and access to the available 
resources”.413 While the analysis above on the meaning of “resources”, “availability”, and 
“maximum” has focused on the type of resources available for use as well as the quantity of 
these resources, the requirement of ensuring equitable and effective use of these resources 
emphasises the ways in which these resources are put to use for the purposes of fulfilling 
ESCRs. 
Equitable use relates to the principles of non-discrimination and equality which are 
fundamental to the Covenant.414 In using the maximum of its available resources to realise 
Covenant rights, a State Party must ensure that access to, and allocation of, resources does 
not discriminate against or exclude any groups, particularly those who are disadvantaged 
and marginalised.415 In addition, equitable use can be linked to the imperative to address 
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inequality through redistribution of resources by, for example, promoting progressive 
taxation.416 The Committee’s emphasis on the prioritisation of core obligations can also be 
seen as a dimension of the equitable use of resources, requiring States Parties to ensure 
that resources are first allocated to areas where the need is greatest.417 For example, the 
Committee’s 2020 concluding observations with respect to Ukraine express concerned 
regarding reductions in governmental subsidies “which disproportionately affect vulnerable 
groups and individuals such as women living in poverty or in rural areas”.418 The Committee 
recommended that the State Party assess the impact of certain fiscal policies 419  and 
“[i]ncrease the level of social spending, paying particular attention to disadvantaged and 
marginalized individuals and regions with high levels of unemployment and poverty”.420 The 
Committee has also affirmed the importance of equitable use of resources and prioritisation 
of the greatest needs in its statement on the COVID-19 pandemic, stating as follows: 
“As this pandemic and the measures taken to combat it have had a disproportionate negative 
impact on the most marginalized groups, States must make all efforts to mobilize the necessary 
resources to combat COVID-19 in the most equitable manner, in order to avoid imposing a 
further economic burden on these marginalized groups. Allocation of resources should 
prioritize the special needs of these groups”.421 
It is clear that the use and allocation of resources for the realisation of ESCRs should 
promote equity through addressing the greatest needs first. With reference to meeting 
priority needs, De Schutter explains that “who is reached matters, at least as much as how 
much governmental spending goes to any particular sector”.422  
The obligation to ensure effective use of resources for the realisation of ESCRs requires 
States Parties to optimise the use, mobilisation, and allocation of resources. Effective use 
includes an obligation on States Parties to eliminate corruption as it “leads to the draining of 
resources”. 423  In General Comment 24 the Committee notes the impact of corruption, 
pointing out that it “undermines a State’s ability to mobilize resources for the delivery of 
services essential for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights”.424 In addition, 
corruption impacts equitable access as it “leads to discriminatory access to public services 
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in favour of those able to influence authorities, including by offering bribes or resorting to 
political pressure”. 425  The Committee has regularly expressed its concern regarding 
corruption in its concluding observations. In relation to Turkmenistan, the Committee 
expressed concern regarding high levels of corruption “which hinders the effective use of 
the State party’s resources for the implementation of the Covenant”.426 In relation to Ukraine, 
the Committee recommended that the State Party “[t]ake rigorous measures to combat tax 
evasion” 427 and “intensify its efforts to combat corruption”. 428 The Committee has also 
recommended that the root causes of corruption are addressed;429 that activists and whistle-
blowers are protected;430 that the impact of corruption on ESCRs is assessed;431 and that 
adequate resources are allocated for government agencies promoting good governance, 
transparency and the investigation of corruption cases. 432  De Schutter argues that 
combatting tax evasion and strengthening tax administration should be a priority “because 
the failure to effectively address tax evasion has regressive impacts, disproportionately 
affecting the poor”.433 
In addition to the abovementioned obligations, Uprimny, Hernández and Araújo argue 
that the emerging doctrine of the Committee imposes extraterritorial obligations in relation 
to “cross-border tax evasion, illicit financial flows and corruption on a global scale”.434 This 
is evident in, for example, the Committee’s concluding observations with respect to the 
United Kingdom, where it expressed concern regarding “financial secrecy legislation and 
permissive rules on corporate tax”.435 Significantly, the Committee recognised that these 
measures hinder the ability to mobilise the maximum available resources for ESCRs both 
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for the United Kingdom and for other states.436 The Committee recommended that the State 
Party “[i]ntensify its efforts […] to address global tax abuse”.437 The Committee has also 
made a similar recommendation in respect of cross-border tax evasion in Switzerland.438 In 
relation to Liechtenstein and international cooperation in the context of maximum available 
resources, the Committee recommended that private foundations based in the State Party 
be “subject to the necessary regulations, in order to contribute to the efforts of other States 
parties in combating tax evasion and tax abuse schemes”. 439 Elson, Balakrishnan and 
Heintz underscore the importance of such measures and note that the presence of tax 
havens and failures to prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion represent a significant loss in 
potential tax revenue for developing countries.440 
Regarding effectiveness, Elson, Balakrishnan and Heintz illustrate that where the term is 
understood only in relation to limiting financial costs, there are other hidden costs that may 
not be accounted for.441 A financially “effective” health service may, for example, require 
more at-home care from relatives to limit hospital expenses. In this way the ostensible 
financial effectiveness would obscure hidden costs disproportionately borne by women and 
girls compelled to take on caregiving roles.442 It is therefore necessary to include such costs 
in determining the effectiveness of resource use. The Committee has, for example, 
recommended that Ukraine’s gender budgeting initiative include “time-use surveys as a tool 
to measure the distribution of paid and unpaid work between women and men”.443  
Financial effectiveness should therefore not be promoted at the expense of human rights. 
More “effective” spending from a financial perspective does not necessarily translate to the 
realisation of ESCRs.444 Effectiveness should be rather understood in terms of the ability of 
the relevant measures to achieve ESCRs to the greatest degree, which could include wise 
use of financial resources and limiting wasteful expenditure. From the perspective of 
Skogly’s qualitative approach to resources, effective use can also be understood as 
ensuring effectiveness in terms of the qualitative nature of resources, not merely from a 
financial or economic perspective. This might mean appropriate and effective use of human 
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and organisational resources or ensuring that infrastructural resources are maintained and 
not overburdened to allow for their continued use in the long term. For example, financial 
resources spent on building new facilities for healthcare may be ineffective if the same result 
(in terms of realisation of the right to health) could be achieved by appropriate maintenance 
and upgrading of existing healthcare facilities. Similarly, sustainability should be considered 
a dimension of effective use in relation to natural resources and the allocation of financial 
resources for environmental protection.445  
Skogly’s qualitative approach emphasises the role of non-financial resources as well as 
their quality and effectiveness in realising ESCRs, noting that taking account of this 
qualitative dimension will contribute to a more sustainable approach.446 The former Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque affirms this qualitative approach (albeit without using the term) in her report on 
sustainability and the rights to water and sanitation.447 The Special Rapporteur’s report 
repeatedly underscores the importance of the quality of existing (non-financial) resources. 
She stresses that the maintenance and operation, and related funding, of existing 
infrastructure is critical for the sustainable realisation of the rights to water and sanitation. 
Installing infrastructure for accessing water, for example, constitutes a temporary measure 
to fulfil the State Party’s obligation if it is not also effective and accompanied with appropriate 
measures to maintain such infrastructure and ensure sustainable access to water.448 A 
qualitative approach to resources should therefore include: a careful consideration of the 
amount and quality of non-financial resources available to the State Party;449 the appropriate 
maintenance and operation of existing infrastructure and systems;450 and the provision of 
necessary funding for such maintenance and operation of any new infrastructure and 
systems.451 This qualitative approach must also be applied to natural resources. Where 
ESCRs are directly dependent on, for example, clean air, soil and water, States Parties must 
invest in the necessary measures to protect and maintain the quality of these resources to 
a degree that is commensurate with the foundational role of these resources in supporting 
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ESCRs. Such a sustainable and qualitative approach to resources naturally supports the 
effective use of natural and non-natural resources. 
5 6 2 Equitable use and principles of IEL 
Applying sustainable development and the principle of integration to the equitable use of 
resources requires the consideration of an integrated range of needs including needs related 
to the environment and natural resources. Failing to integrate the environment into decision-
making related to resource use and allocation will lead to decisions that disproportionately 
and unfairly impact those who are more directly dependent on the environment including, 
for example, indigenous peoples; those dependent on natural water sources for their water 
and sanitation needs; and those whose livelihoods directly depend on the environment and 
natural resources. An integration of environmental considerations into decision-making 
could assist in ensuring that ostensibly equitable decisions with regard to resources do not 
in fact result in disproportionate impacts on certain groups. 
With regard to environmental protection, measures to protect the environment and natural 
resources, such as those related to sustainable use, should be implemented in such a way 
as to minimise the impact on those most severely affected. For example, an adjustment of 
quotas or allocations of fishing licences to ensure sustainable use should consider the 
position of small-scale fishers and seek to mitigate detrimental impacts on ESCRs as a result 
of limitations on the exploitation of marine living resources.452 The burden of measures 
related to sustainable use should be borne by those whose human rights will be least 
affected by such measures. In the example of fishing quotas, ensuring both equitable and 
sustainable use could therefore mean imposing greater restrictions on the licences of larger 
entities in the fishing industry, while ensuring that the livelihoods and rights to food of 
indigenous peoples and small-scale fishers are not unduly affected.  
Similarly, applying the principle of prevention requires resource-related measures that will 
inevitably impact development activities and these measures should be implemented in such 
a way as to ensure the least impact on the most vulnerable. For example, in 2019 the 
removal of fossil fuel subsidies in Ecuador was economically jarring and had a 
disproportionate impact on those reliant on public transport. Any such transitions must be 
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mindful of impacts on the poor and a gradual or tiered system of transition could lessen 
these impacts.453 Such policies, including those related to a just transition away from fossil 
fuels, must therefore take into account any potential disproportionate impacts on the ESCRs 
of the most marginalised and disadvantaged.454 Similarly, where individuals and groups are 
at risk of unemployment resulting from a transition to renewable energy, States Parties must 
ensure that new opportunities are available. For example, in its concluding observations on 
Estonia the Committee recommended that “the State party ensure that workers who are 
affected by industrial restructuring and the transition to renewable energy […] are able to 
make an effective and smooth transition to new occupations that enable them to maintain 
an adequate standard of living”.455 
Equitable resource use has significant overlap with the principles of intragenerational and 
intergenerational equity. 456 Intergenerational equity underscores the need for resources 
devoted to environmental protection for the sake of protecting the future Covenant rights of 
future generations.457 Intragenerational equity suggests that resource use should consider 
the needs of all individuals and groups within a State Party, as well as the needs of other 
states.458 The no-harm principle also seeks to ensure that neighbouring states do not bear 
the costs of environmental harm without any benefit.459 The principle of CBDR could be used 
to address some of this inequity where states are concerned.460 In the context of climate 
change, many states that bear the harshest burden of climate change impacts also have the 
least responsibility.461 In such cases CBDR could be a tool to guide the equitable use of 
resources by imposing stronger obligations on responsible States Parties in relation to the 
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provision of international assistance and cooperation. It is important to note that the 
obligation of international assistance and cooperation exists regardless of responsibility or 
culpability for any form of harm. However, incorporating a degree of responsibility under the 
principle of CBDR can add a degree specificity (who should be responsible for providing 
international resources) and persuasion (why should they be responsible for providing these 
resources). In the context of climate change the direct attribution of responsibility may be 
difficult due to the complexity of determining causation.462 
An understanding of equitable use of resources which takes the environment into account 
and incorporates the principle of intragenerational equity would also require an equitable 
distribution of environmental benefits and impacts among peoples and states. This means 
that where development activities result in environmental harm, the communities whose 
ESCRs are impacted by that environmental harm should also be recipients of the benefits 
from those activities or, at the very least, compensation for harm suffered as a result. For 
example, local communities who bear the brunt of air pollution from coal-fired power stations 
which serve the broader population, should receive some form of compensation, for 
example, through funding for relocation or in the form of healthcare benefits to address the 
harm they are likely to suffer. In addition, those who benefit from the exploitation of natural 
resources but are geographically separate from its impacts, should bear some of the costs 
associated with such exploitation.463  
Industries responsible for pollution and environmental degradation should bear the costs 
of environmental protection and remediation in accordance with the polluter pays principle. 
This would ensure provision of the necessary financial resources for protection of the 
environment that ESCRs depend on, and it would therefore prevent the state from bearing 
the cost on behalf of polluters. Mechanisms for ensuring the appropriate distribution of 
pollution-related costs include the creation of pollution funds, taxes on activities or goods, 
or increased costs to consumers of products which result in significant environmental harm. 
However, caution should be exercised where costs related to the polluter pays principle are 
imposed on ordinary citizens or consumers in relation to essential items or products 
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necessary for the enjoyment of human rights.464 Equitable use therefore requires that state 
resources, which should be used equitably for the benefit of the people, are not instead used 
to solve environmental problems created by corporate entities for financial gain. 
Equitable use of resources as described above is supported by non-discrimination and 
equality in the Covenant, as well as the Committee’s persistent assertion of the priority of 
marginalised and disadvantaged individuals and communities. 465  A teleological 
interpretation of the Covenant that evolves appropriately in light of changing circumstances 
must therefore include the equitable use of natural resources as well as an obligation on 
States Parties to use resources to equitably distribute environmental benefits and provide 
protection from environmental harm.466 
5 6 3 Effective use and principles of IEL 
In accordance with sustainable development and the principle of integration, and in order 
for a State Party’s use of resources to be effective, the environment must be considered in 
resource-related decisions. An approach which ignores environmental dimensions will be 
ineffective in the long term as it would fail to take account of the impacts of a degraded 
environment on ESCRs. Sustainable use of resources ensures effective use for the 
realisation of ESCRs over the long term. For example, in General Comment 12 in the context 
of the right to food, the Committee noted that “[c]are should be taken to ensure the most 
sustainable management and use of natural and other resources for food”.467 
The preventive principle, along with the tools of EIAs and HRIAs, can be used to ensure 
that long-term or permanent harm to ESCRs and the environment is avoided or, at the very 
least, mitigated.468 Although conducting impact assessments often involves initial costs, in 
most cases undertaking these assessments would ultimately be more effective than the 
resources which could be required to remediate the environment or absorb the costs of harm 
caused where no impact assessments are conducted. Many of these costs can also be 
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borne by the proponent of the proposed activity. In some cases, prevention of environmental 
harm will be the most effective and responsible use of resources for States Parties. For 
example, the exploitation of fossil fuels for financial gain may prove ineffective for the 
promotion of ESCRs in the long term due to the significant contribution to climate change 
and the resultant impacts on Covenant rights.469 However, this is not true for all States 
Parties and all circumstances. Developing or least developed states could, for example, 
argue that in the short term, significant gains for ESCRs from the exploitation of fossil fuels 
outweigh any potential risks as a result of climate change.470 This would, however, need to 
be carefully justified. It would be more difficult for wealthier developed states to suggest that 
their contribution to climate change is justified despite the severity of future impacts. Given 
the possible financial benefits involved, the ineffective use of resources in such cases might 
only become evident when environmental risks and impacts are appropriately integrated into 
the decision-making process. This once again underscores the potential use of EIAs and 
HRIAs. Applying the precautionary principle, resource decisions affecting the environment 
cannot be effective if they fail to factor in all potential impacts, even where such impacts are 
uncertain. Environmental harm and related impacts on ESCRs require careful consideration 
and should be avoided where possible, particularly where the potential risk outweighs the 
short-term gain in relation to ESCRs. This is especially important where permanent and 
irreversible environmental harm is concerned. 
As noted above, the effective use of resources requires measures to address 
corruption.471 Taking the environment into account, the effective use of resources should 
include measures to address impacts on the environment, particularly if a healthy 
environment is seen as a resource which positively contributes to the enjoyment of ESCRs. 
Effective use should therefore require measures for environmental protection and imposing 
liability for environmental harm. This includes mechanisms to hold polluters accountable for 
environmental harm to ensure that public resources are not diverted from ESCRs to address 
damage caused by the polluting conduct of private parties.472 One means of addressing this 
is to require financial provisioning for future remediation of environmental harm from those 
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who have been licensed to undertake activities likely to cause environmental harm.473 Given 
the far-reaching extent of the potential harm to ESCRs resulting from pollution and 
environmental degradation, the effective use of resources must include measures to prevent 
corruption and mismanagement in relation to the environment and natural resources, 
including appropriate legislation, environmental management, licensing fees for natural 
resource exploitation, and enforcement of environmental laws.  
In conclusion, effective use is understood to include measures to combat tax evasion, the 
prevention of corruption, the protection of whistle-blowers and the promotion of good 
governance. If environmental considerations are appropriately integrated within the concept 
of effective use, it should also include the prevention of mismanagement of natural 
resources and the environment, the protection of environmental defenders, and the 
promotion of sound environmental governance. Consistent with the principles of 
interpretation in Chapter 3, this greening of the obligation of effective use is an appropriate 
evolution of States Parties’ obligation to use the maximum of available resources in light of 
present-day circumstances. Appropriate environmental protection and management as well 
as use of natural resources should therefore be required of States Parties to the Covenant 
to the extent that the realisation of ESCRs is threatened by related environmental 
degradation and climate change. 
5 7 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an examination of state sovereignty and the right of self-
determination in article 1 of the Covenant. As a point of departure, States Parties are 
permitted to use and dispose of their natural wealth and resources as they see fit. However, 
interpreted systematically in light of States Parties’ obligations in the Covenant, this right is 
not unfettered.474 States Parties are free to use and dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources to the extent that it does not prevent them, or other States Parties, from meeting 
their obligations under the Covenant. The right to self-determination must therefore be 
interpreted to include an obligation on States Parties to use natural resources responsibly 
so as to avoid harm to natural resources or the environment that will, in turn, affect the 
realisation of ESCRs. 
                                            
473 In the South African context, for example, those issued within permits for mining activities are required to 
provide finances for remediation and decommissioning prior to the commencement of mining activities. At the 
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by the permit holders. See sections 46 and 89 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 
of 2002. Of course, such measures need to take into account the irreversible nature of much environmental 
harm, and should ensure that the funds provided are proportionate to the risks involved.  




The integration of environmental considerations within the scope of “maximum available 
resources” in article 2(1) is necessary in order to avoid adverse impacts on ESCRs as a 
result of environmental degradation and climate change. As this chapter has shown, this 
requires a broad view of resources which includes not only a range of resource types, but 
also an appreciation of their qualitative dimension. In particular, natural resources must be 
considered an integral part of the resources available to States Parties, both in terms of the 
revenue that can be generated from their exploitation, as well as through the contribution 
they make to ESCRs as part of functioning ecosystems and a healthy environment. 
Financial, administrative, technological, human and other resources (from domestic, 
international, public and private sources) will be necessary for the protection of the 
environment. To the extent that the environment needs to be protected for the realisation of 
ESCRs, these resources should be devoted to such environmental protection in accordance 
with article 2(1). 
With regards to the availability of resources, it has been proposed that the principles of 
IEL such as sustainable use should serve to exclude certain resources from the pool of 
available resources. In addition, where resource use or the exploitation of natural resources 
will result in significant harm to the environment and ESCRs, those resources could be 
deemed unavailable for the purposes of article 2(1). Where exploitation of natural resources 
is undertaken, there are significant risks of harm to human rights. EIAs and HRIAs are 
therefore important tools to assess risks and impacts, and to guide decision-making. Natural 
resources should also be viewed qualitatively in respect of their contribution to a healthy 
environment conducive to the enjoyment of ESCRs, regardless of their economic value.  
In relation to the concept of “maximum” resources, an integration of environmental 
considerations underscores the fact that, where natural resources are concerned, unlimited 
exploitation and consumption is not in the interests of Covenant rights. In order to ensure 
the continued realisation of ESCRs over the long term, and in accordance with 
intergenerational equity, limits to the use of resources must be imposed. The environmental 
determinants of ESCRs must also be “maximised” through appropriate measures in order 
to enhance their inherent qualitative value in supporting the realisation of ESCRs. 
Under the Covenant, resources must be used equitably and effectively. From an 
environmental perspective, equitable use demands a fair distribution of environmental 
benefits and burdens, particularly where natural resource exploitation is concerned. Where 
measures to protect the environment may affect certain ESCRs, these measures should be 




disproportionately impacted. Equitable use of resources also requires a consideration of the 
needs of future generations as well as the equitable distribution of resources between states 
in respect of states’ responsibilities for environmental harm. 
Finally, an understanding of the effective use of resources that integrates environmental 
dimensions must include long-term sustainability. Short-term resource use that benefits 
ESCRs, but ultimately causes significant harm to the environment on which those ESCRs 
depend, cannot be deemed effective. Effective use also requires the appropriate use of EIAs 
and HRIAs prior to making relevant decisions to ensure that resources are not squandered 
on projects that promise gains for ESCRs but ultimately result in harm to Covenant rights. 
Resource use can only be effective where decisions regarding resources are not limited to 
financial concerns, but consider all relevant risks and impacts including those related to 
natural resources and the environment. Measures to prevent corruption and protect state 
resources should also be applied to natural resources and the environment. This can be 
done through, for example, measures to prevent the mismanagement of environmental 
resources and appropriate enforcement of relevant environmental laws including the 
application of the polluter pays principle. 
In order for the Covenant to adapt appropriately to present-day circumstances and be 
effective in light of increasingly severe and urgent environmental challenges, the obligation 
on States Parties to use the maximum of available resources for the realisation of ESCRs 
must integrate environmental considerations. Such an effective and evolutive interpretation 
of article 2(1) requires States Parties to actively consider the inherent value of natural 
resources beyond their potential economic use and to dedicate resources to appropriate 
environmental management and protection where ESCRs are threatened by environmental 
harm. 475  A failure to systematically integrate environmental considerations within the 
meaning of maximum available resources will result in the numerous environmental threats 
to ESCRs becoming invisible and thus being overlooked. The obligation on States Parties 
to use the maximum of available resources must therefore incorporate relevant 
environmental considerations in order to ensure the continued progressive realisation of 
ESCRs. The following chapter continues to explore the greening of article 2(1) and examines 
the relevance of environmental considerations for the interpretation of core obligations, 
progressive realisation and non-retrogression. 
 
                                            





CORE OBLIGATIONS, PROGRESSIVE REALISATION  
AND NON-RETROGRESSION 
6 1 Introduction 
This chapter continues to examine aspects of States Parties’ obligations in article 2(1) of 
the Covenant with the aim of integrating environmental considerations in their interpretation. 
The chapter investigates the concepts of core obligations, progressive realisation, and non-
retrogression. These three aspects of States Parties’ obligations are considered together as 
they are interrelated. Core obligations can be seen as the baseline or foundation of ESCRs, 
while progressive realisation proceeds from this foundation and seeks to achieve the “full 
realization” of Covenant rights. 1  Where progressive realisation advances the level of 
attainment of ESCRs, the corollary duty to avoid retrogression requires that States Parties 
sustain any progress made towards full realisation, and avoid any backwards steps in that 
regard. The aim of this chapter is to explore how these interrelated aspects of States Parties’ 
obligations can be interpreted so as to take environmental considerations into account. 
The chapter begins with an examination of the notion of core obligations and the current 
approaches of the Committee and scholars to this concept.2 This is followed by an analysis 
of the environmental dimensions of core obligations primarily with reference to the principles 
of IEL. In this regard the urgency and priority afforded to core obligations is important and 
would also apply to any environmental dimensions identified. 
Progressive realisation is then considered. 3  As is noted below, the obligation of 
progressive realisation requires a broad range of measures from States Parties. This 
chapter does not analyse all of these in detail. The focus is on the long-term measures 
required for progressive realisation as well as the forward-looking perspective required from 
States Parties in order to adopt plans and strategies for the realisation of ESCRs. In light of 
the long-term nature of environmental impacts, this future-oriented perspective is particularly 
important for greening the obligation of progressive realisation. In the context of progressive 
realisation and the abovementioned long-term perspective, the chapter also examines the 
position of future generations under the Covenant. This includes an investigation of the 
possibilities for recognising future generations’ rights as well as the possible scope of States 
                                            
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 article 2(1). 
2 See 6 2 below. 




Parties’ obligations towards future generations under the Covenant. The forward-looking 
dimension of progressive realisation and the position of future generations are then 
considered in relation to the principles of IEL. 
Finally, the chapter examines the obligation on States Parties to avoid retrogressive 
measures, including the limited circumstances where States Parties might justify such 
measures. 4 The chapter concludes with an integration of environmental considerations 
within the obligation of non-retrogression. This is done with reference to the principles of IEL 
and includes an investigation of the relationship between sustainability and retrogression. 
6 2 Core obligations 
6 2 1 Current interpretation of core obligations 
6 2 1 1 Introduction 
The concept of minimum core obligations was introduced by the Committee in General 
Comment 3. 5 The description provided there has been characterised as the “canonical 
formulation” of the minimum core.6 The Committee states the following: 
“On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body 
that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States parties’ reports the 
Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the 
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. 
Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the 
most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum 
core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être”.7 
Minimum core obligations are intrinsically linked to the requirement of progressive realisation 
in article 2(1). While progressive realisation allows States Parties at different levels of 
development the flexibility to meet Covenant obligations according to their resources and 
capabilities, minimum core obligations ensure that this flexibility is not exploited to the extent 
that ESCRs become meaningless.8 The concept of core obligations can be understood as 
a response to the “potential for self-serving invocations of the doctrine of progressive 
realization as a cover for present non-compliance”. 9  As the Committee notes, an 
                                            
4 See 6 4 below. 
5 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10. 
6 J Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now (2017) 9. 
7 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10. 
8 CESCR Social Protection Floors para 10; Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 367; Odello & 
Seatzu The UN Committee on ESCR 21. 




interpretation of the Covenant that excludes minimum core obligations would deprive it of its 
“raison d’être”.10  
Tasioulas proposes two interpretations of the nature of the relationship between the 
minimum core and progressive realisation. The minimum core doctrine can be understood 
as a component of progressive realisation that sets out the first steps that should be taken 
in order to progressively realise ESCRs. On the other hand, the minimum core can also be 
understood as an independent threshold outside of progressive realisation, emphasising 
that core obligations should not be subject to progressive realisation. The minimum core can 
therefore be seen either as “part of the doctrine of progressive realization” or “as limiting its 
domain of operation”.11 Tasioulas argues that the latter approach is most appropriate given 
the immediate nature of minimum core obligations. This is consistent with the Committee’s 
repeated characterisation of core obligations as immediate obligations.12 It is important to 
note that immediate obligations also exist with respect to progressive realisation, most 
notably the obligation to “take steps” towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs.13 The 
Covenant requires States Parties to continue to take “deliberate, concrete and targeted” 
steps 14  towards achieving progressively the full realisation of Covenant rights “as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible”.15 Core obligations and progressive realisation 
therefore can, and should, be pursued simultaneously by States Parties, while affording the 
appropriate urgency and priority to the minimum core. 
It is necessary to clarify the terminology used in relation to what has been referred as “the 
minimum core doctrine”. 16  In its initial formulation in General Comment 3, the terms 
“minimum core obligation” and “minimum essential levels” were used. Minimum essential 
levels refer to the substantive minimum content of the relevant ESCRs which could be 
                                            
10 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10. On the justification of this interpretation see, for example, L 
Forman, L Caraoshi, AR Chapman & E Lamprea “Conceptualising Minimum Core Obligations under the Right 
to Health: How Should We Define and Implement the ‘Morality of the Depths’” (2016) International Journal of 
HR 531 542; Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 15. 
11 Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 14. 
12 See CESCR General Comment No 13 para 43; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 30; CESCR General 
Comment No 15 para 37; CESCR General Comment No 17 para 25 & 39; CESCR General Comment No 21 
para 67 & 55; CESCR General Comment No 23 para 52. However, on at least one occasion the Committee 
has, confusingly, referred to the progressive realisation of core obligations. See CESCR Ukraine (2014) para 
15. The immediate nature of core obligations is discussed further below at 6 2 1 2. 
13 See, for example, CESCR General Comment No 15 para 17; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 30; 
CESCR General Comment No 19 para 40. 
14 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 2. 
15 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 9; CESCR Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (10 May 2001) E/C12/2001/10 para 18; CESCR Social Protection Floors para 10. 
See also M Ssenyonjo “Reflections on State Obligations with Respect to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in International Human Rights Law” (2011) 15 International Journal of HR 969 978; Sepúlveda Nature of 
Obligations under the ICESCR 369; Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 29. 




referred to as “the nature or essence of a right, that is, the essential element or elements 
without which it loses its substantive significance as a human right”.17 The terminology used 
by the Committee to refer to this substantive essence of ESCRs includes “minimum 
essential levels”,18 “minimum core content”19 and, less frequently used, “core content”.20 
This minimum core content is the substance of the ESCRs that core obligations must realise. 
The Committee therefore describes core obligations with reference to the minimum essential 
levels or core content of the relevant right.21  
While the terminology initially used by the Committee referred to “minimum core 
obligations”, the Committee has shifted its language to refer to “core obligations”,22 with a 
handful of exceptions including its 2020 statement and general comment.23 With regard to 
the earlier emphasis on “minimum”, Chapman and Russell note the concern of human rights 
                                            
17 A Chapman & S Russell “Introduction” in A Chapman & S Russell (eds) Core Obligations: Building a 
Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002) 1 9. 
18 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10; CESCR General Comment No 12 para 17; CESCR General 
Comment No 15 para 44(c) & 56; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59; CESCR General Comment No 
22 para 49; CESCR General Comment No 23 para 65; CESCR Poverty and the ICESCR (10 May 2001) 
E/C12/2001/10 para 15; CESCR Human Rights and Intellectual Property (14 December 2001) E/C12/2001/15 
para 12; CESCR The World Food Crisis para 8; CESCR Netherlands (2017) para 39; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Indonesia (19 June 2014) E/C12/IDN/CO/1 para 12; CESCR Concluding Observations, Yemen 
(22 June 2011) E/C12/YEM/CO/2 para 4; CESCR Lebanon (2016) para 12; CESCR Sweden (2016) para 20. 
19 CESCR An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” under an 
Optional Protocol to the Covenant (10 May 2007) E/C12/2007/1 para 10; CESCR Public Debt, Austerity 
Measures and the ICESCR para 4; CESCR Argentina (2018) para 6; CESCR Cabo Verde (2018) para 13; 
CESCR Slovenia (2014) para 8; CESCR Concluding Observations, Sudan (27 October 2015) 
E/C12/SDN/CO/2 para 18; CESCR Concluding Observations, Bulgaria (29 March 2019) E/C12/BGR/CO/6 
para 9; CESCR Ukraine (2014) para 5; CESCR Concluding Observations, Iceland (11 December 2012) 
E/C12/ISL/CO/4 para 6; CESCR Canada (2016) para 10; CESCR Ecuador (2019) para 6(d); CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Ireland (8 July 2015) E/C12/IRL/CO/3 para 11; CESCR Concluding Observations, 
Spain (6 June 2012) E/C12/ESP/CO/5 para 8. 
20 CESCR General Comment No 8: The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (12 December 1997) E/C12/1997/8 para 7; CESCR General Comment No 12 para 
8; CESCR The World Food Crisis para 8; CESCR Iceland (2012) para 6; CESCR Spain (2018) para 14; 
CESCR Concluding Observations, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (14 July 2016) 
E/C12/GBR/CO/6 para 19; CESCR Concluding Observations, Angola (15 July 2016) E/C12/AGO/CO/4-5 para 
8. 
21 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 43; CESCR General 
Comment No 15 para 37; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59-60; CESCR General Comment No 21 
para 67; CESCR General Comment No 23 para 65; CESCR Poverty and the ICESCR (10 May 2001) 
E/C12/2001/10 para 15; CESCR Sweden (2016) para 20; CESCR Concluding Observations, The Netherlands 
(9 December 2010) E/C12/NDL/CO/4-5 para 25(b). 
22  CESCR General Comment No 12 para 6; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 43, 45, 47 & 48; 
CESCR General Comment No 15 para 6, 37, 38, 40 & 42; CESCR General Comment No 17 para 25, 35, 39, 
41 & 42; CESCR General Comment No 18 para 30 & 31; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59, 61 & 65; 
CESCR General Comment No 21 para 55 & 67; CESCR General Comment No 22 para 49; CESCR General 
Comment No 23 para 50, 52, 65 & 78; CESCR General Comment No 25 para 51 & 52. CESCR Poverty and 
the ICESCR (10 May 2001) E/C12/2001/10 para 15-18; CESCR Human Rights and Intellectual Property (14 
December 2001) E/C12/2001/15 para 11-13; CESCR An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the 
“Maximum of Available Resources” para 6; CESCR Social Protection Floors para 10; CESCR Duties of States 
towards Refugees and Migrants under the ICESCR para 9, 10 & 18. 
23 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10; CESCR Statement on the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) 
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activists that “the identification of minimum core content will reveal to State parties how little 
they have to do in order to be in compliance with their obligations, and that States will do 
that minimum and nothing more”.24 Forman, Caraoshi, Chapman and Lamprea similarly 
note the contrast between the notion of core or essence and minimum, noting that “that 
which is most essential and therefore important, seems to conflict with that which is 
minimum, by definition, the very least a state should do”. 25  They suggest that these 
considerations are likely have triggered the Committee’s move away the term “minimum 
core obligations” to its more widely used “core obligations”. Whether or not this is the case, 
it seems clear from the Committee’s work that it tends towards the use of the term “core 
obligations”.26 
6 2 1 2 The nature of core obligations 
Regarding the nature of core obligations, it is useful to note the distinction between 
obligations of conduct and obligations of result.27 In General Comment 3 the Committee 
notes that Covenant obligations include both types of obligations.28 The Committee also 
identifies the obligation of progressive realisation of ESCRs as “[t]he principal obligation of 
result reflected in article 2(1)”,29 but it does not similarly specify what type of obligation 
minimum core obligations are. It therefore remains unclear “whether core obligations require 
a fixed set of outcomes or simply action reasonably capable of achieving such outcomes”.30 
In some cases, the Committee describes core obligations with reference to minimum 
essential levels or core content, indicating obligations of result. The Committee has, for 
example, required the provision of minimum essential levels of food,31 water32 and social 
security.33 There are, however, some core obligations that would fall within the realm of 
                                            
24 Chapman & Russell “Introduction” in Core Obligations: Building a Framework for ESCR 9. The authors also 
point out, however, that if these “minimum” obligations were actually fulfilled by all States Parties to the 
Covenant, “that would in many cases represent progress”. 
25 Forman, Caraoshi, Chapman & Lamprea (2016) International Journal of HR 536. 
26 This dissertation uses the terms “core obligations” and “minimum core obligations” interchangeably. 
27 See “The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1998) 20 HR 
Quarterly 691–704, para 7 in relation to the distinction between obligations of conduct and result. See also 
Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 184-196; Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 21. 
28 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 1. 
29 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 9. 
30 Forman, Caraoshi, Chapman & Lamprea (2016) International Journal of HR 537. 
31 CESCR General Comment No 12 para 6, 14 & 17; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 43(b); CESCR 
The World Food Crisis para 7-8; CESCR Duties of States towards Refugees and Migrants under the ICESCR 
para 9; CESCR Concluding Observations, Benin (9 June 2008) E/C12/BEN/CO/2 para 44; CESCR Concluding 
Observations, Kenya (1 December 2008) E/C12/KEN/CO/1 para 28; CESCR Concluding Observations, 
Angola (1 December 2008) E/C12/AGO/CO/3 para 29; CESCR Sudan (2015) para 50. 
32 CESCR General Comment No 15 para 37. See also para 44(c) & 56. 
33 CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59; CESCR Social Protection Floors para 8; CESCR Liechtenstein 
(2017) para 25; CESCR Uruguay (2017) para 30; CESCR Concluding Observations, Honduras (11 July 2016) 




obligations of conduct, such as the obligation to monitor the realisation of the rights to 
water34 and social security.35 In the absence of greater clarity from the Committee, it must 
be accepted that core obligations can be both obligations of result and obligations of 
conduct. Sepúlveda argues that the distinction has various drawbacks and proposes viewing 
Covenant obligations as a hybrid of both obligations of conduct and result. 36  For the 
purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to note that although the minimum core of ESCRs is 
often linked to specific minimum levels or entitlements (or results), this is not always the 
case. The core content of ESCRs is therefore not synonymous with minimum essential 
levels, but can also refer to the obligations of conduct related to the minimum core. 
States Parties are required to prioritise core obligations above non-core obligations. As 
General Comment 3 explains, a failure to meet core obligations on the basis of a lack of 
available resources must be justified by demonstrating that “every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations”.37 Chapman and Russell argue that this prioritisation is a question of 
timing rather than “some sort of hierarchy according to relative worth”.38 States Parties are 
required to meet their core obligations first. However, this does not mean that meeting core 
obligations is a prerequisite for taking steps in relation to non-core obligations. Where core 
obligations can be simultaneously pursued alongside medium- and long-term measures 
towards progressive realisation, this must be done.  
Tasioulas describes the minimum core doctrine as providing guidance on how to prioritise 
compliance with a range of human rights obligations.39 Core obligations can also assist in 
determining non-compliance with the Covenant.40 The Committee has reiterated the priority 
of core obligations on a number of occasions,41 including in its statement on the COVID-19 
pandemic where the Committee notes that “[i]n responding to the pandemic, the inherent 
dignity of all people must be respected and protected, and minimum core obligations 
imposed by the Covenant should be prioritized”.42  
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35 CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59(f). 
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37 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 10. 
38 Chapman & Russell “Introduction” in Core Obligations: Building a Framework for ESCR 9. 
39 Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 14.  
40 See Odello & Seatzu The UN Committee on ESCR 20. 
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Comment No 15 para 6; CESCR General Comment No 17 para 41; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 
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The priority of core obligations is also evident in the Committee’s description of these 
obligations as being of “immediate effect”.43 Tasioulas emphasises immediacy as a primary 
characteristic of the minimum core doctrine and argues that it “specifies a ground floor of 
immediate compliance with Covenant rights that binds all states”.44 This means that core 
obligations must not only be met first, but they should also be met immediately. The 
immediacy of core obligations indicates that these obligations are not subject to progressive 
realisation. The Committee’s position on this is, however, not entirely consistent.  
Despite references to a number of core obligations being of immediate effect,45 the 
Committee does not consistently refer to this immediacy in its general comments. A number 
of general comments describe core obligations and immediate obligations separately and 
do not explicitly describe core obligations as being of immediate effect.46 In addition to this, 
the Committee has, on at least one occasion, referred to the progressive realisation of core 
obligations.47 The latter reference appears to be an anomaly in the Committee’s work. 
Whether or not all core obligations are considered immediate obligations, it is clear that they 
must be prioritised and addressed before non-core obligations are pursued. Where such 
core obligations are not immediately met States Parties should, at the very least, be 
expected to provide convincing justification for this failure.48 It is important to reiterate that, 
in many instances, it is possible (and indeed necessary) for States Parties to pursue plans 
and policies for long-term progressive realisation while simultaneously attending to their core 
obligations. The immediacy of core obligations does not preclude States Parties from taking 
steps towards progressive realisation where this can be done without impeding realisation 
of the minimum core. 
                                            
43 CESCR General Comment No 13 para 43; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 30; CESCR General 
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obligations under articles 7, 9 and 11 of the Covenant”. 
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The Committee’s emphasis on international assistance and cooperation for the fulfilment 
of core obligations further underscores their priority. 49  While all obligations under the 
Covenant require a degree of international assistance and cooperation in line with article 
2(1), the Committee has stressed that “it is particularly incumbent on States parties, and 
other actors in a position to assist, to provide international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical which enables developing countries to fulfil their core 
obligations”.50 The Committee appreciates that, although meeting core obligations is a more 
attainable minimum for certain countries, many developing and least developed states will 
require assistance and cooperation to ensure that those same obligations are met 
worldwide.51 This also places an obligation on States Parties to actively seek assistance to 
meet their core obligations where they do not have the resources to do so themselves.52 
This international assistance and cooperation extends beyond the provision of resources. 
For example, in its 2018 concluding observations in relation to Germany, the Committee has 
recommended that the State Party exercise its leverage with international financial 
institutions to ensure that loan conditionalities do not lead to the violation of core 
obligations.53 
As a result of the priority of minimum core obligations, departure from these obligations 
is not permitted except in the strictest of circumstances.54 As the Committee established in 
General Comment 3, any State Party relying on resource constraints for a failure to meet its 
minimum core obligations “must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations”. 55  In this regard the Committee has indicated in its concluding 
observations that where there is sufficient economic growth to allow a State Party to meet 
its minimum core obligations, this must be done immediately.56 In addition, the Committee 
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has recommended that measures be taken to ensure that debt servicing does not reduce 
the public budget to the extent that minimum core obligations cannot be met.57 It is also 
important to note that a State Party cannot restrict minimum core obligations on the basis of 
nationality or legal status.58 The Committee has held that “[t]he essential minimum content 
of each right should be preserved in all circumstances and the corresponding duties 
extended to all people under the effective control of the State, without exception”.59 
The justification of retrogressive measures and limitations under article 4 of the Covenant 
both require compliance with minimum core obligations. 60  In relation to retrogressive 
measures, the Committee does provide for retrogression in certain circumstances and with 
a heavy burden of justification on States Parties.61 It is clear, however, that retrogressive 
measures cannot be justified if they are incompatible with the State Party’s core 
obligations.62 Minimum core obligations thus serve as a baseline below which States Parties 
are not permitted to regress.  
Limitations to the Covenant are provided for in article 4 and these are only permitted 
where they are “compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”.63 Müller argues that any limitation 
of minimum core obligations would go against the nature of the rights in the Covenant, 
particularly given the Committee’s rationale for minimum core obligations in General 
Comment 3.64 If a failure to establish minimum core obligations would deprive the Covenant 
of its “raison d’être”, then a limitation of those core obligations would be considered 
incompatible with the nature of ESCRs and therefore impermissible.65 Müller notes that, 
particularly in relation to subsistence rights, “it seems to be hardly ever possible to limit the 
minimum core without touching upon the very nature of the rights in question”.66 While a 
failure to meet minimum core obligations may technically be justified by a State Party with 
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reference to a lack of available resources,67 it is evident that this would require particularly 
severe constraints and extreme circumstances following every effort by the State Party to 
mobilise and secure domestic and international resources to meet its core obligations.68 
6 2 1 3 Determining the content of core obligations 
The content of core obligations has often been described by the Committee with reference 
to the minimum core content or minimum essential level of Covenant rights. As noted above, 
the core content of ESCRs can refer to the specific minimum essential levels or thresholds 
related to ESCRs. However, minimum core content can also refer to the obligations of 
conduct associated with individual ESCRs. In some cases the Committee also refers to a 
“social protection floor” which it considers akin to minimum core content.69 For example, in 
its concluding observations in relation to Ireland, the Committee recommended that the 
State Party “identify the minimum core content of the Covenant rights or a social protection 
floor and ensure the protection of this core content at all times”.70 In its statement on social 
protection floors the Committee also describes “the concept of social protection floors as a 
core obligation”.71 The precise nature of the relationship between social protection floors 
and minimum core content requires clarification. 
In order for States Parties to meet minimum core obligations, it is essential to establish 
the content of these obligations. Whether or not this minimum core content is relative (i.e. 
country-specific) or universal is a subject of debate.72 In some instances the Committee has 
directed individual States Parties to determine or identify the minimum core content of 
ESCRs, suggesting that there is a relative dimension to this content.73 The Committee’s 
general comments provide a degree of clarity regarding the nature of the core obligations, 
however, these are not explicit with regard to substantive and quantitative minimum levels.74  
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In the context of certain rights, the Committee has been more direct regarding the content 
of core obligations than with other rights. In relation to the right to adequate food, for 
example, the Committee has affirmed that States Parties are required to ensure access to 
the minimum essential level of food necessary to ensure freedom from hunger.75 Although 
less frequently referenced, the Committee has also held that the right to water obliges States 
Parties to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water “that is sufficient and 
safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease”. 76  The Committee has also 
regularly referred to the minimum core content of social security benefits, requiring a 
minimum essential level of benefits.77 The standard or level of benefits required has been 
described in relation to subsistence; 78 coverage for major life risks;79 access to health 
services and income security;80 and the minimum level of benefits necessary “to acquire at 
least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, food and the 
most basic forms of education”.81 Of course it will be clear from the above that even these 
more explicit descriptions of minimum core content do not provide precise quantitative levels 
which are universally applicable. The Committee thus provides room for individual States 
Parties to prescribe appropriate minimum essential levels for their specific contexts 
according to the standards set out in its general comments.  
Determining the parameters of the minimum core continues to be a subject of debate, 
perhaps most comprehensively examined in the work of Katherine Young. 82  Young 
describes three distinct approaches to the minimum core: the essence approach; the 
consensus approach; and the obligations approach. 83  The essence approach can be 
described as the search for an essential minimum which links the core elements of a right 
to a foundational norm.84 The consensus approach views the minimum core as the “agreed-
upon nucleus” of the relevant right.85 The third approach to minimum core content is not, as 
Young explains, an alternative to the essence and consensus approaches, but “it relies on, 
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and incorporates, these justifications within its assessment of obligation”.86 Young ultimately 
argues that all three approaches to the minimum core are problematic and that the functions 
of the minimum core may be better served by other approaches, including the use of 
indicators and benchmarks and limitations on rights.87 Despite these and other criticisms of 
the minimum core approach to ESCRs,88 it is clear from its general comments that the 
Committee supports an approach to the Covenant which includes the delineation of core 
obligations.89 Precisely how the minimum core content or obligations are determined is less 
evident from the doctrine of the Committee. 
Another relevant criticism relates to the characterisation of minimum core content or 
obligations as the “floor” of ESCRs. The concept of the minimum core is a minimalist strategy 
to draw attention to the most severe material deprivation.90 While this emphasis on the 
minimum or floor of ESCRs is important and necessary, many have pointed out the risk that 
“the ‘floor’ will become a ‘ceiling’”.91 In other words, the focus on the bare minimum required 
by core obligations may cause States Parties to lower their objectives and become 
complacent once these minimum obligations are met. This could lead to complacency and 
disregard for State obligations that are regarded as falling within the realm of non-core 
duties, but are nevertheless essential for the full realisation of the relevant rights.92 This 
criticism cautions against an exclusive focus on minimum core obligations that loses sight 
of progressive realisation. Core obligations are an important point of departure, but they 
must be followed by the active pursuit of progressive realisation.93 Successfully meeting the 
core obligations does not absolve a State Party from the obligation to pursue the full 
realisation of ESCRs “as expeditiously and effectively as possible”.94 
                                            
86 Young (2008) Yale Journal of International Law 151. 
87 Young (2008) Yale Journal of International Law 164-170. See also Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 30-
32; Forman, Caraoshi, Chapman & Lamprea (2016) International Journal of HR 538. 
88 See, for example, Forman, Caraoshi, Chapman & Lamprea (2016) International Journal of HR 538-540. 
89 See CESCR General Comment No 12 para 6 & 8; CESCR General Comment No 13 para 57; CESCR 
General Comment No 14 para 43; CESCR General Comment No 15 para 37; CESCR General Comment No 
17 para 39; CESCR General Comment No 18 para 31; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 59; 
CESCR General Comment No 21 para 55; CESCR General Comment No 22 para 49; CESCR General 
Comment No 23 para 65; CESCR General Comment No 25 para 52. 
90 Young (2008) Yale Journal of International Law 113-114. 
91  Chapman & Russell “Introduction” in Core Obligations: Building a Framework for ESCR 9; Forman, 
Caraoshi, Chapman & Lamprea (2016) International Journal of HR 536. See also Odello & Seatzu The UN 
Committee on ESCR 20; Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 28-29. 
92 Chapman & Russell “Introduction” in Core Obligations: Building a Framework for ESCR 9; Tasioulas 
Minimum Core Obligations 15; Odello & Seatzu The UN Committee on ESCR 20. 
93 CESCR Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (10 May 2001) 
E/C12/2001/10 para 18; CESCR Social Protection Floors para 10. See also Ssenyonjo (2011) IJHR 978; 
Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations under the ICESCR 369; Tasioulas Minimum Core Obligations 29. 
94 CESCR General Comment No 13 para 44; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 31; CESCR General 




The core obligations in respect of ESCRs serve an important function in providing a 
necessary baseline for States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant. This ensures that 
States Parties do not invoke the flexibility of progressive realisation in order to avoid their 
Covenant obligations. Minimum core obligations also provide a point of departure for the 
prioritisation of various ESCR-related obligations due to their immediate nature and their 
prioritised position in relation to retrogressive measures and article 4 limitations. As 
discussed above, there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding the precise scope and 
content of minimum core obligations which requires further clarification. The following 
section examines the integration of environmental considerations within core obligations 
under the Covenant arguing that the core of ESCRs is reliant on a healthy environment and 
natural resources. 
6 2 2  Core obligations and the principles of IEL 
Environmental considerations are fundamental to the ability of States Parties to meet their 
core obligations. The core of ESCRs is dependent on a safe and healthy environment, and 
protection of the environment and natural resources is therefore integral to realising the 
minimum core of Covenant rights.95 The minimum core of the rights to food and water, for 
example, cannot be realised if the natural resources of soil and water are polluted and 
contaminated beyond repair. 96  In accordance with the principle of sustainable 
development,97 it is therefore essential to integrate environmental considerations within 
measures aimed at realising the minimum core. A failure to do so will put the core of ESCRs 
and basic subsistence at risk from the impacts of climate change and environmental 
degradation.  
Many of the above recommendations and observations require a degree of clarity 
regarding the content of the minimum core. This is certainly an area that warrants further 
research. In addition to the scope and parameters of core obligations as a whole, it is also 
recommended that a baseline is established for the minimum environmental conditions 
necessary in order to realise Covenant rights. States Parties’ core obligations under the 
Covenant must include an obligation to maintain and protect these minimum environmental 
conditions required to meet core obligations. This environmental dimension of the minimum 
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core doctrine could be described as the inverse of the “ecological ceiling” described by 
Raworth in relation to the concept of doughnut economics.98 In contrast to delineating the 
ecological ceiling or planetary boundaries 99  which must not be transgressed, these 
minimum environmental conditions would demarcate the baseline environmental conditions 
that all States Parties must protect in order to guarantee their ability to meet minimum core 
obligations as required by the Covenant. It is recommended that States Parties identify and 
demarcate these baseline environmental conditions individually and in cooperation with 
other States Parties in order to safeguard these minimum environmental conditions at a 
local, regional and international level. 
Any appropriate prioritisation of the minimum core requires the prioritisation of the 
environmental base on which ESCRs depend. Environmental decision-making should 
therefore be guided by the minimum core so as to prioritise environmental protection for 
ecosystems and natural resources on which the core of ESCRs depend.  
The doctrine of the minimum core underscores the priority and urgency of ensuring that 
core obligations towards the current generation are met. In the context of the Covenant, the 
principle of intergenerational equity does not alter this. The priority for States Parties remains 
with their immediate core obligations. However, the principle of intergenerational equity 
suggests that, wherever possible, measures that protect the environment for future 
generations while meeting core obligations must be taken. Such measures must always be 
preferred over measures that meet core obligations at the expense of the environment and 
future generations. Where there is a threat to the ability of States Parties to meet their core 
obligations in future, this should be addressed with relative urgency, considering the priority 
of core obligations over other obligations of progressive realisation. 
Turning to the principle of intragenerational equity, the obligation of international 
assistance and cooperation requires States Parties to act in order to ensure core obligations 
are met where they are threatened in other jurisdictions as a result of environmental 
degradation and climate change. Given the widespread and global nature of climate change 
impacts, and their disproportionate impact on the poor and on the global south, the obligation 
of international assistance and cooperation necessitates concrete action for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in order to safeguard the realisation of minimum core content by 
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all States Parties to the Covenant. The principle of CBDR underscores this need for 
international assistance and cooperation. Where climate change is concerned, States 
Parties that are able to comfortably meet core obligations must assist other States Parties 
struggling to meet their core obligations. This is particularly relevant where the former States 
Parties have substantially contributed to climate change, and the latter are unable to meet 
core obligations as a direct result of the impacts of climate change. 
Similarly, considering the no-harm principle100 suggests that States Parties responsible 
for environmental harm affecting the minimum core of ESCRs in other jurisdictions must 
provide the necessary assistance and cooperation in order to protect the relevant ESCRs 
and to remedy the environmental damage caused. 101  In taking measures to address 
transboundary harm, States Parties should treat environmental impacts on minimum core 
obligations with the necessary urgency and priority. 
Where there is potential future risk to the realisation of core obligations as a result of 
environmental harm, the preventive principle underscores the need to take measures to 
prevent such harm rather than to attempt to rectify it after the fact.102 Failure to address such 
environmental harm timeously and in accordance with the preventive principle may result in 
a violation of core obligations. In order to give effect to the preventive principle, and to protect 
the core of ESCRs where an environmental threat exists, resources will be required to 
secure and maintain the minimum core content of ESCRs. Decisions regarding the 
allocation of such resources to environmental protection will need to take into account the 
level of risk and the likelihood and severity of potential impacts on the minimum core. In line 
with the precautionary principle, a lack of certainty regarding these impacts must not excuse 
inaction where the potential harm will violate the minimum core content of ESCRs. While the 
precautionary principle can also be applied to other aspects of ESCRs, the standard of 
caution must be higher where the minimum core is at risk, particular where there are threats 
to basic subsistence. In other words, a particular activity that may yield significant socio-
economic benefits cannot be justified if it poses an environmental risk (albeit uncertain) 
resulting in harm to core obligations or basic subsistence needs. Particular caution must be 
exercised, for example, where any ecosystem or environmental function integral to meeting 
core obligations is threatened. 
                                            
100 In relation to the no-harm principle, see Chapter 4, 4 3 2 2 2. 
101 On the relationship between core obligations and international assistance and cooperation, see CESCR 
General Comment No 8 para 7; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 45; CESCR General Comment No 15 
para 38; CESCR General Comment No 17 para 40; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 61; CESCR 
General Comment No 25 para 51. 




A failure to require the protection of the most basic conditions necessary for the realisation 
of the core of ESCRs, is a failure to ensure that the Covenant is effective in realising ESCRs 
both now and in the future. Any such core environmental obligation would require further 
investigation in order to determine the appropriate scope and content of the minimum 
environmental conditions necessary for the core of ESCRs. However, the guidance of the 
principles of IEL analysed in Chapter 4 is a useful starting point. Ultimately, the urgency and 
priority afforded to minimum core obligations under the Covenant, must also be applied to 
protecting the environmental conditions on which such obligations depend, and to 
preventing harm posed by environmental degradation and climate change. Any effective 
measures to meet core obligations for all States Parties must also include the international 
assistance and cooperation required by the Covenant. Any interpretation of the Covenant 
that is effective in protecting individual rights holders and that evolves appropriately 
according to current circumstances, must protect the environmental base on which the most 
basic core of ESCRs relies.103 
6 3 Progressive realisation 
6 3 1 Introduction  
Article 2(1) requires States Parties to the Covenant to take steps to the maximum of their 
available resources “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in [the Covenant]”. The Committee describes progressive realisation as a 
“necessary flexibility device” that allows States Parties to act in accordance with their 
capabilities and level of development.104 The Committee has explained that progressive 
realisation should not be interpreted so as to deprive article 2(1) of “all meaningful 
content”.105 The Committee has also stressed that despite the reference to progressive 
realisation in article 2(1), States Parties have immediate obligations in relation to Covenant 
rights.106 Progressive realisation “means that States parties have a specific and continuing 
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obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization” 
of the relevant right.107 This formulation underscores the fact that progressive realisation 
requires ongoing progress in realising ESCRs and that this progress should be pursued 
without delay.  
Progressive realisation therefore does not mean that States Parties “may infinitely 
postpone taking action”.108 Instead it requires States Parties to take deliberate, concrete and 
targeted steps,109 within a reasonably short period of time,110 towards the realisation of 
ESCRs. The steps required for progressive realisation cover a range of categories, including 
legislative, administrative, financial, educational and social measures.111 States Parties are 
also required to “monitor the realisation of ESC rights and to devise appropriate strategies 
and clearly defined programmes […] for their implementation”.112 In General Comment 1 the 
Committee affirms that States Parties are required to “work out and adopt a detailed plan of 
action for progressive realisation”.113 
An obligation to plan for the progressive realisation of ESCRs necessarily requires a 
forward-looking view of the realisation of Covenant rights. Ensuring the effective progressive 
realisation of ESCRs therefore requires a perspective that takes future needs into account. 
Although it is analysed in more detail below, it is important to note here that the duty to avoid 
retrogression implies that ESCRs must be maintained into the future and that temporary 
gains in the realisation of ESCRs are insufficient for compliance with the Covenant. 114 
Dowell-Jones argues that article 2(1) includes the principle that “[o]bjectives set must not be 
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such as to detrimentally impact the future ability of the State to implement the Covenant”.115 
In order for States Parties to ensure effective progressive realisation and avoid 
retrogression, the measures taken under article 2(1) must include a future-oriented 
perspective and long-term strategies for the sustained realisation of ESCRs. 
While progressive realisation includes a host of significant immediate and short-term 
obligations, this chapter focuses on the long-term effectiveness of measures taken towards 
progressive realisation. This temporal aspect of progressive realisation is particularly 
important for the integration of environmental considerations as well as for the rights of future 
generations. Environmental harm often has significant long-term or irreversible impacts, and 
these impacts may only materialise well after the catalysing harmful conduct or activity.116 
A forward-looking perspective of the progressive realisation of ESCRs is therefore essential 
for long-term environmental protection and for safeguarding ESCRs against environmental 
threats. 
The section below investigates temporality in the Covenant with an emphasis on 
examining how the Committee has dealt with the long-term and future-oriented dimension 
of progressive realisation, including through its references to sustainability. This is followed 
by an analysis of long-term environmental concerns in the Committee’s work and the 
potential role of sustainability in supporting an integration of environmental considerations 
and progressive realisation. The position of future generations and the relevance of their 
rights in the pursuit of progressive realisation is then addressed. 
6 3 2 Progressive realisation and temporality in the Covenant 
Hiskes argues that “[r]ights are very future-oriented things” and points out the “conceptual 
closeness of rights and promises”, drawing attention to the forward-looking nature of both.117 
This orientation towards the future is particularly evident in relation to ESCRs and the long-
term dimensions of the concept of progressive realisation. It is clear from the work of the 
Committee that a forward-looking view of ESCRs, including the adoption of plans and 
strategies for progressive realisation, does not mean that State Parties are permitted to 
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indefinitely delay action to realise Covenant rights.118 As noted above, the obligation to 
continuously improve conditions has been described by the Committee as an obligation to 
move “as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realisation of Covenant 
rights.119 This progress requires movement towards the full enjoyment of ESCRs, and such 
movement is necessarily fixed in time. While the speed at which progressive realisation 
should occur is described as “expeditious”, there are few fixed time frames attached to the 
realisation of ESCRs.120 One notable exception to this is article 14 of the Covenant which 
requires States Parties “to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action” within two years for 
the progressive realisation of the right to primary education “within a reasonable number of 
years”.121 Aside from this reference to a specified time-frame, in relation to other ESCRs 
States Parties are simply required to take “deliberate, concrete and targeted steps”122 within 
a reasonably short period. 123  On numerous occasions the Committee has also 
recommended that States Parties set their own time-frames for the progressive realisation 
of Covenant rights through time-bound benchmarks or targets.124 As noted above, there are 
also certain obligations that the Committee requires States Parties to meet immediately.125  
Immediate obligations are those obligations that are not subject to the qualifications of 
progressive realisation or maximum available resources and require “immediate 
implementation in full”.126 These immediate obligations must be met by all States Parties 
regardless of their respective levels of development, and this should be done without 
delay. 127  Notable immediate obligations include the obligation to take steps and the 
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obligation to guarantee the rights in the Covenant without discrimination.128 Minimum core 
obligations are also described by the Committee as being of “immediate effect”.129 Each of 
the rights in part III of the Covenant requires States Parties to take both immediate and 
progressive measures to meet their Covenant obligations.130 
As Young notes, both immediate and progressive obligations necessitate a degree of 
delay, whether that is the time it takes to accumulate and mobilise necessary resources; the 
time it takes to enact relevant legislation; or the time taken to develop a strategy or plan of 
action for the realisation of a right.131 Although these obligations could be distinguished 
according to their immediate or progressive nature, both forms of obligation necessitate the 
passage of a certain amount of time. In this regard Alston and Quinn note the “artificiality of 
the idealized way in which the immediate/progressive distinction is often portrayed”. 132 
Young also asserts that this overlap between immediate and progressive obligations 
problematises any distinction between ESCRs and civil and political rights which suggests 
that the latter are able to be realised immediately and do not involve any delays. 133 
Regardless of the degree of time required, it is clear that, at the very least, the obligations 
identified as immediate obligations by the Committee must be met as a matter of urgency. 
It is therefore evident that time has an important role to play in progressive realisation and 
the concept of progress in relation to ESCRs. In order to ensure progressive realisation over 
the long term, States Parties must have a forward-looking perspective in planning future 
measures for realising ESCRs as well as in implementing more immediate measures that 
may only have an impact at a later stage. For many ESCRs, a sustained increase in 
enjoyment requires structural changes to laws, policies, institutions or infrastructure. As such 
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structural changes cannot occur overnight, many ESCRs will, by their nature, necessitate 
measures taken with a long-term perspective.134  
Düwell and Bos argue that many elements of human rights are inherently “future-
oriented”, noting that “[h]uman rights protect the individual’s capacity for future-oriented 
action and the realization of long-term plans”.135 The authors cite the examples of the right 
to education which aims to enhance future opportunities for children and, in an implicit 
reference to the right to culture, the “possibility that entire cultures can perpetuate 
themselves in the future”.136 Shue similarly suggests that many large-scale and long-term 
projects require the efforts of multiple generations, and that “in many respects the future and 
its people are dependent on those of us alive now”.137 He notes, for example, that “a single 
generation cannot build a great university” or a thriving economy.138 The structural and 
institutional changes necessary to realise most ESCRs require progressive realisation that 
incorporates long-term strategies and aims to realise ESCRs both now and in the future. 
Many examples of this long-term dimension of ESCRs and of progressive realisation can 
be found in the Committee’s work. In its concluding observations, the Committee has 
recommended long-term strategies in relation to housing; 139 combatting poverty;140 and 
finding solutions to unemployment.141 The Committee has also noted the sustained long-
term efforts required in order to change attitudes regarding xenophobia and racism,142 as 
well as gender discrimination.143 This forward-looking perspective is particularly evident in 
relation to the Committee’s approach to children and the right to education. The Committee 
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has often emphasised the role of education in enhancing the future prospects and future 
well-being of children.144  
In addition to the above, the concept of sustainability is often used by the Committee to 
indicate a consistent and long-term realisation of rights.145 In order for programmes related 
to ESCRs to be considered sustainable, they should be capable of maintaining a certain 
level of enjoyment over the long term without an interruption or reduction in respect of the 
realisation of the relevant right (i.e. without retrogression). It is important to note that the 
Committee’s use of “sustainability” does not necessarily relate to the environment or 
sustainable development. While this dissertation argues that maintaining sustainable 
systems and programmes for the progressive realisation of ESCRs does necessitate 
incorporating environmental considerations, it is not always clear that this is the Committee’s 
intention when using the term “sustainability”. From the context it seems that by 
“sustainability” the Committee usually means to refer to the ability of a particular measure to 
be sustained over a long period. In any event, the references to sustainability confirm that 
the Committee supports a long-term view of ESCRs and requires States Parties to continue 
to maintain (or improve on) certain levels of enjoyment of ESCRs. This is also supported by 
the duty to avoid retrogressive measures.146 
In relation to economic and financial sustainability, it is useful to note the impacts that 
unsustainable approaches can have on future generations.147 For example, in relation to the 
use of sovereign bond markets, Dowell-Jones warns that “extending future claims without 
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an adequate plan for funding them” potentially violates article 2(1).148 She notes that States 
Parties that rely too heavily on sovereign bond markets to fund ESCRs: 
“[H]ave effectively mortgaged the rights of future generations to enjoy their socio-economic 
rights in order to satisfy the socio-economic rights of the current generation, as the debt will 
have to be repaid by future tax-payers”.149 
It evident that unsustainable approaches to the environment have a similar effect of 
mortgaging the rights of future generations, placing the burden on them to bear the burden 
of damage done and resources depleted by the current generation.150 
In its concluding observations and general comments, the Committee has often referred 
to the sustainability of social security as well as the sustainability of the financial institutions 
on which social security depends. 151  Similarly, the Committee has recommended that 
strategies to create jobs and combat unemployment are sustainable.152 More directly related 
to environmental considerations is the Committee’s call for sustainable strategies in relation 
to agriculture and the realisation of the right to food.153 Referring to the sustainability of all 
ESCRs, the Committee’s 2019 statement on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
refers to “the importance of ensuring that rights are fulfilled through methods that are 
sustainable so as to ensure that the rights are secured both for present and future 
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generations”.154 Any truly sustainable approaches to ESCRs will have to take environmental 
considerations into account, and it is therefore recommended that future references to 
sustainability are more explicit in this regard. In some instances, the Committee’s references 
to sustainability are more explicitly linked to the environment. These examples are examined 
further below.155 
At this point it is useful to note that the forward-looking and future-oriented dimension of 
progressive realisation discussed above by no means precludes the use of short-term 
measures. The requirement to move as “expeditiously” as possible certainly implies that 
States Parties must realise ESCRs in the shortest time possible.156 Some circumstances 
will therefore require immediate intervention through means which may not be sustainable 
over the long term. However, the obligation of progressive realisation demands that States 
Parties develop strategies that consider, in addition to these immediate needs, how ESCRs 
can be sustained, and improved upon, into the future.  
It is therefore clear that the Committee is in support of a long-term and forward-looking 
view of the progressive realisation of ESCRs. However, as noted above, the Committee’s 
references to sustainability are not consistently linked to environmental considerations, and 
its limited references to future generations are similarly not always connected to the 
environment. Progressive realisation in article 2(1) must be interpreted to require the 
integration of environmental considerations in long-term measures taken by States Parties 
in order to ensure that ESCRs can continue to be progressively realised for present and 
future generations. Such an interpretation would be an appropriate evolution of the 
Covenant as a living instrument adapting to present-day challenges and conditions.157 The 
following section examines such an interpretation of progressive realisation and the 
Covenant by considering the position of the environment and future generations from a 
sustainable and forward-looking perspective. 
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6 3 3 A forward-looking perspective: Considering the environment and future generations 
under the Covenant 
6 3 3 1 The Committee’s current approach to long-term environmental harm and 
sustainability 
The progressive realisation of ESCRs is inextricably linked to the health of the 
environment.158 Environmental degradation and climate change will lead to significant harm 
to ESCRs unless urgent action is taken to guarantee the realisation of ESCRs now and in 
the future. The long-term and future-oriented dimension of ESCRs discussed above requires 
the appropriate regard for environmental considerations and the position of future 
generations in the realisation of ESCRs. Riley argues that the “delivery of human rights in 
good faith prohibits partial or token fulfilment of the rights and requires their sustainable 
delivery into the future”.159 A failure to consider the environment, as well as its impact on 
future generations, will result in ESCRs that cannot be sustained into the future and 
therefore cannot be progressively realised. This section discusses how the Committee has 
dealt with long-term environmental concerns and demonstrates that a future-oriented view 
of the Covenant and of progressive realisation must incorporate the environment in order to 
be effective. The position of future generations is discussed further below.160 
As noted above, the environment and future generations are not always included by the 
Committee as relevant to a long-term and forward-looking view of progressive realisation, 
even where the term sustainability is used.161 However, there are a number of occasions 
where the Committee has clearly recognised the long-term nature of environmental impacts 
and considerations, and has required States Parties to take action in this regard. 
At this point it is useful to note the distinction between sustainable development and 
sustainability. As a concept, sustainability can be seen as broadly related to sustainable 
development. Unfortunately, sustainability is vaguer and more open to interpretation than 
sustainable development. The term “sustainability” is often used to refer to the longevity of 
certain approaches in relation to their ability to limit environmental harm and ensure the 
continued existence of a healthy environment and access to natural resources. However, 
the term can also be used to refer to longevity outside of the environmental context, which 
can even be in conflict with environmental sustainability. In some cases, measures taken to 
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secure economic sustainability may, for example, rely on environmentally harmful activities 
and be in conflict with the pursuit of environmental sustainability. Given this ambiguity it is 
recommended that the Committee define its understanding of sustainability and apply it 
consistently in order to ensure that the language of sustainability is not used to promote 
environmentally unsustainable approaches that ultimately threaten the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs.162 
While many of the Committee’s references to sustainability do not suggest a particular 
environmental perspective, there are some clear references to environmental sustainability 
in the Committee’s work. Most notably, General Comment 15 not only relies on 
sustainability, but also provides further definition for the term. In a footnote the Committee 
refers to the outcomes of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (“Rio Conference”) namely the Rio Declaration 163  and Agenda 21, for a 
“definition of sustainability”.164 The relevant principles in the Rio Declaration referred to by 
the Committee include: the centrality of human beings in sustainable development; 
sustainable production and consumption; appropriate exchange of science and technology; 
participation and access to information; international cooperation to address environmental 
problems; and the precautionary approach to the prevention of environmental 
degradation.165 While the principles of the Rio Declaration have broad application, the more 
detailed and particular references to Agenda 21 in the context of the Committee’s definition 
of “sustainability” indicate that this definition is intended specifically for the right to water. 
The General Comment also requires international assistance for the realisation of the right 
to water to be sustainable, noting a particular responsibility on “economically developed 
States parties” in this regard.166 
In General Comment 12 on the right to food, the Committee describes sustainability as 
“intrinsically linked to the notion of adequate food or food security, implying food being 
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accessible for both present and future generations”.167 The adequacy of food is connected 
to climatic and ecological conditions, while sustainability is described as incorporating “long-
term availability and accessibility”.168 The Committee thus understands that the long-term 
and progressive realisation of the right to adequate food is connected to environmental 
considerations and emphasises that States Parties should ensure “the most sustainable 
management and use of natural and other resources for food”.169 In its statement regarding 
the world food crisis, the Committee also notes that strategies to combat climate change 
should not negatively affect the right to food, but should “promote sustainable agriculture”.170 
The environmental sustainability of approaches to the right to food are integrally linked to 
the progressive realisation of the right. The Committee has expressed concern regarding 
the long-term realisation of the right to food in its concluding observations where it has 
recommended the promotion of “environmentally sustainable eating habits”;171 long-term 
strategies for sustainable food production;172 and building the resilience of agriculture to 
environmental shocks.173 The Committee has also expressed concern regarding the “long-
lasting and hazardous impact” of the use of herbicides on the soil and the productivity of 
crops in Gaza, recommending an assessment of the impact of such activities on livelihoods, 
health, food security and the environment.174 On the basis of the precautionary principle the 
Committee also recommended that the spraying of herbicides cease while the relevant 
impact assessment is conducted.175 The Committee recognises that the right to adequate 
food cannot be realised into the future if methods to realise the right are not environmentally 
sustainable. 
The Committee has also expressed concern regarding future impacts and threats to 
ESCRs from environmental harm which should be prevented in order to ensure progressive 
realisation of Covenant rights. This is evident in the Committee’s statement on climate 
change which is largely concerned with the vast extent of future risks, although it recognises 
that ESCRs are already being affected by climate change.176 The Committee notes that 
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climate change will affect a number of ESCRs “at an increasing pace in the future”.177 In its 
statement in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Committee also urges States Parties 
to promote scientific research “to learn lessons and increase preparedness for possible 
pandemics in the future”. 178  This confirms that the Committee is concerned with the 
continued realisation of the Covenant over time, encouraging appropriate preparation and 
present-day action in order to address risks and impacts that have not yet materialised.  
In its concluding observations the Committee has recommended that States Parties take 
action to prevention the future occurrence of harm, particularly where such harm has already 
occurred in the past. For example, in response to damage to homes resulting from gas 
extractions in the Netherlands, the Committee recommended the State Party take measures 
not only to remedy the damage done, but to “prevent future occurrences of damages related 
to gas extractions”.179 Similarly, in relation to a waste management crisis in Lebanon, the 
Committee recommended that the State Party take measures “to prevent future waste 
management crises, in view of their potentially hazardous impact on health”.180 In the latter 
case the Committee also recommended investment in infrastructure for water and sanitation 
as well as the independent monitoring of the provision of water, sanitation and waste 
management services.181 In relation to Gambia the Committee proposed planning for future 
environmental impacts when it recommended that the State Party “[a]dopt effective 
measures to address the adverse impact of changes in rainfall patterns on the right to 
adequate housing”.182 It is clear then, that the progressive realisation of ESCRs over the 
long term necessitates a future-oriented view that will invariably implicate environmental 
factors. In a number of instances this long-term perspective has also expressly included the 
consideration of future generations.  
In order for the realisation and enjoyment of ESCRs to be maintained, and even improved, 
over the long-term it is essential to consider the environmental dimensions and sustainability 
of measures taken by States Parties. The failure to do so will likely lead to unsustainable 
practices and policies that undermine efforts to realise ESCRs by resulting in retrogression 
or backwards steps. 183  While the Committee’s references to sustainability have been 
somewhat inconsistent, a more deliberate application of the concept combined with a clearer 
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definition is vital for incorporating environmental considerations within the long-term 
planning required by progressive realisation.  
The work of the former Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water 
and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque demonstrates how sustainability is related to the 
notion of progressive realisation. In 2013 the Special Rapporteur submitted a report to the 
UN Human Rights Council focusing on “sustainability in realizing the human rights to water 
and sanitation”.184 The report emphasises the importance of sustainability for human rights, 
particularly in relation to progressive realisation.185 The report describes sustainability as 
intimately connected to progressive realisation: 
“In order for services to be sustainable, they must be available and accessible to everyone on 
a continuous and predictable basis, without discrimination. There must be ‘permanent 
beneficial change’ that flows from quality services and sustained behavioural change, or, in 
human rights terms, progressive realization towards fully realizing the human rights to water 
and sanitation for everyone. Once services and facilities have been improved, the positive 
change must be maintained and slippages or retrogression must be avoided. Services must 
be available for present and future generations and the provision of services today should not 
compromise the ability of future generations to realize the human rights to water and 
sanitation”.186 
In this description the Special Rapporteur’s understanding of sustainability has significant 
overlap with progressive realisation. The distinction is perhaps that progressive realisation 
has often focused on the need to continuously improve, while sustainability seeks to 
continuously maintain provision of services, ensuring that any improvements can be 
sustained over the long term. The Special Rapporteur’s report is critical of approaches that 
incentivise quick solutions that are unsustainable. 187  Sustainability is described by the 
Special Rapporteur as: a human rights principle grounded in sustainable development;188 
“a direct counterpart to retrogression”;189 entailing respect for the natural environment and 
a balance of economic and social dimensions; 190 and requiring strategic planning that 
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includes ongoing risk assessment, financing services and systems across their full life 
cycle,191 as well as accountable governance.192  
The Special Rapporteur demonstrates how environmental considerations can be 
integrated into the interpretation of progressive realisation through emphasising the need to 
ensure that the realisation of ESCRs is effective and sustained over the long term. Adopting 
a clear and comprehensive framework for sustainability as a “human rights principle 
fundamental to the realization of human rights” and “non-dissociable from human rights law” 
is a potentially valuable mechanism to support progressive realisation in the Covenant.193  
Progressive realisation in article 2(1) must be interpreted in light of current environmental 
crises and challenges to sustainable development. An appropriately effective and evolutive 
interpretation of progressive realisation must include the integration of environmental 
considerations, of which sustainability is an integral part. The long-term and future-oriented 
dimension of progressive realisation and the environment also requires the consideration 
future generations who are often the most vulnerable to environmental degradation and the 
impacts of climate change. The position of future generations in the progressive realisation 
of Covenant rights is considered below. 
6 3 3 2 The place of future generations under the Covenant 
The conscious integration of environmental considerations within the Covenant has 
inevitable benefits for future generations who would suffer the consequences of climate 
change and long-term environmental degradation. 194  Future generations are therefore 
implicit in long-term measures towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs, particularly in 
relation to the environment. The section below examines the Committee’s current references 
to future generations and their position under the Covenant. Following this, the potential for 
the explicit recognition of future generations’ rights is investigated, with reference to 
philosophical and theoretical approaches in this regard as well as to the interpretation of the 
Covenant. The latter investigation is split in two, first exploring possibilities for the recognition 
of future generations under the Covenant, and secondly exploring possibilities for the scope 
of obligations towards future generations. 
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6 3 3 2 1  The Committee’s current approach to future generations 
One of the earliest references to future generations by the Committee appears in General 
Comment 12 in relation to the right to food. As noted above, this general comment refers to 
sustainability as “intrinsically linked to the notion of adequate food or food security, implying 
food being accessible for both present and future generations”.195 Further in relation to the 
right to food, the Committee’s statement in the context of the Rio+20 conference emphasises 
the obligation of States Parties to “avoid adverse environmental effects on the right to food”, 
noting the adverse impacts of land grabbing and overexploitation of fisheries which “gravely 
affect the livelihood of present and future generations”.196 General Comment 12 therefore 
establishes that the Committee deems the livelihoods of future generations as worthy of 
consideration in the context of the realisation of ESCRs.  
General Comment 15 on the right to water similarly affirms a link between adequacy and 
sustainability, requiring the realisation of the right “for present and future generations”.197 
The right to water also places an obligation on States Parties to adopt strategies and 
programmes to ensure that there is “sufficient and safe water for present and future 
generations”.198 It is clear that the Committee envisages environmental considerations as 
integral to such strategies and programmes as it makes explicit reference to “reducing 
depletion of water resources through unsustainable extraction, diversion and damming”; 
“reducing and eliminating contamination of watersheds and water-related ecosystems”; and 
“assessing the impacts of actions that may impinge upon water availability and natural-
ecosystems watersheds, such as climate change, desertification and increased soil salinity, 
deforestation and loss of biodiversity”.199 Securing the right to water for future generations 
therefore must include environmental protection. The former Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque affirmed the 
relationship between sustainability and future generations, and noted that the provision of 
water and sanitation services must be ensured for present and future generations.200 
In other contexts, the relationship between future generations and the environment is less 
evident. In General Comment 19 the Committee mentions future generations in the context 
of the right to social security, requiring States Parties to ensure that schemes to implement 
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the right are sustainable “in order to ensure that the right can be realized for present and 
future generations”.201 General Comment 21 recognises the relationship between cultural 
rights and future generations, and places an obligation on States Parties to respect and 
protect cultural heritage by ensuring it is “preserved, developed, enriched and transmitted 
to future generations”.202 Although these examples do not refer to environmental concerns, 
they do serve to support the argument that future generations are a relevant consideration 
in respect of ESCRs. 
In General Comment 25 the Committee requires the use of the precautionary principle 
where an action or policy “may lead to unacceptable harm to the public or the environment”, 
noting that such harm includes harm that is inequitable to present or future generations.203 
This is particularly significant for understanding intergenerational equity in the context of the 
Covenant as it suggests that the burden of activities undertaken today must be equitably 
distributed between present and future generations. It also suggests a responsibility on the 
present generation to take precautionary action to prevent potentially severe environmental 
harm. 204 Referring more broadly to methods of implementing ESCRs, the Committee’s 
statement in respect of the 2030 Agenda notes the obligation on States Parties to ensure 
that sustainable methods are used to fulfil ESCRs in order to “ensure that the rights are 
secured both for present and future generations”. 205  This once again affirms that the 
realisation of ESCRs for future generations should, at the very least, be a relevant 
consideration in States Parties’ pursuit of the progressive realisation of Covenant rights. 
References to future generations in the Committee’s concluding observations are rare. In 
recent years, in relation to fracking and extractive activities, the Committee’s concluding 
observations in respect of both Ecuador and Argentina have noted with concern the negative 
impact of these activities on climate change and “on the enjoyment of economic and social 
rights by the world’s population and future generations”.206 Here the Committee illustrates 
that environmental impacts from these activities are relevant not only for the State Party’s 
population, but for the population of the world, including future generations. This indicates a 
growing appreciation by the Committee for the wide reach of environmental impacts across 
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space and time, and therefore the need for these to be considered in measures to 
progressively realise ESCRs. 
While the Committee does not explicitly recognise the rights of future generations, it is 
evident that it views future generations as a relevant consideration for the realisation of 
Covenant rights. The section below investigates how future generations can be recognised 
under the Covenant. 
6 3 3 2 2  Recognising future generations under the Covenant 
This section reflects on how the recognition of future generations’ rights under the 
Covenant can be understood. It begins with an examination of the nature of future 
generations. This is followed by an analysis of some of the theoretical and philosophical 
justifications (and challenges) related to bestowing human rights on future generations. The 
section concludes with consideration of the extent to which the rights of future generations 
should be recognised under the Covenant. 
Before considering some of the philosophical justifications for the recognising the human 
rights of future generations, it is important to consider the nature of “future generations”. The 
term “future generations” is broadly used to refer to all persons who are not yet born. There 
is, however, no single abstract future generation. Instead, future generations are made up 
of a continuous string of human beings being born in an “ongoing social complex of partially 
overlapping lives”.207 It is perhaps more concrete to conceptualise future generations not in 
terms of an abstract future, but rather in relation to those children who will be born tomorrow, 
and their future children and grandchildren.  
It is therefore useful to consider the role of children’s rights in relation to the future. 
Whether or not legal obligations towards future generations are recognised, States Parties 
to human rights instruments have existing obligations towards children alive today, including 
those who have just been born. Düwell and Bos argue that this obligation extends to the 
future needs of children alive today who require protection as a result of “their incapacity to 
anticipate their future needs and in particular to claim what now needs to be done to secure 
them as vulnerable future adults”.208 For example, education serves as an important link 
between generations. The UN Secretary General’s report on intergenerational solidarity 
recognises the role of education as “critical to intergenerational solidarity” through 
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transmitting knowledge to future generations.209 The human rights obligations of States 
Parties in relation to today’s children requires a future-oriented perspective that ensures 
their rights are realised both now and throughout their lifespan.  
It is also useful to note that cultural communities have a lifespan that extends beyond that 
of any individual and that impacts those who are not yet born. In General Comment 21 the 
Committee describes “cultural life” in article 15 of the Covenant as “an explicit reference to 
culture as a living process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a 
future”. 210  The Committee confirms that the Covenant requires cultural heritage to be 
protected for the sake of future generations.211  
The rights to culture and education illustrate the “social complex of partially overlapping 
lives” that Düwell & Bos describe. 212 Human rights, and ESCRs in particular, must be 
acquired for all. Any separation between the current generation and future generations is, in 
reality, tenuous as a new generation is constantly being born. The former Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque noted that “the spirit of all international human rights instruments is 
‘intergenerational’: human rights instruments do not have expiration dates”.213 
Given the nature of future generations, the forward-looking dimension of progressive 
realisation, and the inclusion of the rights to education and culture in the Covenant, it is 
difficult to justify an interpretation of ESCRs that does not consider and provide for those 
who are not yet born. It is evident that planning for the progressive realisation of, for 
example, healthcare cannot exclude the needs that will arise when new children are born. 
Similarly, progressive realisation of the right to education cannot exclude planning for those 
children who will inevitably enter the schooling system, even if they are not yet born. As will 
be argued below, future generations should therefore be taken into account in measures 
towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs.  
Turning to the theoretical justifications for the human rights of future generations, it has 
been argued that future generations should not be considered bearers of human rights as 
they are not yet born and human rights can only be conferred on human beings who currently 
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exist.214 Others have relied on what is called the “non-identity problem” to refute any claim 
of rights for future generations.215 Lewis summarises the non-identity problem as follows: 
“[T]his problem flows from a recognition that our actions today not only influence the lives of 
persons in the future but also determine which people will exist in the future. It is therefore not 
possible to say that current actions harm or benefit future people because, were those actions 
to change, those persons would never exist”.216 
However, the recognition that the precise identity of future people is not yet known does not 
mean that such persons will not exist. Many have argued that the simple fact of the existence 
of human beings in the future is sufficient to establish that such future generations will have 
human rights.217 Woods argues that any defence of the universality of human rights must 
accept that human rights are extended “to all those who meet the moral criteria of being 
‘human’”.218 This would include those who are not yet born but whose humanity is certain. 
Düwell and Bos argue that obligations to future generations exist as a result of the humanity 
of these future people and the impact that our actions will have on their human rights.219  
The debate regarding the nature of the human rights of future generations is ongoing. 
Regardless of whether such rights are expressly recognised, many argue that it is still 
possible to establish human rights obligations towards future generations.220 Lewis argues 
that the basis for extraterritorial human rights obligations is analogous to obligations towards 
future generations. The obligations of States Parties have been interpreted to extend beyond 
those within the physical territory to include “any person who is under the control of a State 
or affected by the operation of its laws”.221 Lewis therefore suggests that “where a State has 
the ability to affect the rights of a person (be they currently alive or not yet born) then it is 
argued that the State must exercise that power in a way which is consistent with human 
rights”.222 The argument is that if States Parties’ obligations extend to extraterritorial impacts 
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on human rights, then, by the same logic, they should also extend to extratemporal impacts. 
Düwell and Bos argue that obligations towards future generations can also be understood 
in terms of the future of the state itself.223 As the lifespan of a state extends beyond that of 
the individuals within its jurisdiction and has a future beyond the embodied government, the 
authors suggest that the state has a responsibility towards all its citizens, both present and 
future.224 
The Committee’s current approach to future generations has not explicitly recognised the 
full ESCRs of future generations in the present. It is interesting to note that the rights in the 
Covenant “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”.225 This limits the recipients 
of Covenant rights to “the human person” and could be interpreted to suggest that the rights 
of future generations are not included therein. However, there is no doubt that future 
generations of “human persons” will, in future, be bearers of ESCRs under the Covenant. 
Accepting that future generations will have rights means that these future rights are a 
relevant consideration in determining how present day ESCRs are progressively realised 
over the long term. This, in turn, establishes present-day obligations on States Parties that 
relate to the future rights of future generations.  
As demonstrated by the discussion above, the Committee has clearly affirmed that future 
generations have relevance for the realisation of ESCRs today.226 The Committee has not 
yet clarified the nature of States Parties’ obligations towards future generations or how these 
should be understood or protected. Whether or not the human rights of future generations 
are expressly recognised, it is clear that they are relevant for how ESCRs are progressively 
realised. Riley notes, for example:  
“While we may or may not be able to have contractual or rights-based relationships with 
members of future generations, we are certainly able and required to include the interests of 
future generations (whatever their nature and status) within our constitutional designs”.227 
Similarly, States Parties seeking to give effect to the rights in the Covenant should, at the 
very least, ensure that their policies and programmes take future generations into account. 
In light of the existing references to future generations in the Committee’s work the Covenant 
can, and should, be interpreted to include future generations as a necessary consideration 
in the determination and development of States Parties’ measures towards the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs. A teleological interpretation of the Covenant and of progressive 
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realisation cannot exclude an obligation to consider and plan for the future ESCRs of the 
State Party’s (future) population as this would defeat the objectives of progressive realisation 
and render any future planning meaningless.228  
6 3 3 2 3 The scope of Covenant obligations towards future generations 
Once it is established that the rights of future generations are relevant for the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs, it is necessary to reflect on how these considerations can be taken 
into account and balanced with the rights of the current generation. Put differently, how can 
States Parties ensure that the progressive realisation of ESCRs takes proper account of 
future generations without unfairly constraining the rights of the current generation? This is 
the central project of intergenerational equity. 229 In order to answer this question, it is 
important to determine the scope of States Parties’ obligations towards future generations. 
It is helpful to begin by investigating the needs and interests of future generations. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 above, Brown Weiss views intergenerational equity as a 
generational partnership with three central principles: (1) comparable options, which 
requires the conservation of diversity in natural resources; (2) comparable quality, which 
entails ensuring that for each generation the environment is of a comparable quality to that 
enjoyed by the previous generation; and (3) comparable access requiring equitable and non-
discriminatory access to the use and benefit of the Earth’s resources. 230  While these 
principles are a useful guide for determining the needs and interests that should be protected 
for future generations, the precise parameters of future needs can be difficult (and perhaps 
impossible) to establish.231 There is, for example, a problem of variable standards between 
generations. Woods notes the “uncertainty about how, precisely, future generations will 
understand their own interests”. 232  Technological developments also influence the 
resources that may be needed in future. However, there are certain aspects of future needs 
that are certain and should be protected. Woods explains: 
“[W]hile we cannot know precisely what future generations will need to be able to fulfil their 
rights obligations, we can be pretty certain that they will not be able to fulfil those obligations 
without such basic environmental goods as breathable air, drinkable water, sufficient carbon 
sinks, enough biodiversity to sustain ecological systems and support food supply chains”.233 
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Düwell and Bos similarly argue that, although many aspects of life and society will be 
regulated by future generations themselves and in ways that we cannot predict, there are 
still actions that the current generation takes which result in changes that threaten the most 
basic needs of future generations.234 Düwell and Bos note that, regardless of how future 
people conceptualise their lives and their needs, it is certain that “they will need a safe 
environment and fresh air in order to realize whatever life projects they want to realize”.235 
Current generations should therefore ensure that “environmental conditions do not impede 
the fulfilment of other rights”.236 These basic environmental conditions are of course integral 
to the fulfilment of many ESCRs, particularly the right to an adequate standard of living and 
the right to health. 
There are various proposals for how the rights of future generations can be protected. 
Lewis suggests that a helpful starting point is to gain a better understanding of the impacts 
of present-day actions on future generations.237 If we establish as far as possible the nature 
of the risks and impacts associated with actions taken today, then we are in a better position 
to compare outcomes and weigh the relative costs.238 The UN Secretary-General, in a report 
entitled Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations has suggested 
that, at the very least, the development of policies should consider “minimizing harm and 
doing that which benefits both present and future generations”.239 This would have to include 
the avoidance of irreversible impacts on essential ecosystems that support human life.240 
The report also suggests that incorporating the needs of future generations requires policy 
choices “that work to the advantage of both present and future generations” with as little 
burden on the present generation as possible, unless there are clear risks and 
consequences for future generations that must be avoided.241 Lewis notes that “small gains 
for present generations should not be pursued where they would be likely to result in major 
losses for future generations”.242 Similarly, where significant gains are possible for future 
generations with minimally detrimental impacts for present generations, these should be 
considered. However, it is often the case that environmental protection and sustainable 
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approaches to human rights will have benefits for both present and future generations. As 
Shue argues, “[t]he best protections for human rights are protections that endure”.243 
 Although it is possible to develop approaches to human rights fulfilment that benefit both 
present and future generations, conflicts between generational interests is inevitable. Any 
recognition of the needs and interests of future generations inevitably raises the question of 
how conflicts with the rights of the current generation should be resolved. Lewis argues that 
human rights fail to protect future generations sufficiently as any limitation of their rights can 
be justified under human rights law if the limitation aims to protect the human rights of the 
present generation.244 In addition, the precise scope and nature of obligations towards future 
generations is less defined and further obfuscated by the difficulties of demonstrating 
uncertain future impacts and causal links to the conduct in question.245  
Düwell and Bos propose setting human rights priorities in order to distinguish the 
importance and urgency of relevant rights.246 Recognising that any hierarchy of individual 
rights undermines the framework of human rights, Düwell and Bos argue that a set of 
principles are needed in order to guide decision-makers in the exercise of weighing the rights 
of the current generation against those of future generations.247 Unfortunately, the authors 
do not offer any suggestions for such principles.  
It is recommended that any conflict between the rights of present and future generations 
should include a consideration of the following factors: (1) the extent to which basic 
subsistence is threatened; (2) the proportionality of benefits to one generation at the 
expense of another; and (3) the extent to which irreversible impacts are threatened. 
Regarding the first factor, wherever basic subsistence is threatened for either present or 
future generations, States Parties should prioritise action to prevent any such harm. 
Secondly, where negligible harm to the current generation will have significant benefits for 
future generations, this would be justified. And finally, where any irreversible impacts might 
occur, these should be avoided wherever possible. In this regard the UN Secretary-
General’s report on intergenerational solidarity points out that “the conventional cost-benefit 
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rationale is unsuitable for the valuation of irreversibilities”. 248 Additional factors or principles 
for weighing the rights of current and future generations need to be developed. 
The tension between the interests of present and future generations is usefully illustrated 
by Shue in relation to climate change and energy policy. Shue recognises that while carbon 
emissions are a significant threat to future generations, access to affordable energy sources 
is essential for human rights.249 In balancing the needs of present and future generations it 
is useful to distinguish between what Shue refers to as “subsistence emissions” and “luxury 
emissions”.250 Shue argues that if human rights are to offer protection from deprivation of 
subsistence needs,251 then there are two important consequences for energy policy: first, 
climate change that results in a deprivation of subsistence rights must be prevented and, 
secondly, current energy sources essential for basic necessities should not be removed 
unless people are supplied with “alternative sources that are enough and as good”.252 It 
must be noted here that Shue’s example relates to a conflict between the interests of the 
current generation and the rights of future generations. The “luxury emissions” to which he 
refers cannot be seen as a right. 
In any event, it is evident that an energy policy that promotes luxury emissions of the 
current generation at the expense of the subsistence needs of future generations would be 
inconsistent with human rights. It is of course true that each specific instance of conflict 
between the rights of the current generation and the rights of future generations will have to 
be considered according to the particular facts and circumstances. Given the complexity of 
ecological processes and the uncertainty of future impacts, this would require individuals 
with the necessary expertise to assess the effects and would also require an appropriate 
exercise of the precautionary principle.253 
 It is worth noting that Shue’s argument, although not strictly a conflict of rights, 
demonstrates that intergenerational equity must be pursued in conjunction with 
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intragenerational equity, emphasising that the burdens of a transition away from 
unsustainable energy generation must be shared within the current generation. 254 The 
project of intergenerational equity must be coupled with intragenerational equity as 
“addressing the needs of future generations is not meaningful if delinked from addressing 
the needs of those living”. 255  However, a future-oriented perspective that takes the 
environment into account and considers long-term environmental impacts can have 
significant benefits for the progressive realisation of ESCRs for both present and future 
generations. 
The Committee has not yet clarified the scope of future generations’ rights under the 
Covenant. While it has referred to future generations on a number of occasions, it is unclear 
to what extent future generations should be protected by the Covenant. What is clear is that 
future generations are a necessary and relevant consideration for States Parties in fulfilling 
their obligations under the Covenant.256 States Parties are not obligated to fulfil the ESCRs 
of future generations, however they do have an obligation to take future generations into 
account and to protect the environmental base on which future ESCRs will depend. 
Ultimately, the progressive realisation of ESCRs must seek to address the needs of both 
present and future generations, with the understanding that a healthy environment is 
fundamental to both. The following section examines how a long-term, forward-looking 
approach to environmental considerations and future generations can be integrated within 
the obligation of progressive realisation with the guidance of the principles of IEL. 
6 3 4 Progressive realisation, future generations and the principles of IEL 
Once it has been established that progressive realisation requires a future-oriented 
perspective that emphasises the environmental sustainability of measures taken and that 
takes future generations into account, it is necessary to consider how this might be done. 
The environmental principles discussed in Chapter 4 can guide States Parties’ steps 
towards progressive realisation to ensure that such steps can be maintained over the long 
term and can, as far as possible, protect the needs and interests of future generations. This 
can help ensure that the progressive realisation of ESCRs is not derailed by environmental 
degradation which may lead to retrogression or the violation of Covenant rights. 
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The integration of environmental factors into decision-making, policies and approaches 
related to ESCRs is vital for securing effective progressive realisation. Without taking the 
environment into account, improvements in the level of attainment of ESCRs are at risk of 
falling short over the long term where they depend on a healthy environment or natural 
resources. Where the environment is actively incorporated and considered in measures 
taken towards progressive realisation, the resultant progress in ESCRs will protect the long-
term enjoyment of those rights for the present generation. Progressive realisation therefore 
also requires the sustainable use of natural resources in order to ensure that levels of 
ESCRs are able to be maintained. Any appropriate integration of the environment will also 
protect the environmental base on which future ESCRs depend, thereby protecting the rights 
of future generations.  
Article 2(1) states that each State Party must take steps to the maximum of its available 
resources “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant”. 257  This phrase must be interpreted in light of present-day 
environmental conditions and in accordance with the purpose of effective realisation of 
ESCRs. 258 The “full realization” of Covenant rights should therefore be understood as 
including all aspects of ESCRs that can be achieved for all without transgressing planetary 
boundaries,259 employing unsustainable methods, or causing the irreversible environmental 
harm, as this would ultimately put all ESCRs at risk. There is therefore an ecological ceiling 
that determines the threshold of “full realization” (and the goal of progressive realisation) 
under the Covenant. 260  In other words, the “full realization” of ESCRs should not be 
interpreted in such a way that the fulfilment of these rights would require an amount of 
natural resources or degree of environmental harm that cannot be sustained. Given the 
relevance of the environmental dimension, the interpretation of the scope of “full realization” 
of ESCRs will also need to adapt according to scientific developments, findings and 
predictions regarding the state of the environment. 
While States Parties are permitted to grant more extensive forms of socio-economic 
provisioning than contemplated by Covenant obligations, a removal of any such additional 
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and unsustainable levels of provisioning would not amount to a retrogression, as it would 
extend beyond the scope of “full realization”.261 In some instances a removal of additional 
benefits may even be required if harm to the environment and ESCRs is caused. Shue’s 
distinction between “luxury emissions” and “subsistence emissions” is a good illustration of 
this.262 States Parties are permitted to use fossil fuels to generate energy to provide for the 
ESCRs of their populations (i.e. subsistence emissions). However, where a State Party has 
exceeded its obligations under the Covenant by providing non-essential access to energy 
at the expense of the climate (i.e. luxury emissions), the removal of such additional access 
could be required in the interests of climate change mitigation to the extent that it causes 
harm to ESCRs within the State Party or extraterritorially.263 Put differently, States Parties 
should only allow harmful emissions from fossil fuels to the extent necessary for the 
realisation of ESCRs, and any additional access to energy could be provided from 
renewable energy sources. 
The long-term and forward-looking perspective of progressive realisation and the needs 
and interests of future generations are unavoidably intertwined. The principle of 
intergenerational equity underscores the moral obligation on the present generation to 
consider the position of future people and the state of the environment they will inherit. As 
the Committee notes in General Comment 25, harm which is inequitable to present or future 
generations should be considered “unacceptable”. 264  States Parties therefore have an 
obligation to consider the impact of their decisions and activities on the environment and the 
rights of future generations. States Parties should also adopt measures to reduce their 
impact on future generations and mitigate threats such as climate change. The UN Secretary 
General’s report on intergenerational solidarity recognises the role of “long-term scientific 
research and development” for intergenerational solidarity, noting that this research “is 
necessary to develop substitutes for depleted resources, to extract and use resources more 
efficiently and to understand and manage long-term threats to environmental quality”.265 As 
noted above, intergenerational equity is particularly important where the survival and 
subsistence needs of future generations are at risk.266 
                                            
261 In relation to retrogression see 6 4 below.  
262 Shue (2014) JHRE 51. 
263 See “Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights” (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of HR 578-590. See also CESCR CC and the ICESCR para 
7. 
264 CESCR General Comment No 25 para 56. 
265 UNGA Intergenerational Solidarity and the Needs of Future Generations (2013) A/68/322 para 28. 




Although it remains important to include the interests of unborn generations in measures 
taken towards the progressive realisation of ESCRs, this must be balanced with the ESCRs 
of the present generation and the need for intragenerational equity. Given the 
interdependent and global nature of environmental systems, a failure to consider 
sustainability and long-term environmental impacts in one State Party has important 
implications for other States Parties. Taking a long-term perspective of ESCRs and 
progressive realisation into account, intragenerational equity suggests that every State Party 
should ensure that measures taken in the pursuit of progressive realisation are sustainable 
and protect the environment. International assistance and cooperation under the Covenant 
must also include employing methods and practices that do not cause environmental 
damage to other States Parties; promoting the equitable distribution of environmental 
resources and burdens; and providing assistance to States Parties bearing the brunt of 
environmental harm. For example, the Committee has recommended that Bangladesh 
“strengthen international cooperation in order to mobilize the financial and technological 
support to which it is entitled in mitigating and responding to the effects of climate 
change”.267 
The interests of future generations add a further dimension to the obligation of 
international assistance and cooperation and the principle of CBDR. A failure to ensure 
intragenerational equity also means that the future generations within certain States Parties, 
such as small island developing states, will be born into dire circumstances and will bear a 
significantly disproportionate burden of environmental harm. Failures in intragenerational 
equity with respect to climate change may, for example, threaten the entire territory and 
existence of such States Parties, with devastating consequences for future generations.268 
Such circumstances will inevitably result in severe impacts on the progressive realisation of 
ESCRs within affected States Parties.269 
Effective progressive realisation over the long term requires appropriate environmental 
protection measures. With reference to the preventive principle, 270  the prevention of 
environmental harm ensures that ESCRs can be progressively realised, while also 
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protecting the ESCRs of future generations that depend on the natural environment. In 
accordance with the precautionary principle, it is essential to recognise that environmental 
impacts may have significant long-term effects, while others may be irreversible. This 
warrants the exercise of caution where uncertainty exists regarding the nature and extent of 
environmental impacts. In its general comment on science, the Committee affirms the 
importance of applying the precautionary principle where there is a risk of unacceptable 
harm to the public or the environment.271 
The polluter pays principle requires those responsible for environmental pollution to bear 
the costs of clean up, rehabilitation and compensation for resultant environmental 
degradation.272 Future generations should not be burdened with inequitable financial and 
environmental debt as a result of polluting activities that benefit certain members of the 
current generation.273 Particularly in the case of private corporations, it is inconsistent with 
the Covenant to protect financial interests of polluters at the cost of the ESCRs of present 
and future generations that depend on a healthy environment. Effective implementation of 
the polluter pays principle can encourage business practices that support and enhance long-
term progressive realisation of ESCRs. A failure to ensure comprehensive legislative and 
other measures to give effect to the polluter pays principle will result in significant public 
resources being directed towards clean-up and environmental rehabilitation. Those costs 
must come from the responsible entities and not cause an undue reduction in the available 
resources for the progressive realisation of ESCRs.274 Where pollution comes from outside 
the affected State Party, international law must take the impacts on ESCRs into account in 
any determination of compensation. States Parties must also ensure that individuals and 
companies under their jurisdiction are held responsible for pollution that impacts on the 
territory of other States Parties.275 This would also be consistent with the no-harm principle 
which prohibits transboundary environmental harm. 
In conclusion, progressive realisation must include a future-oriented perspective that, in 
order to be meaningful and effective, takes the environment and future generations into 
account. This forward-looking dimension of progressive realisation can only be effective if 
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we recognise the critical role of the environment in the realisation of ESCRs and the risks 
posed by unsustainable and environmentally harmful practices. Environmental impacts also 
pose a severe risk to the rights of future generations. The interpretation in the Covenant of 
the concept of progressive realisation and its ultimate end-goal of the “full realization” of the 
rights recognised in the Covenant must accordingly incorporate environmental 
considerations and the rights of future generations if is to guarantee the sustainable 
enjoyment of the relevant rights now and in the future.  
6 4 Non-retrogression 
6 4 1 Introduction 
Although the Covenant itself does not refer to retrogression, the duty to avoid 
retrogressive measures is an accepted corollary of the obligation of progressive realisation 
in article 2(1).276 It is implicit in the obligation of progressive realisation that a decline in 
conditions should not be permitted. 277  According to Warwick, the concept of non-
retrogression thus fills “a substantive and logical gap in the progressive realisation 
obligation”. 278  In General Comment 3 the Committee notes that “any deliberately 
retrogressive measures […] would require the most careful consideration and would need 
to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and 
in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources”.279 The Committee has 
repeatedly noted that there is a strong presumption against retrogressive measures, and 
that State Parties will bear the burden of justifying such measures.280 A step backwards or 
a failure to maintain the forward movement required by progressive realisation is therefore 
a retrogressive step or measure in violation of article 2(1) unless it can be justified according 
to the criteria established by the Committee.  
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Young notes that this obligation of non-retrogression is a more fixed standard of 
accountability in contrast to the open-ended standard of progressive realisation. 281  Of 
course, in the context of the arguments made above, this dissertation argues that 
progressive realisation can only be seen as open-ended to the extent of the “full realization” 
of ESCRs, as interpreted according to planetary boundaries and environmental 
constraints.282 The section below analyses the Committee’s current interpretation of the duty 
to avoid retrogressive measures. This is followed by an examination of the environmental 
dimensions of retrogression, with reference to the principles of IEL. 
6 4 2 Current interpretation of non-retrogression 
It is important to begin by clarifying the terminology used by the Committee in relation to 
retrogression. The term “retrogressive measures” is most commonly used in the 
Committee’s work to refer to instances of retrogression. 283  As some have noted, the 
Committee has also been known to discuss instances of retrogression without any clear 
reference to the term.284 The Committee has also used the terms “regressive measures”285 
or “regression”286 as well as “steps backwards”.287 From the context of their usage it is 
evident that in most instances the Committee uses these terms to refer to retrogression or 
retrogressive measures. 
In General Comment 3 the Committee refers to “deliberately retrogressive measures”.288 
This phrase is repeated in a number of subsequent general comments,289 but the reference 
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to “deliberate” measures or “deliberately” retrogressive measures is absent in the 
Committee’s general comment on science290 as well as its 2016 statement in relation to 
public debt and austerity measures, which has particular relevance for retrogression.291 If 
the deliberate nature of retrogressive measures is accepted as a requirement despite these 
omissions, its meaning remains unclear. Sepúlveda suggests that it should be understood 
as requiring a step back in the level of protection as a result of “an intentional decision by 
the State”.292 However, as Warwick demonstrates, the deliberate nature of a State Party’s 
conduct can be understood in two ways: a deliberate measure by a State Party can have a 
retrogressive effect (whether intended or not); or alternatively, a measure can be taken with 
the deliberate intention of a retrogressive effect. 293  This distinction has important 
implications for the culpability of States Parties as the standard of avoiding measures with 
unintended retrogressive effects is clearly higher than the avoidance of steps that are 
intentionally retrogressive.294 The former Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe 
Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque refers to acts and omissions that 
may have retrogressive effect even if they are not deliberately retrogressive.295 However, 
the Committee has not addressed the meaning of this reference to deliberateness and this 
remains an aspect of the doctrine of non-retrogression in need of clarification. 296 It is 
recommended that retrogressive measures be treated as violations of the Covenant 
regardless of the State Party’s intent, as this would be most consistent with a pro homine 
approach to interpretation.297 
Returning to General Comment 3, in relation to the obligation of progressive realisation 
the Committee states that:  
“[A]ny deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources”.298 
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This formulation of criteria for the justification of retrogressive measures is repeated in a 
number of subsequent general comments, usually prefaced by the statement that “[t]here is 
a strong presumption of impermissibility of any retrogressive measures”299 and an assertion 
that States Parties bear the burden of proving that the abovementioned criteria have been 
met.300 Placing this burden of proof on States Parties provides an important opportunity for 
the Committee to “distinguish between the inability and the unwillingness” of States Parties 
to meet their Covenant obligations.301 The Committee also emphasises the need to protect 
those who are most vulnerable, noting that “even in times of severe resources constraints” 
States Parties must adopt “relatively low-cost targeted programmes” for those at risk.302 
In later general comments the abovementioned formulation of non-retrogression in 
General Comment 3 has not been referred to in its entirety, although elements thereof still 
appear. 303  This change in formulation of retrogressive measures and criteria for their 
justification can be attributed to the evolution of the Committee’s treatment of retrogressive 
measures through General Comment 19, 304  the Committee Chairperson’s 2012 letter 
relating to austerity measures,305 and the related statement on public debt and austerity from 
2016.306 These are discussed below. 
In General Comment 19 the Committee echoed the approach set out in General 
Comment 3, affirming the presumption of the impermissibility of retrogression and the 
burden of proof on the State Party to show a careful consideration of alternatives, and 
justification with reference to the “totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant” and the 
full use of maximum available resources.307 The Committee then sets out additional factors 
that will be considered: 
                                            
299 See, for example, CESCR General Comment No 13 para 45. See also Sepúlveda Nature of Obligations 
under the ICESCR 328. 
300 CESCR General Comment No 13 para 45; CESCR General Comment No 14 para 32; CESCR General 
Comment No 15 para 19; CESCR General Comment No 18 para 21; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 
42; CESCR General Comment No 21 para 46. See Warwick (2019) HR Law Review 478-482 on the burden 
of proof for retrogressive measures. 
301 Müller (2009) HR Law Review 585. 
302 CESCR General Comment No 3 para 12. See also CESCR General Comment No 14 para 18; CESCR 
General Comment No 15 para 13; CESCR General Comment No 17 para 20; CESCR General Comment No 
18 para 12(b)(i); CESCR General Comment No 21 para 23. 
303 See CESCR General Comment No 22 para 38; CESCR General Comment No 23 para 52; CESCR General 
Comment No 25 para 24. 
304 CESCR General Comment No 19 para 42. 
305 Chairperson of the CESCR Letter Dated 16 May 2012 Addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (16 May 2012) CESCR/48th/SP/MAB/SW. 
306 CESCR Public debt, austerity measures and the ICESCR. See also CESCR An Evaluation of the Obligation 
to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available Resources” para 10 with regard to the criteria considered under 
the OP-ICESCR where resource constraints are relied upon to justify retrogressive measures. 




“The Committee will look carefully at whether: (a) there was reasonable justification for the 
action; (b) alternatives were comprehensively examined; (c) there was genuine participation 
of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (d) the measures 
were directly or indirectly discriminatory; (e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the 
realization of the right to social security, an unreasonable impact on acquired social security 
rights or whether an individual or group is deprived of access to the minimum essential level 
of social security; and (f) whether there was an independent review of the measures at the 
national level”.308 
These factors are reiterated in the Committee’s later statement on public debt and austerity, 
specifically with reference to retrogressive measures impacting social security.309 Although 
these factors apply to instances related to the right to social security, the Committee has 
recently referred to the requirements of consultation and independent review in relation to 
the impact of austerity measures on all ESCRs.310 The criteria set out by the Committee in 
relation austerity measures are analysed below. It is apparent, however, that the 
requirements of consultation and independent review identified in General Comment 19 
have been incorporated into the list of criteria that must be considered in relation to the 
justification of austerity measures. 
Retrogression as a result of austerity measures was first addressed in the 2012 letter to 
States Parties from the Chairperson of the Committee.311 Although it only made mention of 
“regression” once, the letter stated that, in the case of economic and financial crises, 
proposed policy changes or adjustments must meet the following requirements: the policy 
must be a temporary measure; the measure must be necessary and proportionate “in the 
sense that the adoption of any other policy, or a failure to act, would be more detrimental” 
to ESCRs; it must not be discriminatory and should “support social transfers to mitigate 
inequalities” and ensure there is no disproportionate impact on the disadvantaged and 
marginalised; and finally, the policy should identify and protect the minimum core content of 
ESCRs.312 As Nolan has noted, this letter is not a general comment and is unlikely to have 
“the status of even soft law”.313 However, the Committee has since referred back to this 
letter and reiterated the criteria set out there on a number of occasions. 314  The 
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abovementioned criteria for retrogressive measures in the context of economic and financial 
crises have thus gained prominence in the Committee’s work, particularly through their 
inclusion in the Committee’s 2016 statement on public debt and austerity measures.315 In 
the latter statement the Committee repeats the requirements set out in its 2012 letter and 
further notes that, where the right to social security is concerned, the factors set out in 
General Comment 19 also apply.316 The Committee has also referred to these requirements 
in the context of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,317 noting that “[i]n times of severe 
economic and financial crisis, all budgetary changes or adjustments affecting policies must 
be temporary, necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory”. 318 
This analysis of the Committee’s evolving doctrine on retrogression suggests that the 
factors or criteria considered in assessing a State Party’s justification of retrogressive 
measures may be dependent on the particular circumstances. Different criteria will be 
considered where the State Party relies on resource constraints as a justification;319 where 
the retrogression occurs as a result of economic or financial crises; 320  where the 
retrogression concerns the right to social security;321 or where the retrogression does not 
relate to any of the aforementioned categories.322 In practice, however, this approach is not 
straightforward. In many instances, for example, retrogressive measures will be taken in 
relation to social security, during an economic or financial crisis, and with the State Party 
relying on resource constraints as a result. This would then require the consideration of a 
long list of criteria, making the justification of such retrogressive measures notably 
complex. 323 Warwick argues that “a more holistic and purposeful approach is needed”, 
proposing that such an approach should be centred on the purpose of the doctrine of non-
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retrogression which is to fill a gap in relation to progressive realisation.324 Warwick thus 
distils the approach into a two-stage enquiry.325 The first stage is a strong prohibition of 
retrogression, emphasising that retrogressive measures are contrary to the obligation of 
progressive realisation. In order the rebut this presumption, the second stage then involves 
an assessment of the “exceptional circumstances” in the given case and the extent to which 
they permit retrogressive measures.326 
Given that retrogression necessarily involves a diminishment of ESCRs, it is important to 
consider the relationship between retrogressive measures and limitations of ESCRs in terms 
of article 4 of the Covenant.327 The Committee has paid significantly more attention to 
retrogression and the criteria for justifiable retrogressive measures than the nature and 
application of article 4 and the justifications required for an acceptable limitation to Covenant 
rights. 328 It is evident that the Committee prefers the approach of non-retrogression in 
relation to backwards steps but the reasons for this, and indeed the distinction between the 
two, remain unclear. 
Some authors argue that a retrogressive measure can, and should, be distinguished from 
a limitation in accordance with article 4 of the Covenant. Sepúlveda suggests that 
retrogressive measures are not limitations of ESCRs and that article 4 therefore provides an 
additional enquiry, so that where “a retrogressive measure places a limitation on the rights, 
States must comply with the conditions set out in article 4 ICESCR”.329 Alston and Quinn 
suggest that the distinction between article 4 limitations and retrogressive measures is a 
difference between a “formal limitation” and “a general level of attainment” of rights.330 They 
link a reduction in a general level of attainment to resource availability, explaining that such 
a reduction constitutes a retrogressive measure where it is attributed to a lack of 
resources.331 Where resources are not at issue, Alston and Quinn propose that a limitation 
should be dealt with according to article 4. This seems to be consistent with the Committee’s 
approach. As Müller argues, the Committee’s development of criteria for retrogressive 
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measures, and its discussion of these in relation to article 2(1), suggests that “the CESCR 
does not consider these ‘retrogressive measures’ to be ‘limitations’ within the meaning of 
Article 4 ICESCR”.332 However, as Müller notes, the reasonableness of this distinction “can 
be questioned”.333 
Noting the practical difficulties of distinguishing between retrogressive measures and 
limitations, Müller proposes “a unified standard […] for evaluating all limitations, including 
retrogressive measures” with reference to the criteria set out in article 4.334 Müller illustrates 
that the criteria for retrogressive measures can be reframed according to the wording of 
article 4 without much difficulty as the differences between these criteria are minimal.335 
Assessing retrogressive measures under article 2(1) in accordance with the requirements 
of article 4 is therefore proposed as “a sensible and practical contextual relationship between 
Article 4 and Article 2(1) ICESCR”.336 Müller’s approach does seem feasible and could 
afford some much needed structure to the doctrine of non-retrogression. However, it is 
evident from the Committee’s emphasis on non-retrogression and the absence of reliance 
on article 4,337 that the Committee supports the use of the criteria set out in its general 
comments and statements to assess States Parties’ retrogressive measures. 338  It is 
interesting to note that the numerous references to article 4 in the Committee’s general 
comment on science could indicate a more prominent role for article 4 limitations in future.339 
The Committee’s views under the Optional Protocol similarly indicate greater reliance on 
article 4.340 For now, however, the criteria developed by the Committee as set out above is 
the primary mechanism for assessing the justification of retrogressive measures. 
As the corollary of progressive realisation, the prohibition of retrogression ensures that 
States Parties do not move backwards in the realisation of ESCRs. Where retrogressive 
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measures are taken, the burden is on the State Party to justify such measures due to 
exceptional circumstances with reference to the relevant criteria set out by the Committee. 
The appropriate integration of environmental considerations in the context of retrogression 
suggests that (1) retrogression due to environmental degradation should be avoided, and 
(2) retrogressive measures with the aim of protecting the environment may be justifiable. 
This relationship between retrogression and environmental considerations is discussed 
below.  
6 4 3 Non-retrogression and the principles of IEL 
It is important to begin by reiterating that retrogression must be understood in the context 
of the interpretation of “full realization” proposed above, taking planetary boundaries and 
environmental limits into account.341 If the full realisation of ESCRs is understood as the 
ceiling of progressive realisation, retrogression is then the reduction of any level of 
attainment up to, and including that ceiling. A reduction in any additional benefits in excess 
of the ceiling of full realisation of the relevant ESCRs does not therefore constitute a 
retrogressive measure.  
Integrating environmental considerations in the doctrine of non-retrogression requires 
measures to protect the environment and natural resources in order to ensure that 
environmental harm does not adversely affect ESCRs and lead to retrogression. The former 
Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations relating to the Enjoyment of 
a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment notes that States Parties’ discretion 
“to determine appropriate levels of environmental protection” is constrained by the 
presumption against retrogressive measures under the Covenant.342 Measures related to 
environmental protection must not, therefore, diminish the enjoyment of ESCRs. Avoiding 
retrogressive measures also requires that States Parties pay particular attention to the 
sustainability of the measures adopted for the progressive realisation of ESCRs. The 
principles of IEL are a useful guide to illustrate these dimensions of non-retrogression.  
The integral relationship between the notion of sustainability and the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs is discussed above.343 The corollary of this relationship is the link 
between retrogression and unsustainability. By definition, if a level of enjoyment of a right 
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cannot be sustained over a period of time, then a reduction in the level of enjoyment is 
inevitable. Although sustainability is not itself a principle of IEL identified in Chapter 4, its 
significance in the context of retrogression is underscored in the work of the former Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque. While the meaning and scope of sustainability in this context is unclear, it is 
evident that it does include environmental sustainability.344 
The Special Rapporteur highlights the relationship between sustainability and non-
retrogression in the context of the right to water and sanitation: 
“There is a clear link between non-retrogression and sustainability. Acts or omissions that 
result in retrogressions in the progressive realization of the rights to water and sanitation 
jeopardize sustainability. […] [R]etrogressive steps will perpetuate unsustainable practices and 
create a constant threat to the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights in general 
and the rights to water and sanitation in particular”.345 
Progressive realisation, and by extension non-retrogression, cannot be achieved without 
sustainable approaches to the realisation of ESCRs that consider the long-term viability of 
measures used as well as the sustainable use of resources. With regard to the use of 
resources, it is significant to note that the Special Rapporteur’s report emphasises the 
retrogression that is likely to result from “letting infrastructure deteriorate due to a lack of 
investment in operation and maintenance”.346 Appropriate management and use of existing 
infrastructure, systems and resources can assist in promoting long-term sustainability and 
thereby prevent retrogression in ESCRs in times of crisis.347 This approach is consistent 
with a qualitative view of existing State resources that considers their longevity and does 
not solely depend on the allocation of new resources to realise ESCRs.348  
Importantly, the Special Rapporteur emphasises the need to ensure non-discrimination. 
As the report notes, “[l]ack of sustainability, slippages and backward steps will primarily 
affect the most marginalized members of society, since they will often lack the means to 
adjust, a necessary voice, visibility, and access to mechanisms of redress”.349 In other 
words, a failure to prevent discrimination will inevitably result in the disproportionate impact 
of retrogression on “the most marginalized members of society”.350 In order to ensure that 
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discrimination and retrogression are avoided, the Special Rapporteur argues that “it is 
crucial to ensure that the ‘forever’ dimension – including considerations of how operation 
and maintenance will be paid for and managed – is built into policymaking from the 
outset”.351 Ensuring the sustainability of systems and services for the long term will result in 
increased security and consistency in the realisation of ESCRs for disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups who would ordinarily be most severely impacted by the retrogression 
that tends to accompany economic and financial crises. 
While the Special Rapporteur’s mandate was limited to the right to water and sanitation, 
the report’s perspectives on sustainability and retrogression have relevance for all ESCRs. 
Just as sustainability can ensure that levels of attainment of ESCRs can be maintained, 
unsustainable measures and practices pose a significant threat to ESCRs and will often lead 
to retrogression. In light of the limitations of the natural environment including, for example, 
the notion of planetary boundaries or the finite nature of non-renewable resources, an 
approach to ESCRs that does not include environmental sustainability will eventually result 
in retrogression when the effects of such unsustainable approaches are inevitably felt.  
In extreme circumstances unsustainable approaches to ESCRs may be deemed 
necessary where they are required as a matter of urgency in order to meet core obligations. 
In the case of extreme drought, for example, unsustainable measures employed by a State 
Party for the sake of providing basic access to water could be justifiable under the 
Committee’s criteria for retrogressive measures.352 Such unsustainable interventions would 
need to be temporary, necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory. Once the core 
obligations have been met, replacing the unsustainable measures with a long-term 
sustainable approach must be a priority. It is also important to note that such unsustainable 
and potentially retrogressive steps should only be contemplated as a last resort, and once 
the State Party has made every effort to use the maximum of available resources to meet 
its obligations through appropriately sustainable measures (including through, for example, 
progressive taxation and seeking international assistance and cooperation).353 
In addition to the relationship between sustainability and non-retrogression, it is useful to 
consider how the principles of IEL identified in Chapter 4 can assist in preventing 
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retrogressive measures resulting from the impacts of climate change and environmental 
degradation. These are considered below. 
As a core component of sustainable development, the principle of integration requires the 
incorporation of the environment in decision-making.354 As ESCRs depend on a healthy 
environment, a failure to integrate environmental considerations within measures to 
progressively realise ESCRs will result in retrogression. It is imperative that the environment 
be included in the long-term planning for progressive realisation and that measures related 
to mitigation and adaptation to climate change are included in this. A failure to adequately 
consider the effects of climate change on ESCRs and integrate these into measures and 
policies for progressive realisation will lead to poorly informed policies and a lack of 
preparedness for crises. This may then lead to retrogressive measures. In its concluding 
observations with respect to Bangladesh and Mauritius the Committee has, for example, 
commended the States Parties for establishing funds related to the environment,355 and has 
recommended that the States Parties strengthen disaster response and risk reduction in 
addition to seeking international cooperation and assistance for mitigating and responding 
to the effects of climate change.356 
The principle of intergenerational equity highlights the importance of a forward-looking 
view of ESCRs and progressive realisation. If measures put in place for the current 
generation take appropriate account of the environment and the need for sustainability, they 
will be more resilient against possible retrogression and will also ultimately benefit future 
generations.  
As environmental harm may lead to retrogression, it is important to prevent environmental 
harm as far as possible. Considering the irreversible nature of many environmental impacts, 
and the potential effect this could have on the level of enjoyment of ESCRs, it is important 
to apply to the preventive principle in order to avoid retrogressive measures. Similarly, the 
use of the precautionary principle can safeguard the environment in order to prevent 
potential future risk to ESCRs which might necessitate retrogressive measures.  
Where environmental harm has been caused, incorporating the polluter pays principle 
into domestic law can ensure that States Parties do not bear related environmental costs 
and would thereby protect resources allocated to ESCRs from being diverted into 
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emergency environmental rehabilitation. A failure to implement measures to hold polluters 
accountable for the costs of their pollution results in unexpected and unnecessary costs on 
States Parties that may ultimately lead to a reduction in ESCR-related budgets and other 
retrogressive measures. 
 While the examples above examine how environmental principles can assist in protecting 
ESCRs from retrogression, there may also be circumstances where these principles can be 
used to justify retrogressive measures. Where current approaches to ESCRs are 
unsustainable or environmentally harmful, retrogression may be a necessary step in the 
transition to more environmentally sustainable measures that ensure the continued long-
term enjoyment of ESCRs. However, as noted above, this would only be relevant in the most 
extreme circumstances. Any such retrogressive measures must only be considered as a last 
resort,357 and after the relevant State Party has made use of the maximum of available 
resources. 358 This includes employing progressive taxation and related redistribution of 
resources to protect the ESCRs of the most marginalised and disadvantaged.359 This also 
requires a concerted effort from the State Party to seek international assistance and 
cooperation to employ more environmentally sustainable measures before resorting to 
retrogression.360 Finally, any such measures would need to be justified according to the 
Committee’s criteria for retrogressive measures or, where relevant, the limitations clause in 
article 4 of the Covenant. 
Retrogression might be justified in accordance with the preventive principle where 
significant, or potentially irreversible, environmental harm poses a threat to ESCRs. 
Immediate retrogressive measures in relation to ESCRs may therefore need to be put in 
place in order to protect the ability of the State Party to continue to realise ESCRs in the 
future. Similarly, the precautionary principle suggests that where an uncertain but severe 
risk exists, precaution should be exercised in order to prevent future harm. In the case of 
such uncertain future harm, proportionality would have particular relevance. The severity of 
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potential harm posed to the environment, taken with the related risk to ESCRs, would need 
to outweigh the effect of any retrogressive measures required in order to prevent this 
potential environmental harm.  
Any retrogressive measures implemented in order to protect the environment or ensure 
the sustainability of States Parties’ steps towards progressive realisation would need to be 
appropriately justified. The relevant criteria identified by the Committee include: the context 
of the full use of maximum available resources and the totality of rights in the Covenant; 
whether the measures are temporary, necessary, proportional and non-discriminatory; and 
whether the minimum core is affected.361 These are discussed in more detail below. 
In relation to the context of the full use of maximum available resources and the totality 
of Covenant rights, where retrogressive measures are taken in order to protect the 
environment, and where the maximum of available resources have been used,362 these 
measures may be justifiable. In order to show that the measures are justified, the 
environmental protection in question must be linked to the protection of ESCRs. If the 
relevant measures to protect the environment have the effect of ensuring the continued 
protection and realisation of ESCRs, both now and in future, then it is proposed that such 
retrogressive measures could be acceptable if all other criteria are met. 
Regarding whether the measures are temporary, any retrogressive measures taken in 
order to protect the environment or secure the sustainable use of resources must be 
temporary. This means that the measures should only persist for as long as they are 
necessary. Where a State Party wishes to impose a permanent restriction on ESCRs this 
should be dealt with as a limitation under article 4 of the Covenant and the State Party would 
be required to meet the criteria therein.363 
Turning to the necessity of retrogressive measures, here the justification of such 
measures depends on the extent to which the steps taken to protect the environment can 
be linked to the protection and realisation of ESCRs. Where there is clear evidence that the 
steps to protect the environment are essential in order to secure the future realisation of 
ESCRs, then the retrogressive measures should be deemed necessary. EIAs and HRIAs 
are essential tools in determining the likely impacts of proposed measures (and the impacts 
of inaction) as well as the resultant effect on ESCRs. The necessity of retrogressive 
measures is likely to be particularly evident in the case of measures to prevent irreversible 
                                            
361 See 6 4 1 above on the Committee’s criteria for assessing retrogressive measures. 
362 See Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of maximum available resources. 




environmental harm that would permanently affect ESCRs. It is also important to point out 
that a retrogressive measure will not be deemed necessary if the State Party has not yet 
made full use of the maximum of available resources as required by the Covenant. 
Proportionality is perhaps the most pertinent criterion for assessing the retrogressive 
nature of measures taken to protect the environment.364 Here the risk to the environment, 
and its ultimate effect on ESCRs, must be greater than the impact of the retrogressive 
measures themselves. This is well illustrated in the context of the precautionary principle. 
Where serious and uncertain potential environmental harm exists, the precautionary 
principle indicates that it should be avoided and prevented. In order to justify reliance on this 
principle when implementing a retrogressive measure, a State Party would need to show 
that the extent of the possible harm to ESCRs (as a result of the environmental damage) is 
significantly greater than the certain harm the State Party will cause to ESCRs through the 
retrogressive measure itself. Proportionality is also relevant in the context of the needs of 
future generations. In some cases, a minor retrogressive step in the enjoyment of ESCRs 
for the present generation could protect future generations from severe harm to ESCRs, or 
even harm to the basic subsistence of future people. For example, a State Party may be 
forced to reduce fishing quotas for a season due to a dramatic decline in the population of 
a specific species. While this might, for example, impact on access to food and livelihoods 
in the short term, the step could be justifiable if it protects the species and allows for 
continued access in the future – protecting access to food and livelihoods for present and 
future generations. In such instances a proportionality enquiry suggests that retrogression 
can be justified where a failure to do so would have disproportionate and severe 
consequences for ESCRs in the future or, indeed, for ESCRs in other States Parties. 
In addition to the above, any retrogressive measures must also be non-discriminatory. 
This criterion should be understood in the context of the obligation to avoid direct and indirect 
discrimination under article 2(2) of the Covenant.365 In relation to measures that protect the 
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environment, it is particularly important for States Parties to ensure that retrogressive 
measures do not discriminate against indigenous peoples and other individuals and groups 
who are dependent on the environment and natural resources for basic subsistence.366  
In relation to indirect discrimination, the effect of retrogressive measures must not have 
a disproportionate negative impact on the ESCRs of certain groups or individuals. Using the 
example above, a retrogressive reduction in fishing quotas may be a necessary and 
proportionate measure in order to maintain the viability of the species in future, and thereby 
to protect related livelihoods and access to food. However, any measures in this regard must 
also not have a disproportionate impact on the ESCRs of individuals or groups who are 
marginalised or disadvantaged. In this example the State Party would need to ensure that 
the reduced quotas are imposed and distributed so as to have the least impact on small-
scale fishers or indigenous communities who depend more heavily on the natural resource. 
Those whose ESCRs would not be significantly harmed, such as larger fishing corporations, 
should therefore bear the brunt of such retrogressive measures.367  
Finally, an assessment of retrogressive measures must consider whether the minimum 
core is affected. Given the priority status afforded to the minimum core by the Committee, it 
is unlikely that retrogressive measures can be justified where they violate the minimum core 
of ESCRs. Circumstances may exist where measures to ensure sustainability or to protect 
the environment are vital for safeguarding the State Party’s ability to meet its core 
obligations. In such instances, the State Party should prioritise those measures which allow 
it to meet its core obligations with the utmost urgency. Once the minimum core has been 
met in the immediate or short-term, the State Party should then implement measures for 
environmental protection as a priority. Once again, this would only be relevant in the most 
extreme circumstances where the State Party is unable to take the necessary measures to 
protect the environment despite making full use of the maximum of available resources and 
appropriately seeking international assistance and cooperation. 
In conclusion, non-retrogression has significant links to sustainability, and retrogressive 
measures can be prevented through appropriate measures to protect the environment as 
well as through a future-oriented view of progressive realisation. In light of the various 
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environmental challenges that States Parties contend with, and will face in the future, it is 
vital to ensure that States Parties employ sustainable approaches to ESCRs that prevent 
future environmental impacts. In doing so, States Parties will build resilience against 
environmental harm to ESCRs and thereby avoid retrogression. Any retrogressive measures 
should only be considered as a last resort, and would need to be justified according to the 
Committee’s criteria. Ultimately, forward-looking measures towards progressive realisation 
which are sustainable and take the environment into account will be far more resilient over 
the long term and will support States Parties in fulfilling their duty to avoid retrogressive 
measures. 
6 5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined three related aspects of article 2(1) and how they should be 
interpreted to incorporate environmental considerations. The first is the notion of core 
obligations; the second is progressive realisation, with an emphasis on forward-looking and 
long-term measures; and the third is the duty to avoid retrogression. 
This chapter argues for an interpretation of core obligations and progressive realisation 
that considers the limits of the environment as well as our inherent dependence on the 
environment for the realisation of ESCRs. The “full realization” of Covenant rights must be 
understood as a threshold that incorporates all relevant environmental constraints, including 
planetary boundaries, limited natural resources, and irreversible environmental harm. The 
ceiling of “full realization”368 should therefore be consistent with an “ecological ceiling”.369 
Similarly, core obligations are the floor or baseline of ESCRs from which progressive 
realisation proceeds. Greening the interpretation of core obligations requires the 
identification and protection of the minimum environmental conditions necessary to realise 
the core of ESCRs. As the environmental dimension of core obligations, States Parties must 
protect this environmental baseline with the urgency and priority demanded of core 
obligations. This conceptualisation of the floor and ceiling of ESCRs, and the environmental 
dimension thereof, is akin to the theory of doughnut economics developed by Kate Raworth. 
In the case of this interpretation of the Covenant, the “safe and just space for humanity” 
between the baseline and ceiling is the sustainable realisation of ESCRs for all, within 
appropriate environmental limits.370 
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With respect to core obligations, this chapter has therefore highlighted that guaranteeing 
the minimum core of ESCRs requires the protection of the environment. Any environmental 
threats to the core of ESCRs must be appropriately prioritised and prevented, with the 
requisite urgency. When it comes to uncertain risks to the core, the standard of precaution 
required of States Parties is particularly high. Wherever environmental degradation 
threatens the ability of a State Party to meet their core obligations, it is particularly important 
for other States Parties to provide international assistance and cooperation to protect the 
environment and ESCRs as necessary. 
Progressive realisation requires States Parties to take a range of measures in the 
immediate, short-term and long-term towards to full realisation of ESCRs. Due to the long-
term nature of much environmental harm, this chapter focuses on long-term measures, as 
well as the forward-looking dimension of progressive realisation that is required for future 
planning and the sustainability of ESCRs. The Committee’s references to sustainability 
confirm that this long-term perspective is an important part of progressive realisation, 
although the notion of sustainability requires further delineation. The report of the former 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de 
Albuquerque provides valuable guidance on how sustainability might be conceptualised in 
the context of ESCRs.371 Effective progressive realisation of ESCRs requires planning for 
the future and putting long-term measures into place. States Parties must also consider 
long-term impacts and prevent irreversible harm to the environment. Any measures taken 
towards the realisation of ESCRs must be sustainable over the long term and take future 
environmental impacts into account.  
Progressive realisation that is appropriately sustainable and takes the environment into 
account will benefit both present and future generations. This chapter has investigated the 
possibilities for the position of future generations under the Covenant. The Committee has 
recognised the relevance of future generations on a number of occasions, although the full 
ESCRs of future generations have not been recognised. This dissertation argues that 
recognition of the full range of ESCRs of future generations on the same plane as those of 
the current generation would require a strained and inappropriate interpretation of the 
Covenant. However, despite this absence of explicit recognition of ESCRs for future 
generations, States Parties do have certain obligations towards future generations. These 
include an obligation to consider future generations in measures taken towards progressive 
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realisation; to prevent inequitable environmental harm; and to adopt measures that protect 
the environment and future generations wherever possible. Where the protection of future 
generations might result in some detrimental impacts for the current generations, the 
Committee should develop guiding principles or factors to assist States Parties in selecting 
the appropriate measures. The factors considered should include: the extent to which basic 
subsistence is threatened; the proportionality of benefits to one generation at the expense 
of another; and the extent to which irreversible impacts are threatened. 
Progressive realisation that is effective in the face of climate change and environmental 
degradation therefore requires a future-oriented approach that actively incorporates 
environmental considerations and future generations. Ensuring sustainable approaches to 
progressive realisation that consider the environment and future generations can prevent 
unnecessary retrogression or violations of ESCRs in the future, while also safeguarding the 
ability of States Parties to continue to improve the enjoyment of ESCRs.  
Finally, this chapter has examined the obligation to avoid retrogressive measures. Non-
retrogression ensures that levels of attainment related to ESCRs are maintained, and this 
maintenance of levels of enjoyment is fundamentally linked to environmental sustainability. 
The appropriate protection of the environment on which ESCRs depend can assist in 
ensuring that States Parties do not have to resort to retrogressive measures. This therefore 
requires States Parties to focus their efforts on preventing retrogression by promoting 
sustainability and environmental protection including through the appropriate use of the 
preventive and precautionary principles. In doing so, States Parties can avoid and prevent 
threats to ESCRs resulting from environmental degradation and climate change, thereby 
complying with the obligation to avoid retrogression. 
 In rare circumstances States Parties might be in a position to justify retrogressive 
measures that are implemented in order to protect the environment or safeguard the 
sustainable use of resources. However, such retrogressive measures can only be 
contemplated as a last resort and after the State Party has made full use of the maximum 
of available resources to meet its Covenant obligations. In addition to this, the retrogression 
must be justified according to the criteria established by the Committee. In light of this, it is 
likely that in the overwhelming majority of cases such retrogressive measures would not be 
permissible.  
The following chapter synthesises the research findings of earlier chapters, highlighting 










GREENING THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES  
UNDER ARTICLE 2(1) 
7 1 Introduction 
This dissertation has explored how principles of international environmental law (“IEL”) 
should inform the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) of the 
Covenant in order for a systematic integration of environmental considerations in the 
interpretation of the Covenant. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, ESCRs are dependent on a 
healthy environment and are severely threatened by environmental degradation and climate 
change. This chapter summarises the findings of earlier chapters and proposes an 
interpretation of article 2(1) that incorporates environment-related obligations in order to 
effectively integrate relevant environmental considerations affecting Covenant rights. 
The chapter begins with a synthesis of the rules applicable to the interpretation of human 
rights treaties, and the Covenant in particular, as analysed in Chapter 3. It reviews the rules 
of interpretation and demonstrates that these rules require the integration of the environment 
in the interpretation of article 2(1) of the Covenant. 
Thereafter this chapter proceeds to recall the selected principles of IEL outlined in 
Chapter 4, reviewing their relevance to the interpretation of article 2(1) as elaborated in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The latter chapters emphasise certain essential elements of article 2(1), 
namely: the obligation to use the maximum of available resources; core obligations; the 
obligation of progressive realisation; and the prohibition of retrogression. Guided by the 
principles of IEL, the environmental dimensions of these elements of the Covenant are 
highlighted. 
The chapter then provides a synthesis of the environment-related obligations that are 
required in order to “green” the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1), 
as identified and examined in Chapters 5 and 6. The obligations are arranged according to 
the categories of maximum available resources, progressive realisation and non-
retrogression, core obligations, and international assistance and cooperation. The 
environment-related obligations identified represent a baseline of obligations that are 





The chapter concludes with a consideration of relevant factors and principles to guide 
States Parties in choosing the most appropriate measures to realise ESCRs. These are 
particularly important for decision-making in circumstances where developing and least 
developed states must balance development needed for the realisation of ESCRs with the 
need to prevent environmental harm in order to protect ESCRs. 
7 2 Interpretive support for greening States Parties’ obligations 
The principles of interpretation applicable to treaties, and to human rights treaties in 
particular, are examined in Chapter 3. This dissertation argues that the interpretation of the 
Covenant must include the consideration of the environment and environmental dimensions 
of ESCRs in order to be effective and appropriately responsive to evolving environmental 
conditions. This section synthesises the relevant principles of interpretation, and 
demonstrates how they support, and indeed require, greening the Covenant. 
It is helpful to begin by reiterating that legal interpretation and the generation of meaning 
from a text is a living process without fixed outcomes.1 However, despite the open-ended 
nature of the interpretive process, the interpretation of treaties in international law must 
follow the rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).2 Human rights 
tribunals have shown a strong preference for teleological interpretation, placing emphasis 
on the object and purpose of a treaty.3 The interpretation of human rights treaties also 
involves additional principles and approaches that can be understood as falling under the 
umbrella of teleological interpretation. These include the pro homine approach, the principle 
of effectiveness, and the evolutive approach to interpretation.4 
In the context of the Covenant, the Committee has shown support for a teleological 
approach to interpretation.5 It has recognised that the Covenant should have practical effect 
and benefit individuals in accordance with the principle of effectiveness and the pro homine 
approach.6 The Committee has also emphasised that the interpretation of a right should not 
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render other rights meaningless or ineffective.7 In accordance with the evolutive approach, 
the Committee has recognised that interpretation of the Covenant must give effect to 
present-day conditions and evolve to reflect societal changes.8 
In light of the abovementioned principles of interpretation, this dissertation argues that an 
interpretation of the Covenant that excludes or overlooks environmental considerations will 
be ineffective in promoting ESCRs and in appropriately adapting to rapidly changing 
environmental conditions. A failure to include environmental considerations within the scope 
of the Covenant would have a disproportionately negative impact on the disadvantaged and 
marginalised individuals and groups already bearing the brunt of environmental degradation, 
particularly indigenous communities. 9 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the realisation of 
ESCRs is intimately intertwined with the condition of the environment.10 Climate change and 
environmental degradation pose significant risks for the enjoyment of ESCRs and the ability 
of States Parties to fulfil their Covenant obligations. 11  ESCRs cannot, therefore, be 
effectively realised without considering the impacts of environmental degradation and 
climate change.  
Developments in IEL since the conclusion of the Covenant are relevant for present-day 
interpretation of the Covenant. It is therefore appropriate to consider the relevance and 
significance of principles of IEL for the interpretation of the Covenant.12 These principles 
cannot simply be transferred from environmental law and imposed on States Parties in the 
human rights context, as the application of other bodies of international law is not within the 
scope of the Committee’s mandate. However, they are a valuable guide as they reflect not 
only fundamental changes in the state of the environment itself since the adoption of the 
Covenant, but also offer insight into significant changes in international law pertaining to the 
environment. As a result, these principles serve to demonstrate ways in which the 
interpretation of the Covenant can evolve to integrate relevant environmental 
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11 See Chapter 2, 2 2 1 and 2 3 1 on environmental threats to ESCRs. 




considerations. Any interpretation drawn from a reliance on these principles gains its 
legitimacy not from the principles themselves (although in some instances their status in 
international law can be persuasive), but from an appropriately evolutive interpretation of the 
Covenant consistent with the interpretive rules in the VCLT. 
The rules of treaty interpretation therefore not only permit, but positively require, an 
evolutive interpretation of the Covenant that integrates environmental considerations in 
order to safeguard ESCRs in the face of the threats posed by environmental degradation 
and climate change. This dissertation has focused on the interpretation of States Parties’ 
general obligations under article 2(1), thereby allowing for environmental considerations to 
be incorporated into obligations that are applicable to all Covenant rights. The section below 
considers the environmental dimensions of the obligations in article 2(1) with reference to 
the relevant principles of environmental law identified in Chapter 4 and applied in Chapters 
5 and 6. 
7 3 Greening States Parties’ obligations with the guidance of principles of IEL 
7 3 1 Introduction 
As argued in the previous sections, the principles of IEL are an important guide in 
greening the interpretation of the obligations in article 2(1) of the Covenant. The principles 
serve to illustrate current conditions both in terms of international law developments and in 
terms of contemporary environmental challenges. They are therefore an important gauge 
for an evolutive interpretation of the Covenant that responds to present-day conditions. The 
relevance of each of these principles in integrating environmental considerations in the 
interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) is synthesised below. 
7 3 2 Sustainable development 
Sustainable development is a broad concept without an agreed definition in international 
law. However, there are certain elements or principles of sustainable development that are 
widely recognised. 13  The primary or core element of sustainable development is the 
principle of integration which requires the inclusion of environment in decision-making. The 
other elements of sustainable development include the principles of sustainable use, 
intergenerational equity, and intragenerational equity. Below is an examination of how the 
                                            




elements of sustainable development can guide a green interpretation of States Parties’ 
obligations in article 2(1). 
7 3 2 1 Principle of integration 
As noted above, the principle of integration requires the incorporation of environmental 
factors in decision-making.14 In the context of article 2(1) of the Covenant, this requires the 
integration of environmental considerations within any measures taken to realise ESCRs. 
An effective interpretation of the Covenant therefore must take account of the relationship 
between ESCRs and the environment.15 Applying the principle of integration ensures that 
due consideration is given to the environment and its impact on the enjoyment of ESCRs. 
In relation to the obligation to use the “maximum of available resources”,16 the principle 
of integration indicates that resources should be understood to include natural resources. 
This involves not only those natural resources that can be exploited for financial revenue 
and have been commodified, but also those natural resources that directly contribute to the 
realisation of ESCRs, such as fertile soil, clean air and water, and a stable climate. The 
inherent value of such resources in supporting the enjoyment of ESCRs by providing a 
healthy environment must be protected and maximised for the effective realisation of 
ESCRs. 17  This requires appropriate environmental protection, sustainable use and 
prevention of harm to these critical environmental resources. Understanding maximum 
available resources from the perspective of the environment also means that any 
international resources provided in accordance with the obligation of international 
assistance and cooperation must not result in environmental harm, and such resources 
should include resources for environmental protection as well as climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.18 
The use and exploitation of natural resources for the realisation of ESCRs should be 
carefully considered given the potentially harmful impacts that may follow certain forms of 
natural resource exploitation.19 EIAs and HRIAs must be conducted prior to the potentially 
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15 See 7 2 above. 
16 ICESCR article 2(1). 
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harmful exploitation of natural resources.20 Temporary financial gain from exploitative and 
harmful activities must be weighed against the inherent value of that natural environment in 
supporting the realisation of ESCRs. The availability of natural resources must therefore be 
understood in light of the likely impacts resulting from the exploitation of the resource in 
question.21 Natural resources must be deemed unavailable for the purposes of realising 
ESCRs if their exploitation or extraction will cause significant harm to the environment and 
to ESCRs.  
Integrating environmental considerations into States Parties’ obligations also requires 
measures to protect and preserve a healthy environment which is crucial for the sustainable 
realisation of ESCRs. These protective measures require resources to be devoted to the 
regulation, management and protection of the environment. This includes resources for the 
enforcement of environmental law, the protection of environmental defenders, and the 
prevention of corruption and mismanagement in respect of environmental governance.22 In 
order not to strain the interpretation of the Covenant beyond what is appropriate, any such 
management and protection of the environment in terms of the Covenant must be clearly 
linked to the realisation of the ESCRs. 
Resource use for the realisation of ESCRs cannot be effective without including the 
environment as a significant resource and a determining factor in the enjoyment of Covenant 
rights. A failure to appropriately consider the environment would have a disproportionately 
negative impact on those individuals and groups that rely directly on natural resources for 
subsistence, particularly indigenous peoples.23 In addition, the effective use of resources for 
the realisation of ESCRs requires that environmental degradation and its impacts are 
considered. Appropriate impact assessments must be required in order to ensure that States 
Parties’ resource use in the pursuit of ESCRs is effective over the long term and does not 
cause undue harm to the environment, and ultimately to the ESCRs they seek to promote.24 
Effective progressive realisation of ESCRs also demands appropriate environmental 
protection and assessment of potential impacts, particularly in light of the long-term and 
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22 See Chapter 5, 5 3 3 in relation to the use of non-natural resources for environmental protection. See also 
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sometimes irreversible nature of many environmental impacts.25 Long-term or permanent 
damage to the environment on which ESCRs depend will result in significant impacts on the 
enjoyment of ESCRs. The integration of environmental considerations requires that 
measures to realise ESCRs are sustainable. In other words, the measures taken to realise 
ESCRs must not damage the environment or deplete natural resources to the extent that 
they compromise the future ability of States Parties to continue to realise ESCRs. 
Progressive realisation must therefore be pursued in an environmentally sustainable 
manner.26 A failure to ensure environmental sustainability and to consider the impact of 
environmental conditions on long-term progressive realisation will likely lead to severe 
retrogressive measures in future. The duty to avoid retrogression therefore includes an 
obligation to pursue sustainable measures to realise ESCRs that incorporate environmental 
protection and are resilient to climate change and environmental degradation.27 
An integrated understanding of progressive realisation requires placing appropriate limits 
on the meaning of “full realization” in article 2(1). The interpretation of what constitutes the 
full realisation of ESCRs must be defined according to levels of enjoyment that are feasible 
for all States Parties and their respective populations in light of planetary boundaries and 
the limits of natural resources.28 
The principle of integration also requires priority consideration to preserving the 
environmental conditions necessary to secure the minimum core of ESCRs. Fundamental 
environmental functions and ecosystems that are crucial for meeting core obligations must 
be identified and suitably protected. These aspects of the environment must be protected 
with the appropriate urgency and priority associated with core obligations.29 
In conclusion, the Committee has not expressly referred to the principle of integration, 
although it has referred to sustainability and sustainable development on a number of 
occasions. 30  The Committee has also recognised the impact of the environment on 
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ESCRs31 and has shown its support for imposing environment-related obligations on States 
Parties. 32  A comprehensive integration of environmental considerations within the 
Committee’s supervisory mandate will enable more systematic attention to the relationship 
between the environment and the Covenant and will assist in protecting ESCRs from 
preventable environmental degradation and climate change. The integration of the 
environment within the scope of States Parties’ obligations is an essential component of an 
evolutive interpretation of the Covenant under present-day conditions that are characterised 
by multiple environmental crises. 
7 3 2 2 Sustainable use 
The principle of sustainable use of natural resources aims to protect natural resources 
from overexploitation and depletion.33 Sustainable use requires the use of natural resources 
at a rate that does not lead to their decline or depletion but rather supports their continued 
use over the long term. Appropriate use of natural resources in the pursuit of ESCRs 
requires their sustainable use in order to secure sustained realisation of ESCRs and prevent 
retrogression. 
In identifying the resources available for the realisation of ESCRs, States Parties should 
exclude those natural resources whose use or exploitation cannot be achieved in 
accordance with the principle of sustainable use. In other words, if continued use of a natural 
resource would threaten the existence of that resource or lead to its depletion, it should not 
form part of the “maximum available resources” to be used by the State Party in the 
realisation of ESCRs. Similarly, natural resources should be deemed unavailable where their 
use or exploitation would lead to significant environmental harm.34 
States Parties are required to ensure the equitable use of resources in taking steps 
towards the realisation of ESCRs.35 Any incorporation of the principle of sustainable use 
must therefore be implemented in accordance with this obligation. Where the use of natural 
resources is limited in accordance with the principle of sustainable use, these limits must be 
                                            
2003) E/C12/2002/11 para 28; CESCR Statement in the Context of the Rio+20 Conference on “The Green 
Economy in the Context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication” (4 June 2012) E/C12/2012/1; 
CESCR The Pledge to Leave No One Behind: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (5 April 2019) E/C12/2019/1. See also Chapter 6, 
6 3 2 & 6 3 3 1 in relation to sustainability and the Covenant. 
31 See Chapter 2, 2 3. 
32 See Chapter 2, 2 3 2, 2 3 3 & 2 3 4 for an analysis of obligations related to the environment in the Committee’s 
concluding observations, general comments and statements. 
33 The principle of sustainable use is examined at Chapter 4, 4 3 1 3. 
34 See Chapter 5, 5 3 3 & 5 5 2.  




equitably imposed with particular consideration for those who are most marginalised and 
disadvantaged. In other words, the burden of any measures to secure sustainable use must 
be placed on those groups or individuals whose ESCRs will be least affected such as the 
wealthy and privileged sectors of society.36 
In the context of the duty of progressive realisation, the principle of sustainable use of 
natural resources is essential for maintaining (and, where possible, improving) the 
enjoyment of ESCRs over the long term.37 This requires considering not only what natural 
resources are currently available for ESCRs, but also whether those resources will be 
available in future. Similarly, the unsustainable use of natural resources may force States 
Parties to consider retrogressive measures. 38  However, as noted above, retrogressive 
measures would only be permitted in extreme circumstances and where the measures meet 
the criteria set by the Committee.39  
In conclusion, ensuring the effectiveness of the Covenant and the obligations imposed in 
article 2(1) requires the sustainable use of natural resources. Unfettered or unsustainable 
use of natural resources is a fundamental threat to the enjoyment of Covenant rights both 
now and in the future. States Parties’ obligations in article 2(1) must therefore be understood 
to include an obligation of sustainable use in relation to the natural resources on which 
ESCRs depend. 
7 3 2 3 Intergenerational equity 
Intergenerational equity entails ensuring that the conduct of the present generation does 
not place an undue burden on future generations.40 Given the long-term consequences of 
environmental degradation and climate change, it has become increasingly urgent to focus 
on the impact of these realities on the ability of future generations to access ESCRs and 
meet their basic needs. Although the Covenant does not explicitly confer rights on future 
generations, a teleological interpretation of the Covenant supports an interpretation of 
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ESCRs that includes long-term planning and a future-oriented view of progressive 
realisation.41 
Using the maximum of available resources for the realisation of ESCRs does not imply 
that all resources must be used in the short-term to fulfil the ESCRs of the current 
generation.42 Realising Covenant rights also requires long-term planning for the progressive 
realisation of ESCRs in the future.43 If this long-term planning is done effectively, it should 
include the protection of future generations from environmental harm that would undermine 
the fulfilment of their rights.44 Constraints on the use of natural resources as well as the 
dedication of resources to environmental protection are necessary to ensure progressive 
realisation and to prevent retrogression in the future. 45 Climate change mitigation and 
adaptation are particularly important in this regard due to the severe long-term impacts of 
climate change for present and future generations. 
In many cases, ensuring the long-term progressive realisation of ESCRs will benefit future 
generations, whether they are expressly included or not. Measures taken to protect the 
environment, mitigate climate change, or ensure that natural resources are not depleted will 
automatically benefit future generations and support their ability to meet ESCRs. As argued 
previously, given the nature of overlapping present and future generations, it would be 
illogical to suggest that progressive realisation does not include consideration of the rights 
of future generations.46 Both progressive realisation and intergenerational equity require an 
understanding of the long-term risks and consequences of measures taken in the pursuit of 
Covenant rights. 47  An approach that considers long-term effects and the role of the 
environment would also be more resilient against retrogression for both present and future 
generations.48 
While intergenerational equity under the Covenant cannot be interpreted as elevating the 
needs of non-existent persons over the rights of the current generation, it does require 
considering the position of future generations and the impact of current States Parties’ 
actions on future generations’ ESCRs.49 Measures that benefit both present and future 
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generations equitably must therefore be preferred over those that do not. Among other 
things, this may require determining appropriately sustainable levels of attainment 
associated with the full realisation of ESCRs in order to ensure that future generations are 
not disproportionately or inequitably burdened with environmental damage due to the 
overconsumption or greed of the current generation.50 
On a number of occasions, the Committee has indicated its support for intergenerational 
equity and the protection of the ESCRs of future generations. 51  The Committee has 
recognised the importance of ensuring access to food and water for future generations.52 In 
relation to climate change, the Committee has been critical of the negative impact on climate 
change and the ESCRs of future generations caused by extractive activities and fracking.53 
Perhaps most notably, General Comment 25 refers to “unacceptable harm to the public or 
the environment”, explaining that this would include harm that is inequitable to present or 
future generations. 54  What is evident from the provisions of the Covenant and the 
subsequent work of the Committee is that the position of future generations is a relevant 
consideration which must be taken into account when deciding on appropriate measures for 
the realisation of ESCRs. 
7 3 2 4 Intragenerational equity 
The final element of sustainable development to be considered is the principle of 
intragenerational equity. Intragenerational equity requires ensuring that the burdens of 
environmental degradation and climate change are not disproportionately placed on certain 
individuals or groups and that natural resources are used equitably.55  
Guaranteeing intragenerational equity under article 2(1) of the Covenant requires States 
Parties to ensure that the use of the “maximum of available resources” in the pursuit of 
                                            
50 See Chapter 6, 6 3 4 where it is argued that an evolutive interpretation of the full realisation of Covenant 
rights must incorporate environmental limits and planetary boundaries. See also Rockström et al (2009) Nature 
472; K Raworth Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st Century Economist (2017). 
51 See CESCR General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art 11 of the Covenant) (12 May 1999) 
E/C12/1999/5 para 7; CESCR General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (Arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) 
(20 January 2003) E/C12/2002/11 para 11 & 28; CESCR General Comment No 25 on Science and Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Art 15(1)(b), 15(2), 15(3) and 15(4)) (7 April 2020) E/C12/GC/25 para 56; CESCR 
Statement in the context of the Rio+20 Conference on “the green economy in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication” (4 June 2012) E/C12/2012/1 para 6(d); CESCR The Pledge to Leave 
No One Behind: The ICESCR and the 2030 Agenda para 12(e); CESCR Concluding Observations, Argentina 
(1 November 2018) E/C12/ARG/CO/4 para 13-15; CESCR Concluding Observations, Ecuador (14 November 
2019) E/C12/ECU/CO/4 para 11-12. 
52 CESCR General Comment No 12 para 7; CESCR General Comment No 15 para 11. 
53 CESCR Concluding Observations, Argentina (1 November 2018) E/C12/ARG/CO/4 para 13-15; CESCR 
Concluding Observations, Ecuador (14 November 2019) E/C12/ECU/CO/4 para 11-12.  
54 CESCR General Comment No 25 para 56. 




ESCRs does not disproportionately benefit or harm certain people. Where certain groups or 
geographical areas are burdened with increased pollution, environmental degradation, or 
climate change impacts, States Parties should allocate resources according to these 
needs.56 Those bearing the brunt of polluting industries should receive appropriate benefits 
and compensation for harm. In addition to this, resources aimed at environmental protection 
or pollution prevention should be targeted according to the measures that would provide 
relief for those whose ESCRs are most threatened by environmental harm. 
Where international resources are concerned, international assistance and cooperation 
should be guided by intragenerational equity.57 In other words, developed states should 
provide international resources to developing states, particularly where the developing 
states in question bear an inequitable burden of pollution and environmental harm. 58 This 
also forms part of the principle of CBDR examined below.59 Where natural resources are 
shared among multiple peoples or States Parties, the availability of these resources must 
be interpreted in accordance with the equitable use of these shared natural resources. 
States Parties cannot, therefore, use or consume shared resources without considering the 
human rights of other peoples and States Parties who depend on those resources.60 
As noted above, it is important that measures for progressive realisation are 
environmentally sustainable and do not result in undue environmental harm. Given the 
global nature of climate change and other environmental crises, the realisation of ESCRs 
over the long term cannot be effective if unsustainable and harmful practices continue. In 
light of this, it is important for States Parties to ensure that steps taken towards the 
realisation of ESCRs are sustainable for all States Parties. In other words, every State Party 
is obligated to provide international assistance and cooperation, in accordance with article 
2(1) and in pursuit of intragenerational equity, to ensure that all States Parties are able to 
implement the necessary measures to protect the environment and mitigate climate change 
in their progressive realisation of ESCRs.61 
The international assistance and cooperation referred to above is particularly important 
given the global and transboundary nature of environmental harm as well as its 
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disproportionate impact on the global south and on the poor.62 International assistance and 
cooperation therefore require concrete action for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
in order to safeguard the realisation of ESCRs by all States Parties, thereby promoting 
intragenerational equity. In particular, where the ability of a State Party to meet its core 
obligations under the Covenant is threatened by environmental degradation or climate 
change, all States Parties have an obligation to assist with the requisite urgency and 
priority.63 
Although the Committee does not directly mention the principle of intragenerational 
equity, the spirit of intragenerational equity is embedded in the Covenant and the work of 
the Committee. This is evident in relation to the Committee’s doctrine on equality, non-
discrimination and international assistance and cooperation64 as well as the Committee’s 
repeated insistence that ESCRs of those who are most marginalised and disadvantaged 
must be prioritised.65 The Committee emphasises its support for the most marginalised and 
disadvantaged individuals and groups in, for example, its statement in relation to “the pledge 
to leave no-one behind” in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.66 It is therefore 
consistent with the provisions of the Covenant and the subsequent practice of the 
Committee to interpret States Parties’ obligations to include intragenerational equity as a 
guiding principle. Understanding intragenerational equity in the Covenant from an 
environmental perspective means ensuring that certain individuals, groups and States 
Parties are not disproportionately impacted by environmentally harmful activities that 
threaten ESCRs and, that where undue environmental damage occurs, appropriate 
                                            
62 See, for example, CESCR CC and the ICESCR para 4; UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment: Climate Change (1 February 2016) A/HRC/31/52 para 27-29; UNHRC Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: Climate Change and Poverty (17 July 2019) A/HRC/41/39 
para 11-15. 
63 Chapter 6, 6 2 for a discussion of core obligations and the obligation to provide international assistance and 
cooperation. 
64 On equality and non-discrimination see, for example, CESCR General Comment No 16: The Equal Right of 
Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art 3 of the Covenant) (11 
August 2005) E/C12/2005/4; CESCR General Comment No 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Art 2, Para 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2 July 
2009) E/C12/GC/20. On international assistance and cooperation see, for example, CESCR General 
Comment No 3 para 13-14; CESCR General Comment No 12 para 36-41; CESCR General Comment No 14 
para 38-42 & 45; CESCR General Comment No 15 para 30-36 & 38; CESCR General Comment No 24 para 
11 & 30-35; CESCR Public Debt, Austerity Measures and the ICESCR para 7-9. 
65 See, for example, CESCR General Comment No 14 para 18, 37 & 43(a); CESCR General Comment No 15 
para 7; CESCR General Comment No 19 para 23 & 28; CESCR Statement on the Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) Pandemic and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (6 April 2020) E/C12/2020/1 para 2 & 5; 
CESCR The Pledge to Leave No One Behind: The ICESCR and the 2030 Agenda para 6-10.  
66 CESCR The Pledge to Leave No One Behind: The ICESCR and the 2030 Agenda para 6-10. See, for 
example, para 6 where the Committee states the following: “The concept of leaving no one behind in the 2030 
Agenda is in its essence a commitment by States to prioritize the needs of the most disadvantaged and 




compensation or assistance is provided, including environmental remediation and 
rehabilitation where possible. 
7 3 3 Sovereignty over natural resources and the no-harm principle 
The principle of state sovereignty over natural resources is an important component of 
IEL which is limited by its corollary, the no-harm principle or the prohibition of transboundary 
harm. States have the right to use and exploit their natural resources for the well-being of 
the people, but this is limited to the extent that a state’s activities must not cause harm to 
the environment outside of its jurisdiction.67 As De Schutter has observed, “[t]here is nothing 
that prohibits extending this [no-harm] principle, beyond environmental law, to human rights 
law”.68 
States Parties to the Covenant must ensure that they do not cause transboundary harm 
in their use of natural resources.69 Any exercise of state sovereignty in relation to natural 
resources should be carried out with due diligence. This requires understanding the impacts 
and risks that natural resource use and exploitation hold for both the environment and 
ESCRs. States Parties must make appropriate use of EIAs and HRIAs (or integrated impact 
assessments). 70 Where the use or exploitation of natural resources will cause harm to 
human rights or the environment outside of the State Party’s territory, the relevant activities 
must be avoided or prevented. 71  Given the role of corporations in natural resource 
exploitation, it is also important for States Parties to ensure that those private actors under 
their control are held responsible for harm caused as a result of natural resource exploitation 
in other territories.72 
In relation to the availability of resources, any natural resources whose exploitation cannot 
be achieved without significant transboundary environmental harm should not be considered 
“available” for the realisation of ESCRs.73 Similarly, shared resources should not be deemed 
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available if their use or exploitation will cause harm that infringes on the territory and 
sovereignty of another State Party.74 
Where core obligations are affected or threatened by transboundary environmental harm, 
there is a particular obligation on the responsible States Parties to provide international 
assistance and cooperation to the affected State Party. This should be done with the 
necessary urgency and priority required for the realisation of core obligations. This 
international assistance and cooperation should be required in addition to any compensation 
legally owed under IEL due to the failure to adhere to the no-harm principle.75 
The prohibition of transboundary harm and its position in customary international law has 
been recognised by the Committee in General Comment 24 in the context of extraterritorial 
obligations.76 There the Committee also confirms that this prohibition extends to human 
rights law.77 States Parties are thus prohibited from engaging in activities that cause harm 
to ESCRs in another state’s territory whether caused by environmental damage or not. It is 
important to note that, even if transboundary environmental harm does not have any direct 
impact on human rights, the responsible state remains liable under IEL in accordance with 
the no-harm principle. States Parties’ general obligations under article 2(1) of the Covenant 
must be interpreted to include an obligation to avoid and prevent transboundary harm to the 
environment that poses a threat to ESCRs. 
7 3 4 The preventive principle 
The nature of environmental damage means that it is often incredibly costly to remedy, 
and rehabilitation is not always practically or financially feasible. In addition to this, significant 
environmental harm can be irreversible. This is why IEL underscores the importance of 
prevention in order to protect the environment from irreversible damage. 78  While the 
preventive principle overlaps with the no-harm principle, it is more comprehensive and 
includes the prevention of environmental harm irrespective of where it occurs.79 
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The prevention of environmental harm is vital for the realisation of ESCRs. Irreversible 
environmental damage is an immense threat to all ESCRs and cannot be overlooked in 
measures taken to advance Covenant rights. 80  The use of natural resources for the 
realisation of ESCRs must therefore be constrained, particularly for certain categories of 
natural resources, where the process of exploitation or extraction necessarily poses a 
significant risk of harm to the environment and to ESCRs. 81 The availability of natural 
resources is dependent on their ability to be utilised without a risk of unacceptable harm to 
the environment or ESCRs.82  
Any exploitation of natural resources must also be accompanied by the due diligence 
required under the preventive principle.83 This includes assessing the relevant activity’s 
impact on the environment as well as on ESCRs.84 Where an activity proceeds despite a 
risk to the environment, it is essential to ensure that any detrimental impacts are mitigated 
or minimised. Crucially, where a State Party’s ability to meet core obligations is at risk, the 
preventive measures taken must be proportionate to the priority and urgency afforded to 
those core obligations by the Committee.85 
Effective prevention of environmental harm will require States Parties to dedicate the 
necessary resources to environmental governance and regulation, as well as the 
enforcement of environmental laws.86 Where States Parties already require EIAs for certain 
activities, it is important to include the requirement to assess how any identified 
environmental impacts will affect the realisation of ESCRs.87 The preventive principle not 
only requires pro-active impact assessments before the approval of potentially harmful 
activities, but it also requires an ongoing duty of care for the duration of such activities, 
including continuous monitoring of activities and their associated risks.88 
Measures to prevent environmental damage should be implemented in such a way that 
they have the least impact on individuals or groups who are already marginalised or 
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disadvantaged. Any taxes imposed, subsidies granted, or fees charged in relation to 
environmental protection must be carefully considered with respect to how they might impact 
the ESCRs of those affected by the measures in question. This is important in the context 
of, for example, climate change mitigation and a just transition away from energy policies 
that centre on fossil fuels to more sustainable energy sources.89 It would not be justifiable 
under the Covenant to promote environmental protection at the expense of the ESCRs of 
those who are marginalised or living in poverty.90 
States Parties cannot effectively respect, protect and fulfil ESCRs if they are not proactive 
in preventing irreversible environmental harm that will ultimately inhibit their ability to meet 
their obligations under the Covenant. The Committee has, for example, recognised the 
“massive threat” to ESCRs posed by climate change and the obligation of preventing 
foreseeable harm resulting from climate change.91 The Committee has also recommended 
the prevention of environmental harm in some of its concluding observations.92 Given the 
long-term and potentially irreversible impacts of environmental harm it is important that, 
wherever possible, environmental threats to ESCRs are prevented rather than mitigated or 
remedied after the fact. Any effective interpretation of the Covenant must include the 
protection of the environment and the prevention of environmental harm in order to 
safeguard the underlying environmental determinants of ESCRs. 
7 3 5 Precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle is an extension of prevention for circumstances where there 
is scientific uncertainty surrounding environmental impacts.93 Applying the precautionary 
principle requires the prevention of significant environmental harm even where it is not 
certain that such harm will occur or where the nature or extent of the harm is uncertain. 
Given the uncertain nature of predicting future impacts, this principle ensures that potentially 
harmful activities are not permitted simply on the basis of the uncertainty of environmental 
harm. The principle also requires proactive precautionary action to be taken in order to 
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prevent uncertain but significant environmental harm. Protecting ESCRs from the impacts 
of environmental damage requires appropriate application of the precautionary principle. 
Where there is a significant risk to ESCRs as a result of environmental harm, this must be 
prevented, whether or not detrimental consequences are certain. 
Applying the precautionary principle means limiting the use of natural resources where 
there is an uncertain risk of significant harm. 94  Impact assessments should be 
comprehensive and assess all possible harm as a result of the relevant activities, including 
uncertain impacts. Where impact assessments indicate significant potential harm, the 
proposed activity should be avoided or prevented.95 Although the financial revenue from 
natural resource exploitation can advance ESCRs, this benefit must be weighed against the 
extent of the harm to ESCRs as a result of potential environmental degradation.96 This 
involves a proportionality enquiry: the more significant the scope of potential harm, the more 
stringently the precautionary principle should be applied. In relation to private actors, the 
precautionary principle should be applied to licensing applications for natural resource 
exploitation by placing a burden of proof on these private actors to show that significant 
harm to the environment and ESCRs will not occur.97 
Appropriate application of the precautionary principle can safeguard the ability of States 
Parties to realise ESCRs both now and in the future by preventing environmental damage 
that may last for generations. Even where the likelihood and scope of harm cannot be 
precisely determined, it is important that States Parties exercise caution when taking 
measures to implement ESCRs that might have a detrimental impact on the environment.98 
In relation to core obligations, the standard of precaution applied to environmental threats 
must be even higher. Where a particular measure poses an uncertain but significant risk to 
the minimum core of ESCRs, the State Party must exercise considerable caution. This is 
particularly important where basic subsistence rights are at risk. Similarly, a higher standard 
of precaution is required where there is a risk to environmental functions and ecosystems 
that are essential to the guarantee of core obligations.99 In such cases, States Parties have 
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a positive obligation to take precautionary action to prevent the relevant potential harm to 
the environment and ESCRs. 
Where precautionary action is taken to prevent harm it may, in rare circumstances, 
necessitate retrogression. As noted above, this should only be considered by States Parties 
as a last resort and after the use of the maximum of available resources.100 In such instances 
the harm of the retrogressive measures proposed to prevent environmental damage must 
be weighed against the severity of the potential harm to the environment and ESCRs if no 
preventive action is taken. 101  Any such retrogressive measures must be necessary, 
temporary, proportional and non-discriminatory.102 
It is noteworthy that in the last few years the Committee has made explicit reference to 
the precautionary principle on three occasions. First, in its 2018 concluding observations in 
relation to Argentina the Committee recommended that the precautionary principle be 
included in the State Party’s regulatory framework dealing with the use of potentially harmful 
pesticides and herbicides.103 In 2019, the Committee recommended that Israel conduct 
impact assessments regarding the spraying of potentially harmful herbicides, stating that, 
pending the results, “the State party should, on the basis of the precautionary principle, 
cease such spraying”. 104 Finally, in General Comment 25 the Committee refers to the 
principle in the context of scientific research and explains that the precautionary principle 
“demands that, in the absence of full scientific certainty, when an action or policy may lead 
to unacceptable harm to the public or the environment, actions shall be taken to avoid or 
diminish that harm”.105 These recent references to the precautionary principle suggest a 
growing acceptance by the Committee of the relevance of the principle for ESCRs and the 
implementation of the Covenant. Article 2(1) should therefore be interpreted to include an 
obligation on States Parties to prevent significant or irreversible environmental harm that will 
affect the enjoyment of ESCRs, even where there is uncertainty regarding the likelihood or 
scope of the harm. 
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7 3 6 Polluter pays principle 
The polluter pays principle requires the internalisation of costs in relation to environmental 
harm and related remediation and rehabilitation. According to the polluter pays principle the 
costs associated with pollution must be borne by those who are responsible in order to 
ensure that the general public and the state are not burdened with a degraded natural 
environment or the loss of funds directed at environmental remediation or rehabilitation.106 
Appropriate use of the polluter pays principle protects the natural and financial resources of 
States Parties from the undue burden of remedying harm caused by polluters. This also 
supports intragenerational equity and ensures that instead of (often poorer) communities 
bearing the brunt of pollution, private actors that benefit from polluting activities will bear the 
cost.107 
In order to use the “maximum of available resources” for the realisation of ESCRs in 
accordance with article 2(1) of the Covenant, it is vital that States Parties’ natural resources 
are protected from pollution by private actors. States Parties’ financial resources must not 
be unduly redirected towards cleaning up after those who have profited from polluting 
activities. A failure to appropriately apply the polluter pays principle means that rights-
holders bear the brunt of polluting industries either through a degraded environment 
impacting on ESCRs or through the inappropriate use of public funds to support polluters’ 
activities.108 
In the context of the Covenant it is important that polluters are held responsible not only 
for environmental harm caused in accordance with IEL, but also for the related impacts on 
ESCRs. This requires accurate and comprehensive assessments of the costs associated 
with the pollution that also take their long-term impacts into account. A superficial application 
of the polluter pays principle that fails to take long-term impacts and costs into account will 
result in insufficient compensation, leaving a large gap to be filled with public funds, either 
at the time of the pollution or in the future when further detrimental impacts materialise.109 
Protecting ESCRs through the use of the polluter pays principle requires legislative 
measures at a national and international level that take appropriate account of the full range 
of impacts and allow for a comprehensive determination of compensation under the polluter 
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pays principle, as well as for remediation and rehabilitation where possible.110 Effective 
enforcement of legislation providing for the polluter pays principle is also vital. In the absence 
of effective enforcement of the polluter pays principle, States Parties are at risk of being 
unexpectedly burdened with significant costs related to emergency clean-up operations that 
may reduce ESCR budgets and could result in retrogressive measures.111 
Comprehensive application of the polluter pays principle in domestic and international law 
is essential for the protection of ESCRs and the environment, and supports equitable 
distribution of the costs of environmental degradation. It is clear that it would be wholly 
inconsistent with the Covenant to protect the financial interests of private actors engaged in 
polluting activities at the expense of the environment and the ESCRs of affected 
communities and the broader public. The Committee has recommended that States Parties 
prevent pollution and environmental harm. However, aside from insisting that those affected 
are compensated for harm, it has rarely addressed the question of costs associated with the 
rehabilitation and remediation of the environment.112 It is important to ensure that those 
responsible for harm to the environment bear the costs for remediation and rehabilitation of 
the affected environment through appropriate legislation and enforcement. This protects 
ESCRs from the short- and long-term effects of a degraded natural environment as well as 
from any reduction in public funds that may be unduly directed at rehabilitating the 
environment on behalf of polluters. 
7 3 7 Common but differentiated responsibilities 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (“CBDR”) has a degree of 
overlap with the polluter pays principle in that both principles seek to ensure fairness by 
placing the responsibility for environmental harm on the shoulders of those who cause it.113 
CBDR aims to balance the needs and interests of states at different levels of development, 
taking into account their relative contributions to global environmental harm, as well as their 
respective capabilities to address environmental harm. 114  Viewing CBDR from the 
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perspective of the Covenant requires considering how ESCRs within certain States Parties 
are disproportionately impacted by global environmental challenges that arise from the 
actions of other States Parties. CBDR promotes intragenerational equity by recognising that 
those States Parties that have contributed significantly to climate change and global 
environmental degradation also have a corresponding responsibility to prevent further harm 
and provide assistance to the most affected States Parties. 
The Covenant provides for international resources to be used for the realisation of ESCRs 
in the form of international assistance and cooperation.115 When read with the principle of 
CBDR, States Parties are under a particular obligation to provide such assistance and 
cooperation where their actions have contributed to environmental harm that threatens 
ESCRs in other jurisdictions. 116  States Parties affected by such harm should seek 
assistance from those that bear greater responsibility for the harm caused.117 The provision 
of international resources in accordance with article 2(1) of the Covenant is an obligation 
that States Parties must meet in addition to any other obligations that may exist under IEL 
as a result of transboundary environmental harm caused.118 
The principle of CBDR also underscores the importance of providing international 
assistance and cooperation to respond to environmental challenges such as climate change 
that threaten the progressive realisation of ESCRs.119 For example, the Covenant should be 
interpreted to include international assistance and cooperation by means of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in order to secure the resilience and sustainability of ESCRs over 
the long term. The form of international resources provided under article 2(1) could therefore 
include resources related to environmental protection or climate change adaptation where 
these challenges pose a threat to ESCRs.120 The provision of international assistance and 
cooperation should also be guided by CBDR and intragenerational equity, focusing on those 
who are most severely affected by climate change and the related impacts on ESCRs. 
The obligation of international assistance and cooperation is more stringent where core 
obligations are concerned. Taking the principle of CBDR into account, there is a particularly 
strong obligation to provide international resources for the realisation of core obligations 
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where, for example, States Parties bear responsibility for the climate change that causes 
the harm in question.121 
The principle of CBDR has not been directly referenced by the Committee in its general 
comments, statements or concluding observations. It does, however, form part of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 122 and the related Paris Agreement,123 both of 
which have been supported by the Committee. On a number of occasions, the Committee 
has urged States Parties to meet their commitments in terms of these climate change 
agreements.124 Many States Parties are therefore already required to apply the principle of 
CBDR in that sphere. In the context of article 2(1) of the Covenant, the principle is useful in 
providing a framework for prioritising and coordinating States Parties’ duties under the 
obligation of international assistance and cooperation. It is important to stress that the use 
of this principle as a guide for the interpretation of the Covenant does not remove any 
additional legal responsibility on States Parties for harm caused under IEL. The principle of 
CBDR also does not substantively alter the international obligations under article 2(1), but it 
serves as a guide for States Parties’ action by ensuring that the extent of international 
cooperation and assistance is commensurate with States Parties’ responsibility for the 
environmental harm that threatens ESCRs. 
7 3 8 Conclusion 
The principles of IEL thus demonstrate how the obligations under article 2(1) of the 
Covenant should be interpreted to include environmental considerations. In some instances, 
the Committee’s work reveals support for these principles, for example in the case of 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principle, although a number of the principles 
discussed above have not been explicitly endorsed by the Committee. However, it is evident 
that referring to these principles to guide the interpretation of article 2(1) is consistent with a 
teleological interpretation of the Covenant that is effective and evolves appropriately with 
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changing circumstances. Reliance on the principles of IEL for a green interpretation of the 
Covenant also facilitates the harmonisation of IEL with international human rights law. 
7 4 Greening States Parties’ obligations: Proposed obligations 
7 4 1 Introduction 
As demonstrated above, the Covenant imposes certain obligations on States Parties that 
relate to the environment. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the concepts of maximum available 
resources, core obligations, progressive realisation and retrogression in order to explore 
and delineate some of these environment-related obligations that arise from a teleological 
interpretation of the Covenant. This dissertation has referred to a wide range of environment-
related obligations that should be imposed on States Parties in greening article 2(1). The 
most significant of these are synthesised and highlighted here.  
7 4 2 Maximum available resources 
Greening the obligation to use “the maximum of available resources” for the realisation of 
ESCRs requires the active integration of environmental considerations within the notion of 
resources, with particular attention to the role of natural resources. Viewed qualitatively, 
natural resources must be understood in light of their role as fundamental determinants of 
ESCRs and States Parties should therefore invest in their protection.125 Resources must be 
devoted to environmental protection to the extent that it is necessary to prevent related harm 
to ESCRs. With reference to the availability of resources, natural resources must be deemed 
unavailable for use where it is not possible to exploit them in accordance with the principle 
of sustainable use,126 or where their extraction or exploitation will result in harm to Covenant 
rights.127 
In order to ensure the effective use of resources, 128  States Parties must require 
appropriate use of EIAs and HRIAs prior to making decisions regarding activities that may 
cause harm to the environment and ESCRs.129 This is essential to ensuring that decision-
                                            
125 See Chapter 5, 5 3 1 and 5 6 3 where this is argued for in the context of a qualitative approach to resources. 
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) 9 HR Quarterly 122-135 para 27. 
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makers take all relevant risks and impacts into account. Such impact assessments are 
particularly important, and must be mandated, wherever the exploitation of natural resources 
is concerned. 130  Greening the requirement of effective use of resources includes an 
obligation to prevent corruption and mismanagement in relation to environmental resources, 
including through environmental legislation and related enforcement.131 Such environmental 
laws must also provide for the comprehensive application of the polluter pays principle.132  
In addition to effective use, States Parties are obligated to use resources equitably. From 
an environmental perspective, this requires States Parties to promote the equitable 
distribution of environmental resources as well as environmental costs. Where measures 
are taken to protect the environment or natural resources, such measures must have the 
least detrimental impact on individuals and communities that are already marginalised and 
disadvantaged. Similarly, resources allocated towards environmental protection should be 
targeted according to the needs of those communities where the brunt of environmental 
degradation and pollution is felt. 133 Wherever private actors benefit from environmental 
harm, for example in relation to natural resource exploitation, States Parties must also 
protect local communities from the impacts of these activities. This should be done through 
appropriate mechanisms such as licensing processes and fees, taxation of profits, 134 
financial provisioning for future environmental impacts135 and appropriate compensation for 
harm.136 With respect to licensing and approval processes, it is vital that local communities 
are given opportunities for participation and consultation and, in the case of indigenous 
communities, that all private actors respect the right of FPIC.137 
An interpretation of the obligation to use the maximum of available resources that 
incorporates environmental considerations, therefore includes the following obligations on 
                                            
130 The exploitation of natural resources is addressed in detail at Chapter 5, 5 4 2. 
131 See Chapter 5, 5 6 1 and 5 6 3 in relation to effective use States Parties’ obligations related to preventing 
corruption. 
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133 See CESCR The Pledge to Leave No One Behind: The ICESCR and the 2030 Agenda para 6-10. See 
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States Parties: (1) to consider environmental factors in decisions related to resource use, 
mobilisation and allocation; (2) to devote the necessary resources to the protection of the 
environment so as to prevent related harm to ESCRs; (3) to use resources sustainably and 
place limitations on resource use that is harmful to the environment or unsustainable; (4) to 
ensure the effective use of the environment and natural resources for the realisation of 
ESCRs; (5) to ensure that the use and exploitation of natural resources does not harm or 
threaten ESCRs, including through undertaking environmental and human rights impact 
assessments; and (6) to prevent activities related to the exploitation of natural resources 
where the benefit of such exploitation does not outweigh the impacts on the environment 
and ESCRs. 
7 4 3 Core obligations  
Under the Covenant, core obligations must be met with particular priority and urgency.138 
Greening the Covenant therefore requires a commensurate prioritisation of aspects of the 
environment that are essential for meeting core obligations. States Parties must determine 
the nature and extent of the baseline environmental conditions required to meet their core 
obligations. These minimum environmental conditions must then be protected through the 
use of all necessary measures and with the appropriate urgency and priority. Where the 
core of ESCRs is threatened by activities that may cause environmental harm, the standard 
of precaution exercised must be proportionate to the extent of the potential harm to ESCRs. 
The standard of precaution exercised must therefore be particularly rigorous where basic 
subsistence is threatened. 
The Committee has emphasised that obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation are particularly stringent where core obligations are concerned.139 In light of 
this, States Parties have a particular obligation to provide assistance and cooperation to 
States Parties whose core obligations are under threat as a result of the impacts of 
environmental degradation and climate change. This obligation is further underscored by 
the principles of intragenerational equity and CBDR, especially where climate change is 
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concerned. 140  Adequate international assistance and cooperation in this regard must 
include international cooperation for the mitigation of climate change as well as assistance 
in relation to climate change adaptation for the most affected States Parties where the core 
of ESCRs is at risk.141 
Integrating environmental considerations within core obligations under the Covenant 
therefore entails the following obligations on States Parties: (1) to prevent and avoid impacts 
on the environment, ecosystems and environmental functions that are integral to the 
realisation of the minimum core of ESCRs; (2) to determine the baseline of minimum 
environmental conditions, both globally and within the State Party’s territory, on which core 
obligations depend and to prioritise the protection of this environmental base through all 
necessary measures; (3) to apply the precautionary principle to all activities that may result 
in significant harm to the environment and to exercise particular precaution where there is 
any risk of environmental harm that would affect the ability of States Parties to meet their 
core obligations. 
7 4 4 Progressive realisation and non-retrogression 
Article 2(1) places an obligation on States Parties to take steps “with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization” of the rights in the Covenant. An interpretation that is 
appropriately evolutive and effective must understand “the full realization” of ESCRs in the 
context of present-day environmental conditions. The level of enjoyment of ESCRs that is 
understood as “full realization” must therefore be attainable for all in light of the thresholds 
of natural resources, planetary boundaries, and any other relevant environmental limitations. 
This full realisation can be viewed as the ceiling of ESCRs and of the obligation of 
progressive realisation.142 
Incorporating environmental considerations into article 2(1) requires States Parties to 
take the environment into account in any plans, programmes and policies aimed at the 
progressive realisation of ESCRs. In choosing measures to progressively realise ESCRs, 
States Parties must assess the impacts of such measures on the environment and, 
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wherever possible, select those measures that have the least harmful consequences for the 
environment and ESCRs. In addition to this, States Parties must consider and assess the 
impacts of any steps towards environmental protection on marginalised and disadvantaged 
individuals and communities. As these sectors of society often bear a disproportionate 
burden of pollution and environmental harm, it is critical that they do not also bear the burden 
of measures to protect the environment. Where measures are implemented for the 
sustainable use of natural resources, environmental protection, pollution prevention or 
similar interventions, States Parties must ensure that they do not have inequitable or 
disproportionate impacts on marginalised or disadvantaged individuals and communities. 
Progressive realisation does not only require that States Parties attain a certain level of 
enjoyment of ESCRs, it also requires that such levels are maintained.143 In order to realise 
and maintain ESCRs, and thereby to prevent retrogression, States Parties must ensure the 
long-term viability of measures taken as well as the sustainable use of resources. This 
includes, for example, the obligation to plan and budget for the management, operation and 
maintenance of infrastructure in order to avoid retrogression resulting from poorly planned 
measures.144 Maintaining levels of attainment of ESCRs also requires a concerted effort 
from States Parties to provide for climate change mitigation and adaptation, both within their 
jurisdictions as well as through international assistance and cooperation, in order to avoid 
retrogression as a result of climate change impacts. 
In relation to intergenerational equity, there is an obligation on States Parties to take the 
rights of future generations into account when making decisions regarding to the progressive 
realisation of Covenant rights. The Committee has already affirmed that environmental harm 
is unacceptable where it is inequitable to present and future generations.145 States Parties 
must therefore promote intergenerational equity in decisions related to the environment by 
preventing inequitable harm and protecting the environment for future generations. 
Measures that support a healthy environment for both present and future generations must 
be preferred over those that do not. 
Under an interpretation of progressive realisation that incorporates environmental 
considerations, States Parties therefore have an obligation: (1) to consider the environment 
in determining measures for the progressive realisation of ESCRs and to select those 
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measures that realise ESCRs while also protecting the environment and future generations; 
(2) to ensure that the progressive realisation of ESCRs is sustainable, particularly in relation 
to the use of natural resources; (3) to avoid unacceptable harm to the environment that 
would be inequitable to present or future generations, including by safeguarding the 
minimum baseline of environmental conditions necessary to realise core obligations in 
future; and (4) to incorporate the needs of future generations into long-term plans for the 
realisation of ESCRs.  
7 4 5 International assistance and cooperation 
Article 2(1) requires States Parties to take steps “individually and through international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical” to progressively realise 
ESCRs. International assistance and cooperation was not analysed in particular detail in this 
dissertation, except to the extent relevant for the examination of maximum available 
resources, core obligations, progressive realisation, and non-retrogression. However, a 
number of relevant environment-related obligations were identified, particularly in the 
context of maximum available resources and core obligations.  
With regard to maximum available resources, States Parties’ consideration of available 
resources must include international resources obtained through international assistance 
and cooperation.146 This is particularly important in relation to environmental challenges of 
a transboundary or global nature. States Parties must provide international assistance and 
cooperation in order to address environmental degradation and climate change that poses 
a risk to the realisation of ESCRs. States Parties must also provide assistance and 
cooperate by sharing any scientific and technological research, training and expertise that 
are essential for environmental protection as well as climate change mitigation and 
adaptation.147 
The Committee has made it clear that the obligation of international assistance and 
cooperation is of particular importance where core obligations are concerned.148 States 
Parties are obligated to provide assistance and cooperation to any State Party that is unable 
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to meet its core obligations, and to act with the requisite urgency and priority. From an 
environmental perspective, this includes an obligation on States Parties to provide 
assistance and cooperation in relation to climate change mitigation and adaptation in areas 
where climate change threatens the ability of a State Party to meet its core obligations.  
States Parties must promote the principle of CBDR in international law and target efforts 
of international assistance and cooperation accordingly, with particular attention to assisting 
those States Parties that are severely and disproportionately affected by climate change, 
such as small island developing states.149 Those States Parties with the most responsibility 
for climate change have a stronger obligation to provide international assistance and 
cooperation in that regard, including through appropriate adjustments to their energy 
policies.150 In addition, States Parties seeking international assistance should be guided by 
the principle of CBDR when requesting assistance related to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. 
An interpretation of article 2(1) that incorporates the environment therefore includes 
obligations to provide international assistance and cooperation through: (1) addressing 
environmental degradation and climate change that pose a threat to ESCRs, particularly 
where core obligations are at risk; (2) sharing scientific and technological resources in 
relation to environmental protection and climate change mitigation and adaptation; and (3) 
mitigating climate change by making changes to the State Party’s own energy policies. 
States Parties in need of resources to protect ESCRs from environmental harm also have 
an obligation under the Covenant to seek international assistance and cooperation. Finally, 
in meeting these obligations to seek and to provide international assistance and cooperation 
States Parties must be guided by the principle of CBDR. 
7 5 Principles and factors to guide decision-making 
This dissertation has argued that environmental protection is a necessary and 
fundamental measure for States Parties to take in the interests of the progressive realisation 
of ESCRs. However, a degree of environmental harm is sometimes unavoidable, and 
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perhaps inevitable, as a result of the development that is required for the realisation of 
ESCRs, particularly were low-income developing and least developed states are concerned. 
As both development and environmental protection are essential for the protection and 
realisation of Covenant rights, it is crucial for States Parties to balance these interests 
carefully in deciding on the most appropriate measures to realise ESCRs. 
Although this dissertation has not explored these complex and multi-faceted decisions in 
detail, Chapters 5 and 6 refer to a number of principles and factors that can guide States 
Parties’ decision-making in this regard. It is therefore useful to reiterate these here. Before 
outlining the factors and principles below, it is important to emphasise that, wherever 
possible within the maximum of available resources, States Parties are required to realise 
ESCRs while also protecting the environment that Covenant rights depend on. These factors 
and principles are tools to identify those circumstances in which a degree of environmental 
harm can be justified due to limited resources and alternatives, and to guide decision-making 
in that regard. 
First, any decisions regarding measures to realise ESCRs must take into account all 
relevant risks and potential impacts. This requires the appropriate use of EIAs and HRIAs.151 
Impacts on ESCRs resulting from the potential environmental harm must be measured 
against the benefits for ESCRs if the environmentally harmful activity proceeds. The 
precautionary principle has an important role to play in this regard.152 Where scientifically 
uncertain environmental harm poses a significant risk to ESCRs, the harm should be 
prevented and avoided. The proportionality of all potential risks and benefits should also be 
carefully considered. Significant environmental harm must not be justified in the interests of 
minimal gains in the realisation of ESCRs. 
In deciding on appropriate measures for the realisation of ESCRs, States Parties are also 
required not to discriminate, and to pay particular attention to the position of the most 
marginalised and disadvantaged. 153 This requires States Parties to take note of which 
individuals and groups stand to benefit from an activity that may harm the environment, as 
well as noting who will bear the brunt of the environmental harm if the activity were to 
proceed. Wherever possible States Parties should avoid environmental harm while also 
providing additional assistance to those who are disproportionately affected by, for example, 
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unemployment or increased costs of energy and transport.154 Where necessary, States 
Parties should use progressive taxation and other mechanisms to protect the poor from any 
disproportionate impacts.155 
Other important factors include the extent to which the minimum core is threatened, either 
by potential environmental harm or by a failure to pursue environmentally harmful 
development. The factors and principles identified by the Committee in the context of 
retrogressive measures are also relevant wherever retrogression might occur. These are 
explored in detail in Chapter 6.156 
Finally, the obligation of international assistance and cooperation should be 
considered.157 Wealthy States Parties are required to provide assistance and cooperation 
for the progressive realisation of ESCRs, including for the protection of the environmental 
base on which the rights depend. As noted above, the principle of CBDR should guide offers 
and requests for international assistance and cooperation. 158 Developed States Parties 
therefore have a particular obligation to provide a variety of resources so that developing 
and least developed States Parties have the ability to choose steps towards the realisation 
of Covenant rights that realise ESCRs without significantly compromising the environment, 
thereby protecting ESCRs over the long-term.   
The abovementioned factors and principles are by no means a comprehensive list of 
considerations. They do, however, serve as a point of departure for States Parties in 
ensuring that environmental considerations are appropriately balanced with other interests 
when choosing the most suitable measures for realising ESCRs in both the short term and 
long term. It is important to note that, for wealthy developed countries, it will be far more 
difficult to justify environmental harm that detrimentally impacts ESCRs, under the guise of 
the progressive realisation of ESCRs. Ultimately, States Parties must make these decisions 
on a case-by-case basis with due consideration for the specific needs and vulnerabilities of 
their population as well as the particular environmental conditions (and impacts) within the 
State Party, and globally. In doing so, States Parties must seek to progressively realise 
ESCRs as expeditiously and effectively as possible. 
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7 6 Conclusion 
The state of the environment is a critical determinant of ESCRs and States Parties’ ability 
to meet their obligations under article 2(1) of the Covenant. A degraded environment places 
ESCRs, and indeed human survival, at risk. Any effective implementation of the Covenant 
therefore requires the integration of environmental considerations into States Parties’ 
obligations under article 2(1). Appropriately greening article 2(1) requires adherence to the 
rules applicable to the interpretation of human rights treaties. As demonstrated in section 2 
above, a teleological interpretation of the Covenant that is effective and appropriately adapts 
to changing circumstances is one that actively integrates the environment. The interpretive 
rules explored in Chapter 3 affirm that the integration of environmental considerations within 
States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) is essential for the realisation of ESCRs.159 
The greening of States Parties’ obligations in this dissertation draws on the principles of 
IEL. These principles guide the interpretation of the Covenant and assist in identifying how 
States Parties’ measures to realise ESCRs can promote environmental protection as well 
as protect ESCRs from harm caused by environmental degradation and climate change. As 
outlined above, the principles of environmental law have directed the interpretation of 
maximum available resources, core obligations, progressive realisation, and non-
retrogression in this dissertation thereby facilitating the identification of States Parties’ 
obligations related to the environment.160 
This chapter synthesises the most important States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) 
that relate to the environment and have been identified and examined in Chapters 5 and 
6.161 These obligations are vital for protecting ESCRs from the threats of environmental 
degradation and climate change. It is therefore recommended that these obligations be 
included in the Committee’s interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) of 
the Covenant. The obligations identified in this dissertation do not purport to be a 
comprehensive list of all States Parties’ obligations that relate to the environment. It is 
important that the Committee continue to evolve and adapt its interpretation of article 2(1) 
according to changing circumstances as well as in light of new scientific discoveries and 
developments. However, these obligations provide an important baseline for the integration 
of environmental considerations within States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1). The 
inclusion of these and other environment-related obligations is critical in order to ensure the 
                                            
159 See section 7 2 above. 
160 See section 7 3 above. 




continued effectiveness and relevance of the Covenant in guaranteeing ESCRs for all in the 
face of growing environmental challenges. 
Finally, the chapter reiterates factors and principles that should guide States Parties’ 
decision-making in relation to appropriate measures for the realisation of ESCRs, as 
identified in Chapters 5 and 6. These are important considerations for States Parties that 
are compelled to consider environmental harm in the interests of progressively realising 
ESCRs, and will only be relevant where the maximum of available resources have been 





CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8 1 Introduction 
Economic, social and cultural rights are increasingly threatened by environmental 
challenges that are largely driven by human activity. In particular, climate change poses an 
existential threat to human life and the ability of States Parties to guarantee ESCRs.1 In 
order to continue to safeguard the rights under the Covenant, it is imperative that 
environmental considerations are systematically and comprehensively integrated within the 
Covenant. This project of greening the Covenant must be done in accordance with the rules 
of interpretation applicable to human rights treaties. This dissertation has shown that a 
teleological interpretation of the Covenant with an evolutive approach supports, and indeed 
requires, the integration of environmental considerations.  
As demonstrated in this dissertation, the principles of IEL provide guidance for this 
interpretation of the Covenant by highlighting how relevant environmental challenges have 
been regulated in IEL and through promoting the harmonisation of human rights law and 
IEL.2 Their nature as legal principles means that these principles of IEL are sufficiently 
flexible for context-specific application by States Parties both under IEL and, where 
consistent with the rules of interpretation, within the scope of the Covenant.3 
Focusing on the interpretation of States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1) of the 
Covenant in this dissertation has allowed for an interpretation of key aspects of the Covenant 
that have significant implications for the realisation of all ESCRs. In light of the fact that 
article 2 has “a dynamic relationship with all of the other provisions of the Covenant”, the 
whole of the Covenant can thus be infused with environmental considerations through the 
greening of article 2(1). 4  This ensures that environmental considerations are actively 
integrated within all States Parties’ measures towards realising ESCRs, thereby 
safeguarding both the environment on which these ESCRs depend as well as the continued 
ability of States Parties to realise ESCRs in the face of environmental degradation and 
climate change. 
Chapter 7 has provided a synthesis of the findings from Chapters 3 to 6 of the dissertation. 
Without duplicating the contents of Chapter 7, this chapter concludes by reviewing how this 
dissertation has addressed the research problem and supplementary research aims as 
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identified in Chapter 1. Following this, the chapter highlights the most significant 
contributions made by this research for a proposed interpretation of States Parties’ 
obligations that integrates environmental considerations. Finally, a number of important 
areas for future research will be outlined. 
8 2 Reviewing the research problem and supplementary aims 
The primary research problem identified in Chapter 1 posed the question of how the 
Covenant should be interpreted in order to systematically integrate environmental 
considerations. This dissertation has answered that question with reference to the rules of 
interpretation, principles of IEL, and States Parties’ obligations under article 2(1). 
The rules of interpretation examined in Chapter 2 prescribe how human rights treaties, 
and the Covenant in particular, should be interpreted. As has been argued, a teleological 
interpretation of the Covenant requires the appropriate integration of environmental 
considerations in order to ensure that the object and purpose of the Covenant can be 
realised.5 In particular, the principle of effectiveness underscores the fact that the Covenant 
cannot be effective and practical in ensuring ESCRs if the environment is not considered.6 
Similarly, an evolutive approach to the interpretation of the Covenant emphasises that the 
Covenant is a living instrument that must evolve appropriately in light of present-day 
circumstances, which are characterised by widespread environmental upheaval and related 
threats to ESCRs.7 
A supplementary aim of this dissertation was to identify relevant and recognised principles 
of IEL to guide the process of greening the Covenant through interpretation. Chapter 4 
examined a selection of principles of IEL for this purpose. These principles were applied in 
Chapters 5 and 6 in the context of interpreting key elements of article 2(1) of the Covenant. 
The contribution of each of these principles to an integrated environmental interpretation of 
article 2(1) is summarised in Chapter 7.8 This dissertation demonstrates that the principles 
of IEL have relevance for States Parties’ obligations under the Covenant and can contribute 
to a systematic integration of environmental considerations. This is confirmed by the 
Committee’s express recognition and reliance on certain principles of IEL.9 The proposed 
                                            
5 See Chapter 3, 3 3 2 3 and 3 3 3 2 in relation to teleological interpretation. See also Chapter 7, 7 2. 
6 See Chapter 3, 3 3 3 2 1 on the principle of effectiveness. 
7 The evolutive approach to interpretation is examined at Chapter 3, 3 3 3 2 2. On human rights treaties as 
living instruments see for example, Mapiripán Massacre vs Colombia Series C No 122 (2005) IACtHR para 
106; Tyrer v United Kingdom Application Number 5856/72 (1978) ECtHR para 31 & Judge v Canada 
Communication No 829/1998, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2003) HRC para 10.3. 
8 See Chapter 7, 7 2 where the interpretive support for greening States Parties’ obligations is presented. 
9 See, for example, Chapter 7, 7 3 3 and 7 3 5 on the Committee’s explicit reference to the no-harm principle 




interpretation of article 2(1) illustrates that a systematic and active process of integrating 
environmental principles within the scope of States Parties’ obligations strengthens the 
Covenant’s responsiveness to environmental challenges and promotes the effective 
realisation of ESCRs. 
Another aim of this dissertation was to investigate how States Parties’ obligations can be 
interpreted so as to integrate environmental considerations within the Covenant in 
accordance with the rules of interpretation. As noted above, the rules of interpretation are 
examined in Chapter 2. This dissertation has interpreted key elements of article 2(1) in 
accordance with this methodology. As demonstrated by Chapters 5 to 7, combining the rules 
of interpretation with the selected principles of IEL allows for a more systematic approach to 
the integration of environmental considerations. The relevance of the principles of IEL for 
the interpretation of article 2(1) has been tested against the interpretive methodology 
outlined in Chapter 2. As noted above, the emphasis on key elements of article 2(1) also 
supports a systematic approach to greening the Covenant, ensuring that all ESCRs are 
implemented with reference to relevant environmental considerations. The most significant 
contributions of the proposed interpretation are discussed further below. 
The final aim of this dissertation was to identify relevant environment-related obligations 
that should be imposed on States Parties in order to protect the environment on which 
ESCRs depend and to ensure States Parties’ continued ability to realise Covenant rights. 
Various environment-related obligations are identified in Chapters 5 and 6, and the most 
significant of these are synthesised in Chapter 7.10 As this dissertation demonstrates, these 
obligations are critical to guaranteeing the enjoyment of ESCRs. The overarching obligation 
on States Parties is to take the environment into account wherever it is relevant for the 
enjoyment of ESCRs. 
8 3 Significance of the dissertation 
This section highlights a selection of important contributions made by this dissertation to 
the interpretation of article 2(1). These relate to the guidance of the principles of IEL, the 
qualitative approach to resources, the concept of minimum environmental conditions, and 
the interpretation of “full realization” under article 2(1) in light of relevant environmental 
constraints. These are detailed below. 
This dissertation has indicated how the principles of IEL can be drawn on to guide the 
greening of the Covenant. These principles are detailed in Chapter 4 and applied to article 
                                            




2(1) in Chapters 5 and 6. The dissertation demonstrates how the Committee can use these 
principles to contribute to a systematic integration of environmental considerations within 
the interpretation of States’ Parties obligations under article 2(1). As noted above, principles 
are inherently flexible and therefore particularly useful in relation to the diverse context-
specific problems faced by States Parties to the Covenant.11 Reliance on these principles 
also promotes harmonisation in international law, bridging the gap between IEL and 
international human rights law. The quality and effectiveness of the Committee’s 
recommendations in relation to ESCRs and the environment would be significantly 
strengthened by building synergies between the Committee’s existing doctrine and the 
principles of IEL. 
The obligation on States Parties to use the maximum of available resources is examined 
in detail in Chapter 5. The second contribution to highlight here concerns the greening of 
this concept through a qualitative approach to resources.12 The Committee has placed a 
substantial emphasis on the use of financial resources for the realisation of ESCRs, and 
rightly so. 13  However, a number of other resource categories are relevant, and often 
essential, for the implementation of the Covenant. These include legislative, administrative, 
educational, cultural, scientific and human resources.14 In response to this narrow approach 
that focuses almost exclusively on financial resources and their availability, 15  Skogly 
proposed a qualitative approach to resources that considers the variety of resource types 
available to States Parties as well as the related means of implementation. 16 Skogly’s 
qualitative approach involves considering the relevance of non-financial resources, as well 
as the quality and effectiveness of these resources in realising ESCRs.17 This dissertation 
builds on this qualitative approach to emphasise the inherent value of natural resources.  
                                            
11 See Chapter 4, 4 2 and 4 4. 
12 See Chapter 5, 5 3 1, 5 3 2 2 & 5 6 1 above in relation to a qualitative view of resources. 
13 R Uprimny, SC Hernández & AC Araújo “Bridging the Gap: The Evolving Doctrine on ESCR and ‘Maximum 
Available Resources’” in K Young (ed) The Future of Economic and Social Rights (2019) 624 629 & 639; S 
Skogly “The Requirement of Using the Maximum of Available Resources for Human Rights Realisation: A 
Question of Quality as Well as Quantity” (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 393 400-401 & 404. 
14 See Chapter 5, 5 3 1. See also RE Robertson “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote 
the Maximum Available Resources to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (1994) 16 Human 
Rights Quarterly 693 695-697; Skogly (2012) Human Rights Law Review 404-413. With respect to the 
Committee’s reference to non-financial resources see, for example, CESCR General Comment No 3 para 7; 
CESCR General Comment No 18: The Right to Work (Art 6 of the Covenant) (6 February 2006) E/C12/GC/18 
para 22; General Comment No 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art 15, Para 1(a) of the 
Covenant) (21 December 2009) E/C12/GC/21 para 48; CESCR General Comment No 23: The Right to Just 
and Favourable Conditions of Work (Article 7 of the Covenant) (7 April 2016) E/C12/GC/23 para 50; CESCR 
General Comment No 24: State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Context of Business Activities (10 August 2017) E/C12/GC/24 para 14. 






Natural resources, and the state of the environment generally, are vital underlying 
determinants of ESCRs. This dissertation therefore highlights that the inherent quality of the 
environment and natural resources is an available resource that States Parties must take 
advantage of, or “maximise”.18 These resources must be considered in light of their inherent 
qualities and contributions to the enjoyment of ESCRs, outside of their commodification or 
any revenue that might be gained from their exploitation. In taking measures to realise 
ESCRs, States Parties must therefore take into account any potential impacts on natural 
resources and the environment that might have a detrimental impact on the ability of these 
resources to support the realisation of Covenant rights. 19 This approach also requires 
protecting the inherent quality of the environment that supports ESCRs, and devoting 
resources to necessary environmental protection. This dissertation demonstrates that the 
appropriate application of principles of IEL provides significant guidance in relation to such 
environmental protection. 
The application of Skogly’s qualitative approach to the environment and natural resources 
provides a new approach to the contribution of these resources for the realisation of ESCRs. 
If properly applied by the Committee and States Parties, this qualitative approach would 
ensure that the value of the environment and natural resources in the realisation of ESCRs 
is actively considered rather than being disregarded or obscured by the overwhelming focus 
on financial resources.  
The third significant contribution that will be highlighted here is the recognition of the 
environmental dimensions of core obligations. 20  This dissertation proposes that States 
Parties determine the minimum environmental conditions that are a necessary prerequisite 
for meeting their core obligations. Once identified, this provides a framework for prioritising 
environmental protection and preventative measures. These baseline environmental 
conditions, and related obligations, should be protected with the priority and urgency 
afforded to core obligations. 
Finally, the obligation of progressive realisation demands the consistent advancement of 
ESCRs up to the point of “full realization”.21 This dissertation has argued for an interpretation 
of this end goal of progressive realisation in light of relevant environmental limits.22 An 
understanding of these environmental limits is crucial for defining the scope of full realisation 
                                            
18 See Chapter 5, 5 5 2 on maximising the inherent value of the environment and natural resources. 
19 See Chapter 5, 5 4 2 4 with regard to the conduct of impact assessments. 
20 See Chapter 6, 6 2 2 on the proposed minimum baseline environmental conditions. 
21 ICESCR, article 2(1). 




under the Covenant and therefore for defining the scope of States Parties’ obligations. The 
Covenant cannot guarantee a level of attainment beyond what the boundaries of our 
environment will allow. 
Borrowing from Raworth’s image of a doughnut with “the safe and just space for 
humanity” located between the social foundation and the ecological ceiling, 23  the 
dissertation proposes that the environmental dimension of core obligations be considered 
the ecological floor of ESCRs, and that the full realisation of ESCRs be defined according 
to the planet’s ecological ceiling. The progressive realisation of ESCRs therefore requires 
States Parties to move progressively from the baseline of core obligations towards the full 
realisation of ESCRs as defined by planetary boundaries and relevant environmental limits. 
The recognition of the ecological floor of ESCRs requires States Parties to prioritise all 
measures necessary to secure these minimum environmental conditions with the utmost 
urgency. Similarly, the recognition that the full realisation of ESCRs is defined according to 
an ecological ceiling requires States Parties to protect the environment wherever possible 
in order to prevent any adjustment or lowering of this ceiling of full realisation as a result of 
environmental degradation. Ensuring that everyone is able to enjoy ESCRs within this safe 
and just space for humanity will also require prioritising the needs of the most marginalised 
and disadvantaged, often necessitating the redistribution of resources from those who have 
a surplus. 
The abovementioned contributions of this dissertation are wholly consistent with a 
teleological interpretation of the Covenant that responds to present-day conditions and is 
effective in the practical realisation ESCRs for individual rights-holders. Greening article 2(1) 
as proposed here will allow for the systematic integration of environmental considerations 
within the Covenant, thereby contributing to the protection of the environment for the sake 
of the enjoyment of ESCRs and ensuring that ESCRs can continue to be realised for present 
and future generations. 
8 4 Possibilities for future research 
As recognised in Chapter 1, the scope of this dissertation has been limited to specific 
considerations regarding greening key concepts of article 2(1) of the Covenant through 
interpretation.24 Through the course of this research, however, a number of possibilities for 
future research have been identified. These are outlined below. 
                                            
23 Raworth Doughnut Economics 44-45. 




The notion of an environmental baseline or minimum environmental conditions as devised 
above requires additional investigation. 25  In particular, the establishment of such an 
ecological floor requires significant interdisciplinary research in order to determine the scope 
and content of the minimum environmental conditions that would be necessary to secure 
States Parties’ ability to meet their core obligations. This may need to be done on a national, 
regional and international level so as to account for various context-specific needs and 
environments while also incorporating global environmental conditions. The notion of an 
environmental baseline for the core of ESCRs is only useful if the necessary work is done 
to identify its content and scope in various contexts. Of course, any recognition of the 
environmental dimensions of core obligations also requires research and clarification on the 
scope and content of core obligations themselves. Similarly, interpreting the ceiling of the 
full realisation of ESCRs in accordance with environmental constraints requires 
interdisciplinary research to determine the relevant boundaries and thresholds of the 
environment, and to then apply those limits to the scope and content of the ESCRs 
guaranteed under the Covenant.26 
The integration of environmental considerations within individual ESCRs was not within 
the scope of this dissertation. However, this remains an important area for future research. 
The environmental dimensions of States Parties’ obligations under individual Covenant 
rights need to be investigated and defined. The principles of IEL relied on in this dissertation 
could provide guidance on the interpretation of ESCRs. In particular, the interpretation of 
article 11(1) should be examined in light of the environmental limits to ESCRs recognised in 
this dissertation, especially given the right to “the continuous improvement of living 
conditions”. An appropriate interpretation of article 11 may require an investigation of how 
this right could be justifiably limited under article 4 in order to guarantee all ESCRs without 
exceeding planetary boundaries. 
In addition to investigating specific ESCRs and environmental considerations, further 
research is necessary in relation to monitoring the environmental dimensions of ESCRs. It 
may be necessary to establish specific indicators, targets and benchmarks. Existing 
instruments such as the Sustainable Development Goals may be useful in this regard.27 
                                            
25 See 8 3 above as well as Chapter 6, 6 2 2. 
26 See 8 3 above and Chapter 6, 6 3 4 on the interpretation of “full realization” in article 2(1). 
27 See, for example, C Golay “ESCR and SDGs: Practical Manual on the Role of United Nations Human Rights 
Mechanisms in Monitoring the Sustainable Development Goals that Seek to Realize Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights” (June 2020) The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
<https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/ESCR%20and%20SDGs%20-




As noted in Chapter 6, the Committee makes reference to the notion of “sustainability” in 
a variety of contexts, often unrelated to the environment.28 It is therefore necessary to 
establish a definition of sustainability in the context of the Covenant. This would promote 
clarity and consistency in the work of the Committee, thereby providing clearer guidance for 
States Parties on the nature and scope of their obligations under the Covenant. Establishing 
a definition of sustainability that includes environmental concerns would further promote the 
greening of the Covenant. 
Although the integration of environmental considerations within article 2(1) has 
implications for the Covenant as a whole, there are a number of groups that require particular 
attention. Certain groups and categories of individuals are at a much greater risk of harm in 
relation to environmental degradation, and climate change in particular. It is therefore 
important to conduct dedicated research on the position of, for example, indigenous peoples, 
women, children, the poor, peasants and other people working in rural areas as well as 
those in vulnerable geographical locations, including small island developing states and, 
more broadly, climate refugees. Such research should investigate the extent of current and 
potential future impacts on the ESCRs of these groups as well as the scope of States Parties’ 
obligations in this regard. 
This dissertation has identified a number of extraterritorial obligations of States Parties 
as well as obligations of international assistance and cooperation.29 Further research is 
required to examine the precise extent of States Parties’ extraterritorial obligations under 
the Covenant, particularly as they relate to climate change and environmental harm. In 
addition, the nature and scope of international cooperation and assistance must be 
investigated in the context of the global nature of many environmental challenges, and 
climate change in particular. Clear obligations regarding international assistance and 
cooperation for climate change mitigation and adaptation need to be determined. In addition, 
a framework or set of guiding principles is needed for the allocation of responsibility for 
climate change and extraterritorial environmental harm, as well as for the prioritisation of 
assistance for states where such harm has occurred. This once again requires 
interdisciplinary research that investigates the degrees of responsibility for global or 
extraterritorial environmental harm of States Parties as well as relative degrees of impact on 
human rights that demand assistance. 
                                            
28 See Chapter 6, 6 3 2 and 6 3 3 1 in relation to the Committee’s use of the term “sustainability”. 





The position of future generations has been considered in Chapter 6. Further research is 
required in order to determine the nature of the rights of future generations under the 
Covenant as well as the scope of related States Parties’ obligations. In addition to this, 
research is required in order to determine how best to resolve conflicts between the rights 
of present and future generations.30 
More broadly, further research is also necessary with regard to the relationship between 
the Covenant and IEL. As demonstrated by the reliance on principles of IEL in this 
dissertation, there are numerous opportunities for harmonisation and synergies between 
environmental law and human rights law, and the Covenant in particular.31 For example, 
additional principles and mechanisms of IEL not addressed here may be significant sources 
of guidance for the implementation of the Covenant or the interpretation of ESCRs. 32 
Similarly, in the context of the United Nations it is recommended that possibilities for 
collaboration between the Committee and the UN Environment Programme be investigated 
in order to promote harmonisation and coordination between ESCRs and IEL.33  
8 5 Concluding remarks 
As this dissertation has demonstrated, effective realisation of ESCRs under the Covenant 
requires States Parties’ obligations to be interpreted so as to integrate relevant 
environmental considerations. States Parties cannot comply with their Covenant obligations 
without taking into account the numerous threats to ESCRs posed by, for example, 
biodiversity loss, air and water pollution, deforestation, land degradation, ocean acidification, 
and extreme weather events including droughts, heat waves and floods.34 These threats 
have a disproportionately negative impact on the rights of those who are already 
marginalised and disadvantaged. 
                                            
30 Some preliminary recommendations are made in this regard in Chapter 6, 6 3 3 2 3. 
31 On the relationship between the Covenant and IEL, see S Chuffart & JE Viñuales “From the Other Shore: 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from an International Environmental Law Perspective” in Riedel E, G 
Giacca & C Golay (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and 
Challenges (2014) 286 286-307.  
32 See, for example, the work of Elisa Morgera in relation to human rights and the principle of fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing. See E Morgera “Under the radar: the role of fair and equitable benefit-sharing in protecting 
and realising human rights connected to natural resources” (2019) 23 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 1098 1098-1139; E Morgera “Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing” in L Krämer & E Orlando (eds) 
Principles of Environmental Law (2018) 323 323-337. 
33 See, for example, the memorandum of understanding concluded between UNEP and the OHCHR in 2019 
in relation to such collaborative work. See UNEP & OHCHR “Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Cooperation between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)” UN Environment Programme (16 August 2019) 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/29758/MoU_UNEP_OHCHR.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y> (accessed 05-11-2020). 




Protecting ESCRs therefore requires environmental protection and the imposition of 
environment-related obligations on States Parties. The interpretation of States Parties’ 
obligations proposed in this dissertation systematically integrates environmental 
considerations with reference to established principles of IEL. In this way the dissertation 
contributes to the critical project of greening the Covenant. Such a project is indispensable 
for ensuring that present and future generations are able to enjoy sustainable access to 
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